Who’s in Charge? Air C2 and Close Air Support in Afghanistan (3/3)

C2 structure in Afghanistan - final part.

Over the previous articles, we’ve broken down how Close Air Support missions are tasked in real time, and introduced the various actors —JTACs, TOCs, ASOCs, CRCs, AWACS, and aircrews. Now, we can look into real combat missions and start thinking about how we can replicate it in DCS World missions?

5. War Stories and Lessons Learned

Operation Anaconda, that I already introduced several times before, was conducted in March 2002 in Afghanistan's Shah-i-Kot Valley, and can serves as a case study. It was one of the first major joint operations during OEF, aiming to eliminate al-Qaeda and Taliban forces entrenched in the valley. However, the operation exposed significant flaws in CAS coordination and C2 structures, offering important lessons for future engagements.

5.1 Area Description

The Shah-i-Kot Valley is a main valley close to the Pakistani border and away from major roads. Intelligence had identified a substantial enemy presence, including a large number of Al Qaeda fighters, leading to a plan to insert U.S. and coalition forces to encircle and neutralize them. The operation involved conventional forces from the 10th Mountain Division and 101st Airborne Division, supported by Special Operations Forces (SOF) and Afghan military forces.

Shah-i-Kot Valley as described in the attached presentation.

However, the rapid transition from SOF-led missions to conventional operations outpaced the establishment of robust C2 structures. The Air Support Operations Center (ASOC), critical for managing CAS requests and airspace deconfliction, was notably absent at this time.

5.2 Effects of the Lack of Command and Control

The absence of ASOC meant that CAS requests had to be routed directly through the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) located in Saudi Arabia. This huge distance introduced delays and communication breakdowns. The lack of a unified airspace control plan also further complicated matters, leading to congested airspace and increased risk of fratricide.

In this after-action report, these issues were clearly highlighted:

" To make things even more challenging, the comms were a mess. AWACS had nothing really to tell us, we didn’t have an ASOC to talk to and there was nobody to give us an area of operations update, which as a CAS guy I would have expected. Nobody was on any of the frequencies we had been given. We went back to the AWACS and requested another ‘freq’ to try. We had a sheet that probably had a hundred on it, but the list didn’t have who was assigned to any of them — it just had lots of tactical air direction [TAD] numbers. We decided to try them all, so between the two of us we just flipped through the frequencies.

Eventually, we got onto a frequency where there were three different guys screaming for CAS. No-one had priority, as there was no ASOC to determine who needed CAS. I had to make that decision, working out who to support first. I started talking to the guy who was screaming the loudest — that was the best I could do. "
— Capt. Scott Campbell, A-10 pilot

The congested airspace, combined with limited situational awareness, forced pilots like Capt. Campbell to assume roles beyond their training, acting as de facto Forward Air Controllers (Airborne) to coordinate strikes and manage airspace.

Joint Terminal Attack Controllers (JTACs) on the ground faced immense challenges. With limited communication infrastructure and the absence of an ASOC, JTACs struggled to relay CAS requests effectively. The burden of airspace management and target coordination often fell on pilots in the air.

The operation saw extensive use of air assets, including A-10s, F-15Es, AC-130 gunships, and attack helicopters. However, the lack of coordinated airspace management led to dangerous situations. In one instance, an A-10 pilot narrowly avoided collisions with multiple aircraft and even falling bombs.

" As we are climbing back up into our orbit over the valley, ‘Spartan’ [a British AWACS] called to tell us that a B-52 strike was inbound with a TST [time-sensitive target] mission assigned by the CAOC. I raised the ‘BUFF’ — callsign was ‘Cujo’ — on the radio and got him to pass us his target, run-in heading and angels. He was 10 minutes out, ready to lay down a string of 2,000lb JDAMs [Joint Direct Attack Munitions]. Lt Col Kostelnik and I plotted out his run with grease pencils onto our maps. His target was one ‘click’ south of the troops we had just been supporting, and his bomb fall line was going to run right through the orbit of an AC-130 gunship that was flying beneath us — I didn’t think the Spectre’s crew would be too happy with that! I immediately called the bomber off, gave him a new run-in heading and moved the gunship south so that the B-52 was clear to make the strike. "

A B-52 refueling over Afghanistan.

Despite these challenges, the adaptability and professionalism of aircrews were instrumental in the operation's eventual success.

5.3 Lessons Learned

Operation Anaconda underscored the critical importance of integrated C2 structures in joint operations. Some of the key takeaways included:

• Establishing an ASOC: the absence of an ASOC at the operation's onset led to significant coordination issues. In future operations a permanent ASOC was created in order to manage CAS effectively.

• Unified airspace management: a coherent airspace control plan is essential to prevent congestion and ensure the safety of air operations. It has been discussed previously in the ACO description.

• Enhanced communication means: reliable and redundant communication channels are vital for timely CAS requests and coordination between ground and air units. The use of computer "chat" linking all the C2 actors, instead of a succession of point to point radio or phone networks, became a real game changer.

6. Trying to Replicate a C2 Structure in DCS World

If you’ve made it this far, you now understand how fragile the real Close Air Support (CAS) process can be. From JTARs and airspace deconfliction to unreachable CRCs and overloaded ASOC, Afghanistan proved that CAS is as much about coordination as it is about firepower.

So the question for us, DCS World mission designers becomes: can we simulate this in a way that adds immersion without overwhelming my players? I believe that the answer is not to try to duplicate every echenlonr, but rather to try borrow some the structure, add friction, and some decision making, that make CAS feel earned.

6.1 Simulating the Ground C2 Chain: JTAC, TOC, and ASOC

You can simulate this with:

• A JTAR describing the tactical situation for pre-planned CAS missions

• An additional layer of coordination between the player and the JTAC, with a simulated TOCs, such as:

  • Widow TOC (used by British forces in Helmand)

  • Slayer TOC (used by Canadian forces in Kandahar)

The role of the TOC will be to pass an overview of the situation on the ground, let you know the ground commander's priorities, and send you to one of the JTACs in the area.

For those with good scripting skills, it might very be interesting to try represent the ASOC as a script that would spawn enemy units close to existing friendly JTACs, and in a multiplayer environment task the most suitable asset depending on proximity, fuel and weapon status.

6.2 Integrating Real CRCs

In real life, CRC (Control and Reporting Centers) are responsible for airspace management within their Battle Management Areas (BMAs). Aircraft not in contact with ATC (Bagram, kandahar, etc...) had to report to CRCs.

In the previous article, you had a detailed map of CRC callsigns and their respective responsibility areas.

You can try simulate this by:

• Assigning BMA sectors using map zones/triggers;

• Prepare a few simple radio messages to simulate CRC handoffs, and more detailed text messages to simulated detailed taskings;

• For even more realism, using CGRS grids for tasking is even better.

• Add "background chatter" on CRC frequencies to simulate comms with other assets in the air.

CGRS Grid as described in an earlier article (cf. link above).

If no CRC or AWACS is present (just like in Anaconda), make sure that deconfliction between assets is taken care of by someone, the JTAC normally, but by default one of the players has to be in charge of this responsibility — a great task for experienced players in multiplayer.

6.3 Simulating Communications and Friction

In real ops, most friction doesn’t come from lack of aircraft—it comes from communications: bad relays, unclear priorities, or broken chains. In DCS, you can replicate this with:

• Radio range limitations: you can simulate mountains and terrain masking by forcing aircraft to relay through another asset . Western Afghanistan (Farah or Herat regions) was notably very badly covered by radio, and it was not uncommon to have to travel back more than 150 Nm to get back in touch with the C2.

• Delays: the time between the moment an even occurs and an asset is actually tasked could be counted in minutes, and sometimes in tens of minutes. You can tell the player that an event like a TIC happened, and wait a few minutes before he's actually tasked to support it. In the same logic, ground operations have their own delays, and even with a legitimate target in sight, it was sometimes necessary to wait several minutes before being allowed to engage it through a 9-line.

• Re-taskings: even when in contact with a JTAC for a real support mission, if another more important event occurs, the player might be forced to switch to another area to support the ongoing action.

Obviously, the goal isn’t to make it over-complicated, but it’s to make players feel the urgency or scarcity that real CAS crews operate under.

Conclusion

This wraps up the core series of articles about the C2 structure in Afghanistan. Next I'll try to explore the FAC(A) mission during OEFn: how it was used, how it replaced JTACs when needed, and how it fits into DCS World.

Thank you!