June 30, 2026

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Sources:

[1] Central Intelligence Agency. (1959, April 27). Background: Tibet {Memorandum}.

“The Dalai Lama is the political and religious ruler of Tibet. The Panchen Lamas, of lesser spiritual authority, have resided at Shigatse, in a monastery where there are some 12,500 monks. A. The present Dalai Lama is the fourteenth in succession.

1. Born in 1935 in the Chinese province of Tsinghai to Tibetan parents.

2. Brought to Lhasa in 1939.

B. The present Panchen Lama is the ninth in succession.

1. Born in 1937, also in Tsinghai province to Tibetan parents. (Not related to the Dalai Lama.)

2. Remained in Tsinghai until brought to Tibet by the Chinese Communists in 1952.” (p. 1)

[2] Duoji Cairang, & Zhang Jianghua. (1996). 西藏封建农奴制社会形态 {The social formation of the feudal serf system in Tibet}. China Tibetology Publishing House.

“总括说来 , 整个趋势是寺庙和世俗领主占有土地的份额一直在增加 , 地方政府占有的份额在减少 , 而在僧俗领主中 , 有极少数的寺院、上层僧侣和世俗贵族变成了占地数万的大领主。这种趋势在 18 世纪末到 19 世纪初已经明显可见。正如 1830 年《铁虎清册》的绪论所写 : “ …… 嗣后 , 从政府差地中拨归贵族、寺庙者甚多 , 辗转效尤 , 要求并顿、减差者日益增多。 ” ① 根据《铁虎清册》清查登记数统计 , 卫藏地区核定的支差 “ 顿 ” 总数为 1.6 万多顿 , 其中包括扎什伦布寺和萨迦寺属的一部分。 ② 除去二者 , 直属噶厦管辖的为 1.4 万多顿。三类领地的划分为 : 政府占 44% , 寺院占 23% , 贵族占 33% 。 ② 因为这个统计数字中扣除了贵族、寺院的一些免差地 , 故贵族、寺院数字较实际土地数有些缩小。如果加上约略估计的减差数 , 总数应为约 1.5 万顿 , 则三者的比例大致是 40:25:35 。这就是说由政府直接管理与经营的土地在三类中占的比例最大。因为地区间情况不同 , 每个宗各类领主所占比例相差很大。

一般说来 , 拉萨、日喀则附近大寺院较多 , 寺院和上层僧侣占有的领地较为集中 ; 山南、江孜和工布地区贵族领地较多 , 白朗、仁蚌和边远的宗属于政府的领地占大多数。下面举出几组数字 ( 略去分数 ) :

雪列空所辖 18 个宗谿中 , 政府差地 226 冈 ( 合 113 顿 ) , 寺院谿卡 306.5 顿 , 贵族谿卡 156.5 顿。又如止贡寺所在的墨竹工卡宗三种的顿数分别为 28.5 、 211.5 和 150 ; 哲蚌寺所在的堆龙蔡德为 30 、 106 和 30 。贵族占地较多的如乃东 ( 拉加里计算在内 ) , 政府 114 、寺院 176.5 、贵族 773 ; 工布则拉岗宗为 165 、 423.5 、 520 ; 江孜为 200 、 126 、 424 ; 尼木为 46.5 、 73 和 392.5 。“ (p. 116-117)

{In summary, the overall trend was that the share of land held by monasteries and secular lords kept increasing, while the share held by the local government decreased. Among the monastic and secular lords, a very small number of monasteries, high‑ranking monks, and secular nobles became great lords owning tens of thousands of ke of land. This trend was already clearly visible from the end of the 18th century to the beginning of the 19th century. As the introduction to the 1830 Tiehu Qingce (Iron Tiger Register) states: “… Thereafter, much land was transferred from government cha land to nobles and monasteries; following this example repeatedly, those requesting merger of dun (units) or reduction of cha increased daily.”① According to the statistics of the Tiehu Qingce, the total number of dun (units for corvée payment) assessed in the Ü‑Tsang region was more than 16,000 dun, including some belonging to Tashilhunpo Monastery and Sakya Monastery.② Excluding those two, the number directly under the Kashag’s jurisdiction was more than 14,000 dun. The division among the three types of fiefs was: government 44%, monasteries 23%, nobles 33%.② Because this statistical figure deducted some tax‑exempt land of nobles and monasteries, the numbers for nobles and monasteries were somewhat smaller than the actual land area. If the roughly estimated reduction is added back, the total would be about 15,000 dun, and the approximate proportions would be 40:25:35. That is, the land directly managed and operated by the government accounted for the largest proportion among the three types. Because conditions varied from region to region, the proportions held by each type of lord differed greatly from one dzong to another.

Generally speaking, near Lhasa and Shigatse there were many large monasteries, and the land held by monasteries and high‑ranking monks was relatively concentrated. In the regions of Lhokha (Shannan), Gyantse, and Kongpo, noble land was more abundant. In Bainang, Rênbung, and remote dzongs, government‑held land accounted for the majority. Below are several sets of figures (fractions omitted):

Among the 18 dzongs and shö under the jurisdiction of Xueliekong, government cha land was 226 gang (equivalent to 113 dun), monastery shöka accounted for 306.5 dun, and noble shöka for 156.5 dun. For example, in Mêdogungkar Dzong, where Drigung Monastery is located, the dun numbers for the three types were 28.5, 211.5, and 150 respectively. In Tölong Tsédé, where Drepung Monastery is located, they were 30, 106, and 30. In areas with more noble land, such as Nêdong (including Ragyi), the figures were government 114, monasteries 176.5, nobles 773; in Gongbo Zêlagang Dzong: 165, 423.5, 520; in Gyantse: 200, 126, 424; in Nyêmo: 46.5, 73, and 392.5.}

[3] Duoji Cairang, & Zhang Jianghua. (1996). 西藏封建农奴制社会形态 {The social formation of the feudal serf system in Tibet}. China Tibetology Publishing House.

“山南地区 15 个宗谿统计 :

总计为 7332 冈 , 其中政府 2652 冈 , 占 36.2% ; 寺院 1432 冈 , 占 19.5% ; 贵族 3248 冈 , 占 44.3% 。

拉萨地区德庆、孟堆、蔡三宗 : 共有土地 6.9 万克 , 政府仅有 250 克 , 占 0.4% , 寺院 5 万多克 , 占 73% ; 贵族 1.8 万克 , 占 26.6% 。

118 西藏封建农奴制社会形态

江孜 : 共 5.7 万克 , 政府 1.3 万克 , 占 22.9% ; 寺院 1.9 万多克 , 占 34.5% ; 贵族 2.4 万多克 , 占 42.6% 。

白朗 : 共 3.6 万克 , 政府 1.6 万克 , 占 44% ; 寺院 8808 克 , 占 24.2% ; 贵族 1.1 万多克 , 占 31.8% 。“ (p. 117-118)

{Statistics of 15 dzongs and shö in the Lhokha (Shannan) region:

Total: 7,332 gang, of which government held 2,652 gang (36.2%), monasteries held 1,432 gang (19.5%), nobles held 3,248 gang (44.3%). In the three dzongs of Dêqên, Mêndoi, and Tsê in the Lhasa region: total land was 69,000 ke, of which the government held only 250 ke (0.4%), monasteries held more than 50,000 ke (73%), nobles held 18,000 ke (26.6%). Gyantse: total 57,000 ke, government 13,000 ke (22.9%), monasteries more than 19,000 ke (34.5%), nobles more than 24,000 ke (42.6%). Bainang: total 36,000 ke, government 16,000 ke (44%), monasteries 8,808 ke (24.2%), nobles more than 11,000 ke (31.8%).}

[4] Duoji Cairang, & Zhang Jianghua. (1996). 西藏封建农奴制社会形态 {The social formation of the feudal serf system in Tibet}. China Tibetology Publishing House.

"例如 : 拉孜宗共有 17 户差巴的桑珠谿卡 , 在 1951 年前人们能够记忆的几十年中曾有 10 户差巴丢弃差地、差房逃亡外地 , 都是由于 “ 欠债、差役过重 ” ① 。又如该宗的柳谿卡 , 50 年代末共有差巴 61 户 , 人们记忆中曾有 3 户请求获准交出差地 , 改做佣人或堆穷 , 另有 15 户差巴被逼得无路可走 , 逃亡他乡。 ② 但是 , 这些逃亡者往往又被抓捕回来 , 受到严惩并被重新奴役。例如 : 墨竹工卡宗 1887 年 ( 火猪年 ) 黑丁谿卡 9 户差巴串通逃走 , 所遗差地和负担由留下的 33 户差巴分担。两年后 , 领主把这 9 户又寻找回来 , 恢复了他们耕种的差地 , 给他们重新套上枷锁。逃亡差巴被抓后遭受毒打 , 被逼为奴的情况随处可见。差巴即使有幸逃离了原领主的控制 , 无需多久 , 不可避免地又沦为另一领主的农奴。有不少烟火户就是这样的逃亡者。“ (p. 138)

{For example: in Sangzhu manor (Shöka) of Lhatse Dzong, which had 17 trakpa families, within the decades that people could remember before 1951, 10 trakpa families abandoned their allotment land and houses and fled, all because of “heavy debt and excessive corvée”. Another example: in Liu manor of the same dzong, there were 61 trakpa families in the late 1950s. Within living memory, 3 families had requested and been allowed to return their land and become hired laborers or dudchung, while another 15 trakpa families were driven to desperation and fled. However, these fugitives were often captured, severely punished, and re‑enslaved. For example: in 1887 (Fire Pig year) in Heiding manor of Mêdogungkar Dzong, 9 trakpa families conspired to flee. The land and obligations they left behind were distributed among the remaining 33 trakpa families. Two years later, the lord found these 9 families, restored the land they had previously cultivated, and put them back in chains. Captured fugitive trakpa were beaten and forced into slavery everywhere. Even if a trakpa managed to escape his original lord’s control, before long he would inevitably become the serf of another lord. Many “smoke‑household” serfs were such fugitives.}

[5] Duoji Cairang, & Zhang Jianghua. (1996). 西藏封建农奴制社会形态 {The social formation of the feudal serf system in Tibet}. China Tibetology Publishing House.

"控制农奴人身自由的严密制度

西藏的领主有控制农奴的一套管理制度 , 这些制度一般没有系统的成文法规 , 但它在各地却是基本一致的 , 也是相当严密的。

( 一 ) 出生登记 , 死后销名。无论是差巴还是堆穷 , 孩子出生后 , 必须到庄园或领主那里登记 , 也就是给未来的劳役负担者挂号。庄园根据农奴登记的姓名、年龄和性别编制人口清册 , 宗政府也掌握着全宗各谿卡的人口册 , 所有的农奴无论在家或出走何处 , 都是载之于册的。这是领主摊派乌拉、收敛人役税的根据。按照规定 , 农奴从 15 岁到 59 岁都得为领主服劳役。农奴死后家属要报告领主 , 请求销名 , 才能免除这份负担。无论是出生登记或死后销名 , 农奴除向领主或其管事人员献哈达外 , 遭受额外的勒索也是常有的事。出家为僧者 , 在庄园除名 , 由寺院管理。还俗时可归属原来领主 , 也可以另找新的领主。

( 二 ) 对属民的通婚限制。同属一个领主的农奴通婚前 , 家长要携带哈达、酒等礼品去向庄园主报告 , 一般都会得到允准。不同领主的农奴之间通婚则要受到较严格的限制 , 很多领主都不愿意自己所属农奴嫁出或赘出 , 特别是劳力短缺的庄园 , 领主就只许娶人 , 不许嫁出。经请求同意结婚者 , 还要办理领属关系的转换手续 , 办法之一是嫁出者向领主交 “ 本卓 ” ( 意即官长准许 ) , 实际上就是赎身费 , 数额不定 , 由领主视其家庭经济情况索要 , 几十两至几百两藏银不等。另一种办法是交换农奴。这种交换往往在通婚若干年后 , 恰好两家领主间有互相交叉占有的农奴 , 交换对等进行 , 男换男、女换女。常常是几起嫁出者及其所生子女一起办理交换 , 由双方领主和地方头人协议后 , 立下文书 , 依照协议双方农奴均归新领主。换人文书在各地庄园内是常见的。下面是其中的一件 :

桑雄阿巴部落所存换人文书

土鼠年 ( 1948 年 ) 月日一式两份

达扎拉让的属民 ( 阿巴部落的人 ) : 女 , 珠吉 38 岁 , 女 , 札莫 32 岁 , 住在呷旺秋地方的呷尔测儿子 3 岁 , 住在测部地方呷则的儿子 3 岁 , 女勒争。

住在星桑地方的白珠桑姆珠 21 岁 , 住在诺珠地方的儿子索则 8 岁 , 儿子俄丹 5 岁 , 女央尖 30 岁 , 其女尔测久 7 岁 , 小女测白 5 岁 , 男朴布 24 岁 , 加呷尔娜姆的妻子珠玛 48 岁 , 他的五儿洞沙则 18 岁 , 女拙可 31 岁 , 男桑油 , 男尼玛札西 , 男旺秋多布钦 47 岁 , 女才丹珠玛 46 岁 , 女阿泽 28 岁 , 郭珠朴达 ; 索马尔妻白马旺秋家 4 人 , 共男女 25 人 , 今后归属森巴部落。

森巴的属民呷知觉札 37 岁 , 亲戚昂旺强巴 23 岁 , 才丹的儿子木达 14 岁 , 秋达尔媳妇阿久 34 岁 , 操保的儿子代替人 , 女拉昂却 28 岁 , 丹达究儿子鲁珠 34 岁 , 索娜旺秋儿子的代替人 , 女才仁却作姆 37 岁 , 她的女儿白操 15 岁 , 二女儿央吉 13 岁 , 三女儿却英格丹 4 岁 , 四女儿桑姆麦 1 岁 , 一家共有女 5 人。测达尔之子白玛南杰 , 拉隆阿姆姐的女婿珠云丹 20 岁 , 女塔尔错之子白玛南杰 4 岁 , 女客即 76 岁 , 男洛桑克珠 35 岁 , 女木底的儿子贡呷札都 5 岁 , … … 共男女 25 人 , 今后属阿巴部落。

以双方的百户、根布为代表 , 经过充分的协商 , 公平地进行了属民的交换。从此各属民及其全部遗产归属新的领主 , 原领主不得进行干预。已商妥的协定 , 双方都不得违犯。如果一方有违犯欺骗的行为 , 另一方将上告大法官 , 根据达赖喇嘛的命令 , 进行彻底的处治。“ (p. 141-143)

{Strict system for controlling the personal freedom of serfs

The lords of Tibet had a set of management systems for controlling serfs. These systems generally had no systematic written laws, but they were basically consistent across regions and were quite strict.

(1) Birth registration and posthumous name removal. Regardless of whether they were trakpa or dudchung, when a child was born, it had to be registered with the manor or the lord – i.e., the future labor burden was enrolled. The manor prepared a population register based on the serfs’ registered names, ages, and genders; the dzong government also held the population registers for all shöka in the dzong. All serfs, whether at home or having fled elsewhere, were recorded in the registers. This was the basis for the lords to apportion ula (corvée) and collect poll taxes. According to the rules, serfs had to perform labor for the lord from age 15 to age 59. After a serf died, the family had to report it to the lord and request that the name be removed, only then could that burden be lifted. Whether for birth registration or posthumous name removal, besides offering a khatag to the lord or his steward, serfs often suffered additional extortion. Those who became monks were removed from the manor’s roll and were managed by the monastery. When they returned to lay life, they could either rejoin their original lord or find a new lord.

(2) Restrictions on marriage of serfs. When serfs belonging to the same lord wished to marry, the head of the household had to go to the manor lord with gifts such as a khatag and wine; permission was generally granted. Marriage between serfs of different lords was more strictly restricted. Many lords were unwilling to let their own serfs marry out or be taken in as matrilocal husbands, especially in manors short of labor, where the lord allowed only the taking in of spouses, not the giving out of serfs. If permission was granted after request, a transfer of affiliation had to be processed. One method was for the person marrying out to pay the lord a “benzo” (literally “official permission”), in effect a redemption fee. The amount was not fixed; the lord demanded whatever he thought the family could pay, ranging from dozens to several hundred taels of Tibetan silver. Another method was to exchange serfs. Such exchanges often took place several years after the marriage, when two lords happened to have serfs in cross‑possession; the exchange was made on a one‑to‑one basis, male for male, female for female. Often several persons marrying out together with their children were exchanged at once. After the lords and local headmen of both sides reached an agreement, a written document was drawn up, and according to the agreement the serfs on both sides all belonged to their new lords. Exchange documents were common in manors everywhere. Below is one such document:

Exchange document preserved by the Aba tribe of Sangxiong

Earth Rat year (1948), month and day, two copies.

Serfs of Dazha Larang (people of the Aba tribe): female, Zhuji, 38; female, Zhamo, 32; son (age 3) of Gaerce living in Gawangqiu area; son (age 3) of Gaze living in Cebu area; female, Lezheng.

Baizhu Sangmuzhu, 21, living in Xingsang; her son Suoze, 8; son Edan, 5; female Yangjian, 30; her daughter Ercejiu, 7; youngest daughter Cebai, 5; male Pubu, 24; Zhuma, 48, wife of Jiajiaerna; his fifth son Dongshaze, 18; female Zhuoke, 31; male Sangyou; male Nima Zhaxi; male Wangqiu Duobuqin, 47; female Caidan Zhuma, 46; female Aze, 28; Guo Zhupuda; Baima Wangqiu’s family (4 people) from Suomaer’s wife … total 25 men and women. Hereafter they belong to the Senba tribe.

Serfs of the Senba tribe: Ga Zhijue Zha, 37; relative Angwang Qiangba, 23; Muda, 14, son of Caidan; Ajiu, 34, daughter‑in‑law of Qiudaer; substitute for son of Caobao; female Laangque, 28; Luze, 34, son of Dandajiu; substitute for son of Suonawangqiu; female Cairen Quezuomu, 37; her daughter Baicao, 15; second daughter Yangji, 13; third daughter Queying Gedan, 4; fourth daughter Sangmaimai, 1; total 5 females in one family. Baima Nanjie, son of Cedaer; Zhuyundan, 20, son‑in‑law of Lalong A’mu’s sister; Baima Nanjie, 4, son of Taercuo; female guest, 76; male Luosang Kezhu, 35; Gongga Zhadu, 5, son of Mudi … total 25 men and women. Hereafter they belong to the Aba tribe.

Represented by the hundred‑household heads and genbu of both sides, after full consultation, an equitable exchange of serfs was carried out. Henceforth each serf and all his/her property belong to the new lord, and the original lord may not interfere. Neither side may violate the agreed terms. If one side violates or deceives, the other side will appeal to the supreme judge, and according to the Dalai Lama’s order, thorough punishment will be carried out.}

[6] Duoji Cairang, & Zhang Jianghua. (1996). 西藏封建农奴制社会形态 {The social formation of the feudal serf system in Tibet}. China Tibetology Publishing House.

"( 四 ) 抽调去当 “ 差若 ” 。 “ 差若 ” ( 意为助差者 ) 。按规定 , 每户差巴应有一定数量的劳动力 ( 例如工布则拉岗宗规定是 4 个 ) 。如果劳力不够 , 领主就抽调另外的差巴或堆穷补齐 , 以使这家差巴能够支差。实际上都是由穷苦户中抽人到富裕的大差巴家助差。被指派的农奴要离开自己的家庭 , 算作被补差巴家里的人 , 但在这家中只有干活的义务 , 而没有家人的权利 , 与囊生差不多。被抽走的人往往一直干到年老力衰后才被放回。如 1958 年囊色林一个谿卡中就有 46 个差若 , 其中直接由差巴、堆穷家中抽调者有 14 人 , 其余是破产和逃亡后被抓回的农奴。与此相类似的还有领主指定并家 , 即令一家面临破产的差巴与另一家合并。总之 , 领主可以任意拆散一个家庭或合并不同的家庭。“ (p. 143)

{(4) Transferring people to serve as “chairo”. Chairo means “helper for the cha payment”. According to the regulations, each trakpa household was required to have a certain number of laborers (for example, in Gongbo Zêlagang Dzong the requirement was 4). If a household lacked enough laborers, the lord would transfer additional trakpa or dudchung to make up the number, so that the trakpa household could perform its cha duties. In practice, poor households were always the ones transferred to work for wealthy, large trakpa households as auxiliary labor. The designated serf had to leave his own family and was counted as a member of the assisted household, but he had only the obligation to work there and none of the rights of a family member – much like a nangsheng. Those who were transferred often remained until they were old and infirm before being released. For example, in 1958, one shöka of Nangselin had 46 chairo, of which 14 were directly transferred from trakpa and dudchung households, and the rest were bankrupt or captured fugitive serfs. Similar to this was the lord’s ordering the merger of households, i.e., forcing a trakpa household on the verge of bankruptcy to merge with another household. In short, the lord could arbitrarily break up a family or merge different families.}

[7] Duoji Cairang, & Zhang Jianghua. (1996). 西藏封建农奴制社会形态 {The social formation of the feudal serf system in Tibet}. China Tibetology Publishing House.

"其美 ” 全称叫 “ 结美其美 ” ( 即不生不死制 ) 。这种形式的牲畜总量并不太多 , 但它却是一种较为普遍的剥削方式。办法是领主放给牧民 1 头牛或 1 只羊 , 规定牲畜生了幼畜归牧民 , 死了也不注销。一般 1 头牛年交酥油 2 克 , 1 只羊年交酥油 0.2 克或 1 两藏银 , 马交酥油 3 克。有的牛只交 1 克。这种形式的特点是强制性强 , 放其美的主要是噶厦或直接控制部落的领主 , 前者即官家放的最多 , 几乎遍及各地 , 称为 “ 雄止其美 ” 。牧户承接其美很少有自愿的 , 多是领主通过部落头人派放给有一定数量牲畜的牧户 , 因此它是不能任意退回的。放其美时并不一定给牧户真正可以繁殖生产的牲畜 , 不少是以公牛或老弱牛充数的 , 甚至以货币、茶叶等作价代替。“(p. 155)

{The full name of “Qimei” is “Jiemei Qimei” – the “neither birth nor death” system. The total number of livestock in this form was not very large, but it was a relatively common method of exploitation. The method was: the lord gave a herder one cow or one sheep, stipulating that any offspring born belonged to the herder, but if the animal died it was not written off. Generally, for one cow the annual butter payment was 2 ke; for one sheep, 0.2 ke or 1 tael of Tibetan silver; for a horse, 3 ke of butter. For some cows, only 1 ke was required. The characteristic of this form was its strong coerciveness. The main distributors of qimei were the Kashag or the lords who directly controlled the tribes. The government side issued the most, almost everywhere, calling it “Xiongzhi Qimei”. Herder households rarely accepted qimei voluntarily; it was usually assigned by the lord through the tribal headmen to herder households that already had a certain number of livestock, and it could not be arbitrarily refused. When issuing qimei, the lord did not necessarily give the herder a truly reproductive animal; many were bulls or old, weak cows, and some were substituted with cash, tea, or other goods.}

[8] Duoji Cairang, & Zhang Jianghua. (1996). 西藏封建农奴制社会形态 {The social formation of the feudal serf system in Tibet}. China Tibetology Publishing House.

"牧民承租所受的剥削是相当深重的 , 他们一年到头要精心放牧 , 生下牛犊养大后是畜主的 , 到了畜产品收获季节 , 打出的酥油 , 大部分是要留下来交租 ( “ 协玛尔 ” ) , 自己留下酸奶水和奶渣。如果只从酥油、奶渣、牛毛等畜产品计算 , 缴纳的畜租约占总产值的 60%—80% , 加上繁殖培养幼畜的产值 , 剥削率可达 80%—90% 。“ (p. 156)

{The exploitation suffered by herders who rented livestock was extremely heavy. They had to tend the herds carefully all year round; the calves they raised belonged to the livestock owner. When the livestock products were harvested, most of the butter they produced had to be handed over as rent (“shiemar”), leaving only the whey and cheese curds for themselves. If calculated only from livestock products such as butter, cheese curds, and hair, the rent paid accounted for about 60‑80% of the total output value. When the value of raising the young animals was added, the exploitation rate reached 80‑90%.}

[9] Duoji Cairang, & Zhang Jianghua. (1996). 西藏封建农奴制社会形态 {The social formation of the feudal serf system in Tibet}. China Tibetology Publishing House.

"第四节农奴主阶级和贫苦农奴收支实例

一. 庄园领主和代理人的经济收支

(一) 大贵族拉加里赤钦的收支

拉加里是西藏古老的贵族世家,全年的剥削收支在西藏大贵族中是有代表性的。他家有大小20多个庄园,经营方式分为两种:一是由赤钦派人管理,农具、耕牛和种子由庄园自备,给管理人员发工资或拨给一些土地为酬,庄稼直接收回。二是将庄园租给“孝折”等经营,各庄园的差巴“谿约”等劳力和牲畜由承租人支配。每年承租人按规定租额向赤钦交租,歉收自补,丰收归己。

这些庄园中,最小的有自营地60克,最多的有400克。将近一半的庄园,各有自营地200克左右。若以每个谿卡有自营地150克计算,总共有3000多克。按一般年景每克地产粮68克计,可收粮食约2-2.5万克,扣除耕畜饲料和庄园管理人所得,赤钦每年从谿卡自营地收入粮食约1.5-2万克。

除庄园自营地外还有很多出租地,大部租给差巴,少部分租给堆穷。藏历十月收租,收租的第一天要举行仪式,强佐戴黄色碗型帽,穿红藏袍,唱一段贺词后,装1克新青稞送赤钦过目。仪式毕才按账本上的数字一户户地收租,连收5天,可收5000克,加上别处所收1000多克,每年可收租粮6000-7000克。

牧业收入:拉加里有9处牛场,由孝折充任管家,有牧工45人,“东喀”(打酥油的木桶)43个。计有牦牛约3500头,其中公牦牛500头,母牦牛近3000头。当年生小牛的,年交酥油2克,去年生犊今年没有生的交酥油1克;前年生小牛,去年今年未生犊的交酥油0.5克;大前年生而以后三年未生的交酥油0.25克。不孕的奶牛不交酥油。1956年生小牛的母牛有1000多头,收酥油2000多克。其他近2000头母牦牛,收酥油1000克。每年总共收酥油3000多克。同时还可收到约400来克奶渣(每克约20斤)。

此外,还有3个羊场。其中一个有羊1500只,4个牧羊人;一个有羊800只,3个牧羊人;一个有羊400只,2个牧羊人,共有羊2700只。牧羊人全是堆穷,每人每年工资20克青稞,不准挤羊奶,羊毛全部交赤钦,每年可收羊毛500克。

上述牛羊全部是赤钦“放生”的牲畜,不准放牧者宰杀,牛羊得病或老死后,皮肉要上交赤钦,每年可收死牛羊400头(只)。

债利收入:每年放债粮1000克,另外常从噶厦借入转手贷出,从中获取债利,这两项约可收债利粮1000克。

以上农业、牧业及债利收入,总计每年可收入粮食两万多克,酥油3000克,奶渣400克,羊毛500克,死牛羊400头(只)。另有副产品氆氇、卡垫等尚未计入。

支出:第一,最多的是宗教开支。

(1) 达果札仓有喇嘛500人,每年藏历六七月中,在赤钦府念经1个月,在绒区赤钦另一住宅念经11天,共支出糌粑3000多克(合青稞2000克),盐碱40克,酥油500多克,茶650块。

(2) 达果札仓500多喇嘛在工布群科尔杰寺念经1个月,要供给糌粑2000克(合青稞1330克),酥油300多克。

(3) 哎地区9个寺院,除庙产早已由赤钦拨给外,每年还要补助青稞600克,酥油约100克。

(4) 哎地区大小寺庙13个,僧尼689人,每年藏历一月十三至十七日在拉加里举行祈祷禳灾法会,供给糌粑1000克(合青稞660克),茶200块,酥油120克,盐碱20克。

(5) 每月的八、十、十五、二十五、三十日要给佛、法、僧三宝上供,常年还要请喇嘛念消灾经,要用酥油300克,青稞500克,茶50块,盐碱10克。

(6) 按旧例每月给茹果却德等寺放茶两次,计酥油100克,茶150块,盐碱10克。

(7) 按早年的规定,每年要向拉萨甘丹寺交供奉酥油300克。

以上7项合计,在宗教方面每年要花青稞5100克,酥油1720克,茶1050块,盐碱80克。

第二,府内管理人员、仆役、牧工等的茶饭口粮开支。

强佐、聂巴、秘书、淳及赤钦随身侍从等,都来自“孝折”,即亲信待从人家,因已给予封地,所以来赤钦府服务,赤钦只供酥油茶、酒,不另发口粮。其他仆役,如丫鬟6人、炊事员4人、马夫1人、骡夫1人、裁缝5人、染匠3人、织垫工3人、织氆氇工6人、纺线工12人、挤奶2人、看房子2人、背水扫地7人、秤柴草2人、听差囊生5人、牧羊工9人、放牛工45人,以及绒区赤钦家里的仆役总共120多人。除裁缝每人每年的口粮是12克青稞、炊事员是18克青稞以外,其他每人每年的口粮均是20克青稞和1克15涅嘎酥油。合计每年约需开支青稞2500克,酥油180克,以及一些牛羊肉等。

第三,对噶厦的负担。

每年向包细列空交包细粮400克;早年欠噶厦青稞6000克,年交600克债利;每年向拉恰列空交酥油500克、青稞100克;向布达拉孜恰列空交酥油200克,共交青稞1100克,酥油700克。

第四,生产支出种子粮3000多克。

总计每年开支青稞1.17万克,酥油2600余克,茶叶1000多块。收支相抵后的余额如青稞1万多克,酥油400克等作为赤钦一家10口人的豪华生活消费,包括修缮林苑、亲朋往来与其他开支。①

(二) 领主代理人的经济收支

代理人一般是领主的亲信。西藏有一些藏语称“孝折”的人,意为侍从或仆从。大贵族世家都有一定数量的孝折户。如大贵族世家吞巴有孝折72户,多仁有孝折56户,拉加里有孝折29户,呼图克图等大活佛也有一定数量的孝折户,大农奴主可以从孝折中选任强佐、涅巴、仲译、措本和谿堆等管理人员,依靠他们去统治所属农奴。他们则靠为主人办事致富。领主封给孝折的土地,少的有10多克、多的有七八十克。家里只要有一人为主人办事即无其他负担。孝折也种一定数量的差地,但户主一般不参加劳动,而是派谿卡农奴、囊米或雇短工耕作。有职务的孝折,还获得领主一定数量的酬劳。也有一些孝折的生活不如一般的大差巴。领主代理人中更多的不是孝折,而是领主信任的大差巴。下面列举代理人(孝折)旺杰才旦的经济收支情况,他在领主代理人中是具有代表性的。

旺杰才旦家8口人,有自营地150克,牦牛200头,奶牛10头,耕牛6头,马6匹,驴20头;有百姓9户(50人)和20个囊米。百姓和囊米是拉加里随土地一起封与的,无偿为其耕种自营地。对赤钦家,旺杰才旦出一个差,即赤钦有事找他,要自备伙食去效劳,是忠顺的奴仆。但在群众面前他又高人一等,作威作福,群众尊称他为“色古学”(少爷)或“贡文”(老爷),对他弯腰吐舌,且要经常向他送礼。

他家有5个劳动力均不参加劳动。农牧生产和家务,主要由20个囊米负担。他家只供给粗劣的伙食,1年发给每人1件长衫或1套褂裤、1双鞋。春耕秋收,则向9户差民任意派差,且要他们自备工具和口粮,同时还要向他交一定数量的实物租。

据旺杰才旦讲,1956年他的自营地收青稞1008克,地租收入200克,共收粮食1200多克。有牦牛200头,1956年生小牛100多头,收酥油300克。还有担任措本的收入还未计算在内。扣除种子150克,支付囊米消耗360克,雇工25克,雇人支哎巴康差50克等,以及自己的消费,还剩余700克左右粮食,加上剩余的酥油,经济上是相当富裕的。①

充当代理人的大差巴,也有领主给予的特殊照顾。他们的剥削收入同样是可观的。所以占总人口3%的农奴主代理人,已变为压迫剥削广大农奴和奴隶的农奴主阶级。

二、贫苦农奴的一般经济收支

在农奴阶级中,贫苦农奴要占三分之二强。兹举两户以窥一斑。

(一) 贫苦差巴柳洛扎西的经济收支

日喀则宗艾马岗咱尼谿卡的柳洛扎西,男,家有4口人,他在1958年仍是雅鲁藏布江渡口的船工,该年实种份地34克。有老耕牛2头,老奶牛2头,马1匹,绵羊29只,猪1头。农具有犁1架,锄头1把,镰刀3把,背筐2个,四齿叉、二齿叉各1把。有一小院落住房。当年总收入240.5克青稞。其中农业收入137.6克青稞,副业收入24.5克青稞。渡船收入可观,可折合青稞78.4克。

全年支出287.7克青稞。其中(1)承担日喀则宗政府的地租合计为103.4克青稞。由于入不敷出,每年总有拖欠,要被宗政府抓去坐一段时间的牢房。(2)本人也说不清楚欠多少子孙债,已连交9年债息,每年要交债息15克青稞。(3)每年要请1位喇嘛念1次经,付出0.4克青稞。(4)生产投资、添补农具、修补渡船,请40天短工,需18.3克青稞。(5)生活消费150.6克青稞。

收支相抵,一年尚差50来克青稞。他家几年才能做1件新衣服,伙食低劣,生活十分贫苦。①

(二) 贫苦堆穷简阿的经济收支

墨竹工卡宗甲马谿卡堆穷简阿,男,家有8口人,妻子算半个劳动力,有6个孩子。种堆穷囊冈地3克,向谿卡出半个乌拉差,每年计出180人/日。因无畜力,家里只有一个半劳动力,故只能种半克土地,剩下的2.5克地,租给别人种,收获后平分。收获物全部用于还债。原有1头黄牛,在不出乌拉时隔1天可上山打1次柴,换5哲青稞,做全家人两天的口粮。因债主逼债,牛被强行抵了债。1955年简阿被迫把15岁的大女儿卖给别人,卖价只6克青稞。欠债40多克,多数是欠甘丹寺的,每年要付出债利8克青稞。家中有1口铝锅、1个瓦锅、两个陶壶、1把木勺和一断把的铜勺。全家只有1条破垫子,盖几张破羊皮。生活来源:一是当雇工,1天可得3哲青稞做稀粥,全家8口人喝。另外他接手“背尸”去葬场的工作。原来一位背尸老人死后,穷人们争着背,最后商定由简阿背。背送到天葬场,死者的衣服归背尸者,好衣可以卖,旧衣自己穿。1年可背三四个死人。较富裕的死者家,要给1克青稞为酬。为穷户背尸可得5两藏银。

全家1年最多能买1克酥油、4块沱茶。平时无肉菜,没有茶,只用水搅拌豌豆糌粑。1956年藏历年,简阿借粮买了1只羊腿,答应做工偿还。为求吉利,过年第一天在家中吃,早上吃面疙瘩,喝3次酥油茶,下午喝稀粥。翌日即外出乞讨“醃”(青稞酒)和“卡不赛”(油炸面果子)吃。平时每天要喝1次稀粥。穿死人衣,大人穿坏了改给小孩穿。①

像上列两家贫苦差巴、堆穷的情况在西藏的农奴中是多数,还有不少家破人亡、逃亡乞讨的农奴。与大贵族世家的生活相比,一个是天堂一个是地狱。从农奴主阶级和农奴阶级的经济收支和生活对比中,可以看到西藏封建庄园制的一个缩影。(p. 219-225)

{Section 4 – Examples of Income and Expenditure of the Serf‑Owner Class and Poor Serfs

1. Economic income and expenditure of manor lords and their agents

(1) Income and expenditure of the great noble Ragyi Chikyen

Ragyi was an ancient aristocratic family in Tibet, and its annual exploitation income and expenditure were representative among the great Tibetan nobles. The family owned more than 20 large and small manors, operated in two ways: first, Chikyen sent people to manage them, with farm tools, oxen, and seeds provided by the manor itself; managers were paid wages or given some land as compensation, and the harvest was taken directly. Second, the manor was leased to xiaoze (trusted attendants) for operation; the labor (such as trakpa and xiyue) and livestock in each manor were at the disposal of the lessee. Each year the lessee paid rent to Chikyen according to the specified amount; if the harvest was poor, he made up the shortfall; if abundant, the surplus was his.

Among these manors, the smallest had 60 ke of demesne land, the largest 400 ke. Nearly half of the manors each had about 200 ke of demesne land. Calculating an average of 150 ke of demesne land per manor, the total was more than 3,000 ke. Based on an average yield of 68 ke of grain per ke of land in a normal year, the harvest was about 20,000‑25,000 ke. After deducting livestock feed and the income of manor stewards, Chikyen’s annual grain income from the demesne land of the manors was about 15,000‑20,000 ke.

In addition to the demesne land, there was much leased land, mostly rented to trakpa, with a small portion rented to dudchung. Rent was collected in the tenth month of the Tibetan calendar. On the first day of collection, a ceremony was held: the qiangzho wore a yellow bowl‑shaped hat and a red Tibetan robe, sang a congratulatory speech, then filled one ke of new barley for Chikyen’s inspection. After the ceremony, rent was collected from each household according to the accounts, continuing for five days, bringing in 5,000 ke. Together with more than 1,000 ke collected elsewhere, annual rent grain came to 6,000‑7,000 ke.

Livestock income: Ragyi had nine yak farms, with xiaoze acting as stewards, 45 herders, and 43 butter churns. There were about 3,500 yaks, including 500 males and nearly 3,000 females. For cows that calved that year, the annual butter payment was 2 ke; for those that calved the previous year but not this year, 1 ke; for those that calved the year before last but not in the last two years, 0.5 ke; for those that calved three years ago and then not for three years, 0.25 ke. Barren cows paid no butter. In 1956, more than 1,000 cows calved, yielding over 2,000 ke of butter. The other nearly 2,000 female yaks yielded 1,000 ke of butter. Total annual butter income was over 3,000 ke. At the same time, about 400 ke of cheese curds (about 20 jin per ke) were also collected.

There were also three sheep farms. One had 1,500 sheep with 4 shepherds; another had 800 sheep with 3 shepherds; another had 400 sheep with 2 shepherds – a total of 2,700 sheep. The shepherds were all dudchung, each paid an annual wage of 20 ke of barley. They were not allowed to milk the sheep, and all wool was turned over to Chikyen, yielding 500 ke of wool annually.

All the above yaks and sheep were Chikyen’s “released life” animals; herders were not permitted to slaughter them. When animals fell ill or died of old age, their hides and meat were handed over to Chikyen, yielding about 400 dead yaks and sheep per year.

Usury income: Each year 1,000 ke of grain were lent out. Additionally, Chikyen often borrowed from the Kashag and reloaned the money, profiting from the interest. These two sources together yielded about 1,000 ke of interest grain annually.

Summing up the income from agriculture, livestock, and usury, the annual total was more than 20,000 ke of grain, 3,000 ke of butter, 400 ke of cheese curds, 500 ke of wool, and 400 dead yaks and sheep. Sideline products such as pulu (Tibetan woolen fabric) and carpets are not included.

Expenditure: First, the largest expenditure was on religion.

(1) Daguo Zhacang Monastery had 500 lamas. Every year in the sixth and seventh months of the Tibetan calendar, they recited sutras for one month at Chikyen’s mansion, and for 11 days at his other residence in Rong district. Total expenditure: more than 3,000 ke of tsampa (equivalent to 2,000 ke of barley), 40 ke of salt and alkali, more than 500 ke of butter, and 650 bricks of tea.

(2) The 500‑plus lamas of Daguo Zhacang recited sutras for one month at Gongbu Qunkerje Monastery, requiring 2,000 ke of tsampa (equivalent to 1,330 ke of barley) and more than 300 ke of butter.

(3) In Ai District, there were 9 monasteries. In addition to temple properties long since allocated by Chikyen, he annually provided a subsidy of 600 ke of barley and about 100 ke of butter.

(4) Ai District had 13 large and small monasteries with 689 monks and nuns. Every year from the 13th to the 17th of the first Tibetan month, a prayer and disaster‑averting ceremony was held at Ragyi, requiring 1,000 ke of tsampa (660 ke of barley), 200 bricks of tea, 120 ke of butter, and 20 ke of salt and alkali.

(5) On the 8th, 10th, 15th, 25th, and 30th of each month, offerings were made to the Buddha, Dharma, and Sangha. Throughout the year, lamas were also invited to recite sutras for disaster relief, consuming 300 ke of butter, 500 ke of barley, 50 bricks of tea, and 10 ke of salt and alkali.

(6) According to old custom, twice a month tea was offered to Rugu Quede and other monasteries, costing 100 ke of butter, 150 bricks of tea, and 10 ke of salt and alkali.

(7) According to early regulations, 300 ke of butter were offered annually to Ganden Monastery in Lhasa.

Summing up the above seven items, religious expenditures each year were 5,100 ke of barley, 1,720 ke of butter, 1,050 bricks of tea, and 80 ke of salt and alkali.

Second, food and ration expenses for mansion managers, servants, herders, etc.

The qiangzho, nieba, secretaries, attendants, and Chikyen’s personal retinue all came from xiaoze families – trusted attendant households. Because they had already been granted fiefs, when they served in Chikyen’s mansion they were only provided with butter tea and wine, not additional rations. Other servants: 6 maids, 4 cooks, 1 groom, 1 muleteer, 5 tailors, 3 dyers, 3 carpet weavers, 6 pulu weavers, 12 spinners, 2 milkmaids, 2 house‑watchers, 7 water‑carriers and sweepers, 2 firewood weighers, 5 errand nangsheng, 9 shepherds, 45 yak herders, plus servants at Chikyen’s Rong mansion – altogether more than 120 people. Except for tailors, who received 12 ke of barley per person per year, and cooks, who received 18 ke, all others received 20 ke of barley and 1 ke 15 niega of butter per person per year. Total annual expenditure: about 2,500 ke of barley, 180 ke of butter, and some beef and mutton.

Third, obligations to the Kashag.

Each year 400 ke of grain were paid to the Baoxi Liekong; an old debt of 6,000 ke of barley to the Kashag required 600 ke annual interest; to the Laqia Liekong: 500 ke of butter and 100 ke of barley; to the Potala Ziqia Liekong: 200 ke of butter. Total payments: 1,100 ke of barley and 700 ke of butter.

Fourth, production expenditure – seed grain: more than 3,000 ke.

Total annual expenditure: 11,700 ke of barley, more than 2,600 ke of butter, and more than 1,000 bricks of tea. The surplus after income and expenditure – such as more than 10,000 ke of barley and 400 ke of butter – was used for the luxurious living expenses of Chikyen’s family of 10 people, including repairing the garden, entertaining relatives and friends, and other expenditures.①

(2) Economic income and expenditure of a lord’s agent

Agents were generally the lord’s trusted people. In Tibet, there were people called xiaoze, meaning attendants or servants. Great aristocratic families all had a certain number of xiaoze households. For example, the great aristocratic family Tunba had 72 xiaoze households, Doren had 56, Ragyi had 29. The great khutuktu and other high tulkus also had a certain number of xiaoze households. Great serf‑owners could select stewards, managers, secretaries, and manor heads from among the xiaoze, relying on them to rule their serfs. These agents enriched themselves by serving their masters. The land enfeoffed to a xiaoze ranged from a little over 10 ke to 70‑80 ke. As long as one person in the household served the master, there were no other obligations. Xiaoze also cultivated some cha land, but the household head generally did not work; instead, he used the manor’s serfs, nangmi, or hired short‑term laborers to farm. Xiaoze who held official positions also received a certain amount of compensation from the lord. Some xiaoze lived less well than ordinary large trakpa. Most lord’s agents were not xiaoze but rather large trakpa trusted by the lord. Below is an example of the income and expenditure of an agent (xiaoze) named Wangjie Caidan, who was representative of lord’s agents.

Wangjie Caidan’s family had 8 people, 150 ke of demesne land, 200 yaks, 10 dairy cows, 6 plow oxen, 6 horses, 20 donkeys; 9 commoner households (50 people) and 20 nangmi. The commoners and nangmi had been enfeoffed together with the land by Ragyi and worked his demesne land without compensation. Toward the Chikyen family, Wangjie Caidan provided a cha service: whenever Chikyen had a matter requiring his attendance, he had to go with his own provisions and serve as a loyal servant. But before the common people, he was above them, throwing his weight around; they respectfully called him “Seguxue” (young master) or “Gongwen” (lord), bowed to him with their tongues out, and often had to give him gifts.

His family had 5 laborers, none of whom did any work. Agricultural and pastoral production and household chores were mainly borne by the 20 nangmi, to whom the family gave only coarse food, and once a year each received a long gown or a set of jacket and trousers, and a pair of shoes. During spring plowing and autumn harvest, he arbitrarily sent the 9 commoner households to do corvée, requiring them to bring their own tools and food, and also made them pay a certain amount of rent in kind.

According to Wangjie Caidan, in 1956 his demesne land produced 1,008 ke of barley, and land rent brought in 200 ke – a total of more than 1,200 ke of grain. He had 200 yaks; in 1956 more than 100 calves were born, and he collected 300 ke of butter. His income from serving as a cuoben was not included. After deducting 150 ke for seed, 360 ke for the nangmi’s consumption, 25 ke for hired labor, 50 ke for hiring people to perform the Aiba Kangcha obligation, and his own consumption, he still had about 700 ke of grain left, plus surplus butter – economically quite well off.①

Large trakpa who acted as agents also received special favors from the lords. Their exploitative income was also considerable. Thus the agents of the serf‑owners, who made up 3% of the total population, had become part of the serf‑owner class oppressing and exploiting the vast numbers of serfs and slaves.

2. General economic income and expenditure of poor serfs

Among the serf class, poor serfs accounted for more than two‑thirds. Two examples are given below to illustrate.

(1) Income and expenditure of a poor trakpa: Liuluo Zhaxi

Liuluo Zhaxi of Aima Gangzani Manor, Shigatse Dzong, male, family of 4. In 1958 he was still a ferryman on the Yarlung Tsangpo River. That year he actually cultivated 34 ke of allotment land. He had 2 old plow oxen, 2 old dairy cows, 1 horse, 29 sheep, and 1 pig. His farm tools included 1 plow, 1 hoe, 3 sickles, 2 back‑baskets, 1 four‑pronged fork, and 1 two‑pronged fork. He had a small courtyard house. Total annual income: 240.5 ke of barley. Among this, agricultural income was 137.6 ke of barley, sideline income 24.5 ke of barley. Ferry income was considerable, equivalent to 78.4 ke of barley.

Total annual expenditure: 287.7 ke of barley. Among this: (1) Land rent paid to the Shigatse Dzong government amounted to 103.4 ke of barley. Because of the annual deficit, he always fell into arrears and was imprisoned by the Dzong government for a period each year. (2) He himself did not know how much in “grandchildren’s debts” he owed; he had already paid interest for 9 consecutive years, at 15 ke of barley per year. (3) Each year he hired a lama to recite sutras once, costing 0.4 ke of barley. (4) Production investments, tool repairs, ferry repairs, and hiring a short‑term worker for 40 days required 18.3 ke of barley. (5) Living expenses: 150.6 ke of barley.

Income minus expenditure left a deficit of about 50 ke of barley. His family could afford a new garment only once every several years. Their food was poor, their life extremely hard.①

(2) Income and expenditure of a poor dudchung: Jian A

Jian A of Jiama Manor, Mêdogungkar Dzong, male, family of 8 (his wife counted as half a laborer, 6 children). He cultivated 3 ke of dudchung nangang land and owed the manor half an ula labor obligation, totaling 180 person‑days per year. With no animal power and only one and a half laborers in the family, he could only cultivate half a ke of land; the remaining 2.5 ke were rented to others, with the harvest split equally. All of his share was used to repay debts. He originally had one yellow ox; on days when he had no ula duty, he could go up the mountain every other day to collect firewood, trading it for 5 zhe of barley (enough for two days’ food for the whole family). When creditors pressed him, the ox was forcibly taken to pay the debt. In 1955, Jian A was forced to sell his 15‑year‑old eldest daughter for only 6 ke of barley. He owed more than 40 ke of barley, most of it to Ganden Monastery, paying 8 ke of barley in annual interest. His household possessions consisted of one aluminum pot, one earthen pot, two clay kettles, one wooden ladle, and one copper ladle with a broken handle. The whole family had only one torn felt mat to sleep on and covered themselves with a few torn sheepskins.

Sources of livelihood: He worked as a hired laborer, earning 3 zhe of barley per day, which was made into thin porridge for all 8 family members. He also took up the work of carrying corpses to the burial ground. After an old corpse‑carrier died, the poor people competed for the job, finally agreeing that Jian A would do it. He carried corpses to the sky burial ground; the deceased’s clothes belonged to the carrier – good clothes could be sold, worn‑out ones he wore himself. He could carry three or four corpses a year. Families of relatively wealthy deceased gave him 1 ke of barley as a reward; for poor families he received 5 taels of Tibetan silver.

The family could buy at most 1 ke of butter and 4 bricks of tea per year. Usually they had no meat or vegetables, and no tea – only water mixed with pea tsampa. During the Tibetan New Year of 1956, Jian A borrowed grain and bought a sheep leg, promising to repay with labor. For good luck, on the first day of the New Year he ate at home: in the morning dough‑drop soup and three cups of butter tea, in the afternoon thin porridge. The next day he went begging for chang (barley wine) and kabsai (fried dough twists). Every day his family had one meal of thin porridge. They wore clothes taken from the dead; when adults wore them out, they were altered for the children.①

Situations like those of the two poor trakpa and dudchung families above were the majority among Tibetan serfs. There were also many serfs whose families were destroyed and who fled to beg. Compared with the life of great aristocratic families, one was heaven and the other hell. From the contrast in economic income, expenditure, and living standards between the serf‑owner class and the serf class, we can see a microcosm of the Tibetan feudal manor system. (p. 219-225)}

[10] Duoji Cairang, & Zhang Jianghua. (1996). 西藏封建农奴制社会形态 {The social formation of the feudal serf system in Tibet}. China Tibetology Publishing House.

"本编介绍的是⻄藏封建农奴制社会的经济制度｡

公元 1 0 世纪到 1 3 世纪 , ⻄藏由奴⾪制社会过渡到封建社会｡

逐步建⽴起来的封建领主庄园制 , ⼀直延续到 2 0 世纪中叶｡

⻄藏封建农奴制社会经济基础的核⼼是封建⼟地所有制｡

它分为三个层次 : 1 . 中央政权拥有最⾼所有权 , 对⻄藏的重

要⾸领 , 可以直接封赐或没收⼟地｡ 2 . 政教合⼀的⻄藏地⽅

政府享有⾼⼀级的⽀配权 , 它把⼀部分⼟地拨给下属机构经

营 , 其余的⼟地封给寺院和贵族 , 并可以找各种理由将⼟地收

回｡ 3 . 直接占有和经营⼟地的是官家､寺院､贵族三⼤领主｡" (p. 289)

{This part has described the economic system of Tibetan feudal serf society. From the 10th century to the 13th century, Tibet transitioned from a slave society to a feudal society. The feudal lord‑manor system that gradually developed lasted until the middle of the 20th century. The core of the economic base of Tibetan feudal serf society was feudal land ownership. It had three levels: 1. The central government held the highest ownership and could directly grant or confiscate land from important Tibetan leaders. 2. The theocratic local government of Tibet enjoyed a higher level of control. It allocated part of the land to its subordinate institutions for management, and enfeoffed the remaining land to monasteries and nobles, and could take land back on various grounds. 3. The direct possessors and managers of the land were the three great lords: the government (officialdom), monasteries, and nobles.}

[11] Duoji Cairang, & Zhang Jianghua. (1996). 西藏封建农奴制社会形态 {The social formation of the feudal serf system in Tibet}. China Tibetology Publishing House.

"三⼤领主占有的耕地中 , 约有三分之⼀是使⽤所属农奴的⽆偿劳

役直接经营的｡其余的⼟地以份地的⽅式分给农奴耕种或者出

租｡" (p. 289)

{Of the cultivated land possessed by the three great lords, about one‑third was managed directly using the unpaid labor of their serfs. The remaining land was distributed to serfs as allotments for cultivation or was rented out.}

[12] Duoji Cairang, & Zhang Jianghua. (1996). 西藏封建农奴制社会形态 {The social formation of the feudal serf system in Tibet}. China Tibetology Publishing House.

"三⼤领主在占有⼟地的基础上不完全占有所属农奴的⼈⾝｡当某些⼟地的占有权有变动时 ( 这是指封赐､赠与､出租

或没收 , 但不准许⾃由买卖⼟地 ) , 农奴就随同⼟地⼀起⾪属

于新的领主｡领主对农奴进⾏严密控制 , 农奴的出⽣和死亡都

要及时登记在册｡农奴由于婚姻､谋⽣等原因被获准离开原居

住地 , 也要每年向所属领主交纳⼈头税 , 保持⼈⾝⾪属关系｡" (p. 289-290)

{On the basis of their land ownership, the three great lords incompletely possessed the persons of their serfs. When the ownership of certain land changed (this refers to enfeoffment, gifts, lease, or confiscation — but free buying and selling of land was not permitted), the serfs passed together with the land to the new lord. The lords exercised strict control over the serfs: the birth and death of every serf had to be promptly registered. Serfs who were permitted to leave their original place of residence due to marriage, livelihood, or other reasons still had to pay an annual poll tax to their affiliated lord, thereby maintaining the personal bond of dependency.}

[13] Duoji Cairang, & Zhang Jianghua. (1996). 西藏封建农奴制社会形态 {The social formation of the feudal serf system in Tibet}. China Tibetology Publishing House.

"三⼤领主对农奴的剥削主要是强制性的地租和⾼利贷｡地租

的形式 , 藏语称为 “ 差乌拉 ” , 或统称为 “ 差 ” ｡按⽀差的⽅式可

分为两⼤类｡

⼀类是 “ 冈卓 ” , 意为⽤腿⾛路 , 即⼈役和畜役｡另

⼀类是 “ 拉顿 ” , 意为⽤⼿奉献 , 即以实物为主和少部分货币｡农

奴对地⽅政府和三⼤领主这两个层次⽀付的差乌拉 , 在观念上有

明确的区分 , 因此差乌拉⼜分为外差和内差｡外差是农奴对政府

⽀付的租税 , 主要是给⻄藏地⽅政府 , 也包括少量为中央王朝驻

藏⼤⾂⽀付的租税｡地⽅政府按⽀差单位 “ 冈 ” 或 “ 顿 ” 拨给农

奴差冈地 ( 摊派兵役则拨给玛冈地即兵役差地 ) , 但这类⼟地不是

直接给予农奴 , ⽽是包括在对领主的封地之中并在封地⽂书中写

明 , 再由领主分配给⽀差的农奴｡内差是农奴给所属领主⽀付的

劳役､实物或货币 , 由领主拨给份地耕种｡在实际⽣活中 , 由于

这两个层次的差地都由领主拨给农奴 , 所以在⼟地界限上并不明

确｡每个⽀差单位的⼟地⾯积由领主规定 , 各地差异很⼤｡差的

名⽬繁多 , 领主可以随时增加 , 包括全年的农业⽥间劳役和各种

实物或折成货币｡可以说领主想要什么或当地可能产出什么 , 就

会有相应名⽬的差 , 统计起来不下⼏百种之多｡" (p. 290)

{The exploitation of serfs by the three great lords was carried out mainly through compulsory land rent and usury. The form of land rent is called chawula in Tibetan, or simply cha. According to the manner in which the cha was rendered, it can be divided into two broad categories. One category is gangzhuo, meaning “walking with the legs” — i.e., human corvée and animal transport. The other category is ladun, meaning “offering with the hands” — i.e., goods (mostly in kind) and a small portion of money. The serfs made a clear conceptual distinction between the chawula they paid to the local government and that paid to the three great lords. Thus chawula is further divided into outer‑cha and inner‑cha. Outer‑cha was the rent and tax paid by serfs to the government, mainly to the local government of Tibet, but also including a small amount paid to the imperial resident minister of the central dynasty. The local government allocated chagang land (or magang land, i.e., military service land, when military service was levied) to serfs according to the payment unit gang or dun. However, this type of land was not given directly to the serfs; it was included in the fiefs granted to the lords and specified in the fief documents, and then the lords distributed it to the serfs who owed the cha. Inner‑cha was the labor, goods, or money paid by serfs to their immediate lord, who in return gave them allotments of land to cultivate. In actual practice, because both levels of cha land were allocated to serfs by the lords, the boundaries between the two types of land were not clearly drawn. The area of land per cha payment unit was set by the lords and varied greatly from place to place. The categories of cha were numerous, and lords could add to them at any time. They included year‑round agricultural labor in the fields, as well as various goods (or their cash equivalents). One could say that whatever the lords wanted, or whatever the locality could produce, a corresponding cha category would appear; there were no fewer than several hundred kinds in total.}

[14] Duoji Cairang, & Zhang Jianghua. (1996). 西藏封建农奴制社会形态 {The social formation of the feudal serf system in Tibet}. China Tibetology Publishing House.

"三⼤领主都放⾼利贷 , 包括粮⻝和货币｡农奴中除极其贫

困者⽆⼈愿意贷给之外 , ⽋债是普遍的现象｡⽋债的年代久､

数量⼤ , 很多已成为⼦孙债｡⾼利贷是三⼤领主重要的剥削⼿

段 , 同时⼜以此束缚农奴 , 避免农奴因⽣活⽆着⽽逃亡 , 是保

证领主有稳定的剥削对象的重要⼿段｡" (p. 290-291)

{All three great lords engaged in usury, including loans of grain and money. With the exception of the extremely impoverished serfs, whom no one was willing to lend to, indebtedness was a universal phenomenon. Debts were old and large in amount; many became debts passed down from generation to generation. Usury was an important means of exploitation for the three great lords, and at the same time it bound the serfs, preventing them from fleeing due to destitution. It was a crucial means of ensuring the lords had a stable pool of people to exploit.}

[15]

"庄园是三⼤领主在农业区的基层经济单位 , 是⾃给⾃⾜⾃

然经济的基层组织 , 同时具有⼀定的司法权｡庄园制度包括了

⼟地管理制度､农奴制度和劳役制度｡封赐给寺院和贵族的⼟

地和农奴都是以庄园为单位的｡规模⼤的庄园在⾏政上具有宗

( 相当于县 ) 的地位｡" (p. 291)

{The manor was the basic economic unit of the three great lords in agricultural areas, the grassroots organization of a self‑sufficient natural economy, and also possessed a certain degree of judicial authority. The manor system included the land management system, the serf system, and the corvée system. The land and serfs enfeoffed to monasteries and nobles were all organized in manors. Large manors had the administrative status of a dzong (roughly equivalent to a county).}

[16] Duoji Cairang, & Zhang Jianghua. (1996). 西藏封建农奴制社会形态 {The social formation of the feudal serf system in Tibet}. China Tibetology Publishing House.

"⻄藏封建农奴制社会的阶级结构包括农奴主阶级和农奴阶

级 , 没有其他⾃由⺠｡

农奴主阶级占⻄藏总⼈⼝的 5 % 左右 , 占有全部⼟地和农

奴｡农奴主阶级分为官家､寺院､贵族三⼤领主和农奴主代理

⼈两个层次｡官家是⻄藏政教合⼀的封建地⽅政府 , 其中的上

层官员由贵族和上层僧侣组成｡寺院领主的成员包括活佛等上

层僧侣 , 其中有的来⾃贵族家庭 , 有的则是由于在寺院中的地位⽽成为贵族的｡贵族都占有庄园 , 具有世袭的社会地位｡到

2 0 世纪中叶共有贵族 2 0 0 家左右 , 其中⼤贵族 2 5 家 , 中等贵

族 2 6 家｡此外 , 牧区中的世袭千户也属于贵族｡农奴主代理

⼈是原来出身于农奴阶级 , 但后来成为领主的⼤⼩管家或头

⼈ , 代表领主直接统治和剥削农奴｡他们⾃⼰也有⼤量剥削收

⼊ , 因此已分化成为农奴主阶级的组成部分｡" (p. 291-292)

{The class structure of Tibetan feudal serf society consisted of the serf‑owner class and the serf class. There were no other free people. The serf‑owner class made up about 5% of Tibet’s total population and owned all the land and serfs. The serf‑owner class was divided into two levels: the three great lords (government, monasteries, nobles) and the agents of the serf‑owners. The government (officialdom) was the theocratic feudal local government of Tibet, and its high‑ranking officials consisted of nobles and high‑ranking monks. The monastery lords included high‑ranking monks such as tulkus (reincarnated lamas); some of them came from aristocratic families, while others became nobles because of their position within the monastery. The nobles all possessed manors and held hereditary social status. By the middle of the 20th century, there were about 200 noble families, of which 25 were great nobles and 26 were medium nobles. In addition, the hereditary thousand‑household heads in the pastoral areas also belonged to the nobility. The agents of the serf‑owners were originally from the serf class but later became the lords’ major or minor stewards or headmen, directly ruling and exploiting the serfs on the lords’ behalf. They themselves also derived large amounts of exploitative income, and thus had become part of the serf‑owner class.}

[17] Duoji Cairang, & Zhang Jianghua. (1996). 西藏封建农奴制社会形态 {The social formation of the feudal serf system in Tibet}. China Tibetology Publishing House.

"农奴阶级｡他们的⼈身都分别⾪属于三⼤领主｡主要包括

差巴､堆穷和囊⽣三个等第｡

差巴 , 领种差地的⼈｡主要是⽀外差 , 有些领主也要他们

⽀内差｡差地可以继承｡其中有少部分差巴⽐较富裕 , 也有些

剥削 , ⼤多数则⽐较贫困｡差巴破产后则论为堆穷甚⾄囊⽣｡

堆穷 , 意为⼩户｡从领主或差巴处租种少量⼟地 , ⽣活贫

困 , 常常靠出卖劳动⼒维持⽣活｡

囊⽣ , 没有个⼈经济 , 住在主⼈家⾥ , 负担家内劳役和⽥

间劳役｡地位类似奴仆与隶｡领主､差巴都可以占有囊⽣｡" (p. 292)

{The serf class. Their persons were respectively attached to the three great lords. They mainly consisted of three estates: trakpa, dudchung, and nangsheng. Trakpa – those who held cha land. They mainly performed outer‑cha, though some lords also required them to perform inner‑cha. The cha land could be inherited. A small number of trakpa were relatively well‑off and themselves practiced some exploitation, but the majority were quite poor. When a trakpa went bankrupt, he fell to the status of dudchung or even nangsheng. Dudchung – meaning “small household.” They rented tiny plots of land from lords or from trakpa. They lived in poverty and often had to sell their labor to survive. Nangsheng – they had no individual economy of their own, lived in their master’s house, and performed domestic chores and field labor. Their status was similar to that of servants or slaves. Both lords and trakpa could own nangsheng.}

[18] Duoji Cairang, & Zhang Jianghua. (1996). 西藏封建农奴制社会形态 {The social formation of the feudal serf system in Tibet}. China Tibetology Publishing House.

"最初的等级划分本应与阶级划分是⼀致的 , 但随着社会经

济的发展 , 在阶级之间和等级之间都出现了⼈员流动｡少数⾮

贵族的⼈员被认定是转世活佛或者在寺院中升到较⾼职位者则

可列⼈贵族等级｡个别的⼤富商也可以成为贵族｡在昌都地区

政教合⼀的呼图克图系统中 , 已分化出⼀些当地的⼩贵族 , 但

还没有进⼈⻄藏贵族世家的⾏列｡前述的农奴主代理⼈在阶级

地位上已进⼈农奴主阶级 , 但还没有突破等级界限 , 不能具有

贵族身份｡另⼀⽅⾯ , 如阿⾥地区古代贵族的后裔已沦为农

奴｡历代被封为贵族的有 4 0 0 家之多 , 到 2 0 世纪 5 0 年代只剩

下了⼀半｡在近代 , 农奴阶级中的各等第主要趋向是因贫困破

产向下流动 , 反映出⻄藏封建农奴制的⽇趋衰败｡" (p. 292)

{Originally, the estate divisions ought to have been consistent with the class divisions. However, with socioeconomic development, there was movement of people both between classes and between estates. A small number of non‑nobles who were identified as reincarnated tulkus, or who rose to high positions within monasteries, could be admitted to the noble estate. Occasionally, a very wealthy merchant could also become a noble. In the theocratic khutuktu system of the Qamdo region, some local petty nobles had differentiated themselves, but they had not yet entered the ranks of the Tibetan aristocratic houses. The aforementioned agents of the serf‑owners had, in terms of class status, entered the serf‑owner class, but they had not broken through the estate boundaries and could not acquire noble status. On the other hand, the descendants of ancient nobles in, for example, the Ngari region had fallen into the serf class. Altogether, over 400 families had been enfeoffed as nobles over the ages, but by the 1950s only half remained. In modern times, the overall trend among the different estates within the serf class was downward mobility due to impoverishment and bankruptcy, reflecting the growing decay of Tibetan feudal serf society.}

[19] Duoji Cairang, & Zhang Jianghua. (1996). 西藏封建农奴制社会形态 {The social formation of the feudal serf system in Tibet}. China Tibetology Publishing House.

“第三编政治制度和社会组织 – 第二章地方政权

二、郡王制时期 (1718‑1750)

这个时期，清朝中央政府为推进全国统一，直接派兵平定蒙古准噶尔部攻占西藏之乱，设置驻藏大臣，废除“第悉”职务，设4名“噶伦”，任用藏族世俗领袖人物管理西藏。

公元1717年，住在伊犁的蒙古准噶尔部首领策妄阿拉布坦派大将策零敦多布率兵6000，取道和阗，横穿藏北，突袭拉萨，杀拉藏汗。准噶尔军占领西藏后，废除拉藏汗所立的“达赖”意希嘉措，任命达孜巴·拉杰绕丁为第巴，掌管西藏政务。为平定准噶尔之乱，1720年，康熙皇帝任命皇子允禵为抚远大将军，督导大军由川、青二路入藏。此时，西藏的康济鼐、颇罗鼐等也率部配合清军，夹击准噶尔，使其逃回伊犁。清朝为顺应西藏僧俗大众的要求，将居住在西宁塔尔寺的达赖喇嘛的转世灵童——格桑嘉措护送进藏，册封为“弘法觉众第六辈达赖喇嘛”，赐金册金印。于是藏族史上出现3个第六世达赖（即仓央嘉措、意希嘉措和格桑嘉措），后来清朝承认仓央嘉措为第六世达赖，格桑嘉措为第七世。

清朝中央政府平定准噶尔之乱后，为彻底结束蒙古诸部在西藏角逐，拒绝继续册封固始汗的后裔为西藏的汗王，以避免蒙藏统治者之间争权夺利的斗争。于是清朝任用藏族世俗的领袖人物管理西藏。清朝中央政府对西藏的政策，转为直接的施政管理。1721年清朝废除独揽大权的第悉职务，由3名噶伦共同主管政务，1723年增为5名噶伦。封康济鼐、阿尔布巴为贝子，隆布鼐为辅国公，俱授为噶伦，颇罗鼐为台吉。1723年，升颇罗鼐和扎尔鼐二人为噶伦。1725年以康济鼐为首席噶伦，总理全藏事务。1727年西藏噶伦内部不和，代表前藏地方势力的阿尔布巴联合隆布鼐、扎尔鼐两噶伦杀死代表后藏地方势力的首席噶伦康济鼐。颇罗鼐台吉集结后藏、阿里藏军于1728年攻下拉萨，软禁阿尔布巴等人。清朝再次果断派兵进藏平息“噶伦内讧”，将阿尔布巴等3噶伦处决。

清朝平息1727年的“噶伦内讧”后，加强了对西藏治理。采取了以下的施政措施：

1. 赐给颇罗鼐“贝子”头衔，命令他总理全藏事务。重新任命3个噶伦，协助颇罗鼐。清朝怕准噶尔劫持七世达赖，1728年，令查郎阿等人移七世达赖至康区噶达之惠远庙，派兵千余人护卫。达赖喇嘛较长时间离藏，有利于颇罗鼐执掌西藏的政治、经济大权。1740年，颇罗鼐主办藏事有功，晋封为“郡王”。历史上把清朝中央政府先后任用康济鼐以及颇罗鼐父子的三届世俗贵族管理西藏时期统称作“郡王时期”。

2. 1727年正式设立驻藏大臣2人。第一任驻藏大臣是副都统马喇和内阁学士僧格。当时，驻藏大臣的任务是统领驻藏官兵，防守边境及督导颇罗鼐总理藏务。

3. 对原和硕特蒙古汗王旧辖康、青、藏区，将康定、理塘、巴塘等地划归四川管辖；将中甸、阿敦子、维西等地划归云南管辖；惟昌都以外各部落仍归西藏；勘定川、青、藏三省界址，将居住在3省之界的“南称巴彦”七十九族“番民”中的玉树等四十族划归西宁办事大臣管辖；霍尔纳克书三十九族，划归驻藏大臣管辖。另将后藏的拉孜、昂仁、彭措林三宗赠给班禅管理。

4. 留驻川陕兵2000人分驻前后藏，归驻藏大臣指挥。又留滇军1000人驻昌都作为声援。

三、噶厦时期 (1751‑1959)

公元1747年，颇罗鼐死，次子珠尔默特那木扎勒袭封郡王，其与七世达赖的矛盾激化。早在1735年七世达赖由噶达移居拉萨后与颇罗鼐等世俗官员出现矛盾，实质是世俗领主与宗教首领争夺领导权的斗争。清朝多次居中调和，乾隆皇帝亲手敕谕颇罗鼐：“达赖喇嘛系执掌阐扬西方佛教之人，尔系约束管理藏内人众之人，尔二人同心协力，以安地方，使士伯特向化，一应事务皆赖尔等办理。朕视尔二人俱属一体，从无倚重倚轻之见，若尔二人稍有不和，以致地方不宁，甚负朕信任期望之思。”（《清实录》卷二八〇）乾隆皇帝在给达赖的谕旨中指出：“朕向因珠尔默特那木扎勒素不信奉达赖喇嘛，心怀仇隙，是以屡加训饬。”珠尔默特那木扎勒表面服从乾隆皇帝的调解，暗中却作谋叛达赖的准备。驻藏大臣傅清侦悉此事，并通知达赖“共同相机行事”。由于情况危急，驻藏大臣手下又无一兵，傅清、拉布敦只好计诱珠尔默特至驻藏大臣衙门拔刀将其砍死，他们也被珠尔默特的党羽杀害。珠尔默特之乱不得人心，很快被七世达赖平息。清朝也立即派四川总督策楞率兵入藏处理善后事宜，于1751年颁布《酌定西藏善后章程》十三条，建立达赖喇嘛与驻藏大臣共同督导下的噶厦集体会办体制。

1792年，福康安率兵入藏驱逐侵扰西藏的廓尔喀军队，巩固了祖国的边防，解除了西藏人民的灾难。在取得反击廓尔喀侵略的胜利之后，清朝针对西藏地方各项制度一向松弛，弊病甚多，官吏贪污和政治腐败，以致敌人入境，无力抵抗，大力整顿地方吏治，改革行政体制。1792年，福康安会同西藏地方官员共同议定条例，奏报乾隆皇帝，于1793年颁布了《钦定藏内善后章程》二十九条。

以上两个章程，对达赖、班禅和驻藏大臣的职权及各级官吏应遵守的制度、边界防御、对外交涉、财政税收、宗教活动等各方面都作了详细的规定，并以法律形式固定下来。这标志着清朝对西藏地方的全面管理，也标志着西藏地方政府的机构已经定型。

（一）两个章程对西藏地方政府的体制作了重大的改革，废除郡王制，建立噶厦地方政府，由七世达赖掌握西藏地方政权。在达赖圆寂禅榻空虚或达赖灵童年幼不能理政时期，清政府任命格鲁派的高僧担任“执政佛”摄政总理西藏事务。这表明清朝否定了在西藏一度推行的世俗领袖掌权的“郡王制”，实行政教合一的制度。从七世达赖逝世（1757）至十三世达赖亲政（1895），其间除八世达赖和十一世、十二世达赖短时期亲政外，清朝中央委任了11个执政佛摄政：

1. 第穆呼图克图诺门罕 – 摄政21年 (1757‑1777)

2. 噶勒丹锡呼图禅师（即第六十一任甘丹赤巴、策墨林活佛——昂旺楚称）– 摄政10年 (1777‑1786)

3. 济呷呼图克图（第八辈济呷、功德林活佛，达擦益喜罗桑丹白贡布）– 摄政7年 (1804‑1810)

4. 第穆呼图克图（即第七辈第穆、丹吉林活佛，罗桑甲央班觉敦珠甲措）– 摄政9年 (1811‑1819)

5. 噶勒丹锡呼图（即第七十三任甘丹赤巴、策墨林活佛——昂旺江白楚称）– 摄政26年 (1819‑1844)

6. 七世班禅·丹白尼玛 – 摄政两年 (1844‑1845)

7. 热振·昂旺益西楚称坚赞（即热振活佛）– 摄政17年 (1845‑1862)

8. 夏扎·旺秋结布 – 摄政3年 (1862‑1864)

9. 地珠·罗藏青绕汪曲 – 摄政9年 (1864‑1873)

10. 济呪通善呼图克图（即第十一辈济呪、功德林活佛，达察·阿旺班丹曲结坚赞）– 摄政12年 (1875‑1886)

11. 第穆呼图克图（即第九辈第穆，阿旺罗桑成列绕结）– 摄政9年 (1886‑1895)

（二）两个章程提高和扩大了驻藏大臣的管理权限，驻藏大臣会同达赖、班禅总办西藏地方事务，噶伦以下系驻藏大臣的属员，驻藏大臣稽查财政收支，督察司法、户口差役，统率训练地方军队，负责巡视边境等。藏文的二十九条章程的第十条规定：“驻藏大臣按常规上山瞻礼（达赖）外，藏内事务由达赖喇嘛、班禅额尔德尼、驻藏大臣三方平等协商办理。噶伦以下番目及管事喇嘛、分系属员，无论事务大小均应遵照驻藏大臣命令办理。至于扎什伦布诸务，由索本堪布代办，所办何事应先禀知驻藏大臣，待该大臣巡办之便稽查管束。”可见清朝通过钦差驻藏大臣加强了对西藏的全面管理。

（三）规定噶伦以下的机构编制和官员品级。这证明西藏的官制是清朝中央政府制定的。以下摘录《理藩院事例》卷九百七十七《西藏官制》：驻藏大臣二人所属前藏唐古特官。（共269人）

三品

- 总理大小事务噶布伦 – 3人

- 喇嘛噶伦 – 1人

四品

- 总理兵丁戴本 – 6人

- 稽查商上出纳孜本 – 3人

- 总理库务商卓特巴 – 2人

五品

- 管兵如本 – 12人

- 管粮业仓巴 – 2人

- 管拉萨番民朗仔辖 – 2人

- 管理刑名协尔邦 – 2人

- 管理布达拉番民硕第巴 – 2人

- 边缺营官 – 14缺23人

- 大缺营官 – 10缺19人

六品

- 管兵甲本 – 24人

- 管马达本 – 2人

- 噶厦办事大仲译 – 2人

- 卓呢尔 – 2人

- 中缺营官 – 43缺59人

小缺营官 – 25缺25人

七品

- 厦办事小仲译 – 3人

- 管兵定本 – 120人

- 管门第巴 – 3人

- 管糌粑第巴 – 2人

- 管草第巴 – 1人

- 管柴第巴 – 2人

- 管账房第巴 – 2人

- 管牛羊第巴 – 3人

（四）两个章程规定了关于活佛转世的“金奔巴掣签”制度。关于藏兵的编制、财政税收、对外交涉等项，都做了明确的规定。

（五）清朝授给七世达赖掌握地方政权期间，1752年，西藏地方政府组织机构中新设了一个重要的机构“译仓”（秘书处），内设僧官4人，藏语称作“仲译钦莫”，责成译仓审核噶厦的公文政令，管理全藏的寺院，并负责僧官的升迁任免。译仓的仲译钦莫还有权联合孜康的孜本主持“官员机要大会”或“官员扩大会议”研讨解决政府遇到的重大问题。僧人参与政治活动，译仓是重要的途径。为了进一步加强僧人对政治的影响，在政府中与世俗贵族抗衡，八世达赖强白嘉措在政府组织机构中设立了基巧堪布这一官职。基巧堪布为三品僧官，是达赖的近侍之臣和私人的管家，协助达赖处理一切大小事务。全面管理布达拉宫的库务工作，主管译仓，并有权管理僧官和各寺院执事的升降任免。有权参与噶伦的会议，解决重大问题。

定型时期西藏地方政府核心机构示意图：

达赖喇嘛或执政佛 → 基巧堪布 → 噶厦 → 译仓 / 孜康 → 全区寺院 → 临时召集的大小官员会议 → 各级基层组织（略）

1895年十三世达赖土登嘉措亲政。此时，西藏正处在大动荡的时代，1904年英帝国主义由侵食藏边发展到武装攻占拉萨，达赖被迫内游青海、蒙古、五台山等地，1908年晋谒慈禧太后和光绪皇帝。1910年返回拉萨不久，又因与驻藏大臣不和，出走中印边境。辛亥革命后，1912年12月达赖返回拉萨，结束了两年多的流亡生活。十三世达赖从自身曲折的经历中，发现邻近的国家、民族的近代建设和发展，痛感西藏贫弱、落后，决心变革图强，在西藏推行新政和改革措施。对西藏地方政府的机构做了大的变动，新设组织机构。

1906年达赖喇嘛由蒙古抵青海驻锡，深感在内地与西藏联系有诸多不便，为避免驻藏大臣的责难，乃于1907年（？）私自设立“司徒”。司徒一职相当于过去的“第悉”，秉承达赖的意志，领导噶厦的日常工作。先后担任司伦的有夏扎·边觉多吉、雪康·顿珠彭措、朗敦·贡噶旺秋等。

设立“马基康”（藏军司令部），扩编藏军。达赖从印度返回拉萨后，1913年设立马基康，任命达桑占东为噶伦兼藏军总司令，赐给扎萨的头衔；任命赤门·罗布旺杰为副总司令，着手扩编藏军，将原来的6个代本扩充为16个代本。

这支军队的军饷，责成以下的机构筹办：

“颇康”，成立于1792年。当时清朝训练6个代本的“番兵”，筹集了相当数量的银两作为军费交给颇康，每年向外借贷，收取利息，作为军饷。到了1912年，这笔军费基金还能支付藏军军饷的一部分，不足部分则由地方政府指定的七八个斡卡的赋税中支出。

“雪基颇康”，负责从彭波、达境、山南等地储备库中调运粮食，以供给驻在拉萨的军队。支付军饷的钞票则从拉萨造币厂提取。

“巴不细列空”（有人写作包细或报细，或译为军粮局），始建于1916年，由大仲译罗桑丹姆，孜本龙夏·多吉才杰，负责核查寺庙、贵族实际占有的土地，按新核定的土地征收赋税。每年为政府增加赋税达几万担粮食，用这些增收的粮食补贴军饷。

为了解决武器弹药的补充问题，1913年设“衙门制造厂”，打制斧头、长矛、刺刀等武器，后来也制造称之为“哲洋枪”的枪械和带轮子的小炮。此厂还铸造各种面值的藏币。1931年把“钞票印刷厂”、金币铸造厂等合并成立“扎西电机厂”等。

十三世达赖推行新政时，还设置了邮电局、电报局、水电厂、警察局等新机构。这些机构和官员给中世纪的西藏封建农奴制社会，带来了一些近代科学的气息。

基巧（相当于现在的专区）一级地方机构的设置。十三世达赖时，在重要的边界口岸、商贸汇集的地方或几个宗谿之上，设置基巧，委派噶伦或四品以上的官员前往施政、执法，处理宗谿难以解决的军政大事。基巧一级的行政机构有：

1. 朵麦基巧。1918年达赖委派噶伦喇嘛强巴丹达为朵麦基巧，管辖朵麦地区（即今之昌都地区）22个宗谿，处理该地区的军政事务。朵麦基巧一般委派噶伦或扎萨一级的高级官员，可以代表噶厦行使职权，有时称“朵基噶厦”。

2. 卓木基巧。最初两任卓基由普通俗官担任，1917年任命四品俗官米介巴·齐米多吉为第三任卓基，驻亚东。卓基的职责是管理卓木地区的行政事务，在边境口岸对外籍人员及其物品进行检查，处理边民的民事纠纷。

3. 江孜商务基巧。1906年英国在江孜设商务总管，于是西藏地方政府也设立江孜商务基巧，给这些英国人供应柴草和日常所需的物品，并办理商业口岸事务。

4. 山南基巧。1912年委派霞苏·益西土丹为山南基巧。先后共有10任。其主要职责是处理各宗谿无法解决的诉讼案件，传达西藏地方政府下达的公文政令。

5. 霍基，后改称羌基。历史上藏北三十九族部落头人各自称雄，彼此抢劫杀人，抢夺阻拦来往商队，社会治安混乱。约1920年，西藏地方政府派堪穷扎巴朗杰为“霍基”，率领二三百名藏兵驻扎丁青，对三十九族征税、执法和维护社会治安。1943年，西藏地方政府在藏北推行宗谿制度，把三十九族分为6个宗，宗本由政府委派。霍基改称为羌基。基巧公署由丁青迁至那曲，管辖东自丁青，西至“朗茹”的广大地区。另外，征集上千名藏北民兵，组成藏军的第十七兵营。

6. 日喀则基宗后来改称“藏基”。最初西藏地方政府委僧俗2人为日喀则宗本。1921年开始称作“日喀则基宗”，委派四品官穆加瓦为第一任宗基，对西藏地方政府所属的后藏各县征税、执法。1954年后改称“藏基”。

7. 阿里基巧。早在1681年委派阿里噶本对阿里地区进行管理。1954年，正式委派阿里基巧（四品，僧俗各一），驻扎噶尔雅萨，对阿里地区5个宗（即噶尔、日土、札达、达巴、普兰）进行管理，并审核政府派往阿里收税官员的账目，代表西藏地方政府管理对外开放的商埠、口岸。

8. 塔工基巧，简称“工基”。1954年，任命四品俗官1人，驻扎在则拉岗宗，对塔布、工布地区的9个宗谿进行管理。

西藏地方政府还先后设置过“拉堆基巧”，“波密基巧”，德格基巧，尼牙绒基巧，门达旺寺主管等基巧一级的机构。”(p. 324-334)

{During this period, in order to promote national unification, the central government of the Qing dynasty directly dispatched troops to quell the rebellion of the Mongol Dzungar tribe, which had seized control of Tibet. It established the post of Imperial Resident Minister in Tibet (Amban), abolished the position of Desi (regent), set up four Kalön (ministers), and appointed Tibetan secular leaders to govern Tibet.

In 1717, Tsewang Araptan, the leader of the Mongol Dzungar tribe residing in Yili, sent his general Tseren Dondub with 6,000 soldiers by way of Khotan, crossing northern Tibet, and launched a surprise attack on Lhasa, killing Latsang Khan. After the Dzungar army occupied Tibet, they abolished the “Dalai Lama” (Yixi Gyatso) installed by Latsang Khan, and appointed Daziba Lajer Raoding as Depa (governor) to manage Tibetan affairs. To pacify the Dzungar rebellion, in 1720 the Kangxi Emperor appointed his son Yunti as General of the Pacification of the Far East, leading a large army into Tibet via Sichuan and Qinghai. At that time, Tibetan leaders Kangchennä and Polhanä also led their forces to cooperate with the Qing army, attacking the Dzungars from both sides and forcing them to flee back to Yili. In response to the wishes of the Tibetan clergy and laity, the Qing dynasty escorted the reincarnated soul boy of the Dalai Lama – Kelsang Gyatso – who was living in Kumbum Monastery in Xining, into Tibet, and conferred upon him the title “The Sixth Dalai Lama, Dharma King who Spreads the Teachings and Enlightens the Multitude,” presenting him with a golden book and golden seal. Thus in Tibetan history there were three Sixth Dalai Lamas (namely Tsangyang Gyatso, Yixi Gyatso, and Kelsang Gyatso). Later the Qing recognized Tsangyang Gyatso as the Sixth Dalai Lama and Kelsang Gyatso as the Seventh.

After pacifying the Dzungar rebellion, the central government of the Qing dynasty, in order to definitively end the rivalries of the various Mongol tribes in Tibet, refused to continue enfeoffing the descendants of Gushri Khan as kings (khan) of Tibet, thereby avoiding power struggles between Mongol and Tibetan rulers. The Qing then appointed Tibetan secular leaders to govern Tibet. The Qing central government’s policy toward Tibet shifted to direct administrative control. In 1721, the Qing abolished the all‑powerful Desi post and established three Kalön to jointly administer affairs, increased to five Kalön in 1723. Kangchennä and Albuwa were enfeoffed as Beizi, Lumbunä as Fuguo Gong (Duke of the State), all appointed as Kalön, and Polhanä as Taiji. In 1723, Polhanä and Jarnä were promoted to Kalön. In 1725, Kangchennä was made Chief Kalön, in charge of all Tibetan affairs. In 1727, discord arose among the Tibetan Kalön. Albuwa, representing the forces of the Ü (central) region, allied with two other Kalön, Lumbunä and Jarnä, and killed Kangchennä, the Chief Kalön representing the forces of the Tsang (western) region. Polhanä Taiji gathered the Tibetan forces of Tsang and Ngari and in 1728 captured Lhasa, placing Albuwa and the others under house arrest. The Qing again decisively sent troops into Tibet to quell the “Kalön infighting” and executed Albuwa and the other two Kalön.

After the Qing dynasty suppressed the “Kalön infighting” of 1727, it strengthened its administration of Tibet and adopted the following measures:

1. It bestowed the title of “Beizi” on Polhanä and ordered him to take charge of all Tibetan affairs. Three Kalön were reappointed to assist Polhanä. Fearing that the Dzungars might abduct the Seventh Dalai Lama, in 1728 the Qing ordered Chala’nga and others to move the Seventh Dalai Lama to Huiyuan Monastery in Garda in the Kham region and sent more than a thousand soldiers to guard him. The Dalai Lama’s prolonged absence from Tibet allowed Polhanä to take control of Tibet’s political and economic power. In 1740, Polhanä was promoted to “Prince‑Prefect” (Jünwang) for his merit in managing Tibetan affairs. Historians collectively refer to the period when the Qing central government successively appointed the three generations of secular nobles, Kangchennä and the father and son Polhanä, to govern Tibet as the “Period of the Prince‑Prefects.”

2. In 1727, two Imperial Resident Ministers (Amban) were formally established. The first Amban were Vice Commander Mala and Cabinet Scholar Senge. At that time, the Amban’s duties were to command the garrison troops stationed in Tibet, guard the borders, and supervise Polhanä in managing Tibetan affairs.

3. Regarding the former Qoshot Mongol khan’s old domain over Kham, Qinghai, and Tibet, the Qing placed Kangding, Litang, Batang, and other areas under Sichuan’s jurisdiction; placed Zhongdian (Shangri‑la), Adunzi, Weixi, and other areas under Yunnan’s jurisdiction; only the tribes outside Qamdo remained under Tibet. The borders of Sichuan, Qinghai, and Tibet were demarcated. Among the “south‑called (Nancheng) Bayan” seventy‑nine tribes of “fan” (non‑Han) people living on the borders of the three provinces, forty tribes including Yushu were placed under the jurisdiction of the Imperial Resident Minister of Xining. The Hor Nakchu thirty‑nine tribes were placed under the jurisdiction of the Amban in Tibet. In addition, the three dzongs of Lhatse, Ngamring, and Phuntsoling in Tsang (rear Tibet) were given to the Panchen Lama to administer.

4. Two thousand troops from Sichuan and Shaanxi were left to garrison Ü and Tsang (central and rear Tibet), under the command of the Amban. Another one thousand Yunnan troops were left to garrison Qamdo as support.

3. The Kashag Period (1751‑1959)

In 1747, Polhanä died, and his second son, Jürmet Namjal, inherited the title of Prince‑Prefect. His conflicts with the Seventh Dalai Lama intensified. As early as 1735, after the Seventh Dalai Lama had moved back to Lhasa from Garda, contradictions arose between him and secular officials such as Polhanä. In essence, this was a struggle between secular lords and the religious leader for leadership. The Qing mediated many times. The Qianlong Emperor personally issued an edict to Polhanä: “The Dalai Lama is the person who directs and propagates the Buddhist doctrine in the western region; you are the person who restrains and manages the people of Tibet. You two must work together harmoniously to pacify the region, causing the Tibetans to submit to civilized rule. All affairs depend on you to manage. I regard you two as a single body, never favoring one over the other. If you two are not in harmony and thereby disturb the region, you will deeply betray my trust and expectations.” (Qing Shilu, Vol. 280) In an edict to the Dalai Lama, the Qianlong Emperor stated: “I have repeatedly admonished Jürmet Namjal because he has never believed in the Dalai Lama and has harbored enmity.” Jürmet Namjal outwardly complied with the Qianlong Emperor’s mediation, but secretly prepared to rebel against the Dalai Lama. The Amban Fuqing learned of this and notified the Dalai Lama so they could “act together according to circumstances.” As the situation was critical and the Amban had no troops at their command, Fuqing and Labudun had no choice but to lure Jürmet Namjal to the Amban’s office, where they drew their swords and killed him. They themselves were then killed by Jürmet Namjal’s followers. Jürmet’s rebellion did not win popular support and was quickly suppressed by the Seventh Dalai Lama. The Qing immediately sent the Sichuan Governor‑General Celeng with troops into Tibet to deal with the aftermath. In 1751, the Qing issued the “Thirteen Articles for the Settlement of Tibet,” establishing a system of collective governance by the Kashag under the joint direction of the Dalai Lama and the Amban.

In 1792, Fu Kang’an led troops into Tibet to expel the Gurkha (Nepalese) forces that had invaded Tibet, consolidating the nation’s borders and relieving the Tibetan people of their suffering. After achieving victory in countering the Gurkha invasion, the Qing dynasty, finding that the various systems in Tibet had long been lax and fraught with abuses, with official corruption and political decay that had left the region powerless to resist the enemy, vigorously reformed local administration and revised the administrative system. In 1792, Fu Kang’an together with Tibetan local officials drew up regulations and reported them to the Qianlong Emperor, who in 1793 promulgated the “Twenty‑Nine Articles for the Improvement and Administration of Tibet.”

These two sets of regulations made detailed provisions concerning the functions and powers of the Dalai Lama, the Panchen Lama, and the Amban; the systems to be observed by officials at all levels; border defense; foreign relations; fiscal taxation; religious activities; and other areas, fixing them in legal form. This marked the Qing dynasty’s comprehensive administration of Tibet and also signified that the structure of the local government of Tibet had become finalized.

(A) The two sets of regulations made major reforms to the structure of the local government of Tibet. They abolished the Prince‑Prefect system and established the Kashag local government, with the Seventh Dalai Lama holding political power in Tibet. During periods when the Dalai Lama had passed away and the throne was vacant, or when the reincarnated soul boy was too young to govern, the Qing government appointed a high monk of the Gelug school as a “ruling Buddha” regent to take charge of Tibetan affairs. This shows that the Qing dynasty rejected the previously implemented “Prince‑Prefect system,” in which secular leaders held power, and instead instituted a theocratic system. From the death of the Seventh Dalai Lama (1757) until the personal rule of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama (1895), except for the short periods when the Eighth Dalai Lama and the Eleventh and Twelfth Dalai Lamas personally ruled, the Qing central government appointed eleven ruling Buddha regents:

1. Dermo Hutuktu Nomunhan – regent for 21 years (1757‑1777)

2. Galdan Shihu Chanyu (i.e., the 61st Ganden Tripa, Tsemönling Tulku, Ngawang Tsültrim) – regent for 10 years (1777‑1786)

3. Jixa Hutuktu (8th Jixa, Kundeling Tulku, Datse Yeshe Losang Tenpai Gönpo) – regent for 7 years (1804‑1810)

4. Dermo Hutuktu (7th Dermo, Danjüling Tulku, Losang Jamyang Paljor Döndrub Gyatso) – regent for 9 years (1811‑1819)

5. Galdan Shihu (73rd Ganden Tripa, Tsemönling Tulku, Ngawang Jampai Tsültrim) – regent for 26 years (1819‑1844)

6. The Seventh Panchen Lama, Tenpai Nyima – regent for two years (1844‑1845)

7. Reting Ngawang Yeshe Tsültrim Gyaltsen (Reting Tulku) – regent for 17 years (1845‑1862)

8. Shakya Wangchuk Gyalpo – regent for 3 years (1862‑1864)

9. Ditru Losang Khyenrab Wangchuk – regent for 9 years (1864‑1873)

10. Jixa Tongshan Hutuktu (11th Jixa, Kundeling Tulku, Datse Ngawang Pelden Chökyi Gyaltsen) – regent for 12 years (1875‑1886)

11. Dermo Hutuktu (9th Dermo, Ngawang Losang Trinley Rabgye) – regent for 9 years (1886‑1895)

(B) The two sets of regulations enhanced and expanded the authority of the Imperial Resident Ministers (Amban). The Amban, together with the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama, jointly managed the affairs of the Tibetan local government. Officials below the rank of Kalön were subordinate to the Amban. The Amban audited fiscal revenues and expenditures, supervised judicial affairs, household registration, and corvée duties, commanded and trained local troops, and were responsible for inspecting the borders. Article 10 of the Tibetan‑language version of the Twenty‑Nine Articles states: “Apart from the Amban’s routine visits to the Dalai Lama for ceremonial purposes, all internal Tibetan affairs shall be handled through equal consultation among the Dalai Lama, the Panchen Erdeni, and the Amban. Kalön and below, as well as Tibetan officials and managing lamas, are all subordinate personnel; regardless of whether an affair is large or small, they must act in accordance with the orders of the Amban. As for the various affairs of Tashilhunpo Monastery, they shall be managed by the Sopön Khenpo, but whatever is done must first be reported to the Amban, so that the Amban may inspect and supervise at the time of his tours.” Thus it is clear that the Qing dynasty, through its appointed Imperial Resident Ministers, strengthened its comprehensive administration over Tibet.

(C) The regulations specified the organizational structure and official ranks below the Kalön level. This proves that the official system of Tibet was established by the central government of the Qing dynasty. Excerpted below from Cases of the Lifan Yuan, Chapter 977, “Tibetan Official System”: The Tibetan (Tangut) officials of Ü (central Tibet) subordinate to the two Imperial Resident Ministers (total 269 persons).

Third Rank

- Kalön (ministers) in charge of all major and minor affairs – 3 persons

- Lama Kalön – 1 person

Fourth Rank

- Debön (military commanders) in charge of soldiers – 6 persons

- Tsipön (auditors) in charge of revenues and expenditures of the Kashag – 3 persons

- Chöndetpa (treasury managers) in charge of depot affairs – 2 persons

Fifth Rank

- Rubön (battalion commanders) in charge of soldiers – 12 persons

- Nyertsangpa (grain managers) in charge of grain – 2 persons

- Langtsé (Nangtsé) officials in charge of Lhasa commoners – 2 persons

- Shierpön (judicial officials) in charge of criminal law – 2 persons

- Shötipa (Zhol Depa) officials in charge of the Potala commoners – 2 persons

- Frontier District Officers – 14 posts, 23 persons

- Major District Officers – 10 posts, 19 persons

Sixth Rank

- Gyabön (company commanders) in charge of soldiers – 24 persons

- Dabön (horse managers) in charge of horses – 2 persons

- Senior Translators (Drongyig) serving the Kashag – 2 persons

- Chönier (stewards) – 2 persons

- Intermediate District Officers – 43 posts, 59 persons

Minor District Officers – 25 posts, 25 persons

Seventh Rank

- Junior Translators of the Nangtsé office – 3 persons

- Dingbön (squad commanders) in charge of soldiers – 120 persons

- Gate Keepers (Depa) – 3 persons

- Tsampa Managers (Depa) – 2 persons

- Pasture Managers (Depa) – 1 person

- Firewood Managers (Depa) – 2 persons

- Tent Managers (Depa) – 2 persons

- Yak and Sheep Managers (Depa) – 3 persons

(D) The two sets of regulations instituted the “golden urn lot drawing” (Golden Urn) system for the reincarnation of tulkus (reincarnated lamas). Clear stipulations were also made concerning the organization of Tibetan troops, fiscal revenue and taxation, foreign relations, and other matters.

(E) After the Qing dynasty granted the Seventh Dalai Lama authority over the local government, in 1752 a new and important organ was established within the organizational structure of the Tibetan local government: the “Yicang” (Secretariat). It was staffed by four monk officials, called in Tibetan Drungyig Chenmo. The Yicang was charged with reviewing all official documents and decrees of the Kashag, managing all the monasteries in Tibet, and handling the promotion and dismissal of monk officials. The Drungyig Chenmo of the Yicang also had the right to convene, together with the Tsipön of the Zikang, an “Officials’ Confidential Conference” or an “Enlarged Officials’ Meeting” to discuss and resolve major issues facing the government. The Yicang was an important channel through which monks participated in political activities. To further strengthen the political influence of the monks and to balance the power of the secular nobles in the government, the Eighth Dalai Lama, Jampai Gyatso, established the position of Kikyab Khenpo in the government structure. The Kikyab Khenpo was a third‑rank monk official, serving as the Dalai Lama’s close attendant and personal steward, assisting the Dalai Lama in handling all major and minor affairs. He had comprehensive control over the treasury work of the Potala Palace, directed the Yicang, and had the authority to manage the promotion, demotion, appointment, and dismissal of monk officials and monastery administrators. He also had the right to participate in the meetings of the Kalön to resolve major issues.

Diagram of the Core Organs of the Tibetan Local Government during the Finalized Period:

Dalai Lama or Ruling Buddha → Kikyab Khenpo → Kashag → Yicang / Zikang → Monasteries throughout Tibet → Temporarily convened meetings of high and low officials → Basic level organizations (omitted)

In 1895, the Thirteenth Dalai Lama, Thubten Gyatso, assumed personal rule. At that time, Tibet was in an era of great upheaval. In 1904, British imperialism, having encroached on Tibet’s borders, escalated to an armed occupation of Lhasa. The Dalai Lama was forced to wander through Qinghai, Mongolia, and Wutai Mountain. In 1908, he had an audience with the Empress Dowager Cixi and the Guangxu Emperor. Soon after returning to Lhasa in 1910, because of a disagreement with the Imperial Resident Minister, he fled to the Sino‑Indian border. After the Xinhai Revolution, in December 1912, the Dalai Lama returned to Lhasa, ending more than two years of exile. From his own tortuous experiences, the Thirteenth Dalai Lama observed the modern development and construction of neighboring countries and peoples, deeply felt Tibet’s poverty and backwardness, and resolved to carry out reforms to strengthen the country. He introduced new policies and reform measures in Tibet and made major changes to the structure of the local government of Tibet, establishing new organs.

In 1906, when the Dalai Lama traveled from Mongolia to Qinghai and took up residence there, he deeply felt that communication with the interior of China was very inconvenient. To avoid criticism from the Imperial Resident Minister, he privately established the position of Situ (viceroy) in 1907 (?). The position of Situ was equivalent to the former Desi, carrying out the Dalai Lama’s will and leading the daily work of the Kashag. Those who successively served as Sidön (viceroy) included Shakabpa Peljor Dorje, Sholkang Döndrub Phuntsok, and Langdün Gongga Wangchug.

Establishment of the “Makigang” (Tibetan Army Headquarters) and expansion of the Tibetan army. After the Dalai Lama returned to Lhasa from India, in 1913 he established the Makigang and appointed Dasang Zhandong as Kalön and concurrently Commander‑in‑Chief of the Tibetan army, bestowing upon him the title of Zasa; he appointed Chimön Lobwang Wanggyal as Deputy Commander, and set about expanding the Tibetan army, increasing the original six Debön to sixteen Debön.

The following organs were made responsible for raising the army’s pay:

“Pokang” , established in 1792. At that time, the Qing dynasty trained “Tibetan soldiers” of six Debön and raised a considerable amount of silver as military funds, which were handed over to the Pokang. The Pokang lent this money out each year and collected interest to pay the army. By 1912, this military fund could still cover part of the Tibetan army’s pay; the shortfall was covered by taxes from seven or eight shöka designated by the local government.

“Xueji Pokang” , responsible for transporting grain from depots in Penpo, Dajing, Lhokha (Shannan), and other places to supply the troops stationed in Lhasa. Banknotes for paying the army were taken from the Lhasa Mint.

“Babuxi Liekong” (also written as Baoxi or Baoxi, translated as the Military Grain Bureau), established in 1916. It was headed by the Senior Translator Losang Dainzin and the Tsipön Lungshar Dorje Tsegyel, and was charged with verifying the land actually held by monasteries and nobles and collecting taxes based on the newly verified land. Each year it increased government tax revenue by tens of thousands of dan of grain, which was used to subsidize the army’s pay.

To solve the problem of replenishing weapons and ammunition, in 1913 a “Yamen Manufacturing Factory” was established, producing axes, lances, bayonets, and other weapons. Later it also manufactured firearms called the “Zheyang rifle” and small wheeled cannons. The factory also minted Tibetan coins of various denominations. In 1931, the “Banknote Printing Factory”, the Gold Coin Mint, and others were merged to establish the “Zhaxi Electric Machinery Factory”, etc.

When the Thirteenth Dalai Lama implemented his new policies, he also established new organs such as a Post and Telecommunications Bureau, a Telegraph Bureau, a Hydropower Plant, a Police Bureau, and others. These institutions and officials brought a touch of modern science to the medieval Tibetan feudal serf society.

Establishment of regional (Kichab, equivalent to today’s prefecture) level local organs. During the time of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama, Kichab were established at important border ports, places where trade gathered, or above several dzongs and shö. Kalön or officials of the fourth rank or higher were sent there to administer, enforce the law, and handle military and political affairs that were difficult for the dzongs and shö to resolve on their own. The Kichab‑level administrative organs included:

1. Dömé Kichab. In 1918, the Dalai Lama appointed Kalön Lama Jampa Danda as Dömé Kichab, administering the Dömé region (the present‑day Qamdo region) with its 22 dzongs and shö, handling the military and political affairs of that region. The Dömé Kichab was generally appointed from among high‑ranking officials at the level of Kalön or Zasa, and could exercise authority on behalf of the Kashag; it was sometimes called the “Dögi Kashag.”

2. Zhuomu Kichab. The first two Zhuomu Kichab were held by ordinary secular officials. In 1917, a fourth‑rank secular official, Mije Ba Qimidoji, was appointed as the third Zhuomu Kichab, stationed in Yadong. The duties of the Zhuomu Kichab were to administer the Zhuomu region, inspect foreigners and their goods at the border ports, and handle civil disputes among border residents.

3. Gyantse Commercial Kichab. In 1906, Britain established a Commercial Agent in Gyantse, so the Tibetan local government also established the Gyantse Commercial Kichab to supply these British agents with firewood, grass, and daily necessities, and to handle commercial port affairs.

4. Lhokha (Shannan) Kichab. In 1912, Xiasu Yixi Tudan was appointed as Lhokha Kichab. There were ten successive holders. Its main duties were to handle litigation cases that could not be resolved by the dzongs and shö, and to transmit the official documents and decrees issued by the local government of Tibet.

5. Huoji, later renamed Qiangji. Historically, the tribal headmen of the Thirty‑nine Tribes in northern Tibet each claimed hegemony, engaging in mutual robbery and murder, plundering and blocking passing merchant caravans, leading to chaotic social order. Around 1920, the local government of Tibet sent Khenchung Zhaba Namgyel as “Huoji,” leading two to three hundred Tibetan soldiers stationed in Dingkye (Dingqing), to collect taxes, enforce the law, and maintain social order over the Thirty‑nine Tribes. In 1943, the local government of Tibet implemented the dzong‑shö system in northern Tibet, dividing the Thirty‑nine Tribes into six dzongs, with dzongpons appointed by the government. Huoji was renamed Qiangji. The Kichab office moved from Dingkye to Nagqu, administering a vast area extending from Dingkye in the east to “Langru” in the west. Additionally, over a thousand northern Tibetan militiamen were recruited to form the 17th Battalion of the Tibetan army.

6. Shigatse Jizong, later renamed “Tsangji”. Initially, the local government of Tibet appointed one monk and one secular official as dzongpons of Shigatse. Beginning in 1921, it was called “Shigatse Jizong,” and a fourth‑rank official, Mujiagwa, was appointed as the first Jizong. He was responsible for collecting taxes and enforcing the law in the Tsang (rear Tibet) counties under the jurisdiction of the local government of Tibet. After 1954, it was renamed “Tsangji.”

7. Ngari Kichab. As early as 1681, the Ngari Garpön was appointed to administer the Ngari region. In 1954, a formal Ngari Kichab (fourth rank, one monk and one secular) was appointed, stationed at Gar Yasa, to administer the five dzongs of Ngari (namely Gar, Rutog, Tsada, Daba, and Purang), to audit the accounts of tax‑collecting officials sent by the government to Ngari, and to manage the open trading ports and border markets on behalf of the local government of Tibet.

8. Tagong Kichab, abbreviated as “Gongji”. In 1954, a fourth‑rank secular official was appointed, stationed at Zêlagang Dzong, to administer the nine dzongs and shö of the Tagu and Kongpo regions.

The local government of Tibet also successively established other Kichab‑level organs, including the Ladui Kichab, the Pomé (Bomi) Kichab, the Dergé Kichab, the Nyarong Kichab, and the Administrator of Mé Dawa Monastery, among others.}

[20] Duoji Cairang, & Zhang Jianghua. (1996). 西藏封建农奴制社会形态 {The social formation of the feudal serf system in Tibet}. China Tibetology Publishing House.

“西藏解放前的法典，最早是沿用西藏吐蕃王朝的“王法”、佛教的“教法”以及元朝和蒙古族的法律。元代以后，由于西藏封建社会发展的需要，在帕竹、噶玛、格鲁派掌政期间，曾经根据明、清两代王朝的法律，并沿袭此前通用的地方诸法先后制订过几部西藏地方法典。这几部法典都具有鲜明的时代性和阶级性，是维护封建农奴制度和农奴主统治利益的重要工具。

一、法典沿革

西藏最早的立法可以追溯到吐蕃时期制订的诸法。据后世的佛教史籍记载，7世纪初，由松赞干布和大臣们在基雪雄饶共同签印，颁布施行《法典二十条》。这部法典一方面规定“要信因果”、“皈依三宝”、“不与贵胄相争”、“争斗者要罚款”和“如约还债”、“盗一罚九”等；另一方面又本着佛教“十善”的精神，规定要“亲邻助友，勿作侵害”、“戒绝恶行”、“不许杀人”等。这一条例客观上起到了稳定社会秩序、维护统治阶级利益的作用，同时也对佛教初传的西藏社会奠定了法律基础。到了芒松芒赞时期，对原有的法律条文进一步补充完善，修订、编纂了法典。据敦煌本吐蕃历史纪年载，公元655年大相噶尔·东赞域松在“高尔地”写订法律。但由于缺少史料记载，不能阐述。

为了适应政教合一封建体制在西藏地方统治的巩固与发展，西藏地方政权在归属中央王朝遵循朝廷大法之外，在不同的历史时期还制订过多部西藏地方法典。其中，以帕竹政权的《法典十五条》，噶玛第悉藏巴政权的《法典十六条》，和17世纪后期的《法典十三条》最具有西藏封建法制的代表性。

13世纪中叶，西藏进入封建农奴制社会。萨迦教派领袖执政时期，仍在执行着吐蕃时期的王法和教法，同时，还执行元朝的法典和蒙古族的一些法律。14世纪中叶，帕竹噶举教派领袖降曲坚赞在西藏取代了萨迦政权，建立了帕竹政权。他参照松赞干布以来历代法律纂集而成的一部封建法典称为《法典十五条》。这部法典是依当时西藏社会发展的需要而制订的，是西藏封建农奴制度确立以后所制订的第一部法典。十五条计为：(1)英雄猛虎律；(2)懦夫狐狸律；(3)地方官吏律；(4)听诉是非律；(5)逮解法庭律；(6)重罪肉刑律；(7)警告罚锾律；(8)使者薪给律；(9)杀人命价律；(10)伤人抵罪律；(11)狡诳洗心律；(12)盗窃追赔律；(13)亲属离异律；(14)奸污罚锾律；(15)半夜前后律。

这部法典适应了西藏地方社会发展的需要，巩固了封建制度的秩序，维护了大农奴主的权益，遂成为此后立法的规范。法典的“对办事人要规定应负的义务”、“处理诉讼的人要明辨真伪”、“杀人者赔偿命价”、“伤人者以血还血”等条文是抑制官吏专横的法规。

公元1613年，噶玛彭错朗杰（藏巴汗）把帕竹政权所制订的《法典十五条》中的“英雄猛虎律”和“懦夫狐狸律”两条合并，删去“半夜前后律”，增加了“异族边区律”，定为《法典十六条》。公元1618年，噶玛丹迥旺布统治全西藏以后，又命白色瓦编辑了一部新法典，在《法典十五条》基础上做了些增删，使得法律的规定更为具体，在十五条之后增加了一些条文。

固始汗和第五世达赖喇嘛管理藏事后，于1642年就原有的《法典十三条》中再删去“地方官吏律”一条，定为《法典十三条》。同时还制定了“造对质辨别是非曲直的法律、逮捕罪犯法律、杀人赔偿命价的法律和处理男女通奸的法律等。”

1679年，第悉桑结嘉措将《法典十六条》进行了整理，并在文字上做了补订，对一些条例做了解释，综合调使之成为西藏一部较详细的封建法典，称《法典清明品鉴》（即《正直明镜鉴》）十三条。

除此之外，还有些地区性的不成文的法律。如山南地区一部分地方有“夏季法契约”。藏历四月二十五日始至秋收完毕期间，各宗、谿都有一个共同遵守的契约，农奴都要签名盖章保证执行。

综上所述，西藏从7世纪吐蕃王朝时便已有成文法规产生，以后统治者根据各朝代的法律，为适应西藏社会的实际情况，先后制订了几部法典。这些旧西藏的法律是用来维护封建农奴主利益的工具。

二、法典的内容

从法律体系来看，西藏法律是诸法混合性质的。归纳起来，由以下四部分组成：

(一) 行政法律条规

行政法律是关于西藏封建地方政府的行政设置和为维护官吏和各农奴主的权威、利益而制订的条规。民主改革前西藏地方政府的行政机构设置是17世纪规定的。官职以萨迦政权时期的设置办法为基础。第六任第悉桑结嘉措所著的《法典清明品鉴》内又云：“职务类别凡十三种，司祭官在此不宜论说，牲畜管理人、守门人乃微不足道。为社稷大业计，大臣、军队司令、法官、工匠管理、大小管家、内室传达室、市民监、宗本、谿本、寺院札仓的物资管理人员、商业人员、北方蒙古头人、香灯师（寺庙中管理佛像、经、塔的人）、达赖喇嘛的信使、收粮官等缺一不可，故新设以上诸多职务。” 1751年，七世达赖格桑嘉措亲政后，新成立噶厦机构，并在原设置的基础上增设噶准（噶厦传达室）、噶仲（噶厦秘书）、侍卫等职务。

(二) 刑事法律条规

1. 维护农奴主权威的条规

为维护农奴制度和农奴主阶级利益，在法律中规定了农奴受苦是命中注定，不得反抗的条文。法律规定“勿与贤哲贵胄相争”，言语行为“要合于佛法”，农奴只能“言语忠实”，“民反者均犯重法”，“不受主人约束者逮捕之，侦探主人要事者逮捕之，百姓碰撞长官者逮捕之”。法典同时还规定“向王宫喊冤，不合体统，应逮捕鞭击之”。法律在这里已带有鲜明的阶级性。如1919年江孜一个牧民叫次旺当真，到拉萨告状，控告江孜宗本无理抢占他的8头牛和80只羊。他想噶厦一定会主持公道，但他却被罚款和挨150皮鞭，其罪名是反抗长官。

2. 放债作为法定职责

达赖内库、“札西列空”（主管藏币铸造和电厂电机局），以及各地方“基巧”（地区）、“宗”（县）等都放债。西藏的几百家大小贵族，除个别已破产负债者外，都放高利贷，主要是借给自己庄园里的农奴。西藏的大小寺院都放债，寺、札仓、寺院却谿等机构及吉索、涅仓、佐布、朱尼等有职有权有钱者都放债，特别是三大寺的高利贷遍及全藏区。解放以前，西藏地方政府、贵族、寺院三大领主不仅放债，而且把它作为法定职责，使剥削百姓手段制度化。

3. 军事法律条规

藏军是西藏地方政府的重要组成部分，是统治阶级维护其利益的主要工具。乾隆帝《钦定藏内善后章程二十九条》中就有军事方面的明文规定。原藏军只有“代本”军职，此后设“代本”6个，下设“如本”12个，每个“如本”拥有250名士兵，“如本”下设“甲本”2个，每个“甲本”拥有125名士兵，“甲本”下设“定本”5个，每个“定本”拥有25名士兵。以上这些军人须选拔年轻有为者，并给予证书。“定本”、“甲本”、“如本”、“代本”逐级晋升，不许跳级。同时还规定，兵额3000名，番兵酌给口粮，每年各给青稞2石5斗。调遣征兵每日由商上各给糌粑1斤，并发给执照，免其徭役。在行军过程中，不准毁坏寺庙，不准杀害行路之人，不准剥取沿途牧民的衣裳及拆离夫妻等；凡各处领兵头目，都要安分守己。

(三) 民事法律条规

1. 婚姻的条规

在藏区各地存在着彼此形式互异、内容相类似的调解婚姻、家庭关系的法律，它们多以习惯法的形式存在。民主改革以前，西藏实行严格的阶级内婚制，结亲要看门第，配偶要求门当户对，即所谓“穷找穷配，富找富合”。婚姻制度较为复杂，有一夫一妻制、一夫多妻制、一妻多夫制。这三种形式的婚姻以及夫妻、父母、子女间的人身关系，都同样按婚姻家庭条规处理，并以习惯法予以认可。

2. 财产继承的条规

财产继承制度在西藏封建农奴制社会中没有形成独立法规，依据习惯性的规定，一般家庭财产，子女、妻子、父母、兄弟、近亲等都属于继承人范围。换句话说，即子女有权继承父母的遗产，妻子可以继承死去丈夫所遗留的财产，若家里没有子女，养子有权继承遗产。被继承人死亡后，继承便开始。继承的遗产包括土地、农奴、牧场、园林和其他财产，官职和相应的特权也都视继承范围。

3. 债务的条规

原西藏地方政府对发放债务制订了专门的条文，放债收利是各级官员的法定职责。地方政府设有放债机构。在政府机构中“台布札列空”（布施基金管理处）、“颇康列空”（粮务局）、“拉恰列空”（财政局）、“孜恰列空”（布达拉财库）等都放债。

(四) 司法腐败

也会过问以捞好处。他们得到一部分贿赂后便推给下级去办案。下级官员捞到油水后，又照例往下转。有时候贿赂多的，真正罪犯也可宣告无罪。总而言之，钱多的有理，钱少的无理。如果双方送钱相当，法官则调和案情。

三、监狱及刑罚体系

原地方政府专门关押犯人的监狱甚少，主要在各地基巧公署、宗政府，把政府办公驻地的最下层的最阴暗、潮湿的房子作为监狱。贵族领主也可以在自己所属庄园内设监狱，大活佛的“拉让”和大寺院的“拉吉”还在寺院里设立关押所。

西藏法律的刑罚，是由死刑、肉刑、流刑、挂狐皮、没收财产等组成的一个体系。它不但名目繁多，而且手段十分残忍。

1. 死刑

死刑是剥夺犯人生命的刑罚。如“骑铜马”就是让“犯人”骑在用铜做的马上，铜马肚里烧牛马粪，由8个人抬着去游八廓街，铜马烧热后，活活把人烤死，然后扔到河里（据说“骑铜马”只是在很早以前用过，1911年后便停用）。“装牛皮”是把人装在牛皮口袋里，只留头部在外，牛皮口袋上拴上石头，投入河里，顺水漂流，让人慢慢死去。“站笼”是只能立一人的四方形的牢笼，约一百六七十厘米高，上边是木枷，夹在人的脖子上，犯人整日站着，逐渐折磨致死。

2. 肉刑

肉刑是损坏罪犯肢体、肌肤、机能的刑罚。戴木枷：木枷长80厘米，戴在犯人的脖子上，不能取下，有的是戴终身枷。戴脚镣：有木制和铁制两种，木制的有25厘米见方，分成两半，中间制成人的脚踝粗细的圆孔，犯人的脚伸到里面后于两端加锁，使人不能站立。“钉木板”：是把犯人的四肢用大铁钉或铁环钉在木板上，使人动弹不得。“撑肘棒”：用一木棒把受刑者双手撑直使之不能弯曲。“皮包手”：就是把犯人的手心放上盐，用湿牛皮包起来，牛皮越干越紧，结果五指舒展不开，使手致残。除此之外，还有脖子挂石环、戴石帽、剜眼珠、抽脚筋、剁手脚、胸口压石头、手指上钉竹签和鞭棍毒打等残忍的刑罚。

3. 流刑

流刑是将犯人押解到荒僻地方去的一种刑罚。过去拉萨一些罪犯戴着木枷脚镣、手铐沿街要饭，有的则被送到隆子等边远地方流放，终身为奴。

4. 罚没

没收财产是剥夺犯人私有财产的刑罚。过去西藏贵族、政府官员犯罪后常用没收其财产来惩罚。

(五) 杀人罪、伤害罪的条规

非法侵犯他人生命，要受到惩罚。法律规定：争斗者罚款，杀人为重罪，要赔偿命价。但西藏由于受宗教中的“自他互易，众生转母”观念影响，很少判死刑。在赔偿命价的法律中，由于人有贵贱之分，命价也有多少之别。《法典十三条》和《法典十六条》规定凡上等上级的人，如王子、活佛、喇嘛其价银与尸体等重。打死头人赔命价三四千元，打死平民赔命价钱三四百元。如：嘎加·占纳杀果木休卓哇部落头人的儿子，并打伤其儿媳，最后用大批牦牛赔偿命价结案。

(六) 盗窃案的条规

法律规定凡偷王之财物者，偷一罚百；偷寺院僧侣之财物者，偷一罚八十；偷平常人的财物者，偷一罚八。在那曲桑雄部落流传着这样的口诀，偷佛像者偷一赔千，偷高僧之物者偷一赔八十，偷僧人之物者偷一赔九，偷官员之物者偷一赔五；偷与自己地位相同者偷一赔四；偷穷人之物者赔原物，并另加稍次的东西，如偷1头牛，除赔1头牛外，再加1只羊；放羊者偷1只山羊赔9只山羊。” (p. 390-401)

{Before the liberation of Tibet, the legal codes first followed the “royal laws” of the Tibetan Tubo dynasty, the “religious laws” of Buddhism, and the laws of the Yuan dynasty and the Mongols. After the Yuan dynasty, due to the needs of the development of Tibetan feudal society, during the periods when the Phagmodru, Karma, and Gelugpa sects held power, several local legal codes were successively enacted based on the laws of the Ming and Qing dynasties and in continuation of previously prevailing local laws. These codes all had distinct temporal and class characteristics and were important tools for maintaining the feudal serf system and the ruling interests of the serf‑owners.

1. Evolution of the legal codes

The earliest legislation in Tibet can be traced back to the various laws enacted during the Tubo period. According to later Buddhist historical records, in the early 7th century, Songtsen Gampo and his ministers jointly signed and promulgated the “Twenty Articles of the Legal Code” at Jixue Xiongrao. This code stipulated on the one hand “to believe in cause and effect,” “to take refuge in the Three Jewels,” “not to contend with the noble,” “to fine those who fight,” “to repay debts as agreed,” and “to pay ninefold for theft”; on the other hand, in the spirit of the Buddhist “Ten Virtues,” it required “to help neighbors and friends, not to harm,” “to abstain from evil deeds,” and “not to kill.” These regulations objectively served to stabilize social order and protect the interests of the ruling class, while also laying a legal foundation for early Buddhist society in Tibet. During the reign of Mangsong Mangtsen, the existing legal provisions were further supplemented and improved, and the code was revised and compiled. According to the Dunhuang chronicle of Tubo history, in 655 CE the grand minister Gar Tongtsen Yülsung wrote and enacted laws at “Gao’er di.” However, due to lack of historical records, they cannot be elaborated upon.

To adapt to the consolidation and development of the theocratic feudal system in Tibet, the Tibetan local government, while belonging to the central dynasty and following the imperial laws, also enacted several local codes in different historical periods. Among them, the “Fifteen Articles of the Legal Code” of the Phagmodru regime, the “Sixteen Articles of the Legal Code” of the Karma Desi Tsangpa regime, and the “Thirteen Articles of the Legal Code” of the late 17th century are the most representative of Tibetan feudal legislation.

In the mid‑13th century, Tibet entered a feudal serf society. During the rule of the Sakya sect leaders, the royal laws and religious laws of the Tubo period were still enforced, along with the Yuan dynasty’s code and some Mongol laws. In the mid‑14th century, the Phagmodru Kagyu leader Jangchub Gyaltsen replaced the Sakya regime and established the Phagmodru regime. He compiled a feudal code called the “Fifteen Articles of the Legal Code,” based on the laws of successive generations from Songtsen Gampo onward. This code was enacted according to the needs of Tibetan social development at the time and was the first code established after the feudal serf system was consolidated. The fifteen articles were: (1) Law of the Brave Tiger; (2) Law of the Cowardly Fox; (3) Law of Local Officials; (4) Law of Hearing Disputes; (5) Law of Arrest and Court Delivery; (6) Law of Corporal Punishment for Serious Crimes; (7) Law of Warning Fines; (8) Law of Envoys’ Salaries; (9) Law of Life Price for Homicide; (10) Law of Compensation for Injury; (11) Law of Purification for Deceit; (12) Law of Recovery for Theft; (13) Law of Marital Separation; (14) Law of Fines for Adultery; (15) Law of Midnight Hours.

This code met the needs of Tibetan local social development, consolidated the order of the feudal system, protected the rights and interests of the great serf‑owners, and thereafter became the norm for subsequent legislation. Provisions such as “stipulating the obligations of officials,” “judges must distinguish truth from falsehood,” “killers must pay a life price,” and “injurers must give blood for blood” were regulations that restrained official tyranny.

In 1613, Karma Phuntsok Namgyal (Tsangpa Khan) merged the “Law of the Brave Tiger” and the “Law of the Cowardly Fox” from the Phagmodru “Fifteen Articles,” deleted the “Law of Midnight Hours,” added the “Law of Border Ethnic Regions,” and established the “Sixteen Articles of the Legal Code.” In 1618, after Karma Tenkyong Wangpo unified all of Tibet, he commissioned Baisewa to compile a new code, adding and deleting provisions based on the “Fifteen Articles,” making the legal stipulations more specific, and adding several articles after the fifteen.

After Güshi Khan and the Fifth Dalai Lama took charge of Tibetan affairs, in 1642 they removed the “Law of Local Officials” from the existing “Thirteen Articles of the Legal Code,” establishing the “Thirteen Articles of the Legal Code,” which included “laws to cross‑examine and distinguish right from wrong, laws for arresting criminals, laws for paying life price for homicide, and laws dealing with adultery between men and women.”

In 1679, the Desi Sangye Gyatso reorganized the “Sixteen Articles,” supplemented the wording, explained some provisions, and synthesized them into a more detailed feudal code for Tibet, called the “Clear Mirror of Legal Codes” (i.e., the “Mirror of Integrity”), consisting of thirteen articles.

In addition, there were some regional unwritten laws. For example, in parts of the Lhokha (Shannan) region, there was a “Summer Law Contract.” From the 25th day of the fourth Tibetan month until the completion of the autumn harvest, each dzong and shö had a commonly observed contract, and all serfs had to sign and seal it to guarantee compliance.

In summary, written legal regulations had already appeared in Tibet from the Tubo dynasty in the 7th century. Later rulers, drawing on the laws of various dynasties and adapting to the actual conditions of Tibetan society, successively enacted several codes. These old Tibetan laws were tools for maintaining the interests of the feudal serf‑owners.

2. Content of the legal code

From the perspective of the legal system, Tibetan law was of a mixed nature, combining various legal fields. In summary, it consisted of the following four parts:

(1) Administrative legal regulations

Administrative laws were regulations concerning the administrative structure of the Tibetan feudal local government and were enacted to maintain the authority and interests of officials and all serf‑owners. Before the Democratic Reforms, the administrative structure of the Tibetan local government had been established in the 17th century. Official positions were based on the system of the Sakya regime. The sixth Desi, Sangye Gyatso, wrote in his Clear Mirror of Legal Codes: “There are thirteen categories of official positions. The ritual officers are not to be discussed here; livestock managers and gatekeepers are too insignificant to mention. For the sake of the realm and the great enterprise, the following are indispensable: ministers, military commanders, judges, handicraft supervisors, chief and minor stewards, inner‑chamber messengers, city supervisors, dzongpons, shöpons, property managers of monastic colleges, commercial officials, northern Mongol chieftains, butter‑lamp attendants (those who manage the images, scriptures, and stupas in monasteries), the Dalai Lama’s envoys, and grain collectors. Therefore, all these many new positions were established.” In 1751, after the Seventh Dalai Lama, Kelsang Gyatso, assumed personal rule, he newly established the Kashag institution and, on the basis of the original structure, added the positions of gazhön (Kashag messenger), gazhong (Kashag secretary), and chamberlains.

(2) Criminal legal regulations

a. Regulations to maintain the authority of serf‑owners

To preserve the serf system and the interests of the serf‑owner class, the law contained provisions stating that the suffering of serfs was predestined and that they must not resist. The law stipulated: “Do not contend with the wise and the noble”; speech and behavior “must conform to the Buddha‑dharma”; serfs could only “speak loyally”; “any popular revolt is a grave offense”; “anyone not restrained by his master shall be arrested; anyone who spies on his master’s important affairs shall be arrested; any commoner who bumps into a high official shall be arrested.” The code also provided that “crying out one’s grievance at the royal palace is improper and shall be punished by arrest and flogging.” The law here clearly exhibited its class character. For example, in 1919, a herder named Tsiwang Dangzhen from Gyantse went to Lhasa to lodge a complaint, accusing the dzongpon of Gyantse of having unjustly seized his 8 cows and 80 sheep. He thought the Kashag would certainly see justice done, but instead he was fined and given 150 lashes, the charge being “resistance to a high official.”

b. Usury as a statutory duty

The Dalai Lama’s Internal Treasury, Zhaxi Liekong (which managed coin minting and the power plant), as well as local Kichab (regional offices) and dzongs (districts), all lent money. The hundreds of large and small nobles in Tibet, except for a few who had gone bankrupt and fallen into debt, all engaged in usury, mainly lending to the serfs in their own manors. Large and small monasteries in Tibet all lent money. The monasteries themselves, their colleges, monastic administrative bodies, as well as individuals with positions, power, or wealth such as Jisö, Niechang, Zuobu, and Zhuni all lent money. The usury of the Three Great Monasteries (Drepung, Sera, Ganden) extended throughout all Tibetan regions. Before Liberation, the three great lords – the local government of Tibet, the monasteries, and the nobles – not only lent money but also made it a statutory duty, institutionalizing the means of exploiting the common people.

c. Military legal regulations

The Tibetan army was an important component of the local government of Tibet and the main tool for the ruling class to maintain its interests. The Qianlong Emperor’s “Twenty‑Nine Articles for the Improvement and Administration of Tibet” contained explicit provisions concerning military affairs. Originally the Tibetan army had only the rank of Debön; thereafter six Debön were established, under whom were twelve Rubön, each commanding 250 soldiers; under each Rubön were two Gyabön, each commanding 125 soldiers; under each Gyabön were five Dingbön, each commanding 25 soldiers. Those who served as officers had to be selected from the young and capable and were given certificates. Promotion was step‑by‑step from Dingbön to Gyabön to Rubön to Debön; skipping ranks was not permitted. It was also stipulated that the total number of soldiers was 3,000, and that Tibetan soldiers should be given rations, each receiving 2.5 dan of barley per year. When summoned for military service, each soldier was to be given one jin of tsampa per day by the Kashag, along with a certificate exempting him from corvée labor. During military operations, it was forbidden to destroy monasteries, to kill travelers, to strip clothing from passing herders, or to separate husbands and wives. All commanding officers everywhere were to maintain good order.

(3) Civil legal regulations

a. Marriage regulations

In various parts of Tibetan areas, there existed laws regulating marriage and family relations, differing in form but similar in content, mostly existing as customary law. Before the Democratic Reforms, Tibet practiced a strict system of intra‑class marriage. When forming an alliance through marriage, family status was considered, and spouses were required to come from matching backgrounds – that is, “the poor seek the poor, the rich seek the rich.” The marriage system was quite complex, including monogamy, polygyny, and polyandry. The personal relationships between husbands and wives, parents and children, and among siblings in these three forms of marriage were all handled according to marriage and family regulations and were recognized by customary law.

b. Property inheritance regulations

The property inheritance system in Tibetan feudal serf society did not develop into independent statutory laws. According to customary rules, the heirs of a general family’s property included children, wives, parents, brothers, and close relatives. In other words, children had the right to inherit their parents’ property; a wife could inherit the property left by her deceased husband; if there were no children, an adopted son had the right to inherit the property. Inheritance began after the death of the deceased. The inherited estate included land, serfs, pastures, gardens, and other property; official posts and corresponding privileges were also included in the scope of inheritance depending on the situation.

c. Debt regulations

The former local government of Tibet had formulated specific provisions concerning the issuance of loans; lending money and collecting interest was a statutory duty of officials at all levels. The local government established lending institutions. Among government organs, the Taibu Zhaliekong (Endowment Fund Management Office), the Pokang Liekong (Grain Affairs Bureau), the Laqia Liekong (Finance Bureau), the Ziqia Liekong (Potala Treasury), and others all lent money.

(4) Judicial corruption

Higher officials would also intervene in cases to extract bribes. After receiving a portion of the bribe, they would pass the case down to lower‑level officials for handling. Those lower officials, after skimming some profit, would in turn pass it further down. Sometimes, when the bribe was large enough, even a truly guilty criminal could be declared innocent. In short, those with more money had the right on their side, those with less money had no right. If both sides offered equal amounts, the judge would mediate the case.

3. Prison and penalty system

The former local government had very few dedicated prisons for holding criminals. In most places, the darkest, dampest rooms on the lowest floor of the Kichab office or dzong government building were used as prisons. Noble lords could also set up prisons in their own manors. The Larang of high tulkus and the Lhagyü of large monasteries also established detention houses within the monasteries.

The penal system of Tibetan law consisted of death penalties, corporal punishments, exile, wearing a wild fox skin, confiscation of property, and other forms. Not only were the categories numerous, but the methods were extremely cruel.

a. Death penalty

The death penalty was punishment that deprived the offender of his life. For example, “riding the copper horse” meant making the “criminal” ride a horse made of copper, inside which cow or horse dung was burned. The horse was carried by eight people as it was paraded around the Barkhor circuit. As the copper horse became hot, it roasted the person alive, and then the body was thrown into the river (it is said that “riding the copper horse” was used only in very early times and was discontinued after 1911). “Being wrapped in cowhide” meant putting a person inside a cowhide bag, leaving only the head outside; stones were tied to the bag, and it was thrown into the river, where it floated along and the person slowly died. The “standing cage” was a square cage that could hold only one person, about 160‑170 cm tall, with a wooden cangue at the top that clamped around the prisoner’s neck. The prisoner had to stand all day and gradually died from torture.

b. Corporal punishments

Corporal punishment was punishment that damaged the offender’s limbs, skin, or bodily functions. Wearing the wooden cangue: the cangue was 80 cm long, worn around the prisoner’s neck and could not be removed; some were worn for life. Wearing fetters: there were wooden and iron types. The wooden type was 25 cm square, split into two halves, with a round hole in the middle sized to the ankle. The prisoner’s ankles were placed inside, and the two ends were locked, making it impossible to stand. “Nailing to a wooden board”: the prisoner’s four limbs were nailed or fixed with iron rings to a wooden board, leaving him unable to move. “Elbow stick”: a wooden stick was used to stretch the prisoner’s arms straight, preventing him from bending them. “Leather wrapping of the hand”: salt was placed in the palm of the prisoner’s hand, which was then wrapped in wet cowhide. As the cowhide dried, it tightened, so that the five fingers could not spread, crippling the hand. In addition, there were other cruel punishments such as hanging stone rings around the neck, wearing stone hats, gouging out eyeballs, pulling out foot tendons, chopping off hands and feet, pressing stones on the chest, driving bamboo skewers into the fingers, and beating with whips and clubs.

c. Exile

Exile was a punishment in which the offender was taken to a desolate place. In the past, some criminals in Lhasa, wearing wooden cangues, fetters, and handcuffs, begged in the streets; others were sent to remote places such as Lhünzê, where they were banished and became slaves for life.

d. Forfeiture

Forfeiture of property was a punishment that deprived the offender of his private possessions. In the past, when Tibetan nobles or government officials committed crimes, forfeiture of their property was often used as a punishment.

(5) Regulations for punishing homicide and assault

Unlawful deprivation of another person’s life was subject to punishment. The law stipulated: those who fought were fined; homicide was a grave crime and required payment of a “life price.” However, due to the influence of the religious concept of “exchanging self and others, seeing all beings as one’s mother,” death sentences were rarely imposed in Tibet. In the law concerning payment of a life price, because people were divided into noble and humble, the life price also differed in amount. The “Thirteen Articles of the Legal Code” and the “Sixteen Articles of the Legal Code” stipulated that for persons of the highest upper class, such as princes, tulkus, and high lamas, the value of their life price was equal to the weight of their body in silver. For killing a headman, the life price was 3,000‑4,000 yuan; for killing a commoner, the life price was 300‑400 yuan. For example, Gajia Zhanna killed the son of a tribal headman of the Guomuxiu Zhuowa tribe and wounded the headman’s daughter‑in‑law; the case was finally settled by paying a large number of yaks as life price.

(6) Regulations for theft

The law stipulated that for stealing the property of a king, the penalty was to pay one hundred times the value of the stolen item; for stealing the property of monastery monks, eighty times; for stealing the property of an ordinary person, eight times. Among the Nagqu Sangxiong tribe, the following rhyme was transmitted: stealing a Buddha image – pay one thousand times; stealing the belongings of a high monk – pay eighty times; stealing the belongings of a monk – pay nine times; stealing the belongings of an official – pay five times; stealing from a person of the same status – pay four times; stealing from a poor person – return the original item plus something slightly inferior, for example, if one cow was stolen, return one cow plus one sheep; if a shepherd stole one goat, pay nine goats.}

[21] International Commission of Jurists. (1959). The question of Tibet and the rule of law. International Commission of Jurists.

"Tibetan society is a serf society based on material estates in Tibet, the main means of production—all the land and most of the cattle belong to three kinds of feudal estate-holders or serf-owners, namely, the officialdom (the feudal government), the monasteries and the nobles. These three kinds of serf-owners only account for approximately 5 per cent of the population, that is, about 60,000 of the 1,200,000 population of Tibet. None of the peasants have any land of their own; few of the herdsmen have cattle of their own. They can only toil for the serf-owners. Together with their children they have for generation after generation belonged to different serf-owners. Part of the estates of the serf- owners are especially set aside for service to the feudal government. The serfs that are assigned to cultivate such land have to do various kinds of corvee for the feudal government. Military service is also borne by some of the serfs on such land. The rest of the estates are the so-called “ self-managed land ” of the serf-owners. On this kind of manorial land, the serfs have to cultivate all the land for the estate owners with their own draught animals and farm implements (sometimes also having to bring their own food), while the lords only allot a small piece of inferior land (about three-tenths of the land of the lords) to the serfs as payment. The serfs spend the great bulk of their time every year working on the land of the serf-owners, and also have to do all kinds of work for them. On the above-mentioned two kinds of estates, more than 70 per cent of the income obtained from the toil of the serfs goes into the pockets of the serf-owners through exploitation. It is generally difficult for the serfs to live on their incomes and, therefore, they are forced to borrow on usurious terms from the serf-owners. A great many serfs are unable to repay the debts they have incurred, and there are even some debts hundreds of years old. The serfs not only have no political rights, they do not even have ordinary freedom of movement. They must get permission from the lord of the manor for even a short term of absence. The nobility in Tibet is hereditary. Their position varies according to the amount of their property. The big nobility make up around one-tenth of this number, or some twenty-odd families; they each own dozens of manorial estates and thousands of serfs. In the feudal governments of Tibet, the power has always been in the hands of these big nobles. The distinctions of rank between nobles and serfs are extremely rigorous. On seeing nobles, the serfs have to avoid them or bow and stick out their tongues as an expression of awe. When they speak they have to follow a definite pattern of speech with no slips. The nobles torture at will the serfs who run away and are recaptured or who are considered to have otherwise violated the law. Besides the commonest form, flogging, there are even such frightfully cruel tortures as gouging out the eyes, cutting off the nose and the hands, hamstringing and chopping off the kneecaps.“ (p. 179-180)

[22] Chen, X. (2008, April 10). Writer's account of transformation in Tibet. China Daily. https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008-04/10/content_6604925.htm

“Before 1959, "the race of Tibetans was slowly dying out from the harsh conditions of serfdom from the number of males who became lamas, engaging neither in production nor responsible reproduction, from childbirths in stables, from syphilis that followed the monasteries like a plague," Strong wrote. And during the trip, we were also witnessing the start of the great transformation in the region. We saw the relief and delight in the eyes of former serfs as huge piles of debt papers - which subjected the serfs to lifelong servitude - were burned to ashes and whips and other old instruments of torture were also cast into flames.”

[23] Conboy, K., & Morrison, J. (2002). The CIA's secret war in Tibet. University Press of Kansas.

"Gompo Tashi, meantime, was growing impatient with Lhasa's waffling. He was especially concerned when the Chinese authorities announced plans to perform a census around the capital and expel any Khampas or Amdowas who had lived there for less than ten years. Although he did not fill into that category, Gompo Tashl was sufficiently worried to seek advice from the influential state oracle of the Nechung monastery. This particular oracle, say Tibetans, was regularly possessed by one of the more important spirits in their cosmology, and his entranced advice held immense sway over decisions of the Lhasa government. During his channeling session with Gompo Tashi, the oracle was unequivocal. The Khampa leader should leave Lhasa, he said, no later than the Buddha Jayanti celebrations on the seventh day of the fourth lunar month. When asked what direction Gompo should take, the oracle answered south, toward Drigu Tso lake. With the decision made for him, Gompo Tashi quietly earmarked pack ani- mals, employees, weapons, and a major slice of his family earnings for the guerrillas in Kham. He also urged the CIA radiomen to remain in Lhasa and stay in contact with one of Phala's assistants. But after a meeting with that assistant- who showed no more backbone than his superior-Tom and Lou elected to join Gompo Tashi in the exodus."“ (p.69-70)

[24] Conboy, K., & Morrison, J. (2002). The CIA's secret war in Tibet. University Press of Kansas.

"Of these {refugees}, some diverted south to the banks of the Drigu Tso, where on 16 June Gompo Tashi arrived to oversee the inauguration ceremony for a unified resistance movement dubbed the National Volunteer Defense Army (NVDA). With 1,500 guerrillas in attendance and Gompo Tashi named titular head by acclamation, the previous flag of the Chushi Gangdruk (a mythical snow lion on a blue background) was replaced by a new NVDA standard featuring crossed Tibetan swords on a yellow field. Tom was on hand to take photographs of the occasion; the roll of film was then couriered out to Gyalo in India.lo The reason for the name change was more than semantic. Although the NVDA was overwhelmingly composed of Khampas, Gompo Tashi intentionally sought to break from the regional overtones of Chushi Gangdruk and present a name and image that would appeal to all Tibetans. As this was transpiring, Tom and Lou duly radioed updates back to the CIA. Much of their reporting consisted of requests for weapons and ammunition, both of which were in short supply. When none were forthcoming, Gompo Tashi took matters into his own hands and departed NVDA headquarters in August to lead a raid against an isolated Chinese garrison southwest of the capital. There, it was hoped, they could make off with a haul of armaments at little risk.“ (p. 72)

[25] Conboy, K., & Morrison, J. (2002). The CIA's secret war in Tibet. University Press of Kansas.

"Once the plane approached the Drigu Tso drop zone, Keck, Aubrey, and Lively all converged in the cabin to offer assistance manhandling the loads down the Four Riven, Six Ranges as instructed by LOU (Tom was still en route from India), local guerrillas had lit a huge flaming cross on the ground. This had been done with a unique Tibetan twist: instead of wood-a precious commodity at high altitudes-the signal had been constructed from more plentiful horse and yak dung. Sighting the fire, Johnson activated a green light in the cabin. As the plane nosed upward, this was the cue for the kickers to remove the final stops on the pallets and give them a gravity-assisted push. With static lines connected to a beam fitted to the ceiling, the supplies thundered down the conveyor and out the door. Olive canopies blossomed in the plane's wake, and the bundles floated toward the waiting guerrillas. Converging on the pallets, the Tibetans broke them open to find two hundred .303 Lee-Enfield rifles and ammunition. A bolt-action rifle that had seen heavy action during World War I, the vintage Lee-Enfield had two advantages. First, it had been a staple of the Tibetan army since 1914. It could therefore be assumed that the Tibetans had mastered its use and maintenance. Second, it was of British origin and had been liberally supplied to regional armies such as those ofIndia and Pakistan; the United States, as a result, was afforded plausible deniability. Although the guerrillas had no qualms about the choice of weapon, they did question the quantities provided. Almost immediately, they leaned on Tom (who had just completed his return trek from India) to radio an appeal for a second drop.“ (p.76-77)

[26] Conboy, K., & Morrison, J. (2002). The CIA's secret war in Tibet. University Press of Kansas.

"Despite a string of tactical wins along the way-a truck ambushed here, an outpost overrun there--the Khampa tactics were generally not working. Part of this was due to the fact that Gompo Tashi was maneuvering his rebels by the hundreds, nearly all of them on horse- back. Although it might have been possible to conceal these numbers in the conifer forests of southern Kham, it was not feasible in the barren hills of central Tibet. The Chinese, as a result, almost always knew where the NVDA was and when it would be coming. Theoretically, the guerrillas should have been able to set the pace of battle and dictate their targets; instead, they were almost always on the run and being corralled by their opponents in a very conventional manner. Bringing spotter planes and field artillery into play, the PLA outnumbered and outgunned the main rebel concentration as it neared Damshung. Peppered with shrapnel, a wounded Gompo Tashi soon ordered a retreat to the east. Part of the NVDA's problem was the collective cold shoulder offered by the local population. As Mao Tse-tung had preached during the Chinese civil war, revolutionary guerrillas were akin to fish thriving in the water of the community. Without water, went the metaphor, the fish could not survive. Given Tibet's sparse population, the Khampa guerrillas rarely encountered such figurative water. And when they did, central Tibetans-influenced by antirebel proclamations from Lhasa and generations of prejudice-saw them as less than brothers in arms.“ (p. 77-78)

[27] Conboy, K., & Morrison, J. (2002). The CIA's secret war in Tibet. University Press of Kansas.

"With the October and November drops, the guerrillas had now been provided with 18,000 pounds of weapons, ammunition, and communications gear. Although this should have been reason for cheer, their attention was instead fixated on a single yellow parachute used during the November shipment. Quickly appropriated by Tom and Lou, the bundle attached to this chute contained additional radios and a satchel of 300,ooo Indian rupees to pay message couriers. Always game fbr a good conspiracy, the Tibetan rebels began bickering that the radio operators had received a small fortune in gold ingots-- hence the color of the chute-and were not willing to share their bounty." Such destructive sniping was compounded by the arrival in December of Walt and a handful of stragglers from Lithang. He had been out of radio contact for half a year, and his sudden appearance was an intelligence windfall for the CIA. Walt, however, did not see it that way and had Tom relay his intense frustration over the radio. Infuriated with Washington's refusal to conduct a weapons drop for Lithang, the fiery Khampa reported that the resistance in that locale was crushed and his three Saipan-trained colleagues missing (only Dan was a known fatality; the fate of the other two was still unconfirmed at the time). "The CIA asked if he would return to Kham to verify their fate," recalls his brother, "but he said there was no hope and refused." It was on that sour note-with Walt sulking at Lhuntse Dzong and Gompo Tashi wrestling with the NVDA's self-inflicted wounds-that 1958 drew to an inauspicious close.“ (p. 79-80)

[28] Conboy, K., & Morrison, J. (2002). The CIA's secret war in Tibet. University Press of Kansas.

"By 1958, Knaus was back in the CIA mainstream and tasked with setting up the China segment offered at the School of International Communism in Arling- ton, Virginia. A CIA front, the school trained foreign cadres about the evils of socialist totalitarianism. He was still serving on its staff at year's end when the call came to lecture a class ofTibetans about the Chinese system. Knaus jotted down some general points for a speech and made his way down to Peary. Upon seeing the Dalai Lama's own brother-and recognizing Lobsang's likely firsthand knowledge of regional events-he tore up his notes. "What I had to say to them," he later said, "was about as applicable as the Punic Wars." Self-deprecation aside, Knaus's visit was a welcome respite from a curriculum that, by early 1959, had grown more physical as tough paramilitary training eclipsed classroom activities. To help in the field, a third paramilitary officer joined Fosmire and Smith in February. That officer, Anthony "Tony Poe" Poshepny, age thirty-four, knew his material. A state-ranked college golfer at San Jose before joining the U.S. Marines, he had received a string of Purple Hearts from Iwo Jima and other Pacific battles. Leaving the corps after the war, he came to Washington in 1951 to apply for a job at the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The bureau's recruiter eyed his combat record and instead steered him across town to the CIA. Poe was quickly added to the agency's rolls, and his paramilitary career over the ensuing seven years mirrored that of Fosmire: small boats in Korea, police training in Thailand, assisting rebels in Indonesia. After a daring submarine escape from the Indonesian island of Sumatra, he had spent the second half of 1958 giving guerrilla instruction to Chinese Nationalist teams on Taiwan and Saipan.“ (p. 88)

[29] Conboy, K., & Morrison, J. (2002). The CIA's secret war in Tibet. University Press of Kansas.

“Learning of the 1958 rebellion, the ROC had made a concerted effort to exploit the Hiu dissent by including Muslim guerrillas among the teams being trained by the CIA. There was no shortage of recruits, as many members of the more prominent Hiu clans had fled to Taiwan. Even one of former warlord Ma pu- feng's many sons was among the novice agents. Tony Poe, later of the Tibet pro`gram, was one of their training officers. His assessment was not particularly positive: "My teams were primarily Muslims, but with Han Chinese leaders. We were jumping about five to six times a day, and exercising in the mountains of western Taiwan. It was mostly ambush training against convoys and railheads. The idea was completely unworkable because the Muslims told me they would kill the Han as soon as they landed."” (p. 102)

[30] Central Intelligence Agency. (1951, June 16). The "liberation" of Tibet (Intelligence Memorandum). Office of Current Intelligence.

“In October 1950, the Peiping regime ordered units of the 2nd Field Army to "march into Tibet," and at the same time notified the Tibetan authorities to send delegates to Peiping to discuss "peaceful liberation." At first, the dominant faction of the Tibetan Government was apparently disposed to resist. However, by the end of 1950, Chinese Communist forces had advanced through western Sikang to a point approximately 300 miles from Lhasa, where they have remained; in this period, Peiping claimed that its forces had "completely wiped out" the "main force" of Tibet, stated to be 5,700 troops. Chinese Communist propaganda, combining menacing with conciliatory gestures, contributed to the ascendancy in Lhasa of elements favoring accommodation to Peiping; this provisional government was left in control in December 1950 by the Dalai Lama, who removed himself to a town near the Indian border where he is still located. The Tibetan delegation in New Delhi, which had been engaged in preliminary conversations with Communist China's Ambassador to India, was instructed to proceed to Peiping, and arrived there in April 1951, its chairman having stated en route that he intended to accept Peiping's definition of Tibet's status. The agreement reached in May provides that "the Tibetan people shall return to... the Motherland" and that the "return" shall be ensured by a military occupation, with the Tibetan authorities contracting to "actively assist the People's Liberation Army to enter Tibet and consolidate the national defenses." The Chinese promise of "national regional autonomy" to Tibet is negated in the same phrase by the provision that such "autonomy" is to be exercised "under the unified leadership" of Communist China. Peiping's promise not to alter the status of the Dalai Lama is rendered equally meaningless by provisions for the reinstatement of the Panchen Lama (under Chinese Communist control since 1949) to his former authority, which would make him in fact superior to the Dalai Lama. The agreement further states that Peiping is to have absolute authority over "all external affairs" of Tibet, that Tibetan troops are to be absorbed by the "People's Liberation Army," and that local "reforms" are to be initiated by "the people." The agreement finally provides that, "in order to ensure (its) implementation," Communist China is to set up a Military and Political Affairs Committee and a Military Area Headquarters in Tibet.” (p. 2-3)

[31] Central Intelligence Agency. (1951, June 16). The "liberation" of Tibet (Intelligence Memorandum). Office of Current Intelligence.

“Chinese Communist commentaries on the agreement indicate some doubt as to whether the Tibetan authorities will implement it. Although Peiping repeatedly cites the "full power" of the Tibetan delegation, it is not known whether the Dalai Lama or the provisional authorities in Lhasa authorized the delegation to sign the agreement, or whether they intend to abide by it. The Dalai Lama and other Tibetan authorities, who have made no public statement on the agreement, are reported to be aware that Peiping's promises are worthless and that they cannot expect to hold other than temporary or nominal power under the Communists. On the other hand, the Tibetans are presumably aware that they cannot expect outside assistance, other than possible sanctuary in India or elsewhere if they should choose to flee. Despite the difficulties presented by the Tibetan terrain and climatic conditions, the Peiping regime undoubtedly has the capability of extending its military control over Tibet. More than 450,000 troops are disposed north and east of Tibet, and an estimated 30,000 of these could be introduced into Tibet. Remaining Tibetan forces total at most 5,000; these forces, lacking numerical strength, materiel, morale, and modern warfare techniques, could at best offer limited guerrilla resistance. While the Tibetan ecclesiastical power is an obstacle to Communist political control, Communist experience with ethnic and religious minorities in several other border areas—including the Tibetans of Southwest China—suggests that the Communists will steadily consolidate their political as well as military control.” (p. 3)

[32] Central Intelligence Agency. (1959, April 27). Background: Tibet {Memorandum}.

“Tibetan resistance continued, especially after the Communist collectivization drive began to affect Tibetans in Chinese territory in late 1955. VI. U.S. Policy Toward Tibet: A. The United States has not issued a flat assertion that China has sovereignty over Tibet, but it has not questioned the Chinese Nationalist position either. 1. The Chinese Nationalists insist that Tibet is an integral part of China. 2. After the recent revolt began, President Chiang Kai-shek stated equivocally that following the Nationalists' return to the mainland, "we will assist the Tibetan people to realize their own aspirations in accordance with the principles of self-determination." B. During the recent revolt, the United States maintained a strategic silence on the status of Tibet.” (p. 2)

[33] Central Intelligence Agency. (1962, May). Transition in Tibet (Geographic Intelligence Report No. CIA/RR GR 62-2). Office of Research and Reports.

"The Chinese Communist occupation of Tibet has been marked by considerable Tibetan resistance to the imposition of Communist programs. Although a postponement of further 'reforms' was announced in December 1960, changes introduced during the past 3 years have slowly strengthened and consolidated the Chinese position in Tibet. The traditional administrative structure of Tibet was abolished in government units. Although effective local government is possible in predominantly agricultural areas, the sparsely populated nomadic areas of northern Tibet present unique problems and have to a large extent remained outside the pale of Chinese administration and the instituting of Communist programs. The actual functioning of local government units in carrying out higher level policy directives has been hindered by an insufficient number of trained and reliable Tibetan and Chinese cadres.” (p. 1)

[34] Central Intelligence Agency. (1962, May). Transition in Tibet (Geographic Intelligence Report No. CIA/RR GR 62-2). Office of Research and Reports.

“In 1959 and 1960, after the international publicity given Tibet by the March 1959 revolt and the flight of the Dalai Lama to India, consultative bodies to the United Nations made authoritative appraisals concerning the legal status of Tibet. These appraisals help to clarify the complexities of international law surrounding the status of Tibet; and, by concluding that Tibet was an independent state in 1913 when it was a signatory to the Simla Convention, they also give some support to the Indian position on the validity of the McMahon Line.” (p. 2)

[35] Central Intelligence Agency. (1962, May). Transition in Tibet (Geographic Intelligence Report No. CIA/RR GR 62-2). Office of Research and Reports.

“After the inauguration of the Preparatory Committee for the Tibet Autonomous Region in 1956, attempts to curb the power of the monasteries and related restrictions helped spark sizable anti-Chinese outbreaks, particularly in eastern Tibet. Consequently, a five-year moratorium on the introduction of so-called democratic reforms was announced by Mao Tse-tung in early 1957. In spite of this promise to postpone "reform," the outbreak of heavy fighting in March 1959 and the flight of the Dalai Lama to India led to a renewal of Chinese efforts to prod the truculent Tibetans into taking the first steps on the "road to socialism." However, considerable Tibetan resistance to both land reform and the organization of mutual-aid teams forced another Chinese "reexamination" of Party policies in 1960, and this review was followed by the retrenchment announcement of late 1960. Despite the 1960 moratorium, a fundamental change in Tibetan society was accomplished through the land reform program by the confiscation or "buying out" of the large landholdings of the monasteries and the nobility, thereby removing the economic base from which much of their power was derived. ” (p. 3)

[36] Central Intelligence Agency. (1962, May). Transition in Tibet (Geographic Intelligence Report No. CIA/RR GR 62-2). Office of Research and Reports.

“II. Administrative Changes In January 1960, the Chinese Communists announced that Tibet had been reorganized into 72 districts (chuan-ch’ü) and 1 municipality (shih), through which the newly created administrative units would be governed. This reorganization marked the end of Tibet's traditional administrative system, which had been based on a level of local government known as the dzong (tsung). It also signaled the end of Chinese efforts to implement policy directives at the local level through traditional institutions. Chinese dissatisfaction with the existing situation had become apparent in 1959 when press releases in China pointedly noted that Tibet's administrative units were staffed almost entirely by Tibetans. Chinese Communist officials charged that these Tibetan administrators, together with the "reactionary clique of the upper strata"—the clerical and lay nobility—had been the principal instigators of the rebellion. In July 1959, the pro-Chinese Tibetan Ngapo Ngawang Jigme, who held the title of Vice Chairman of the Preparatory Committee for the Tibet Autonomous Region, described the traditional Tibetan administrative system as "irrational and inconvenient for administrative management." He further advocated a "rational" administrative redivision based on topography, communications, the economy, defense, and similar factors. Administrative changes of this type were subsequently implemented, and the new administrative structure became effective in January 1960. Most of Tibet's 72 hsien were located in the south and east, where sedentary agriculture was possible. The population of these agricultural regions was estimated at 900,000. By contrast, approximately 300,000 Tibetans classified as nomads were dispersed throughout areas where pastureland could be found, although the majority lived north of the Tsangpo River on the high grasslands of the Chang Thang, or northern plateau. The traditional independence of these nomadic populations, combined with the difficulties of maintaining effective control over pastoral peoples living in a harsh and sparsely populated environment, posed significant challenges for Chinese authorities. As the Panchen Lama observed in December 1960, "a set of work experiences has not yet been found which will suit the characteristics of the pastoral areas in which there is a large stretch of land but a small population and in which the people live widely apart and move frequently from one place to another." ” (p. 5)

[37] Central Intelligence Agency. (1962, May). Transition in Tibet (Geographic Intelligence Report No. CIA/RR GR 62-2). Office of Research and Reports.

“The October 1959 Chinese Communist press report you refer to reflects infrastructure developments following the suppression of the Tibetan uprising in March 1959. The construction of simple highways to connect most of the hsien (counties) in southern Tibet was part of broader efforts by the Chinese government to integrate the region economically and administratively. These roads were primarily intended to facilitate military logistics, governmental access, and basic economic exchange. While the report frames this as development and stabilization, it is important to note that this occurred in the context of a violent crackdown on the rebellion and subsequent political reorganization. The narrative of “rebellion suppression” and “construction” remains contested, with different interpretations of the legitimacy and impact of these actions among Tibetan communities and international observers.” (p. 16)

[38] Central Intelligence Agency. (1962, May). Transition in Tibet (Geographic Intelligence Report No. CIA/RR GR 62-2). Office of Research and Reports.

“In spite of the opposition of the Tibetans and the other vexing problems with which the Chinese Communists have been confronted, the record of ten years of Communist occupation has been one of halting but continuing alteration of the social, political, and economic structure of Tibet. The apparent breaking up of the vast power of the monasteries through the confiscation of most of their large landholdings under land reform programs, and the resulting general depopulation of the monasteries, are perhaps the most far-reaching and significant of the Communist "reforms." The Chinese Communists have reiterated that, despite the present moratorium on new programs, the political need for eventual reform persists. They appear determined to proceed toward their goal of transforming Tibet into a compliant and socialized territory under complete Communist domination.” (p. 29)

[39] Central Intelligence Agency. (1958, July 21). Resistance in Tibet (Geographic Intelligence Memorandum No. CIA/RR-GM-9). Office of Research and Reports.

“Possibly the most important basic factor obstructing the implementation of Chinese Communist plans in Tibet is the rigid and unyielding structure of Tibetan society. Tibetan society is inseparable from Lamaism, or Tibetan Buddhism, which in itself is virtually the state. Supreme spiritual and temporal authority is vested in the head of the Lamaist Church—the Dalai Lama—whose spiritual influence extends far beyond the limits of the political control of Lhasa. The many monasteries found in Tibetan-inhabited areas provide visible evidence of the spiritual dominance of Lamaism. The monasteries also possess great economic influence through their large landholdings and control of wealth. The clergy is an extremely conservative force and, even before the advent of the Communists, had strongly resisted modernization or modification of the traditional Tibetan way of life. Although the Tibetan nobility is numerically small, it has considerable power through hereditary positions in the government and ownership of land and trading concerns. Most Tibetans, however, are neither monks nor nobles but peasants, often tenants, or nomadic herders. Although the chief domains of the nomads are the southern half of the Chang Thang, northeastern Tibet, and parts of Kham, they are found throughout Tibet. Their mobility makes them less susceptible to control than sedentary agriculturalists. The Goloks, a particularly turbulent group of nomadic tribes inhabiting the southeastern part of Tsinghai, have remained outside the sphere of control of either the Chinese or Lhasa. Despite the social and economic inequalities between the upper and lower levels of Tibetan society—a situation likely to be exploited by the Communists—feudal traditions continue to be a significant impediment to change. From 1951 through 1954, the Chinese Communists moved cautiously in Tibet. Aside from establishing and maintaining their military garrisons, Chinese programs were largely limited to local agricultural assistance and public health initiatives. During 1955 and 1956, however, the Chinese either initiated or announced plans for numerous programs, including the organization (March 1955) of a Preparatory Committee for a Tibet Autonomous Region (inaugurated April 1956), the establishment of an administrative hierarchy staffed mainly by Chinese officials, and the development of limited economic and social construction projects. Additionally, the Chinese began in certain areas to institute "democratic reform," a term covering such measures as land redistribution, abolition of certain "feudal" practices, and broader efforts designed to prepare the populace for future steps on the road to socialism.” (p. 2)

[40] Central Intelligence Agency. (1958, July 21). Resistance in Tibet (Geographic Intelligence Memorandum No. CIA/RR-GM-9). Office of Research and Reports.

“In late 1955 and early 1956, armed uprisings occurred in Kham—specifically in the vicinity of Li-t'ang, Pa-an (Batang), and Te-ko, but possibly in other areas as well—and in the Golok-inhabited region of Tsinghai. The revolts in Kham reportedly were triggered by the imposition of "democratic reforms" that hit particularly hard at the power of the monasteries. Military action was necessary to quell these revolts. Information is limited regarding the extent and duration of the fighting, but it was sufficiently serious to cause refugees to flee to Lhasa. Sporadic fighting was still being reported, and there were indications that even larger areas were involved. Furthermore, the road from Szechwan was reportedly cut in several places. This is plausible, since natural conditions such as heavy rains and landslides are sufficient to render certain sections inoperable for days or weeks; with only limited human assistance, long stretches of the road could be put out of operation for indefinite periods, thereby blocking the movement of Chinese personnel and supplies. Finally, the events of 1956 brought to light a Tibetan underground movement, the Mimang, which operated both within and outside Tibet using pamphlets and similar media in a psychological warfare campaign against the Chinese Communists. The violent Tibetan reactions caused the Chinese to reassess the situation, and several speeches in early 1956 attempted to allay Tibetan fears. Despite these assurances, however, Chinese plans for reform continued unabated. In this political climate, the Dalai Lama left Tibet for India in December 1956 to participate in a Buddhist celebration. While there, he held discussions with Indian Prime Minister Nehru and Chinese Premier Chou En-lai. For Tibetan aspirations, the timing of these discussions was favorable, coming shortly after the worldwide indignation generated by the suppression of the Hungarian Revolution.” (p. 3)

[41] Central Intelligence Agency. (1959, March 30). Central Intelligence Bulletin (Copy No. C 3).

“The 28 March order names Peiping's puppet, the Panchen Lama, acting chairman of the preparatory committee in place of the Dalai Lama "during the time" the latter is held under "duress" by the rebels. The Chinese have been grooming the Panchen Lama for just such a role in the event the Dalai Lama refused to cooperate with them. The Communists, apparently anxious to keep the door open for future use of the Dalai Lama as a puppet, are claiming that his attitude continues to favor Peiping against Tibetan "reactionaries." On 29 March, Peiping Radio broadcast the text of letters allegedly exchanged between the Dalai Lama and the political commissar of Chinese armed forces in Tibet supporting this theme and attempting to document Chinese restraint in the face of rebel "provocations." It seems likely that the Communists will continue to use the Panchen Lama for the time being but will increase their efforts to destroy Lamaism in Tibet. [CENSORED BY CIA] [CENSORED BY CIA] the seriousness of the fighting in Lhasa between 20 and 22 March. [CENSORED BY CIA]. [CENSORED BY CIA] a number of buildings in Lhasa were [WRITTEN NOTE CENSORED BY CIA] damaged, including monasteries and the Dalai Lama's palace and summer home. [CENSORED BY CIA] Peiping claims that 4,000 rebels were taken prisoner during the fighting and that rebel forces in all numbered "only about 20,000," including the Khamba tribesmen. The rebels also had built "battle positions" along a key highway and placed "large numbers of machine guns there," according to the political commissar of Chinese armed forces in Tibet.” (p. 1-2)

[42] Central Intelligence Agency. (1959, March 30). Central Intelligence Bulletin (Copy No. C 3).

“A "Great Assembly" of about 400 members representing major monasteries and noble families met only to consider important matters such as the selection of a regent or a declaration of war. Tibetan society is characterized by rigid stratification based on the dominance of the clergy and nobility. Since the church has been the only road to advancement open to the common people, great numbers of young men enter monasteries. It has been estimated that about one-sixth of the male population are monks, a factor which has tended to limit the growth of the Tibetan population and, in some parts of the country, led to the practice of polyandry. The importance of the monasteries is not limited to political and religious matters. Because of the large proportion of the population living under their control, the monasteries are deeply involved in economic activities such as trade and the management of farms and herds. The monks also carry on a substantial part of the handicraft work that provides Tibetans with daily necessities. After dissolving the traditional Tibetan government on 28 March 1959, the Chinese Communist authorities turned over administration of the area to the Preparatory Committee for the Tibetan Autonomous Region, which had been established in 1956 under the nominal chairmanship of the Dalai Lama. The nature and functions of this committee will be discussed in more detail below, in connection with relations between Tibet and the Chinese central government.” (p. 5-6)

[43] Central Intelligence Agency. (1959, April 27). Tibet and China (Background Paper No. 2243/59, Copy No. 2).

“The outstanding characteristic of the government of Tibet is that until recently it had been a functioning theocracy. While religious and political aspects of the government could be distinguished, the former were dominant. Events in Tibet cannot be understood, therefore, without some knowledge of the Tibetan religion and its coordinate leaders, the Dalai and Panchen Lamas. The Tibetan religion is a form of Buddhism usually referred to as Lamaism. Subjected to a heavy admixture of primitive animism, it is regarded as unorthodox by adherents of the major schools of Buddhism. Because the early history of the region was characterized by constant contention among petty rulers, the monasteries, as symbols of continuity and security, acquired a considerable amount of political power.” (p. 1)

[44] Central Intelligence Agency. (1959, April 27). Tibet and China (Background Paper No. 2243/59, Copy No. 2).

“The traditional government consisted of two major divisions, one to administer ecclesiastical affairs and the other to handle secular affairs. Many principal posts were dual, held jointly by a monk and a layman. Even the command of the armed forces was shared in this manner. Most lay members of the government were chosen from the nobility, whose families often owed their positions to association with the church. The families of successive Dalai Lamas, for example, have traditionally been elevated to the nobility and granted estates. This form of government was preserved under Communist domination until the recent outbreak of rebellion in Lhasa, at which time it was dissolved.” (p. 4)

[45] Central Intelligence Agency. (1959, April 27). Tibet and China (Background Paper No. 2243/59, Copy No. 2).

“In February 1956, a serious uprising occurred in a Tibetan autonomous area in Szechwan Province, during which the Chinese Communists resorted to aerial bombardment of at least two Lamaist monasteries that had become centers of resistance. Traffic on the road from Szechwan to Tibet proper was interrupted for a considerable time, and sporadic outbreaks continued for many months. Peiping admitted publicly the following June that the trouble had been caused by an attempt to impose land reform and establish agricultural cooperatives, thus depriving the monks of income from their lands and from peasant donations. The monasteries had also been adversely affected by new policies concerning taxation and grazing lands, as well as by the confiscation of their weapons, including those placed in temples as offerings to the gods. The Chinese Communists attempted for a time to conciliate the Tibetans. The inauguration of the Preparatory Committee for the Tibet Autonomous Region was held in April 1956, and the principal Chinese speaker declared that "reforms in Tibet in the future must proceed from the upper to the lower level by peaceful consultation, and they must accord with the wish of the great majority of the people." In an attempt to allay the apprehensions of monks and nobles, the speaker assured them that "during and after reforms the government must take steps to guarantee the upper strata of Tibetans (including the upper strata of religious circles) that their political status and level of material life is not lowered." A year later, in April 1957, the Chinese Communists went still further in postponing "reforms" in Tibet and announced that action would not be taken until after 1962. They promised that organizations established to prepare for reform would be reduced in size, and that many Chinese personnel who had entered Tibet to assist with reform would be withdrawn. In spite of Chinese attempts to reassure the Tibetans, outbreaks of rebellion continued to occur in the eastern part of the region. In sympathy with their fellow Tibetans living in Chinese territory, the Khambas, a tribe inhabiting Chamdo, attacked Chinese garrisons and seriously interfered with road traffic between China proper and Tibet. Refugees from the disturbed areas began to appear in Lhasa in early 1956, and it became known that a Tibetan independence party—the Mimang—was functioning as the driving force behind anti-Chinese demonstrations. The Mimang also prepared petitions against Chinese policies and presented them to the Dalai Lama. The instances of revolt by Tibetans were on a relatively small scale, however, and constituted an annoyance rather than a threat to Chinese Communist domination. During 1957 and 1958, the Chinese may have intensified their military countermeasures in an effort to stamp out the continuing uprisings. In addition, the highly publicized communalization movement in Communist China in the autumn of 1958 undoubtedly increased Tibetan apprehensions. Tension was further raised by the gradual drift westward of Khamba tribesmen into the vicinity of Lhasa, an area where violence had not yet occurred. The Chinese Communists announced in March 1959 that the Dalai Lama had been named a delegate to the National People's Congress, scheduled to open in Peiping the following month. The Dalai Lama had attended the initial session of the Congress in 1954, and his visit to Peiping had extended to eight months. The Tibetans had protested the departure of the Dalai Lama from Lhasa at that time, however, and the prospect of another journey to Peiping was probably even more alarming in 1959. On 10 March 1959, the Dalai Lama was invited by the Chinese to attend a function in Lhasa. The manner in which the invitation was delivered may have helped to inspire rumors that the Chinese were about to abduct him, and violent anti-Chinese demonstrations occurred throughout the city. Disorders continued during the following days, and the Dalai Lama was spirited from Lhasa on 17 March. Open fighting between Tibetans and Chinese broke out in Lhasa two days later.” (p. 31–33)

[46] Mann, J. (1998, September 15). CIA gave aid to Tibetan exiles in '60s, files show. Los Angeles Times. https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1998-sep-15-mn-22993-story.html.

“For much of the 1960s, the CIA provided the Tibetan exile movement with $1.7 million a year for operations against China, including an annual subsidy of $180,000 for the Dalai Lama, according to newly released U.S. intelligence documents. The money for the Tibetans and the Dalai Lama was part of the CIA’s worldwide effort during the height of the Cold War to undermine Communist governments, particularly in the Soviet Union and China. In fact, the U.S. government committee that approved the Tibetan operations also authorized the disastrous Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba. The documents, published last month by the State Department, illustrate the historical background of the situation in Tibet today, in which China continues to accuse the Dalai Lama of being an agent of foreign forces seeking to separate Tibet from China. The CIA’s program encompassed support of Tibetan guerrillas in Nepal, a covert military training site in Colorado, “Tibet Houses” established to promote Tibetan causes in New York and Geneva, education for Tibetan operatives at Cornell University and supplies for reconnaissance teams. “The purpose of the program . . . is to keep the political concept of an autonomous Tibet alive within Tibet and among foreign nations, principally India, and to build a capability for resistance against possible political developments inside Communist China,” explains one memo written by top U.S. intelligence officials”

[47] Mann, J. (1998, September 15). CIA gave aid to Tibetan exiles in '60s, files show. Los Angeles Times. https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1998-sep-15-mn-22993-story.html.

“The declassified historical documents provide the first inside details of the CIA’s decade-long covert program to support the Tibetan independence movement. At the time of the intelligence operation, the CIA was seeking to weaken Mao Tse-tung’s hold over China. And the Tibetan exiles were looking for help to keep their movement alive after the Dalai Lama and his supporters fled Tibet following an unsuccessful 1959 revolt against Chinese rule. Tibetan exiles and the Dalai Lama have acknowledged for many years that they once received support from U.S. intelligence.”

[48] Mann, J. (1998, September 15). CIA gave aid to Tibetan exiles in '60s, files show. Los Angeles Times. https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1998-sep-15-mn-22993-story.html.

“The Dalai Lama wrote in his autobiography that the cutoff in the 1970s showed that the assistance from the Americans “had been a reflection of their anti-Communist policies rather than genuine support for the restoration of Tibetan independence.””

[59] Mann, J. (1998, September 15). CIA gave aid to Tibetan exiles in '60s, files show. Los Angeles Times. https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1998-sep-15-mn-22993-story.html.

“The budget figures for the CIA’s Tibetan program are contained in a memo dated Jan. 9, 1964. It was evidently written to help justify continued funding for the clandestine intelligence operation. “Support of 2,100 Tibetan guerrillas based in Nepal: $500,000,” the document says. “Subsidy to the Dalai Lama: $180,000.” After listing several other costs, it concludes: “Total: $1,735,000.” The files show that this budget request was approved soon afterward. A later document indicates that these annual expenses continued at the same level for four more years, until 1968. At that point, the CIA scrubbed its training programs for Tibetans inside the United States and cut the budget for the entire program to just below $1.2 million a year.”

[50] Mann, J. (1998, September 15). CIA gave aid to Tibetan exiles in '60s, files show. Los Angeles Times. https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1998-sep-15-mn-22993-story.html.

“The Dalai Lama also wrote regretfully in his book that the CIA had trained and equipped Tibetan guerrillas who conducted raids into Tibet from a base camp in Nepal. The effect of these operations “only resulted in more suffering for the people of Tibet. Worse, these activities gave the Chinese government the opportunity to blame the efforts of those seeking to regain Tibetan independence on the activities of foreign powers--whereas, of course, it was an entirely Tibetan initiative.””

[51] Mann, J. (1998, September 15). CIA gave aid to Tibetan exiles in '60s, files show. Los Angeles Times. https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1998-sep-15-mn-22993-story.html.

“A brief internal history of the CIA’s Tibet operations shows that the Eisenhower administration first formally approved covert support to the Tibetan resistance in September 1958, at a time when the Tibetans were conducting guerrilla raids against Chinese army units. The U.S. intelligence operations were overseen in Washington by the executive branch’s top-secret “303 Committee.” On May 20, 1959, only a few weeks after the unsuccessful Tibetan revolt, the 303 Committee approved the first covert support specifically for the Dalai Lama, who had just arrived in India. These covert CIA programs were re-approved several times during the 1960s. In 1964, the CIA decided that one of the main problems facing the Tibetans was “a lack of trained officers equipped with linguistic and administrative abilities.” As a result, it decided to educate 20 Tibetans. “Cornell University has tentatively agreed to provide facilities for their education,” the CIA explains in one memo.”

[52] State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China. (2021). Tibet since 1951: Liberation, development and prosperity. http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/202105/21/content_WS60a7a3c5c6d0df57f98d9f60.html.

“In old Tibet there was not a single proper school. The illiteracy rate exceeded 95 percent, to say nothing of complete ignorance of modern science and technology. From 1951 to 2020, the central government invested RMB224 billion in Tibet’s education. Now, the region has established a modern educational system which includes preschool, primary and middle schools, vocational and technical schools, institutions of higher learning, and continuing and special education institutions. Students enjoy 15 years of publicly-funded compulsory education. All primary schools are offering math course, all middle schools have completed teaching plans for math, physics, chemistry, and biology courses, and all vocational and technical schools are offering the courses prescribed in the national catalog of courses for these schools. A campaign to popularize senior high school education was completed on schedule. Since 2015, organized educational professionals from across the country have made a tremendous contribution to Tibet’s education system. At present, Tibet has 3,195 schools of various types and at various levels, hosting more than 790,000 students. These include seven institutions of higher learning, 12 secondary vocational schools, 143 middle schools, and 827 primary schools. In addition, more than 92,000 students attend schools outside the region. The gross enrollment rate for the three-year preschool education has reached 87 percent. The net enrollment rate in primary school is more than 99.9 percent, and the gross enrollment rate in junior high, senior high, and higher education are 107, 90.2 and 56.1 percent respectively. Basic balanced development of compulsory education has been realized in all counties. The completion rate for compulsory education has reached 95 percent, and new entrants to the region’s workforce now have an average of 13.1 years of education. Tibet is addressing issues of employment by relying on the concerted efforts of the government, society, and enterprises. The employment rate among higher-education graduates has remained above 95 percent for the past five years, and reached 99 percent in 2020. The development of scientific and technological platforms and talent teams is accelerating. Tibet has 92,000 professional technical personnel, and the contribution of science and technology to economic growth has reached 45.6 percent. Before liberation, there were only three small, shabby government-run institutions of Tibetan medicine and a small number of private clinics. Now, Tibet has a full system covering regular medical services, maternity and child care, disease prevention and control, and Tibetan medicine and therapies. In Tibet today there are 1,642 medical institutions of various types, 11 of which are grade A tertiary hospitals. There are 4.9 hospital beds and 5.89 medical workers per thousand people. Medical teams from other parts of China have been sent to assist Tibet, to ensure that people can receive excellent medical services in their own neighborhoods. The medical and healthcare network now covers the whole region. All townships have health centers and all villages have clinics. These improvements in medical services have brought about a corresponding improvement in public health. The death rate of women in childbirth has dropped to 48 per 100,000, and the infant mortality rate to 7.6 per thousand. Both are record lows. The average life expectancy has increased from 35.5 years in 1951 to 71.1 years in 2019. Victims of more than 400 major diseases can now obtain treatment within the region. Ailments that were once widespread in Tibet, such as hydatidosis, Kashin-Beck disease, congenital heart disease, and cataracts, have been eradicated or brought under effective prevention and control.” (p. 14)

[53] State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China. (2021). Tibet since 1951: Liberation, development and prosperity. http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/202105/21/content_WS60a7a3c5c6d0df57f98d9f60.html. “A social security system including mainly five major types of insurance (old age insurance, medical insurance, unemployment insurance, work-related injury insurance, and maternity insurance) is now in place and covers both urban and rural residents. Basic living standards are effectively guaranteed. In 2020, the basic medical insurance systems of urban and rural residents were integrated, and the standard subsidy increased to RMB585 per person per year. One-time settlement after diagnosis and treatment, full coverage of the insured, and balance of insurance funds have been realized. Individual reimbursement of medical expenses can be as high as RMB140,000, nearly seven times the average annual per capita disposable income of urban and rural residents in Tibet. A special treatment policy has been extended to cover 38 serious diseases. Basic medical insurance is more effective. Full coverage of social insurance Social security provision is improving. The registered urban unemployment rate is below 4 percent. The employment rates of key groups are among the highest in the country. A social security system including mainly five major types of insurance (old age insurance, medical insurance, unemployment insurance, work-related injury insurance, and maternity insurance) is now in place and covers both urban and rural residents. Basic living standards are effectively guaranteed. In 2020, the basic medical insurance systems of urban and rural residents were integrated, and the standard subsidy increased to RMB585 per person per year. One-time settlement after diagnosis and treatment, full coverage of the insured, and balance of insurance funds have been realized. Individual reimbursement of medical expenses can be as high as RMB140,000, nearly seven times the average annual per capita disposable income of urban and rural residents in Tibet. A special treatment policy has been extended to cover 38 serious diseases. Basic medical insurance is more effective. Full coverage of social insurance has been realized, and people of all ethnic groups now enjoy comprehensive social security.” (p. 14-15)

[54] State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China. (2021). Tibet since 1951: Liberation, development and prosperity. http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/202105/21/content_WS60a7a3c5c6d0df57f98d9f60.html. “Through targeted poverty alleviation policies and measures, Tibet has won a decisive victory over poverty, and local people of all ethnic groups now have adequate food and clothing and access to compulsory education, basic medical services and safe housing. By the end of 2019, all the 628,000 registered poor and 74 designated poor counties in Tibet had risen from poverty, marking the end of absolute poverty in Tibet for the first time in history. The average annual per capita disposable income of those who have just emerged from poverty now exceeds RMB10,000, an indication that the positive results of poverty elimination have been consolidated. It was the democratic reform in Tibet that led to leapfrog progress in its social system, and the fight against poverty secured historic improvements in its ways of life.” (p. 15)

[55] State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China. (2011). Sixty years since the peaceful liberation of Tibet. http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2014/08/23/content_281474983043406.htm. “From 1951 to 2010 the central government invested 40.73 billion yuan to give a boost to Tibet’s education. Now, Tibet has basically established an educational system with special local flavor and minority ethnic characteristics, which includes pre-school, primary and middle schools, secondary vocational and technical schools, institutions of higher learning, and adult and special education institutions. In 2010 Tibet had six institutions of higher learning, 122 junior and senior high schools, and 872 primary schools. The total enrollment was over 500,000. More than 20,000 Tibetan students are studying in Tibetan classes in schools of the hinterland. In 12 hinterland provinces and municipalities of China, 42 secondary vocational schools have classes for Tibetan students. Now the enrollment rate for primary school-age children of the Tibetan ethnic group has reached 99.2 percent; that for junior high school, 98.2 percent; that for senior high school, 60.1 percent; and that for institutions of higher learning, 23.4 percent. The illiteracy rate among the young and the middle-aged has fallen to 1.2 percent. The average educational period of people above 15 years old in Tibet has reached 7.3 years. The children enjoy “three guarantees” for compulsory education, i.e., the state guarantees all tuition as well as food and lodging expenses for students from Tibet’s farming, pastoral or impoverished urban families from the pre-school period all the way to the senior high school period. Subsidies for each student in this regard have reached 2,000 yuan per year.”

[56] State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China. (2015, April 15). Tibet’s path of development is driven by an irresistible historical tide. https://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2015/04/15/content_281475089444218_5.html “Since a large proportion of the population were not engaged in economic activity and reproduction, but were used as tools of oppression by the religious power, there was an acute shortage of social resources, and demographic growth had remained stagnant for a long period of time. According to “Tibet” from Annals of Military Events in Qing Dynasty written by Wei Yuan (1794-1851) in the mid-19th century, the Department of Minorities Affairs in 1737 (the second year of Qing Emperor Qianlong’s reign) produced a report on the areas under the jurisdiction of the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Erdeni, which found that there were more than 316,200 lamas in Tibet, from a regional population (excluding present-day Qamdo) of only 1.09 million. By the early 1950s, the local population still stood around 1 million, having seen hardly any increase in 200 years.”

[57] State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China. (2011). Sixty years since the peaceful liberation of Tibet. http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2014/08/23/content_281474983043406.htm. “Before the peaceful liberation, more than 90 percent of the people in Tibet had no private housing, nor had they enough food and clothing. But over the past 60 years the Tibetan people’s living conditions have constantly improved. In 1951 the per-capita housing of urban dwellers was less than three sq m, but the figure reached 34.72 at the end of 2010. Since 2006, with the construction of a new socialist countryside and comfortable housing project underway, 274,800 households, comprising 1.4021 million farmers and herdsmen, have moved into modern houses, and the per-capita housing space has increased to 24 sq m in rural areas. The aim of providing farmers and herdsmen living in poor conditions with comfortable houses has been realized. Tibet has also improved its facilities in the areas of water, electricity, highways, telecommunications, gas, radio and television, postal services and the environment in farming and pastoral areas, giving rise to historic changes in these areas. The coverage rate of postal services in townships, that of highways in townships, and that of highways in administrative villages have reached 85.7 percent, 99.7 percent and 81.2 percent, respec-tively. The region has provided safe drinking water for 1.532 million farmers and herdsmen, and iodized salt for 91.2 percent of the residents in farming and pastoral areas. In 2010 the per-capita net income of farmers and herdsmen was 4,138.7 yuan, registering a double-digit growth for eight consecutive years. The per-capita disposable income of urban dwellers stood at 14,980 yuan.”

[58] State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China. (2011). Sixty years since the peaceful liberation of Tibet. http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2014/08/23/content_281474983043406.htm. “According to the sixth national census, the total population of Tibet increased from one million before the peaceful liberation to more than three million, of whom 2.7164 million or 90.48 percent were Tibetans.”

[59] State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China. (2011). Sixty years since the peaceful liberation of Tibet. http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2014/08/23/content_281474983043406.htm. “The central and regional governments always attach great importance to carrying on, protecting and developing the excel-lent traditional culture of the Tibetan ethnic group. The study, use and development of the Tibetan language are protected by law, and the Tibetan script has become the first ethnic-minority script in China that has international text coding standards for information exchange. The state has altogether apportioned 1.45 billion yuan to maintain and repair the Potala Palace, the Norbulingka and Sakya Monastery, and other cultural relics and historical sites. Tibet’s 76 distinctive cultural items such as folk handicrafts, folk art and Tibetan opera have been listed among items of state-level intangible cultural heritage, and 53 people have been recognized as representatives of the state-level in-tangible cultural heritage. The Potala Palace, Jokhang Monastery and Norbulingka have been listed as UNESCO World Cultural Heritage sites. Tibetan opera and the famous Legend of King Gesar have been put upon the World Intangible Cultural Heritage list. Tibetan medicine, with unique local features, has entered the world market, and Tibetology research is flourishing as never before. Tibet’s radio, TV, press and publications are also growing rapidly. In 2010 the region had four radio stations, five TV stations, 27 medium-wave transmitting and relay stations, 68 radio and TV transmitting and relay stations at the county level, and 9,371 radio and TV receiving and transmitting stations at the township level. Tibet has built China’s first eth-nic- minority-language radio and TV program dubbing center — Tibetan Radio and TV Program Dubbing Center. More than 380,000 households can receive 55 digital radio and TV pro-grams through the Direct Broadcasting Satellite. The radio and TV coverage rate has reached 90.28 percent and 91.4 percent, respectively. Tibet publishes 58 kinds of newspapers and pe-riodicals, and has cumulatively published 12,000 titles of books in Chinese and Tibetan, totaling 250 million printed cop-ies. Tibet now has 10 professional art performing troupes, 500-odd amateur art performing and Tibetan opera teams, and 19 folk art performing groups at the county level. A large number of traditional festivals have been inherited and revived, such as the annual Shoton Festival in Lhasa, Qomolangma Cultural and Tourist Festival in Xigaze and Summer Horse Races in Nagqu. Tibet endeavors to extend radio and TV coverage to every village and household, share cultural information and resources and establish cultural centers at the county and township levels to enrich the cultural life of farmers and herdsmen. It also endeavors to realize the complete coverage of comprehensive cultural centers and county- level sharing of cultural information and resources. A number of literary and artistic works and programs have been created which have a strong local flavor and display the features of our times, and there have been great improvement in both quantity and quality. Freedom of religious belief of all ethnic groups is respected and protected in Tibet. All religions, all religious sects are equal in Tibet. The Living Buddha reincarnation system, unique to Tibetan Buddhism, is fully respected. People are free to learn and debate Buddhist doctrines, get ordained as monks and practice Buddhist rites. Academic degrees in Buddhism are also promoted. The central government has listed some famous sites for religious activities as cultural relics units subject to state or autonomous regional protection, including the Potala Palace, Jokhang, Tashilhunpo, Drepung, Sera and Sakya monasteries. Tibet now has more than 1,700 venues for religious activities, and about 46,000 monks and nuns. Monks and laymen organize and take part in the Sakadawa Festival and other religious and traditional activities every year. More than one million worshi-pers make pilgrimage to Lhasa each year.”

[60] State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China. (2009). Fifty years of democratic reform in Tibet. The Chinese government has made huge efforts to promote the learning, use and development of the Tibetan language. In Tibet, importance is given to both the Tibetan and Han Chinese languages, with priority given to Tibetan. At present, both languages are used in teaching in all schools of the farming and pastoral areas, as well as some urban areas, with the major courses being taught in Tibetan. Teaching is also conducted in the two languages in high schools. Moreover, courses in the Tibetan language have been opened at Tibetan high schools in the hinterland areas of China. In the matriculation examinations for institutions of higher learning and secondary vocational schools, Tibetan is a subject of examination, and the score is included in the total score. Since the establishment of the Tibet Autonomous Region, both Tibetan and Han Chinese have been used for resolutions and regulations adopted by the people's congresses at all levels, and official documents and public announcements of people's governments at all levels as well as their subordinate departments. During judicial proceedings, Tibetan is used in hearing any case involving Tibetan people, and the written Tibetan language is used for legal papers. Both Tibetan and Han Chinese are used for official seals, credentials and signs of all entities; logos of government departments, factories and mines, schools, bus and train stations, airports, shops, hotels, restaurants, theaters, scenic spots, sports venues and libraries; and street and traffic signs. Since its establishment in 1959, Tibetan People's Radio (TPR), with focus on Tibetan-language broadcasting, has developed 42 programs in Tibetan and the Khampa dialect, including 21 hours and 15 minutes of news broadcasting in Tibetan and 17 hours and 50 minutes of broadcasting in the Khampa dialect every day. The Tibet Television Station formally opened a Tibetan satellite TV channel, which has been broadcasting 24 hours a day since October 1, 2007. At present, there are 14 Tibetan- language periodicals and 10 Tibetan-language newspapers in Tibet. Computer information processing of the Tibetan script was realized in 1984, and a Tibetan-script operating system compatible with Chinese and English versions was developed. In 1997, an international-standard Tibetan character code was approved, making the Tibetan script the first ethnic- minority script in China with an international standard.”

Comments (3)

Amro · June 30, 2026

You are a most excellent habibi, sir!

Carlos Lemus · June 30, 2026

Is this a video on Tibet?

Hakim · June 30, 2026

Yup!