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[1] Van Bavel, J., & Reher, D. S. (2013). The baby boom and its causes: What we know and what we need to know. Population and Development Review, 39(2), 257-288.  “The postwar baby boom was a temporary and relatively minor exception to the broader, larger, and more fundamental trend of declining birth rates, observed from the nineteenth century until the end of the twentieth. The temporary and exceptional character of the baby boom has often been related to the temporary and exceptional character of World War II. During the war, according to this account, marriages and births were postponed. The end of hostilities and the liberation of occupied countries produced a climate of gen- eral optimism related to national reconstruction. People were preparing for a new era of peace and economic growth. Their optimism spurred a resurgence in both marriage and fertility. In brief, the fertility recuperation hypothesis implies that births increased after the war because marriages and pregnancies were no longer being postponed (see, e.g., Hajnal 1947). The historical reality, however, is substantially more complex. While this hypothesis may explain the spike in fertility observed in many countries in 1946 and 1947, it cannot account for the fact that fertility was often already recovering before and during the war. Second, the recupera- tion hypothesis cannot account for the largest part of the baby boom, namely the high birth rates observed in the 1950s. Women giving birth in the 1950s and 1960s were often too young to have married during the war; many of them were not even born during the Great Depression (Easterlin 1987; Greenwood, Seshadri, and Vandenbroucke 2005; Doepke, Hazan, and Maoz 2007). Third, the recuperation hypothesis cannot explain the rise of cohort fertility observed in many countries (see Figure 2). There tends to be no peculiar peak in cohort fertility corresponding to the spike in period fertility just after the war, indicating that the latter represented merely a short-term recuperation rather than the beginning of prolonged trend. Changes in period fertility just prior to and during the war, by contrast, do seem to be good indicators of prolonged change, as indicated by the upward trend in cohort fertility” (p. 268-269)

[2] Van Bavel, J., & Reher, D. S. (2013). The baby boom and its causes: What we know and what we need to know. Population and Development Review, 39(2), 257-288.  “Evidence from the US suggests that this situation gave rise to widespread contraceptive failure during the baby boom. More specifically, using detailed survey data on contraceptive practice, Ryder (1978) demonstrated that contraceptive failure largely explained the rising share of high-parity births dur- ing the baby boom in the US. His data showed that there was no change in the number of intended births, but that there was a decline in the effectiveness with which unintended births were prevented. He posited two reasons for the worsening of fertility regulation during this period. First, there was increased exposure to the risk of unintended childbearing because the tempo of repro- duction accelerated. Second, as a result of the decline in the age at marriage, the additional exposure was concentrated in high-risk (“prime-time”) ages, when couples were younger, sexually more active, and in their peak years of fecundity (Ryder 1978, 1979). In short, “the sexual revolution ran ahead of […] the contraceptive revolution,” according to Caldwell (2004: 312), who concluded that “[f]rom this perspective, there is no great mystery about the baby boom” (ibid.). The young felt the need for early sexual relationships while at the same time nei- ther extramarital births nor unmarried cohabitation were tolerated. Earlier marriage was the solution, but the available contraceptive methods were not very efficient (Caldwell 2004; Caldwell and Ware 1973; Caldwell and Ruzicka 1978). Given the apparent increased “appetite for marriage” (Matthijs 2002), we expect that rising marital fertility may have been the unintended consequence of the fact that people were exposed to high risks of conception during an increased number of years. Couples had to wait until the advent of highly efficient hormonal contraceptives to be able to marry at a young age while being able to avoid unwanted conceptions; or, later on, being able to have sex outside marriage with an acceptably low risk of unwanted pregnancy.” (p. 278-279)

[3] Pool, I. (2007). The baby boom in New Zealand and other western developed countries. Journal of Population Research, 24(2), 141-161. “With due gravitas, on 1 January 2006 New Zealand’s news media announced: ‘The Baby Boomers have reached old age (60 years!!)’. This reinforced the fact that the Baby Boom still has a great deal of significance for us even today. That said, the image the media conjured up was one of a single, huge, but short-lasting population wave of grey-haired people, all demanding their pensions and instant hip-replacements at one moment, thereby creating the fiscal and social mayhem everyone had long feared, and doing so at an age five years below that at which they can take up the universal pension in New Zealand.” (p. 141)

[4] Pool, I. (2007). The baby boom in New Zealand and other western developed countries. Journal of Population Research, 24(2), 141-161. “So important has been the impending arrival of the Baby Boom at old age that already in the late 1980s New Zealand had justified its radical, neo-liberal restructuring on the future incapacity of the state to pay for the health and other needs of aged Baby Boomers. And most politicians argued that this wave would produce Dooms- day dependency ratios until mid-century and beyond, a claim even picked up by more serious media commentators (James 1991). Some of the more passionate advo- cates of restructuring even saw ageing in this sense as a population explosion starting immediately around 1990. At the same time they overlooked the Baby Blip, or echo to the Baby Boom as they call it in the United States, that was occurring around 1990, an event that in the media received the false appellation of a Baby Boom. In both New Zealand and Australia, and indeed across the Western Developed Countries (WDC)1 any sudden upsurge in birth numbers tends to get called a Baby Boom.” (p. 142)

[5] Pool, I. (2007). The baby boom in New Zealand and other western developed countries. Journal of Population Research, 24(2), 141-161. “The recognition of the significance of the Baby Boom does not stop with the media, politicians and the general public. The American demographer Philip Mor- gan in an article on the Baby Boom in the Encyclopedia of Population (2003) argued that ‘No twentieth-century demographic phenomenon in the developed countries has attracted greater attention than the “baby boom” - the sustained post-World War II fertility increases in many developed countries that produced large birth cohorts…’ It is important for my argument here that the phrase ‘large birth cohorts’ is stressed. But Morgan then went on to time-reference the advent of these large cohorts to the period ‘mid 1940s to the mid-1960s’, again a point of importance for my later argu- ment (Morgan 2003: 73). Notions about a singulate mega-wave that will wreak havoc on social policy sec- tors, and that was launched in the two decades 1940s to 1960s, are merely two of many inaccurate perceptions about the Baby Boom. Arguably, this is the most ana- lysed generation ever, yet it still constitutes the quintessential urban myth. Its quasi- mythological features are probably better known than its reality, not just among people like advertisers, pop-psychologists, journalists and Treasury economists, but even among demographers who really should know better.” (p. 142)

[6] Pool, I. (2007). The baby boom in New Zealand and other western developed countries. Journal of Population Research, 24(2), 141-161. “The salient points there are as follows. First, with the major exception of the United Kingdom, the English-speaking countries (ESCs) stand out as having much higher Baby Boom fertility than other groupings. The Netherlands stands out among other WDCs as being closest to the ESCs. If a rate of 3.0 or more for a protracted period is the criterion of a Baby Boom, then only the Netherlands and the neo-European ESCs would count. That said, Japan had a marked but very short ‘Baby Boom’, 1947-49, followed by a precipitous drop in crude birth rates, associated with the Eugenics Protection Law of 1948 (Muramatsu 1982). Secondly, the post-Baby Boom decreases are much more marked for the ESCs with the exception again of the United King- dom, than is the case for the other WDCs, except for the Netherlands and Spain. The United States and Australia did not reach the high Baby Boom levels of Canada and New Zealand in the period 1955-65; the United States had a rapid decrease while for Australia this was more modest. If one looks at period changes, then the Antipodean ESCs drew out their rate decline longer than did North America, where spectacular decreases had occurred before 1970. Finally, Ireland’s fertility trends were a function of a long-term trend towards the normalization of age-specific rates, and thus had nothing to do with a Baby Boom per se of the sort occurring elsewhere in the WDCs.” (p. 145)

[7] Pool, I. (2007). The baby boom in New Zealand and other western developed countries. Journal of Population Research, 24(2), 141-161. “In order to look at the effects of using ratios rather than rates we can cite the absolute index, the ETFR. At the peak of the Baby Boom, ETFRs were much higher in the neo-Europes than was the case in Europe or Japan: at 1.3 live births per young woman, Australia was the lowest-rating neo-Europe; the rates were 1.5 for Canada, 1.6 for New Zealand and 1.7 for United States. The ASFRs below 25 years at the height of the Baby Boom in New Zealand and the United States actually exceeded the TFR seen in some European countries today. The closest European countries were Austria and Denmark at 1.1, and the rest varied between 0.6 and 0.9. In contrast, by 1980 the ETFR in the neo-Europes had dropped off far more rap- idly than it had in the European countries, so that by that date most WDCs, European or neo-European, fell into a narrow range between 0.6 and 0.7. The United States and Spain were at 0.8 (but by 1986 Spain had plummeted to 0.4), and New Zealand was a little higher than this 0.6-0.7 at 0.9. Below the norm were Germany and the Nether- lands at 0.4, and France at 0.5.” (p. 150)

[8] Pool, I. (2007). The baby boom in New Zealand and other western developed countries. Journal of Population Research, 24(2), 141-161. “If one looks at longer-term trends in fertility rates (Pool et al. 2007) it becomes evident that the Baby Boom was an aberrant period, as Paul Demeny (2005) and Jacques Val- lin (2002) have both argued.” (p. 156)

Pool, I. (2007). The baby boom in New Zealand and other western developed countries. Journal of Population Research, 24(2), 141-161. “Many commentators on family life, particularly those favouring so-called ‘family values’, see the Baby Boom as one in which these patterns reached their zenith, and the large families of the day as the outcome of family life that was functional and caring, and satisfacto- rily performed its obligations to the society: reproduction, socialization and social cohesion. Many aspects of family life since then, and particularly some of its more manifest forms such as divorce and cohabitation, are seen as linked to social disorder and dysfunction. The family is often seen as breaking down, and with it the entire society (Patricia Morgan 2004). This involves wider issues beyond the scope of the present paper (see Pool et al. 2007). But certainly the narrower demographic parameters show that the Baby Boom was a departure from long-term trends.” (p. 156)

[9] Pool, I. (2007). The baby boom in New Zealand and other western developed countries. Journal of Population Research, 24(2), 141-161. “What also seems to have emerged from this analysis is that the Baby Boom went through three waves, not the one wave that seems to be the perceived model in the media, although not all countries necessarily passed through all phases. There was a first phase that, using Second World War terminology, could be called the ‘phoney’ Baby Boom. It started sometimes in the early 1940s and certainly immediately after World War II. But its drivers were different to a degree from what were to become the trademarks of the Baby Boom properly speaking: many couples marrying and child-bearing in the ‘phoney Baby Boom’ were at higher ages, and there was a catch-up of postponed marriage and delayed parenting. The main part of the Baby Boom started a year or two later, 1947 or 1948 in New Zealand. This was the prototypical period of increasing TFRs almost everywhere, and larger and larger birth cohort sizes in most countries. But in most countries ear- lier and earlier marriage and childbearing marked this second phase. A third phase seems to have got under way in the 1960s. For those countries that entered fully into this stage, TFRs decreased but, importantly, birth cohort sizes remained high and even peaked, while early marriage and family formation intensified and birth intervals declined in duration. Strangely enough the United States, the poster-child for the Baby Boom, did not participate in this except for the FER. Moreo- ver, its peak TFR was high, but not as high as those of Canada and New Zealand. It fell 0.6 of a birth below New Zealand. But even after the Baby Boom had closed off in those countries that engaged enthusiastically in the third phase, and indeed in some others, there was a whiplash effect into the 1980s. Reproduction continued to be concentrated at earlier ages until such time as the new regime of delayed childbearing started to get under way. From the evidence I have presented it is not clear that all countries actually had Baby Booms in the full sense of early childbearing and close spacing, high TFRs and inflated annual number of births.” (p. 156-157)

[10] Pool, I. (2007). The baby boom in New Zealand and other western developed countries. Journal of Population Research, 24(2), 141-161. “But the intangibles are perhaps more important. The Baby Boomers’ own commentators cite things such as attitudes, values and a radical new approach to social institutions. But it is rather more that in the great debates over social change it is not the Baby Boomers who are seen as shaping value-systems, but the whole social ambi- ence of that time as it was played out by the parents of the Baby Boom, the ‘Golden age’: easier access to housing, a universalistic social security system in New Zealand, a more equal spread of incomes, a value system which may have been paternalistic and patriarchal but was also highly pronatalist. In fact the somewhat higher fertility seen in New Zealand and the United States today may even be due to nostalgia for this era, and the social ambience that accompanied it. Such a retrospective effect (what are called the effects due to ‘social apprenticeship’ in fertility regimes of differ- ent sorts) has been reported in a rigorous, multilevel, multiregional, statistical analy- sis across Western Europe by Testa and Grilli (2006). Their conclusion is that the most important determinant of differentials in ideal family sizes for cohorts currently at reproductive ages is the reproductive rate of the generation immediately ahead of them…This analysis of the Baby Boom then raises a very important set of related epistemological questions. Why in a subject that reifies statistical empiricism have we allowed ourselves to see one and only one defining model? What is the source of this model? It seems to be the United States. This in turn leads to a wider epistemological problem. In demography, in most social sciences in fact, the conventional wisdom tends to be formulated in America, based around American experiences that may not have general application, and then to flow out from there to the rest of the world.” (p. 158)

[11] Colby, S. L., & Ortman, J. M. (2014). The baby boom cohort in the United States: 2012 to 2060 (Current Population Reports No. P25-1141). U.S. Census Bureau. “The term “baby boomer” refers to individuals born in the United States between mid-1946 and mid-1964 (Hogan, Perez, and Bell, 2008). Distinctions between the baby boom cohort and birth cohorts from preceding and subse- quent years become apparent when fertility measures are framed within a historical context. The baby boom in the United States was marked by a substantial rise in birth rates post-World War II. Two features of the baby boom differentiate this increase from those previously experienced: the size of the birth cohort and the length of time for which these higher levels of fertility were sustained.” (p. 2)

[12] Colby, S. L., & Ortman, J. M. (2014). The baby boom cohort in the United States: 2012 to 2060 (Current Population Reports No. P25-1141). U.S. Census Bureau. “During the post-World War II baby boom, the United States experienced 18 years of elevated fertility rates, with rates remaining above the pre- boom levels until 1964. Although the fertility rates observed during the baby boom were not the highest ever seen in the United States, the num- ber of births during those years was unprecedented. The National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) recorded 2.9 million births in 1945, which increased by almost 20 per- cent to 3.4 million births in 1946 (NCHS 2005). Births continued to increase through the rest of the 1940s and into the 1950s, reaching a peak of 4.3 million in 1957. By 1965, the baby boom had ended, and births fell below the 4 million mark-a level not exceeded again until 1989, when baby boomers were having children of their own.” (p. 2)

[13] Colby, S. L., & Ortman, J. M. (2014). The baby boom cohort in the United States: 2012 to 2060 (Current Population Reports No. P25-1141). U.S. Census Bureau. “In 1946, there were approximately 2.4 million baby boomers. By 1964, the last year of the baby boom, that figure had reached just shy of 72.5 million. The size of the population born during the baby boom years continued to increase between 1965 and 1999, peaking at 78.8 million in 1999. Increases to this population occurring after 1964 are explained by immigration into the United States of individuals born between 1946 and 1964. The baby boom population has been decreasing since 1999, and the decline is projected to continue through 2060 as the baby boom population enters the older ages and succumbs to the forces of mortality. When the first baby boomers turned 65 in 2011, there were just under 77 million people in this population. By 2030, when the baby boomers will be between 66 and 84 years old, that number is projected to drop to 60 million and decrease further by 2060 to only 2.4 million.” (p.2)

[14] Colby, S. L., & Ortman, J. M. (2014). The baby boom cohort in the United States: 2012 to 2060 (Current Population Reports No. P25-1141). U.S. Census Bureau. “Population estimates and projections produced by the Census Bureau do not distinguish between foreign-born and native-born residents, meaning that the esti- mated population in any given year includes both those born in the United States between 1946 and 1964 and those born elsewhere during this period. Figure 3 uses decennial census data from 1950 to 2010 to classify the population born between 1946 and 1964 by nativity status. Distinct differences are observed in the pattern of change for the two groups. The native-born population in this age range peaked in the 1970 Census, reflecting the end of the baby boom period in 1964. The population declined thereafter as the baby boomers exited the population through death and international migration. In contrast, the foreign- born population in the same age categories as the baby boomers increased through 2010, account- ing for the growth through 1999 for the total population in the baby boom ages that is shown in Figure 2.” (p. 2-5) (2 pages of graphs inbetween)

[15] Colby, S. L., & Ortman, J. M. (2014). The baby boom cohort in the United States: 2012 to 2060 (Current Population Reports No. P25-1141). U.S. Census Bureau. “A comparison of the population pyra- mid from 1945, 1 year prior to the onset of the baby boom, and 1965, 1 year after the baby boom ended, begins to reveal the unprecedented effect that this birth cohort had on the age composition of the U.S. population. In the period from 1946 to 1964, consistently large birth cohorts contributed to a dra- matic increase in the youth popula- tion. During the baby boom, the average number of annual births was just under 4 million. In com- parison, there was an average of 2.6 million births per year in the 19-year period prior to the start of the baby boom. The expansion of the youth population is clearly visible in the bulge that forms at the base of the population pyramid for 1965. The large size of the baby boom cohort relative to those cohorts that preceded and those that followed becomes increasingly apparent in the 1990 population pyramid. By this time, all of the baby boom cohort had entered into adulthood, and the bulge associated with the baby boomers is now visible in the ages 26 to 44. During the years immediately following the baby boom, 1965 through 1974, the average number of annual births dropped to 3.5 million, still nearly 1 million births per year higher than the period before the boom. This decrease is visible in the nar- rowing of the pyramid in the ages 16 through 25. However, only a decade after the last of the baby boom cohort was born, the oldest of the baby boomers began having children of their own and a steady rise in birth cohorts ensued.” (p. 5-6)

[17] Colby, S. L., & Ortman, J. M. (2014). The baby boom cohort in the United States: 2012 to 2060 (Current Population Reports No. P25-1141). U.S. Census Bureau. “Trends in the old-age dependency ratio are also driven in large part by the aging of the baby boom cohort. Between 1945 and 2010, the old- age dependency ratio increased gradually from 12 older-age adults for every 100 working-age adults in 1945 to almost 21 older-age adults for every 100 in the working ages in 2010. This increase reflects increased longevity for the older population. Much larger increases are projected for the old-age dependency ratio in the coming years as the baby boomers begin to enter the older ages. By 2030, when all of the baby boomers will be 65 or older, the old-age dependency ratio is projected to reach almost 35, an increase of 14 older residents for every 100 working-age adults. In 2035, the difference between old- age dependency and youth dependency will be less than 2. Old-age dependency is projected to surpass youth dependency in 2056 and is projected to remain just below 40 through 2060.” (p. 9)

[18] Colby, S. L., & Ortman, J. M. (2014). The baby boom cohort in the United States: 2012 to 2060 (Current Population Reports No. P25-1141). U.S. Census Bureau. “The race and ethnic composition of the baby boom population reflects the composition of the U.S. popu- lation during the mid-twentieth century-the years when these cohorts were born. Between 1940 and 1960, just under 90 percent of the total U.S. population was White (Gibson and Jung, 2002). Since then, the nation’s population has become increasingly diverse through increases in immigration and minority births, resulting in differences between the racial and ethnic composition of the baby boom population and the total population of the United States. Table 1 provides the numeric and percentage distribution of both the baby boom cohort and the total population by race and Hispanic origin.5 In 2012, an overwhelming majority, 72 percent, of people in the baby boom ages were non- Hispanic White alone, compared with 63 percent of the total popula- tion. Although little change is projected for the percentage distribu- tion of the baby boom population the racial and ethnic composition of the two populations is expected to diverge in the years to come, as the younger population becomes increasingly diverse. The percent- age of the total population that is non-Hispanic White alone is projected to decrease between 2012 and 2060, dropping to 55 percent by 2030 and 43 percent by 2060.” (p. 10)

[19] Colby, S. L., & Ortman, J. M. (2014). The baby boom cohort in the United States: 2012 to 2060 (Current Population Reports No. P25-1141). U.S. Census Bureau. “Despite this decline in the number of baby boomers, this cohort will continue to play an important role in shaping two important aspects of the demographic landscape of the nation: its racial and ethnic composition and its age structure. An overwhelming majority of baby boomers are non-Hispanic White alone and, as this cohort reaches the oldest ages, their projected declines due to mortality will con- tribute to projected decreases in the percentage of the population in the non-Hispanic White alone category. This pattern, coupled with increases in immigration and births to minority populations, is projected to produce an increasingly diverse population in the years to come. Aging of the baby boomers is also projected to shift the age structure of the total U.S. population. By 2030, when all of the baby boom cohort will be 65 or older, 1 in 5 Americans is projected to be 65 or older. A larger population in the oldest ages relative to the working- age population will increase old-age dependency and is likely to pres- ent challenges to the government, families, and businesses as they attempt to meet the needs of the growing older population. DATA SOURCE AND METHODOLOGY This report uses estimates of the total U.S. population for July 1 for the years 1945 to 2012 and projections of the total U.S. population as of July 1 for the years 2013 to 2060.” (p.12)

[20] Bouk, D. (2018). Generation crisis: How population research defined the baby boomers. Modern American History, 1(3), 321-342. https://doi.org/10.1017/mah.2018.31“In 2007, the Social Security Administration (SSA) alerted the national media that the“nation’ s first Baby Boomer” (Kathleen Casey-Kirschling,“born on January 1, 1946, at 12:00:01”) would soon be applying for Social Security retirement benefits. SSA intended the press release to advertise online applications for benefits.1 But ABC’s website gave the story an unwelcome slant. It wrote:“Trouble is, 80 million others are right behind her. Casey-Kirschling is the rain- drop that’s about to become a tidal wave.”2 That wave would-the story suggested-soon crash upon and maybe drown the nation’s social insurance programs. But before Casey-Kirschling could become a harbinger of welfare-state woes, she had to become a baby boomer. And well before anyone could become a baby boomer, a newly influential breed of expert had to invent the baby boom, binding it to a narrative of crisis. And even before that, such experts had to foresee the advent of a“mature” American nation, one characterized by slowed population growth and the possibility of longer, better lives through social planning-a vision for the future threatened by the welling“ wave ” (or even more often, the “bulge”) of babies.” (p. 321)

[21] Bouk, D. (2018). Generation crisis: How population research defined the baby boomers. Modern American History, 1(3), 321-342. https://doi.org/10.1017/mah.2018.31“Population researchers in the years leading up to the Great Depression approached a consensus that the United States had undergone a fundamental demographic shift. In 1928, Pascal K. Whelpton declared to readers of the American Journal of Sociology that the“years of mush- room growth which have been characteristic of the United States in the last century seem to be definitely numbered.” Whelpton worked at the Scripps Foundation for Population Problems, an institute for population research supported by private funds on the campus of Miami University, a small public university in the town of Oxford, Ohio. Whelpton was a one-time agricultural economist who became the nation’s leading population forecaster. In years to come he would serve as director of the United Nations’s Population Division and pioneer new survey methods for understanding American fertility.” (p. 324)

[22] Bouk, D. (2018). Generation crisis: How population research defined the baby boomers. Modern American History, 1(3), 321-342. https://doi.org/10.1017/mah.2018.31“Whelpton’s forecasts called forth an America that would by 1975 grow at only a small rate or even decline in size. He used a projection method that began with the existing age structure of a population and applied assumed rates of fertility and mortality for the future. Like his peers, Whelpton assumed decreasing fertility. His methods tracked closely those employed by two life insurance men-Louis Dublin and Alfred Lotka of Metropolitan Life-who took an existing tool for risk making, the“life table,” and adapted it to consider not only mortality rates at each age, but also fertility rates. Using this tool, Dublin had in 1926 concluded for Atlantic Monthly: “The time of rapid multiplication of our population has been left behind for good.”...Whelpton and likeminded scholars of American population maturity were among the first professionals shaping the infant“interdiscipline” of demography. As Emily R. Merchant has explained, population researchers did not coalesce around academic departments, but rather worked in disparate institutional spaces: insurance offices, state bureaucracies, and foundation- funded research centers (like Scripps); here was another example of the sort of structure that Joel Isaac has called the“interstitial academy.” Demography came bound up in politics, argues Merchant, owing its institutional and financial support as well as its relevance to controversies in the 1920s and 1930s over birth control, immigration restriction, eugenics, and the construction of the welfare state. By the late 1930s, the interdiscipline had made maturity a key concept. Alan Brinkley and other historians have emphasized how talk of economic “maturity” drove advocacy for state- centered Keynesian economic planning and intervention in the late 1930s. Population maturity (an intentionally ambiguous concept evoking an aging population and the end of the country’s youthful period of growth) was economic maturity’s twin. Prosperity and fertility appeared to be declining together. Both justified aggressive state management to escape the current Depression and avoid another.” (p. 325-326)

[23] Bouk, D. (2018). Generation crisis: How population research defined the baby boomers. Modern American History, 1(3), 321-342. https://doi.org/10.1017/mah.2018.31“Population research laid the foundation for Jones’s project. In his“Notes on Sources,” Jones gave pride of place to a“seminal essay” by Ryder from 1965, one that“for the first time linked the size of a generation to its experience and its social impact.” Ryder first presented these ideas in 1959 at a meeting of the American Sociological Association, fast on the heels of the first Growth in American Families study. Jones cited Ryder’s revised and expanded version, a soon-to-be-classic paper, published in the leading sociological journal in 1965. Ryder set out to explain why“young adults are prominent in war, revolution, immigration, urbanization, and technological change.” He dismissed the ideas of many preceding theorists of the“ gen- eration,” particularly those like François Mentré who postulated a regular, repeated conflict of generations and whose ideas were popular among some academics. Ryder insisted that the moment when a“cohort” of individuals reached adulthood, it brought with it the possibility of change. Young people entering a social system without experience or seniority could more readily become the agents of revolution, but Ryder emphasized that“they do not cause change; they permit it.” Ryder’s essay implored his colleagues to bring more demographic methods to sociological research: the survey tradition of sociology specialized in taking cross sections or snapshots that demonstrated stable structures, while the demographers’ cohort method allowed research on change over time and tracked the movement of groups through a system. Later in his career, as Ryder won awards for his achievements, one of his peers praised him as“the father of a method that no serious demographic textbook can afford to overlook.” Yet Jones was right to see the way the piece also laid the groundwork for a theory of social change premised on generation size. Social upheaval became more likely in the context of technological change or “intercohort differences,” Ryder argued, singling out for its significance“variation, and particularly abrupt fluctuation, in cohort size.” He had the baby boom in mind:“In the United States today the cohorts entering adulthood are much larger than their predecessors. In conse-quence, they were raised in crowded housing, crammed together in schools, and are now threatening to be a glut on the labor market.” Ryder had brought the crisis-inducing bulge to mainstream sociology. Jones would bring it to the nation at large.” (p. 336)

[24] Bouk, D. (2018). Generation crisis: How population research defined the baby boomers. Modern American History, 1(3), 321-342. https://doi.org/10.1017/mah.2018.31“In addition, the specter of a global“population bomb” probably primed Jones’s readers to accept the possibility of a transformative bulge. Many in the 1970s feared the growing popula- tion figures that undergirded biologist Paul Ehrlich’s 1968 Population Bomb-seeing in them a scourge devouring a finite trove of resources. Cold War concerns that hordes of young peo- ple would tip the Third World toward communist revolution or bring on global ecological col- lapse found new purchase in the 1970s United States. Nixon’s Office of Economic Opportunity pushed birth control in the United States in the wake of spectacular claims that overpopulation triggered crime waves and rampant pollution. Yet many others around the world feared the idea of the“population bomb” even more, seeing in that concept an excuse to exercise control over the bodies of women and people of color and to maintain neocolonial Cold War hierarchies. This second fear manifested itself in protests against“genocidal” birth control programs in poor black neighborhoods and the 1974 revolt of Global South nations against United States-led population control programs at a pivotal conference in Bucharest. Even if confu- sion reigned among experts, politicians, activists, diplomats, and commentators about whether the world was overpopulated and whether that mattered, the international debates about over- population and Cold War population policies awakened many Americans to the political, eco- nomic, and environmental significance of demographic shifts. Just the fact of such a widespread demographic controversy lent credibility to the notion that the baby boom really could have upset the nation’s apple cart.” (p. 339)

[25] Bouk, D. (2018). Generation crisis: How population research defined the baby boomers. Modern American History, 1(3), 321-342. https://doi.org/10.1017/mah.2018.31“Even after its first media mishap, the Social Security Administration attempted again in 2008 to use Casey-Kirschling’s retirement to advertise direct deposit and garner good publicity. The resulting Associated Press story, run on FoxNews.com, instead fretted about the depletion of Social Security reserves. Critics of the American welfare state now wielded the baby boomer crisis narrative like a weapon. Deficit hawks and critics of the welfare state trumpeted the convenient crisis caused by the baby boom’s aging. They founded AGE-Americans for Generational Equity-in 1984 to advance their point. Minnesota Senator Dave Durenberger, co-chair of the first AGE confer- ence, insisted that without big changes, the country’ s “demographic destiny” would result in “generational warfare.” Baby boomers, as AGE participants called them, had begun their lives as victims of crowding but would in 2020 (more than thirty years in the future) cause the succeeding generation to become either victims in turn or revolutionaries.” (p. 340)

[26] Bouk, D. (2018). Generation crisis: How population research defined the baby boomers. Modern American History, 1(3), 321-342. https://doi.org/10.1017/mah.2018.31“The history of the baby boom began with the ambitions of population researchers to contribute to the project of planning for a mature economy and population. The high birth rates of the 1940s surprised the experts, who predicted that the unexpected babies would complicate the nation’s plans. Crowded classrooms and teacher shortages-though hardly new-confirmed for researchers and many school officials the truth of these demographic fears. Lest the baby boom imperil the entire project of rational planning and prediction, as well as global efforts at population control, researchers developed sophisticated theories to describe and explain the baby boom. Bulges became predictable, even ordinary, but they also threatened to instigate social or economic changes that could shake the nation. When population researchers’ social science met the generational contests of the 1960s and 1970s, the encounter gave birth-with the help of some savvy journalism-to the baby boom generation and a new way to tell the story of over 70 million Americans. Today, individuals identify (even if grudgingly) as baby boomers (or Xers or millennials), and the bulge of boomers has been recast as the scourge of yet another set of age-graded institutions (Social Security and Medicare). But this time, the loudest voices denouncing the boomers also target the very welfare state and planning apparatus that first made it possible for population researchers to conceive of the bulge.” (p. 341-342)

[27] David Reher & Miguel Requena (2014): The mid-twentieth century fertility boom from a global perspective, The History of the Family, DOI: 10.1080/1081602X.2014.944553. “From a different but complementary perspective, however, there is ample evidence that societies were becoming increasingly uniform and that, by implication, there may have been an increasingly shared ideal family size, as noted many years ago by Norman Ryder with regard to the United States. The results of a similar exercise shown earlier suggest that the ideal of a new family size came to be shared increasingly by national populations. A contributing factor to this result is the fact that family-level mortality was also lower and more uniform for the younger birth cohorts, though it does not negate the increasing presence of a common goal in these societies. This is not necessarily the mark of increased optimism in these societies but it is certainly one of greater social uniformity.”” (p. 21-22)

[28] David Reher & Miguel Requena (2014): The mid-twentieth century fertility boom from a global perspective, The History of the Family, DOI: 10.1080/1081602X.2014.944553. “Despite the similarities, in the end we are hesitant to call the mid-century fertility boom a real baby boom. The term ‘baby boom’ was tailored to the developed world specifically and referred to the sharp rise in fertility taking place around the time of the war or afterwards. Since starting levels were relatively low, it refers to a real trend change taking place at a fairly advanced stage of the demographic transition. In the developing world, this was not the case, as the rise in fertility took place before the demographic transition when starting levels of fertility were still very high. The main distinguishing factor here is the timing of the demographic transition. From that perspective, in some ways the fertility boom in the developing world has the appearance of the period just prior to the historic demographic transition when fertility ceased its gradual decline, even rising slightly. That said, however, the similarities shown are also striking in both worlds. A matter of coincidence? We do not believe in coincidences, especially when they affect several different aspects of fertility in a wide array of nations. These commonalities offer ample justification for addressing this period of change from a global perspective despite the limitations inherent in our reduced sample. The underlying reasons for this remain to be identified, but they may well be related to the changes in mortality occurring everywhere in the world, to a certain sense of social, economic and political optimism holding during the period, and to the persistent lack of efficient and secure contraception everywhere. The 1960s with its attendant cultural revolution, the introduction of safe and inexpensive contraception and high levels of demand for fertility limitation - especially visible in the developing world - brought this grand cycle to a dramatic end as an enduring fertility bust increasingly became the central characteristic of world populations. At the very least, what is clear is that fertility once again declined after the 1960s and 1970s and once again the trend change took place in both the developed and the developing world with uncanny simultaneity. The exciting and innovative perspective of world fertility trends presented in this paper should encourage demographers and population historians to go beyond narrow-minded obsessions with data issues in order to further our understanding of population swings from a global perspective. If not, we run the risk of missing the forest for the trees on issues of fundamental importance for understanding the way our world works and how this might change in the future.” (p. 22)

[29] Sardon, J.-P. (2006). Fertility in the developed English-speaking countries outside Europe: Canada, United States, Australia and New Zealand. Population, 61(3), 297-291. https://doi.org/10.3917/popu.603.0301. “In the countries of Europe, fertility has at best stabilized at below- replacement level, and sometimes well below this threshold. This is not the case in the non-European developed English-speaking countries where, despite the absence of any directly targeted family policy, fertility appears to be holding up more strongly than in Europe. ” (p. 267)

[30] Sardon, J.-P. (2006). Fertility in the developed English-speaking countries outside Europe: Canada, United States, Australia and New Zealand. Population, 61(3), 297-291. https://doi.org/10.3917/popu.603.0301. “The fertility behaviour of the non-European developed English- speaking countries shows a number of similarities. Despite their geographical separation, these countries would appear to share a common culture and not just a language. They are also countries that have been much more open to immigration than European countries have been on average. A “pioneer” mentality has sometimes been put forward to explain the distinctive features of the non-European developed English-speaking countries compared with the European countries from which their populations originate. The populations of these countries are also heterogeneous; they comprise minorities, some of whom are indigenous. The influence of these minorities varies considerably however, depending on the proportion of the total population that they represent. It is small in Australia, where Aborigines make up only 2% of the total population, but more noticeable in New Zealand, where Maori births account for 22% of the total (Europeans 66%). In the United States, the situation is more complex since there are a number of minorities. In addition to non-Hispanic, non-Latino Whites (67% of the population(35)) and the black community (13%), the population also includes Asians (4%) and Hispanics (13.5%).” (p. 289)

[31] Sardon, J.-P. (2006). Fertility in the developed English-speaking countries outside Europe: Canada, United States, Australia and New Zealand. Population, 61(3), 297-291. https://doi.org/10.3917/popu.603.0301. “The relatively favourable position of these countries compared with many European countries appears paradoxical, especially to a European observer, since the higher fertility levels are in no way related to ambitious and generous family policies. On the contrary, except for Canada, these countries are the only ones in the industrialized world not to grant paid maternity leave to all mothers. The impression that fertility in the non-European developed English- speaking countries is higher than in old Europe appears to have been more justified in the past, even the recent past, than by current trends. These countries’ fertility advantage appears to be waning. Total fertility rates and completed fertility are close to those of the most fertile European countries. The distinctive feature of the United States is not so much its total fertility rate as the regular increase in women’s completed fertility, which is the only such increase to be observed among the developed countries other than Denmark. Analysis of the situation in the countries of the New World and some others, especially in Scandinavia, suggests that fertility is linked to early childbearing. Although the link is sometimes contradicted by international comparisons, it remains the case that within a given cultural area with the same level of development and similar policies(36), fertility does appear to be linked to early childbearing. Might this offer a way of raising fertility in certain European countries, by encouraging or enabling couples to start their families rather earlier? It is hard to say, but anything that helps to integrate young people, whether in terms of employment or housing, and reduce their economic insecurity, is necessarily a move in that direction. But confidence in the future may well depend on an improvement in the economic and social situation.” (p. 290)

[32] Boni-Saenz, A. A. (2026). Age, law, and political economy. Indiana Law Journal, 101(4), 1299-1336. “There are two primary points of contact between age, law, and political economy that justify taking age seriously in these areas. First, age-based legal rules directly structure the labor market in various ways. Chronological age is uniquely adaptable to legal directives because of its numerical nature, its capacity to convey useful information, and its permissibility under Equal Protection analyses, in contrast to race and sex The child labor provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and state equivalents, along with compulsory schooling laws, set minimum ages for entry into the workforce_ll At the other end of the age spectrum, various social welfare laws, including but not limited to Social Security and Medicare, use age alongside other criteria as a trigger for benefits eligibility. These laws create the material conditions that determine whether older adults must continue working at advanced ages to acquire the resources needed to survive. Both sets of age-based rules are meant to soften the hard edges of capitalism. However, they are being put under strain in the current moment of neoliberalism, an era characterized by individualized and marketized notions of societal ordering. The end result is cases like that of Perez and Glover. Second, age and its sibling concept, generation, indirectly shape economic and political relations by legitimating unequal labor market practices and disrupting class-based politics. Age is a salient social characteristic that serves as a basis for social differentiation and the conferral of status, though the status hierarchies that result are more contingent and shifting than for other social categories. In conjunction with status hierarchies based on race, sex, and other characteristics, these age-based hierarchies help define lower-status groups that are particularly ripe for labor exploitation, such as immigrant children of color who work in dangerous industrial occupations and older women of color who work in demanding caring professions.16 In addition to defining these vulnerable groups, these status hierarchies also justify the poor treatment they receive due to their low status position. 17 In the political realm, age and generation serve as cross-cutting cleavages with class, dividing the working population. Members of the Gen Z and Millennial generations blame older generations for poor policy choices and economic hoarding, while Gen X and Baby Boomers criticize younger generations for poor work ethic and a sense of entitlement.18 Age and generation thus serve as receptacles for class-based anxieties, currently manifesting as intergenerational conflict among people with similar economic interests. 19 The displacement of class anxieties onto these social categories distorts policy debates and hinders cross-age and cross-generational solidarity, a prerequisite for achieving economic and other forms of justice.” (p. 1301-1303)

[33] Boni-Saenz, A. A. (2026). Age, law, and political economy. Indiana Law Journal, 101(4), 1299-1336. “At the individual level, one's age identity is a product not only of such chronology, but also of biological changes that one might experience in the aging process, the social expectations associated with different points on the lifecourse, the choices one has made to affiliate or disaffiliate with people based on age, and how old one "feels," independent of any of these factors. The law also constitutes the social meanings of age, for instance by demarcating the barrier between different phases of life, such as childhood, adulthood, and old age. This is all further complicated by the fact that age does not operate in an identity vacuum, as it intersects with other categories of identity, such as race, gender, class, and disability in a complex matrix.  For example, the biological aspects of the aging process combine with social expectations associated with gender to create a unique set of concerns and identities around reproduction in middle age for many women. Expanding beyond the individual, age provides a basis for grouping people together. There are two primary ways in which this happens. First, individuals attain membership within age groups by virtue of their chronological age, whether it is everyone who possesses the same age by year (e.g., fifty) or everyone who is in the same decade of life (e.g., in their twenties). Second, individuals attain membership in a generation based on year of birth. Generation refers to particular birth cohorts who travel through various age categories together over time.  The boundaries between different cohorts are contested, but these groups are often popularized in the public imagination when they receive names, such as "Gen Z" or "Baby-Boomers." What supposedly binds these birth cohorts together beyond a common chronology is various formative sociohistorical moments, which may have an effect on values and attitudes.” (p. 1307-1308)

[34] Boni-Saenz, A. A. (2026). Age, law, and political economy. Indiana Law Journal, 101(4), 1299-1336. “The second way that age-based rules structure economic relations is by creating the material conditions of individuals and families, which affects how much they need to commodify their labor to satisfy basic needs. Social welfare programs delivered by the state provide one pathway toward such decommodification. For example, provision by the state of heating assistance through the Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP), food benefits through the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), or medical care through the Medicaid program makes those receiving the benefits less desperate to participate in the labor market in order to acquire those necessities of life. Many jurisdictions are now experimenting with guaranteed income programs that would provide cash assistance that is not tied to a particular good as well. Not all people who have the luxury of decommodification, however, want to detach from the labor market. In fact, one of the major factors leading to unplanned "unretirement" is a "preference shock" -that is, a discovery that retirement turned out to be less satisfying than originally anticipated. However, for those who do not have the luxury of decommodification, labor market participation may be both expected and involuntary. To the extent that it is, one starts from a weaker bargaining position when seeking out employment if the alternative to waged employment is desperate material conditions. If several people are in that same boat, this will make it more difficult to obtain employment, all other things being equal. For employers, this is something to be welcomed, as there is a surplus of potential employees, which puts downward pressure on wages. The United States is characterized by a neoliberal welfare regime, providing less generous and more narrowly targeted social welfare programs than other industrialized welfare states. However, one consistent feature of this social welfare regime is its consistent use of age-based rules. The largest social welfare programs, Social Security retirement and Medicare, are social insurance programs that have age eligibility requirements for collection of benefits. Even beyond these major programs, age is part of the guidelines for the receipt of various other benefits as well. Social Security Disability Insurance regulations take account of age in awarding benefits, making it easier to qualify for them if you are older, even with the same level of impairments. Similarly, you can more easily qualify for the Supplemental Security Income, SNAP, Medicaid, LIHEAP, and the Weatherization Assistance Program if you are an older adult. There are also programs that condition benefits or benefit amounts upon younger age, such as the earned income tax credit and child tax credit. The reason why age, particularly older age, is so intertwined with the social welfare system in the United States is because age is a proxy for need. Just as with child labor rules, these programs are meant to soften the rough edges of capitalism by targeting resources at those in need, often older adults who are not labor market participants for a variety of reasons. The extreme poverty induced by the Great Depression catalyzed congressional action to establish Social Security and related programs in 1935, building on years of social and political campaigns for income support in old age. In contrast, it was a robust economy in the 1960s, combined with a "compassionate ageism," or portrayals of the elderly as a dependent and needy group, which led to the passage of the Great Society programs. Old-age programs such as Social Security and Medicare have been enormously successful in reducing poverty and improving the well-being of older people in the United States. They have been particularly helpful for older women of color, who might lack other resources due to an accumulation of disadvantages derived from race and gender over a lifetime. In a neoliberal context, however, social welfare programs of all sorts are perennial targets for cutbacks. The most vulnerable social welfare programs are not age-based or universalist in character, such as Medicaid or food assistance. They lack a strong political constituency, and their recipients are seen as less deserving, often for racialized reasons. This has played out most recently with the passage of the 2025 budget bill, which includes sharp cuts to such programs.” (p. 1317-1320)

[35] Boni-Saenz, A. A. (2026). Age, law, and political economy. Indiana Law Journal, 101(4), 1299-1336. “Reductions to social welfare programs force individuals to return to the labor market, if it will have them. 138 For older adults, it appears that employers want them. 139 Just as child labor has recently been on the rise, so too has senior labor. 140 The percentage of people over sixty who are working in the labor market has doubled between 2000 and 2020.141 Many are returning to the labor market out of necessity, often due to the inability to save during earlier working years. 142 Thus, they come to the labor market with little bargaining power, accepting wage cuts. 143 They may also accept poor working conditions, as more than half of older workers are in jobs that are physically demanding, expose them to negative environmental conditions, or have difficult schedules.144 These are often different industries from those seeking child labor, but the underlying economic dynamic is similar. Economic deprivation is often a driver of labor market involvement, even when existing laws create prohibitions or disincentives to doing so.” (p. 1321-1322)

[36] Boni-Saenz, A. A. (2026). Age, law, and political economy. Indiana Law Journal, 101(4), 1299-1336. “The second way that age (and generation) indirectly structure economic relations is through how they shape the politics that produce the legal frameworks that mitigate or exacerbate economic inequalities. Specifically, they can serve as cross-cutting cleavages with class, dividing the working population in the political realm. This occurs by creating social distance between different classes of workers on the basis of other social characteristics and by refocusing energy on said divisions. This inhibits attempts at coalitional politics between people who might otherwise be similarly situated with respect to their economic interests. For example, race serves as a useful cross-cutting cleavage with class, dividing workers who might otherwise find common cause in opposing exploitative economic conditions. In the U.S. context, racialization was an effective dynamic to divide Black and White workers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. White workers, who were also exploited economically, received a "psychological wage" on the basis of their Whiteness, which permitted them certain advantages that were not extended to Black workers. Finding common cause with Black workers would upend the racial status hierarchy in ways that would be detrimental, even if there were reasons to align for economic reasons. Such dynamics made it challenging to form cross-racial coalitions. Gender has similarly been used to divide political coalitions of working-class people. Age also holds the potential for class division, though the way in which it operates is different from race or sex. For children in the labor market, it is not social division that prevents coalitional politics, but rather the inability of children to advocate for their interests in the same way as adults. This is both because many children have not developed the social or legal capacities for political action and because we have delegated the protection of children's interests to parents. This frames questions of whether children can or should work as a matter of familial choice, as echoed in the current debates in states that are weakening child labor laws. When parents are suffering economic deprivation themselves, it is not surprising that they might choose to put their children to work. For older adults, there are two main pathways to social and political division. The first is by connecting ageist stereotypes directly to welfare state spending. This was accomplished to some degree in the 1980s, when an organization called Americans for Generational Equity (AGE) argued that continued spending on old age social welfare programs would harm children and bankrupt the country. This organization pitted two vulnerable groups-low-income children and low-income seniors-against each other to defund the welfare state and advance a neoliberal agenda. At a rhetorical level, critics of these programs use a framing that paints social welfare programs as largely unaffordable due to demographic changes. This framing obscures policy options such as increasing funding for social welfare programs through various means. This, in tum, naturally leads to reform ideas that essentially entail benefits cuts. For example, proposals to raise the retirement age are a regular feature of Republican Study Committee budgets and bills introduced in Congress. However, raising the retirement age functions as a benefits cut over the lifetime of Social Security recipients. It has the additional drawback that it most negatively affects those with shorter life expectancies, such as Black men, who will be less likely to see any benefits from the program due to shortened life expectancies. While AGE did not secure many policy victories and was eventually disbanded, it did succeed in implanting an age-based conflict frame on policy debates, which persists to this day. While this framing has persisted, this case also shows how age may not be as effective for divide-and-conquer tactics as categories like race or gender, which have historically been construed as fixed. The first reason is that age may be secondary to these other characteristics in people's everyday identities, even if age itself is a salient social category. The second reason is that because individuals travel through different ages over time, everyone has an intrinsic connection to people of other ages, who represent either their past, present, or future selves. This is made concrete by family members who share aspects of a person's biology, history, or social environment. Put another way, when state spending benefits your grandmother, and you can see yourself in a comparable situation in the future or even benefit indirectly from that spending today, intergenerational conflict may be harder to embrace. Still, the effects of the age-based conflict framing can serve to distort political debates and ensure that only certain legal or policy options are considered within the realm of possibility. The second route to division is through the social category of generation. Generation is more fixed than age, as one's cohort membership is set at birth, whereas one's age naturally changes over time. Feeling psychological distance from another generation is easier than feeling psychological distance from a person of another age, simply because you will never join another generation. Intergenerational tension is not new and is in some sense cyclical, as younger and older generations have clashed periodically for a variety of reasons. We appear to be experiencing yet another upsurge in intergenerational animosity. This current incarnation of intergenerational conflict, however, is particularly intertwined with class and politics. For example, recent critiques of Baby Boomers accuse them of hoarding wealth, particularly real estate, and exacerbating the housing shortage. Further, there is a renewed interest in characterizing the political system as a gerontocracy, occupied by older adults who do not represent the interests of younger generations. These strains of critique are not entirely unfounded. Wealth is concentrated among older generations, and younger people hold a smaller share of wealth than in the past. The age diversity of our political institutions is also lacking, with older adults overrepresented in them. Nevertheless, these generational critiques often suffer from overly broad generalizations about generations. While wealth is concentrated among older generations, those populations are heterogeneous, with large disparities in wealth within those groups by race and gender. The relationship with age and wealth is in part a function of time, as older individuals have had more time to accrue economic assets. But this highlights an important point, which is that one's economic position as an older adult is highly dependent on one's economic position before that point, as lower-income individuals have less ability to save and accrue assets. Thus, it may be more accurate to say that those who are already economically privileged earlier in life retain and increase that economic privilege over time and into older ages, exacerbating initial inequalities. This represents, however, a relatively small subset of individuals within older generations. And it suggests that intergenerational conflict may be a sort of displacement of class anxieties onto generation. Employers and anti-union activists have taken notice of this, using age and generation divides among workers as a tactic to defeat unionization efforts. This does not mean that age and generation are irrelevant to the analysis of economic divides, but instead suggests that age and generation may be a somewhat poor proxy for economic privilege. In other words, to focus too much on age and generation as the main battleground of politics may create precisely the sort of social and political division that is necessary to prevent unified movements for economic justice. ” (p. 1331- 1335)

[37] Gruijters, R. J., Van Winkle, Z., & Fasang, A. E. (2023). Life course trajectories and wealth accumulation in the United States: Comparing late baby boomers and early millennials. American Journal of Sociology, 129(2), 530-569. [PRE-PUBLICATION VERSION, PAGES 1-90] “Millennials are widely seen as the 'Precarious Generation', bearing the brunt of increasing inequality and instability in American society. Their experience is often juxtaposed to that of their parents' generation, the Baby Boomers, who are generally perceived as an economically privileged generation. A major concern, among scholars as well as the general public, is that the combination of insecure employment and a prolonged transition to adulthood prevents Millennials from obtaining economic security in the form of wealth and home ownership. As a result, it has been suggested that they are “the first generation that is worse off than their parents” -posing a major challenge to the American Dream narrative of steadily improving opportunity and prosperity. The popular claim that Millennials are doing worse than the Baby Boomers at the same stage in their lives might be misleading, for two main reasons. First, the Baby Boomers-and especially the ‘late’ Baby Boomers, who are the focus of this study-also came of age in a time of major economic upheaval and adverse labor market conditions. Considering their economic prospects, Easterlin et al. observed that “the prevailing sentiment in scholarly circles and the media appears to be pessimistic”. Second, generational comparisons of this kind tend to overlook within-cohort differentiation, thus creating an artificial impression of generational homogeneity. Instead of focusing on the average or ‘normative’ experience of each birth cohort, we consider it more fruitful to study intra-cohort patterns of life course diversity, and their association with household wealth (net worth).” (p 3.)

[38] Gruijters, R. J., Van Winkle, Z., & Fasang, A. E. (2023). Life course trajectories and wealth accumulation in the United States: Comparing late baby boomers and early millennials. American Journal of Sociology, 129(2), 530-569. [PRE-PUBLICATION VERSION, PAGES 1-90] “Increases in wealth inequality over the past few decades have been well documented. Growth in aggregate wealth has been concentrated at the top of the distribution, with stagnant or even declining wealth for most of the population. The increasing gap between the rich and the poor is one of the most pressing challenges of our time, and has galvanized major social movements, including Occupy Wall Street and Bernie Sanders' presidential campaigns. We complement the predominant macro-perspective in the wealth literature with a micro-level analysis of individual life course trajectories and wealth outcomes across the two birth cohorts. We ascribe to a holistic life course perspective that conceptualizes work and family lives as longitudinal processes, rather than as point-in-time characteristics. Highly detailed prospective data from the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79 - the 'Baby Boomers') and the NLSY97 (the 'Millennials') allow us to reconstruct work and family life courses from age 18 to 35. We then use sequence and cluster analysis to generate a typology of early work and family trajectories in each cohort. We are particularly interested in assessing whether and how generational shifts in typical work and family trajectories as well as changes in the economic returns to these trajectories relate to generational differences in household wealth and wealth inequality. For example, Millennials might accumulate less wealth because they have a higher likelihood to experience unstable, low wage employment and family lives of serial cohabitation and separation that already led to lower wealth accumulation among the Baby Boomers. In this case, Millennials would acquire less wealth because their life trajectories are less conducive to wealth accumulation (a compositional effect). However, it may also be the case that the same work and family life courses-such as blue-collar employment combined with stable marriage and parenthood-are associated with different levels of wealth accumulation for Millennials compared to Baby Boomers (a returns effect). Our core finding is that, even though there were substantial compositional shifts in work and family trajectories between the two cohorts, these did not explain the observed increase in wealth inequality. Instead, wealth inequality increased because the returns to high-status work trajectories have increased, while the returns to low-status trajectories have stagnated or declined.” (p. 4-5)

[39] Gruijters, R. J., Van Winkle, Z., & Fasang, A. E. (2023). Life course trajectories and wealth accumulation in the United States: Comparing late baby boomers and early millennials. American Journal of Sociology, 129(2), 530-569. [PRE-PUBLICATION VERSION, PAGES 1-90] “We showed that wealth is much more unequally distributed among early Millennials than among late Baby Boomers. The poorest Millennials have less wealth than the poorest Baby Boomers at the same age, but the richest have substantially more. The median Millennial had almost 25% lower wealth at age 35 than the median Baby Boomer, and home ownership decreased from 62% to 49%. This is in line with aggregate trends in wealth inequality, which show increasing indebtedness at the bottom of the distribution, and large gains at the top. Using detailed monthly panel data, we reconstructed work and family life courses from age 18 to 35 and clustered them into a set of 'typical' trajectories. The results reveal a steep decline in the most high-status employment careers among Millennials, as well as an increase in low-skill service work (EGP IIIb) and advanced technical occupations (EGP V). The latter include many jobs associated with the post-industrial knowledge economy, such as designers, sound engineers, and artists. The change in family trajectories is even more pronounced, with a strong decline in the traditional pattern of early marriage and parenthood, and an increase in trajectories characterized by singlehood, single parenthood and staying in the parental home. Findings from multichannel sequence analysis show that Professional work trajectories are often combined with advantaged family trajectories (especially late marriage and parenthood), while working class employment tends to coincide with lower-wealth family trajectories such as early marriage and parenthood or unmarried parenthood.” (p. 35-36)

[40] Gruijters, R. J., Van Winkle, Z., & Fasang, A. E. (2023). Life course trajectories and wealth accumulation in the United States: Comparing late baby boomers and early millennials. American Journal of Sociology, 129(2), 530-569. [PRE-PUBLICATION VERSION, PAGES 1-90] “Although it is difficult to estimate the exact share of transfers in wealth accumulation, recent evidence suggests that-contrary to popular belief- only a small proportion of young adults receive substantial wealth transfers from parents, and the importance of transfers has declined across cohorts. However, for those fortunate enough to receive transfers, their average value has increased, which may also have contributed to the increase in wealth inequality at age 35. Finally, as a result of the top-codes imposed on the publicly released NLSY data we were not able to assess cohort changes in wealth at the very top of the distribution, where a large share of household wealth is concentrated.” (p. 39)

[41] Gruijters, R. J., Van Winkle, Z., & Fasang, A. E. (2023). Life course trajectories and wealth accumulation in the United States: Comparing late baby boomers and early millennials. American Journal of Sociology, 129(2), 530-569. [PRE-PUBLICATION VERSION, PAGES 1-90] “...the polarization in economic returns to work-family life courses is driving increasing wealth inequality across cohorts. The vast and increasing gap between the rich and the poor is a fundamental moral and political challenge. Economic polarization also contributes to a range of other social problems, including the rise of populist authoritarianism. Our findings further suggest that changes in the composition of work-family life courses did not have a major impact on cohort changes in wealth, contrary to popular narratives that see increasingly precarious work careers and unstable family lives as the primary cause of Millennials’ economic troubles. These findings have several implications for economic and social policy. Reversing economic polarization requires tax reforms as well as redesigning the institutions that create, perpetuate and magnify wealth inequality. Policies that enable young families to build assets and attain economic security-such as increasing the minimum wage, providing access to stable housing, and universal health insurance-have large multiplier effects, because they can kickstart an intra- and intergenerational process of cumulative advantage. Spilerman suggests that "even modest levels of financial assets, which normally provide only a small addition to total income, can cushion a family from the economic shock of illness or job loss, enabling a home mortgage, car loan, and other bills to be paid for a number of months and thereby preventing a temporary loss of employment from snowballing into a wider crisis for the family". We agree with Thomas Shapiro, however, that "a tentative, piecemeal, or fragmentary response will not suffice to create equity and family prosperity"” (p. 30-40)

[42] Avery, R. B., & Rendall, M. S. (2002). Lifetime inheritances of three generations of whites and blacks. American Journal of Sociology, 107(5), 1300-1346. “Inheritances are transfers of the unconsumed material accumulations of previous generations. Inheritances therefore take on a special meaning with respect to black and white Americans: they directly link the dis- advantaged economic position and prospects of today’s blacks to the disadvantaged positions of their parents’ and grandparents’ generations.” (p. 1300)

[43] Avery, R. B., & Rendall, M. S. (2002). Lifetime inheritances of three generations of whites and blacks. American Journal of Sociology, 107(5), 1300-1346. “With respect to inheritances already received, we found that the white- black wealth gap diminishes in both absolute and relative terms when their present value was subtracted from current wealth. That is, nonin- herited wealth is more equally distributed between whites and blacks than is inherited wealth. From our forecasts of forthcoming inheritances, we found that these will be even more important in increasing the white- black wealth gap than have been inheritances received so far. We fore- casted that more than one-third of baby boom whites in 1989 were due to receive future inheritances worth more than 25,000 in 1989 dollars (34,718 in 2000 dollars), versus fewer than one in 20 blacks. The white- black gap in the absolute value of lifetime inheritances for the baby boom cohort, moreover, will be much larger than that of the pre-baby boom cohort. The mean white baby boomer’s lifetime inheritance will be worth $125,000 in current (2000) dollars at age 55, as compared to only $16,000 for the black baby boomers and around $70,000 for the preceding generations of whites. The 8.1 to 1 ratio of white-to-black mean lifetime inheritances in the baby boom generation contrasts markedly with the 2.7 to 1 ratio for their mean noninherited wealth.” (p. 1334)

[44] Avery, R. B., & Rendall, M. S. (2002). Lifetime inheritances of three generations of whites and blacks. American Journal of Sociology, 107(5), 1300-1346. “We noted earlier that the baby boom generation effectively saw a halt in progress toward racial equalization in income, albeit at some significant advantage over their parents’ generation. The larger racial difference in the parent generation’s income, however, will ultimately come back to increase economic inequality of the baby boom generation. The process by which this will happen, and is indeed already happening, is through intergenerational financial transfers (inter vivos and bequests at death) from the baby boomers’ parents to the baby boomers themselves. What this process implies, then, is that even when earnings gaps are reduced, intergenerational transfers will act as a drag on the process of equalization of racial economic status. That racial earnings gaps have not narrowed since at least the beginning of the 1980s, moreover, means that the effect of inheritances may be to increase the racial gap in overall economic status, not just postpone its being narrowed. These results have important implications for social policy that is aimed at ameliorating the effects of past social injustice between black and white Americans. Until now, this policy has focused on earnings disparities between whites and blacks. Our results imply that whites’ much greater receipt of inheritances will work to counteract social policy successes in the domain of earnings inequality. We do show a small offsetting effect of reducing black-white wealth inequality under the 1990s federal estate tax regime, under the assumption that the taxes are perfectly implemented. Alternate estimates based on actual estate taxes paid in the past (Aaron and Munnell 1992) indicate that the actual effect would be considerably less. Recent legislation, moreover, aims to phase out these taxes altogether. Alternate proposals to provide an effective and equitable system of taxation of wealth transfers are proposed by Carroll (1989) and Aaron and Munnell (1992), who both propose a conversion of the system of estate taxes (on the bequeathor) into one of inheritances taxes (on the recipient), as in the majority of OECD countries. Wolff (1995) instead proposes a wealth tax. Regarding the options of race-based versus race-neutral (class- based) redistributive tax policy, Conley (1999) argues that class-based policy may be appropriate because currently the wealth gaps can be completely accounted for by observed variables other than race. Thus the difference is to be explained by historical rather than contemporary racial discrimination. Taxes on wealth and intergenerational transfers, even if made race-neutral, can be seen as a potentially important additional policy instrument to compensate for past racial discrimination. Showing how effective for redistribution such an instrument could potentially be, Keister evaluates the effect of changing the estate tax system to lower the exemption limit in the United States from $600,000 to $250,000, and finds larger redistributive effects than from any other interventions she considers in the process of wealth accumulation. One puzzle relevant to contemporary debates on estate taxes is why proposals for substantial taxes on intergenerational transfers do not enjoy much political popularity in the United States. ” (p. 1334-1335)

[45] Avery, R. B., & Rendall, M. S. (2002). Lifetime inheritances of three generations of whites and blacks. American Journal of Sociology, 107(5), 1300-1346. “...our results do not accord well with a life-cycle model of white-black wealth disparities, in which differences in earnings and savings are the only important processes generating wealth differences. We found that estimating inheritances over the entire lifetime instead of up to only an arbitrary, current point of the lifetime was very important for evaluating the full significance of intergenerational trans- fers, as approximately half of their lifetime value appears to be derived after age 55 (even after discounting the value of those transfers received later in life). Our results are also contrary to the inequality-reducing results of inheritances found in studies derived from altruistic, family-dynastic economic theory. Instead, they imply that intergenerational transfers con- tribute substantially to white-black disparities in economic status and are likely to do so increasingly for the present generation of baby boom whites and blacks. Thus our findings further emphasize the importance of con- sidering wealth as well as income in analyses of racial stratification. The highly concentrated nature of wealth and inheritances also within the white and black populations, moreover, in turn indicates a need to explore the more general implications of inheritances for social stratification. Here, family-dynastic theory, in which both marriage matches and family size play very important roles, might be used as a starting point in formally modeling the processes by which families within racial and socioeconomic strata maintain their positions across generations.” (p. 1336)

[46] McFarland, M. J., Hauer, M. E., & Reuben, A. (2022). Half of US population exposed to adverse lead levels in early childhood. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 119(11), e2118631119. “Lead is a developmental neurotoxicant in wide industrial use that was once broadly distributed in the environment…BLLs [blood-lead-levels] greater than 5 μg/dL were nearly universal (>90%) among those born 1951 to 1980, while BLLs were considerably lower than 5 μg/dL among those born since 2001. The average lead-linked loss in cognitive ability was 2.6 IQ points per person as of 2015. This amounted to a total loss of 824,097,690 IQ points, disproportionately endured by those born between 1951 and 1980.” (p.1)

[47] McFarland, M. J., Hauer, M. E., & Reuben, A. (2022). Half of US population exposed to adverse lead levels in early childhood. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 119(11), e2118631119. “During the peak era of leaded gasoline in the United States, which ran from the late 1960s to the early 1980s, the average blood-lead level (BLL) for the general US population was routinely three to five times higher than the current reference value for clinical concern and case management referral (3.5 micrograms of lead per deciliter of blood). Consequently, millions of adults alive today were exposed to high lev- els of lead as children. While these exposures were deemed harmless at the time, animal studies and epidemiological evidence accrued in the intervening years reveal that such expo- sures likely disrupted healthy development across multiple organ systems (particularly the brain, bone, and cardiovascular systems), resulting in subtle deficits to important outcomes, such as cognitive ability, fine motor skills, and emotional regu- lation, that may influence the trajectory of a person’s life (e.g., their educational attainment, health, wealth, and happi- ness). These deficits largely persist across time and, in some cases, worsen and are now hypothesized to put individuals at risk for difficult-to-treat chronic and age-related diseases, including cardiovascular disease and dementia.” (p. 1)

[48] McFarland, M. J., Hauer, M. E., & Reuben, A. (2022). Half of US population exposed to adverse lead levels in early childhood. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 119(11), e2118631119. “Population Estimates in 2015. Table 1 shows that a history of early life lead exposure was ubiquitous among Americans alive in 2015. Among the 318 million people in the US population, only 131 million (margin of error= 1.4 M; 80% CI) had BLLs below 5 μg/dL, the 2015 threshold for clinical concern and case management (23), when they were children. Conversely, the majority of the population-over 54%-had a BLL above this threshold as children. Furthermore, there were large gradations in the extent of lead exposure among these 54%. For instance, nearly 100 million people (MOE= 1.4 M; 80% CI), or 31% of the population, had childhood BLLs above 10 μg/dL-twice the 2015 reference level and three times the current reference level. Around∼10 million people alive in 2015 (MOE= 0.4M; 80% CI) had childhood BLLs above 25 ug/dL-five times the level of concern then and seven times the current level.” (p. 2)

[49] McFarland, M. J., Hauer, M. E., & Reuben, A. (2022). Half of US population exposed to adverse lead levels in early childhood. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 119(11), e2118631119. “Estimated lead-linked deficits in cognitive ability were greatest for the 1966 to 1970 cohort (population size∼20.8 million), which experienced an average deficit of 5.9 IQ points per person. Adjacent cohorts also experienced considerable IQ loss. The 1961 to 1965 cohort experienced a 4.8 IQ point deficit, while the 1971 to 1975 cohort experienced a similar loss of 5.7 IQ points. Because the relative impact of lead exposure on cognitive ability is strongest at lower levels of exposure (i.e., the first units of lead exposure cause the greatest relative harm), we can be reasonably certain that the vast majority of leaded gasoline-exposed cohorts (i.e., those born in the mid-1960s to 1980s) experienced meaningful cognitive loss (>1 IQ point) because of lead expo- sure. Furthermore, over 7% of the 1966 to 1970 and 1971 to 1975 cohort (which together amounted to nearly 3 million children had BLLs above 30 μg/dL This exposure corresponded to an average 7.4 IQ point deficit, which is large enough to shift individuals with below average cognitive ability (IQ < 85) into the range of diagnosable intellectual disability (IQ < 70). Projection estimates indicate that IQ loss due to lead exposure will be similar in the near future. By 2030, early childhood lead exposure will have reduced population IQ by 709,054,633 points. This number amounts to an average deficit of 2.03 IQ points per person.” (p. 3)

[50] McFarland, M. J., Hauer, M. E., & Reuben, A. (2022). Half of US population exposed to adverse lead levels in early childhood. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 119(11), e2118631119. “Despite this, pronounced exposure to lead in early childhood will remain a hallmark of the US population for the next several decades.” (p. 4-5)

[51] McFarland, M. J., Hauer, M. E., & Reuben, A. (2022). Half of US population exposed to adverse lead levels in early childhood. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 119(11), e2118631119. “On the individual level, even relatively small deficits in achieved IQ can have a meaningful impact on people’s lives, as cognitive ability, described by IQ, meaningfully predicts a per- son’s educational and occupational attainment, health, wealth, and happiness. Notably, in the multidecade Dunedin Study, Reuben et al. reported a dose-response relationship between childhood lead exposure and mild downward social mobility by midlife. They estimated that 40% of the association was explained by IQ loss. At the population level, IQ loss estimates are very meaning- ful. Using smaller estimates of lead exposure and IQ loss than our 824 million lead-linked population IQ point loss, previous studies have reported economic losses to the US economy from lead exposure on the order of between 165 to 319 billion dollars in lost wages. The fact that our lead estimates and the IQ loss associated with them are higher underscores the harm done to the US economy more broadly. Such lead loss estima- tion efforts should be repeated across other domains believed to be influenced by lead exposure (including criminal behavior, personality, psychopathology, social mobility, cardiovascular disease, kidney function, and pathological brain aging). Doing so would generate a more complete understanding of the contributions lead exposures may have made to these important outcomes, the ultimate benefits to society from lead’s removal from gasoline (including, potentially, recent improvements in many of these outcomes) and the costs of ignoring existing lead hazards, including lead’s continued use in aviation fuel in the United States, and its wide underregulated use in commercial and industrial processes internationally” (p. 5-6)

[52] Dement, J. M., Brown, D. P., & Okun, A. (1994). Follow-up study of chrysotile asbestos textile workers: Cohort mortality and case-control analyses. American Journal of Industrial Medicine, 26(4), 431-447. “Among white males, the number of deaths almost doubled from 308 to 607 and an additional 11,000 PYAR (from 33,141 to 44,131) were included. The update includes 289 total deaths among black males and 363 among white females. There was a fairly high percentage of black males with unknown vital status (7.6%) and with missing death certificates (7.6%). As is the case in other occupational cohort mortality studies, the follow-up for females was less complete than it was for males. Among the white females, 22.8% had an unknown vital status. This is partially due to married name changes, use of their spouse’s Social Security Number (especially in the 1940s), and because of the greater tendency among women to leave the work force, making it more difficult to determine vital status from the SSA, NDI, or Internal Revenue Service record systems.” (p. 435-436)

[53] Dement, J. M., Brown, D. P., & Okun, A. (1994). Follow-up study of chrysotile asbestos textile workers: Cohort mortality and case-control analyses. American Journal of Industrial Medicine, 26(4), 431-447. “All death certificates with an underlying cause of death that may have been related to mesothelioma were reviewed using methods described by Lilienfeld and Gunderson [ 19861. Mesothelioma was recorded on the death certificates of two white males who had latency periods of 37 and 34 years and who worked at the plant for 25 and 32 years, respectively. Both of these workers were primarily employed in spinning operations. An additional mesothelioma case (not included in the cohort) which occurred after 1990 was observed in a white male employed in mostly non- textile operations at this plant. In addition, four deaths coded as “cancers of other parts of the respiratory system” (ICD-8 code 163 X ) occurred; three among white females (3 observed vs. 0.20 expected; SMR = 14.98; CI = 3.12-29.6) and one among white males (1 observed vs. 0.39 expected; SMR = 2.64; CI = 0.14-12.5). A close review of these deaths found that all mentioned cancer of the lung but without mention of specific site within the lung. Information from death certificates thus suggests that these tumors were lung cancers rather than mesotheliomas; however, no autopsy or other medical reports were available for further confirmation of the pri- mary cancer site.” (p. 437-438)

[54] Dement, J. M., Brown, D. P., & Okun, A. (1994). Follow-up study of chrysotile asbestos textile workers: Cohort mortality and case-control analyses. American Journal of Industrial Medicine, 26(4), 431-447. “Regardless of these problems with follow-up, there appears to be a difference in the overall lung cancer risk as well as the exposure-response relationship for white workers compared to black workers. Among white males and females, a statistically significant increase begins at a cumulative exposure much lower than that for black males. Although this was based on few observed deaths in the low exposure stratum for black males, there were enough data to detect a statistically significant deficit in risk (SMR = 0.40; 6 observed vs. 14.8 expected deaths) below 40,000 fiber/cc-days. Pneumoconiosis was the other asbestos-related disease found in excess and therefore examined in more detail. This category of disease, as defined by the NIOSH LTAS used in this study, includes pneumoconioses, such as asbestosis, as well as chronic obstructive pulmonary disease. The underlying cause of death for approximately 50% of these deaths was from pneumoconiosis. Tables VI gives the results of mortality from pneumoconiosis by cumulative exposure. Like lung cancer, a positive exposure-response was observed in all race/sex groups and, similar to the lung cancer analysis, there was some inconsistency in the trend at low exposures.” (p. 441)

[55] Middleton, L. Y. M., Walker, E., Cockell, S., Dou, J., Nguyen, V. K., Schrank, M., Patel, C. J., Ware, E. B., Colacino, J. A., Park, S. K., & Bakulski, K. M. (2025). Exposome-wide association study of cognition among older adults in the National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey. Exposome, 5(1). “Mild cognitive impairment is characterized by greater cognitive decline than expected based on age and educational attainment.1 In the United States, women experience a 71% lifetime risk of developing cognitive impairment at an average age at incidence of 73.2 Similarly, men experience 61% lifetime risk of cognitive impairment at an average age at incidence of 70.2When these cognitive impairments impact activities of daily living, their syndrome has progressed to dementia, and a common subtype of dementia is Alzheimer’s disease.3,4 These are prevalent and challenging conditions, and understanding modifiable risk factors is key to public health prevention. Later life environmental exposures such as air pollution and cigarette smoking are key modifiable factors for dementia prevention highlighted by the 2024 Lancet Commission.5 Additional environmental factors are suggestive based on current evidence. For example, among 2023 older adults in the United States, a 0.51ng/mL increase in urinary cadmium concentrations was associated with 1.58 times higher hazard of Alzheimer’s disease mortality (95% CI: 1.20, 2.09) over 7.5years of follow up.6 In addition, among 741 older men in the Boston area, a 21μg/g increase in patella bone lead was associated with −0.016 units of loss on the Mini Mental Status Exam score per year (95% CI: −0.032, −0.0004) over 15years.7 Environmental chemical exposures are prevalent and potentially neurotoxic, though prior studies of environmental associations with cognition have been limited to few individual chemicals.” (p. 1)

[56] Middleton, L. Y. M., Walker, E., Cockell, S., Dou, J., Nguyen, V. K., Schrank, M., Patel, C. J., Ware, E. B., Colacino, J. A., Park, S. K., & Bakulski, K. M. (2025). Exposome-wide association study of cognition among older adults in the National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey. Exposome, 5(1). “This study had key strengths. First, the study population was diverse and nationally representative to the United States. This is important for generalizability of findings. Analytically, we accounted for sample weights and clustering strategies. Second, the analysis included assessment of many chemicals from several chemical classes. Examining a wide array of chemicals is important for hypothesis generation. These chemicals were all measured in either blood or urine using rigorous standards. Third, the cognition measure used in this study is broadly applicable and has been implemented in other settings, enabling comparability across studies. For greatest statistical power we examined continuous cognition and for clinical translation we examined cognition dichotomized by impairment status. Fourth, we used current ExWAS analytic standards to test and visualize associations and account for multiple comparisons. We also used multiple imputation approaches to account for missing data in covariate and outcome measures, so that we retained the largest possible sample size. Fifth, we performed several sensitivity analyses which improved the robustness of our findings, including restricting on kidney function status, as some chemicals are metabolized by renal tissues, influencing measured biomarker concentration levels. Together, this study advances the field of environmental epidemiology of cognition among older adults. In summary, this study examined the independent relationships between 147 chemicals with cross-sectional cognition in a large and nationally representative sample of 4982 adults over age 60 in the United States. We confirmed previous observations that elevated levels of cotinine and cadmium are associated with lower cognition. Using this discovery approach, we also identified novel associations between tungsten and mono-benzyl phthalate and cognition. These findings can inspire new laboratory toxicologic investigations as well as longitudinal epidemiologic studies to examine the windows of chemical susceptibility. This paper adds to a building scholarship on environmental risk factors for impaired cognition among older adults. Identifying environmental contributors to Alzheimer’s disease and related dementias is part of the 2023 updated National Plan to Address Alzheimer’s Disease. Together, these studies offer opportunities for public health prevention through policy and practice to reduce chemical exposures and disparities.” (p. 9)

[57] Fabina, J., & Martin, M. (2024). Voting and registration in the election of November 2022 (Current Population Reports No. P20-586). U.S. Census Bureau. “The 2022 congressional election featured a decrease in voter turnout from 2018; however, this election was also characterized by the highest registration rate during a midterm election in over 30 years. Other notable highlights include: • The share of voters who were aged 65 or older was the highest for a congressional election on record, as was the share of voters with a bachelor’s degree or higher. • The share of the 2022 voting population that was non-Hispanic White was higher than the non-Hispanic White share of the citizen voting- age population, and this gap was the largest difference in a congressional election on record.” (p. 1)

[58] Fabina, J., & Martin, M. (2024). Voting and registration in the election of November 2022 (Current Population Reports No. P20-586). U.S. Census Bureau. “Young adults aged 18-29 were 11.7 percent of the voting popula- tion in 2022 and 19.6 percent of the CVAP, the lowest share of the CVAP for this group on record. As a result, 18- to 29-year-olds were underrepresented by 7.9 percent- age points among the voting population, an increase from 6.9 percentage points in 2018 (Figure 2). While voters aged 18-29 have been underrepresented in every congressional election on record, the 2022 election marked the second-smallest underrepresentation for this group, just behind the 2018 election. Voters aged 30-44 were underrep- resented by 2.5 percentage points in 2022. This was not statistically different from the underrepre- sentation of this group in 2018. Voters in this age group were 22.0 percent of the voting population and 24.5 percent of the CVAP. This group has been underrepresented in every congressional election from 1994 to 2022. As the younger age groups were underrepresented among voters, it follows that older age groups were overrepresented in 2022. Voters aged 45-64 were overrepresented by 3.7 percentage points in 2022, as this age group represented 35.8 percent of voters and 32.1 percent of the CVAP. These voters have been overrepresented in every congressional election; however, the 2022 and 2018 elections mark their smallest overrepresentations on record.11 The 2022 election also marked the lowest voter share for 45- to 64-year-olds since 1994.12 Voters aged 65 or older were overrepresented by 6.7 percent- age points in 2022. This group was 23.8 percent of the CVAP; however, they made up 30.4 percent of vot- ers. This age group has also been overrepresented in every congres-sional election dating back to and including 1978. The 2022 election featured the second-largest over- representation of these voters on record, only behind an overrepre- sentation of 8.3 percentage points in 2014.13 The 2022 election also featured both the largest voter share and the largest CVAP share on record for those aged 65 or older.” (p. 4)

[59] Fabina, J., & Martin, M. (2024). Voting and registration in the election of November 2022 (Current Population Reports No. P20-586). U.S. Census Bureau. “The 2022 election featured the first increase in non-Hispanic Black underrepresentation among vot- ers since an increase in the 2006 election. While non-Hispanic Black voters were underrepresented in many high-population states with large non-Hispanic Black CVAPs in 2022, not every state experienced an underrepre- sentation of non-Hispanic Black voters” (p. 16)

[60] Fabina, J., & Martin, M. (2024). Voting and registration in the election of November 2022 (Current Population Reports No. P20-586). U.S. Census Bureau. “The 2022 election featured the first increase in non-Hispanic Black underrepresentation among vot- ers since an increase in the 2006 election.29 While non-Hispanic Black voters were underrepresented in many high-population states with large non-Hispanic Black CVAPs in 2022, not every state experienced an underrepre- sentation of non-Hispanic Black voters for a high registration rate and overrepresentation among voters of those aged 65 or older, those with a bachelor’s degree or higher, and those who were non-Hispanic White.35 Demographic voting trends varied across the nation, with many differences across states in both young adult and non-Hispanic Black voter turnout. The November CPS Voting and Registration Supplement provides a detailed look at the demographics of voters, the methods used to vote, and trend in these measures across time.” (p. 18-20)

[61] Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget. (2024). From riches to rags: Causes of fiscal deterioration since 2001. “Since gross national debt crossed $40 trillion last month - and the more meaningful debt held by the public as a share of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) hit 100% - there has been much discussion over how the debt got this high. Despite efforts to pin the high debt on a single cause, claims attributing it to deficit- financed tax cuts, unpaid-for spending increases, and unchecked growth of entitlement programs for health and retirement are all in some ways correct. As recently as 2001, debt held by the public was 32% of GDP and falling, while the federal government was running annual surpluses of about 1% to 2% of GDP. Today, debt held by the public is 100% of GDP and rising, while deficits are running around 6% of GDP annually.”

[62] Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget. (2024). From riches to rags: Causes of fiscal deterioration since 2001. “Either tax cuts or spending increases enacted since 2001 can explain virtually all the growth of the debt-to-GDP ratio not related to recession-fighting measures. Without deficit-financed tax cuts, unpaid-for spending increases, or recession-fighting measures, the national debt would be fully paid off today; without any two of the three, it would be roughly at 2001 levels. Debt-to-GDP growth can also be explained by the growth of health and retirement programs that was largely (though not fully) built into the law back in 2001 and earlier. Neither the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) nor the One Big Beautiful Bill Act (OBBBA) have yet played a major role in the growth in debt since 2001, though OBBBA will significantly worsen future debt levels.”

[63] Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget. (2024). From riches to rags: Causes of fiscal deterioration since 2001. “Had none of the major spending increases enacted between 2001 and 2023 ever occurred, we estimate debt would have been 65% of GDP in 2023. Similarly, if none of the major tax cuts enacted between 2001 and 2023 had ever occurred, debt would have been 61% of GDP. Alternatively, had the costs of Social Security and federal health programs been held constant as a share of GDP, debt would have been 52% of GDP in 2023.”

[64] Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget. (2024). From riches to rags: Causes of fiscal deterioration since 2001. “Removing the impact of stimulus measures and COVID relief under the last major recessions, debt under these scenarios - assuming either no spending increases, no tax cuts, or constant Social Security and health spending - would have been 37%, 33%, or 24% of GDP in 2023, respectively. In other words, major spending increases, major tax cuts, and growth in entitlement programs can each individually explain most of the growth in debt-to-GDP not related to economic downturns. Although these counterfactuals only run through 2023, we expect very similar outcomes through 2026.”

[65] Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget. (2024). From riches to rags: Causes of fiscal deterioration since 2001. “One way to understand the rise in the debt is to estimate the impact of legislative and regulatory changes. Absent any major spending increases, major tax cuts, or recession responses since 2001, our Riches to Rags paper found debt would be paid off today. Absent any two of the three, debt-to-GDP would be around 2001 levels.”

[66] Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget. (2024). From riches to rags: Causes of fiscal deterioration since 2001. “In our analysis, we estimated that net defense and nondefense discretionary spending increases enacted starting in 2001 added about $6 trillion to debt, or 28% of GDP, while Medicare expansions added another $1 trillion, or 5% of GDP. Discretionary increases include not only normal appropriations but also spending on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as other one-time spending for wars, natural disasters, emergencies, and other initiatives. Medicare expansions were mainly related to the establishment of Medicare Part D and replacement of Medicare’s Sustainable Growth Rate. On the tax side of the ledger, five major pieces of tax legislation - the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts, their extensions and modifications in 2010 and 2013, and the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act - added over $8 trillion to debt between 2001 and 2023, accounting for 37% of GDP of debt in 2023. Finally, legislation and executive actions enacted in response to the 2007-2009 Great Recession and the COVID-19 pandemic and related recession accounted for more than $6 trillion in debt added between 2001 and 2023, or about 28% of GDP.”

[67] Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget. (2024). From riches to rags: Causes of fiscal deterioration since 2001. “Between Fiscal Years (FY) 2001 and FY 2025, the country went from running a 1.2% of GDP surplus to a 5.8% of GDP deficit - a 7.1% of GDP swing (numbers do not sum due to rounding). Of this change, about three-quarters (5.4% of GDP) was the result of higher spending and one-quarter (1.7% of GDP) from lower revenue. The higher cost of Medicare, Medicaid, and other federal health programs explains a full two-fifths (2.8% of GDP) of the increase, while the growth in Social Security and interest costs each explain another one-sixth of the change.”

[68] Lichtenberg, N. (n.d.). The national debt's 20-year deadline and baby boomers' spending problem. Fortune. https://fortune.com/2026/06/21/baby-boomers-debt-20-year-timeline-social-security-generations/. “In a new analysis and in an interview with Fortune, the Penn Wharton Budget Model (PWBM) faculty director sketches an outer limit for U.S. federal debt and a political economy that heavily favors older Americans. His bluntest line may also be his simplest: “We do spend about 10x more per older person than we do per younger person. In total, we spend about 6x in aggregate on older people than younger people.” This means  the average older person gets much more than the average younger person as a policy choice, but since there is a greater number of younger people, when you add up all dollars going to each group, the total to older people is “only” about six times. PWBM estimated in April retirees (adults age 65 and older) receive $2.7 trillion, equal to 38.6% of total federal outlays and 61.9% of age-assignable spending, while working-age adults (ages 26-64) receive $1.2 trillion (27.9% of age-assignable), and children and young adults (under age 26) receive $449 billion (10.3%).”

[69] Lichtenberg, N. (n.d.). The national debt's 20-year deadline and baby boomers' spending problem. Fortune. https://fortune.com/2026/06/21/baby-boomers-debt-20-year-timeline-social-security-generations/. ““People are excited about AI and think it’s going to lead to all this economic growth. People are just misunderstanding it,” he said. “Even if it does lead to more growth than we’re projecting, spending is going to go up with it. It’s not true that AI will simply increase the tax base without increasing spending.” His biggest concern, he added, is how many of us are “really misguided in our understanding of future progress, future growth.””

[70] Lichtenberg, N. (n.d.). The national debt's 20-year deadline and baby boomers' spending problem. Fortune. https://fortune.com/2026/06/21/baby-boomers-debt-20-year-timeline-social-security-generations/. ““What people don’t get is that when you have these financial collapses, it’s not just finance,” Smetters said. The problem the U.K. faces now, he said, is that they already have very high taxes so their “fiscal space” is quite limited in terms of what they can do now. “That’s the problem with the baby boomer generation,” he added. “It’s going to be really hard to change benefits over time.” Sometimes when you have giant fiscal problems that keep going unsolved, year after year, “they can lead to really incredible changes in society that can be very disruptive, beyond just economics.””

[71] Frum, D. (2017). Gen X and Millennials will pay for the GOP's tax plan. The Atlantic. “The baby boom is being evicted from the penthouse of American politics. And on the way out, it has decided to trash the place. That’s probably the best way to understand the generational implications of the tax legislation Republicans are driving through Congress. The House and Senate measures shower enormous benefits on households at the top of the economic ladder, a group that by all indications is older and whiter than the population overall. Then it hands the bill for those benefits largely to younger generations, who will pay through more federal debt; less spending on programs that could benefit them; and, eventually, higher taxes.”

[72] Frum, D. (2017). Gen X and Millennials will pay for the GOP's tax plan. The Atlantic. “In that way, the bills would intensify the generational inequity in how Washington allocates resources between the country’s increasingly diverse youthful generations and its predominantly white older population, groups I’ve called “the brown and the gray.” At a moment when political influence is inexorably shifting to the brown, the tax bill represents an 11th hour raid by the wealthiest of the gray.”

[73] Frum, D. (2017). Gen X and Millennials will pay for the GOP's tax plan. The Atlantic. “The baby-boom generation, which has voted reliably Republican in recent years, has been the largest generation of eligible voters since 1978. But in 2018, for the first time, slightly more Millennials than baby boomers will be eligible to vote, according to forecasts from the Center for American Progress’s States of Change project. Higher turnout rates among baby boomers will preserve their advantage among actual voters for a while. But sometime around 2024, Millennials will likely surpass them. The post-Millennials, Americans born after 2000 who’ll enter the electorate starting in 2020, will widen the advantage. This generational shift will trigger a profound racial change: While about 80 percent of the baby boom is white, over two-fifths of Millennials and nearly half of the post-Millennials are not.”

[74] Frum, D. (2017). Gen X and Millennials will pay for the GOP's tax plan. The Atlantic. “This transition looms over the tax debate. To fund its benefits for the wealthiest families and business, the GOP congressional plans raise taxes on so many subgroups of Americans that no generation emerges as an unequivocal winner. But the evidence suggests that those who gain the most-top earners, business owners, corporate shareholders-are concentrated among whites in the baby boom and the older members of Generation X. And from several angles, younger generations loom as the plans’ biggest losers.”