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SECTION 2

[1] Rooney, D. (2021). About time: A history of civilization in twelve clocks (1st American ed.). W. W. Norton & Company. “But many (probably most, now) refute his claim that the rise of industrial capitalism forced workers into new forms of bondage  disciplined by the clock as far back as we care to look, and in places besides Britain or the industrial West.” (p. 162)

[2] Rooney, D. (2021). About time: A history of civilization in twelve clocks (1st American ed.). W. W. Norton & Company. “As late as the nineteenth century, a Dundee textile factory worker was able to claim that: The clocks at the factories were often put forward in the morning and back at night, and instead of being instruments for the measurement of time, they were used as cloaks for cheatery and oppression . . . it was no uncommon event to dismiss any one who presumed to know too much about the science of horology.” (p. 163)

[3] Rooney, D. (2021). About time: A history of civilization in twelve clocks (1st American ed.). W. W. Norton & Company. “The textile industry was one of the most oppressive in its use of clocks to discipline the lives of its workers, and the most blatant in the way its owners and managers cheated their workforce out of time, and therefore money. Knowledge is power, and workers in the earliest factories and mills were forbidden from carrying watches, for fear they would know how long they were working beyond their paid hours. The time on the factory clock was routinely changed over the course of a day. But some managers went further by collaborating with clockmakers to construct ever more ingenious mechanisms and technical modifications to cheat workers out of the true time and lengthen their days. In 1832, the British Parliament was debating the so-called Ten Hours Bill on textile factory reform. Members were shocked to be told by Michael Thomas Sadler, MP for Newark, social reformer and promoter of the Bill, that: a practice is known to exist in certain mills or factories of using two or more different clocks or timepieces, one being a common or Time Clock, and the other a clock regulated by the velocity of the steam engine or other machinery, and often called a Speed Clock, by which the daily labour, though nominally limited to a certain duration, is often increased much beyond that limitation.” (p. 163)

[4] Rooney, D. (2021). About time: A history of civilization in twelve clocks (1st American ed.). W. W. Norton & Company. “The standardization of time and space is all about maintaining order, controlling people’s behavior, making money, securing political power, building empires and waging war. It is authoritarian and it is nationalistic. ” (p. 167)

[5] Schor, J. B. (1991). The overworked American: The unexpected decline of leisure. BasicBooks. “The time squeeze surfaced with the young urban professional.  These high achievers had jobs that required sixty, eighty, even a hundred hours a week. OnWall Street, they would regularly stay at the office until midnight or go months without a single day off. Workconsumedtheir lives. And if they weren't working, they were networking.” (p. 18)

[6] Schor, J. B. (1991). The overworked American: The unexpected decline of leisure. BasicBooks. “That happened on Wall Street was replicated throughout the country in one high-income occupation after another. Associates in law firms compete over who could log more billable hours. Work-aholics set new standards of survival. ” (p. 19)

[7] Schor, J. B. (1991). The overworked American: The unexpected decline of leisure. BasicBooks. “At cutting-edge corporations, which emphasize commitment, initiative, and flexibility, the time demands are often the greatest. "People who work for me should have phones in their bathrooms," says the CEO from one aggressive American company. ” (p. 19)

[8] Schor, J. B. (1991). The overworked American: The unexpected decline of leisure. BasicBooks. “This combination of retrenchment, economic competition, and innovative business management has raised hours substantially. One poll of senior executives found that weekly hours rose during the 1980s, and vacation time fell. Other surveys have yielded simi- lar results. By the end of the decade, overwork at the upper eche- lons of the labor market had become endemic—and its scale was virtually unprecedented in living memory.” (p. 19)

[9] Schor, J. B. (1991). The overworked American: The unexpected decline of leisure. BasicBooks. “The number of people who work eighty hours a week and bring home— if they ever get there— a six-figure income is very small. But while the incomes of these rarefied individuals were out of reach, their schedules turned out to be downright common. As Wall Street waxed industrious, the longer schedules penetrated far down the corporate ladder, through middle management, into the secretarial pool, and even onto the factory floor itself.8 Millions of ordinary Americans fell victim to the shortage of time.” (p. 19-20)

[10] Schor, J. B. (1991). The overworked American: The unexpected decline of leisure. BasicBooks. “By my calculations, the total working time of employed mothers now averages about 65 hours a week. Of course, many do far more than the average—such as mothers with young children, women in professional positions, or those whose wages are so low that they must hold down two jobs just to scrape by. These women will be working 70 to 80 hours a week. And my figures are extremely conservative: they are the lowest among existing studies. ABoston study found that employed mothers average over 80 hours of housework, child care, and employment. Two nationwide studies of white, married couples are comparable: in the first, the average weekwas87 hours; in the second, it ranged from 76 to 89, depending on the age of the oldest child. ” (p. 20-21)

[11] Schor, J. B. (1991). The overworked American: The unexpected decline of leisure. BasicBooks. “According to my estimates, the average employed person is now on the job an additional 163 hours, or the equivalent of an extra month a year (see table 2.1). Hours have been increasing throughout the twenty-year period for which we have data. The breakdown for men and women shows lengthening hours for both groups, but there is a "gender gap" in the size of the increase. Men are working nearly one hundred (98) more hours per year, or two and a half extra weeks. Women are doing about three hundred (305) additional hours, which translates to seven and a half weeks, or 38 added days of work each year. The research shows that hours have risen across a wide spectrum of Americans and in all income cate- gories—low, middle, and high. The Increase is common to a variety of family patterns—people with and without children, those who are married, and those who are not. And it has been general across industries and, most probably, occupations. 25 The extra month of work is attributable to both longer weekly schedules and more weeks of work, as table 2.2 indicates.” (p. 29)

[12] Schor, J. B. (1991). The overworked American: The unexpected decline of leisure. BasicBooks. “One of capitalism's most durable myths is that it has reduced human toil. This myth is typically defended by a comparison of the modern forty-hour week with its seventy- or eighty-hour counter- part in the nineteenth century. The implicit—but rarely ar- ticulated—assumption is that the eighty-hour standard has pre- vailed for centuries. The comparison conjures up the dreary life of medieval peasants, toiling steadily from dawn to dusk. We are asked to imagine the journeyman artisan in a cold, damp garret, rising even before the sun, laboring by candlelight late into the night.1 These images are backward projections of modern work pat- terns. And they are false. Before capitalism, most people did not work very long hours at all. The tempo of life was slow, even leisurely; the pace of work relaxed. Our ancestors may not have been rich, but they had an abundance of leisure. When capitalism raised their incomes, it also took away their time.2 Indeed, there is good reason to believe that working hours in the mid-nineteenth century constitute the most prodigious work effort in the entire history of humankind.” (p. 43-44)

[13] Schor, J. B. (1991). The overworked American: The unexpected decline of leisure. BasicBooks. “Despite these shortcomings, the available evidence indicates that working hours under capitalism, at their peak, increased by more than 50 percent over what they had been in medieval times” (p. 44)

[14] Schor, J. B. (1991). The overworked American: The unexpected decline of leisure. BasicBooks. “The pace of work was also far below modern standards—in part, because the general pace of life in medieval society was leisurely. The French historian Jacques LeGoff has described precapitalist labor time "as still the time of an economy dominated by agrarian rhythms, free of haste, careless of exactitude, unconcerned by pro- ductivity—and of a society created in the image of that economy, sober and modest, without enormous appetites, undemanding, and incapable of quantitative efforts." Consciousness of time was radially different. Temporal units we take for granted today—such as the hour, or the minute—did not exist. There was little idea of time saving, punctuality, or even a clear perception of past and future. Consciousness of time was much looser—and time had much less economic value.” (p. 46)

[15] Schor, J. B. (1991). The overworked American: The unexpected decline of leisure. BasicBooks. “The contrast between capitalist and precapitalist work patterns is most striking in respect to the working year. The medieval calendar was filled with holidays. Official—that is, church—holidays included not only long "vacations" at Christmas, Easter, and midsummer but also numerous saints' and rest days. Thesewere spent both in sober churchgoing and in feasting, drinking, and merrymaking. In addition to official celebrations, there were often weeks' worth of ales—to mark important life events (bride ales or wake ales) as well as less momentous occasions (scot ale, lamb ale, and hock ale). All told, holiday leisure time in medieval England took up probably about one-third of the year. And the English were appar- endy working harder than their neighbors. The ancient regime in France is reported to have guaranteed fifty-two Sundays, ninety rest days, and thirty-eight holidays. In Spain, travelers noted that holi- days totaled five months per year.” (p. 46-47)

[16] Schor, J. B. (1991). The overworked American: The unexpected decline of leisure. BasicBooks. “The short work year reveals an important feature of precapitalist society: the absence of a culture of consumption and accumulation. There was far less interest in and opportunity for earning or saving money. Material success was not yet invested with the overriding significance it would assume. And consumerism was limited both by the unavailability of goods and by the absence of a middle class with discretionary income. Under these circumstances, the lack of compulsion to work is understandable. ” (p. 47)

[17] Schor, J. B. (1991). The overworked American: The unexpected decline of leisure. BasicBooks. “As capitalism grew, it steadily lengthened work time. The change was felt in earnest by the eighteenth century. The workday rose in the cottage industries which sprang up throughout the English countryside. Rural people, especially women, took on spinning, weaving, lacemaking, and other handicrafts, in their own cottages, in order to earn a little cash to survive. The time commitment ranged from a few hours a day for the better-off, to eight, ten, or twelve hours a day for those who were poor. And this was in addition to regular domestic responsibilities” (p. 50)

[18] Schor, J. B. (1991). The overworked American: The unexpected decline of leisure. BasicBooks. “Specific features of the emerging labor markets also exacerbated pressures toward long hours. For example, capi- talists followed the centuries-old custom of fixing wages by the day, the week, or even the month—in contrast to the modern practice of payment by the hour, which had not been introduced. The daily wage was largely invariant to hours or intensity of labor, a worker earning neither more nor less as the working day expanded or contracted. This flexibility of working hours was a departure from past practice. ” (p. 53-54)

[19] Schor, J. B. (1991). The overworked American: The unexpected decline of leisure. BasicBooks. “The fact that daily wages were fixed gave employers a simple incentive to raise work time: each additional hour worked was free. And because workers were unable to resist the upward pressure on hours, worktime rose dramatically—especially in factories” (p. 54)

[20] Schor, J. B. (1991). The overworked American: The unexpected decline of leisure. BasicBooks. “This helps explain why some of the most heavily capitalized industries, such as steel and railways, have had especially long hours. The U.S. steel industry did not relinquish its "twin relics of barbarism"—the twelve-hour day and the seven-day week—until 1923. For a company operating around the clock, two twelve-hour shifts require far fewer workers than three eight-hour ones. This is one reason companies in the manufacturing sector (where investment is high) remain opposed to reforms such as the six-hour day. Low capitalization is also one reason hours are shorter in the service sector.” (p. 60)

[21] Schor, J. B. (1991). The overworked American: The unexpected decline of leisure. BasicBooks. “The other way to think of it is that the longer hours make the worker more dependent on the company, at least in income terms. Dependency translates into control and, ultimately, profitability.” (p. 64)

[22] Schor, J. B. (1991). The overworked American: The unexpected decline of leisure. BasicBooks. “As a result, our employers ask for more and more from us —and get it on account of the lure of the carrot (the employment rent) and the fear of the stick (dismissal for failure to meet the demands). One autoworker notes: Where I work at the auto plant, the workers are just dropping like flies. When there's a lot of work because of a new model coming out, they make people work 10 and 12 hours every day, 6 days a week. Lots of people, even the younger ones, are developing high blood pressure, having accidents on the job, or car accidents on the way to and from work, or other serious health problems. But they have to do it. If you don't like it, you can just quit.” (p. 65)

[23] Schor, J. B. (1991). The overworked American: The unexpected decline of leisure. BasicBooks. “Pressures toward long hours may be strongest for the third major form of labor contract—payment by salary. Like those early indus- trial workers who received a fixed daily or weekly wage, the earn- ings of the salaried worker do not vary with hours. Extra hours are therefore gratis to their employers. Salaried employment increased substantially in the twentieth century, as firms added white-collar workers—managers, engi- neers, and a variety of professionals, from lawyers to social work- ers. Today almost 40 percent of all U.S. employees are paid by salary, rather than hourly wages.52 As my analysis predicts, salaried workers have longer hours of work than workers paid by the hour. Half the nation's salaried workers belong to the "managerial and professional specialty" group, the occupational category with the longest hours. Some salaried groups are still toiling at nineteenth-century schedules. Medical residents, investment bankers, corporate law- yers, and many other professionals can be expected to work 70 or 80 hours routinely, with extra effort during particularly hectic times. A 1970s study found that most managers at Fortune 500 corporations put in from 60 to 70 hours a week, excluding business travel: "They'd leave home at 7:30 a.m. and return at about the same time that evening. They'd also bring home a few hours of work each day."53 Not only the top echelons, but employees down the hierarchy, are expected to put in the hours.” (p. 68)

[24] Schor, J. B. (1991). The overworked American: The unexpected decline of leisure. BasicBooks. “This economic distress has raised hours in two ways. The first method was direct: employers simply demanded longer hours and more work effort. The 1980s were a period of increased overtime and reductions in vacations, rest periods, and other paid time off. Among better-paid white-collar employees, large-scale layoffs and the cutthroat environment made greater commitment of time and energy necessary to retain one's job. At the low-wage end of the labor market, sweatshops reappeared, with nineteenth-century style conditions. The government contributed by eroding legal protections for employees, as well as failing to enforce existing regulations. The second cause of longer hours has been a steady reduction in hourly rates of pay. Workers paid by the hour'— a majority of U.S. employees—saw their average wage peak in 1973. Since then, it has declined substantially and now stands at its mid-1960s level. This erosion has had a profound effect on hours: in order to main- tain their current standard of living, these employees must now put in longer hours. Like the piece-rate workers who were forced to produce more as the rates fell, a large numberofAmerican families are now in a similar bind. Many men—the group that bore the lion's share of the decline—haveexpandedtheirworktimethrough overtime and second jobs. Unmarried men especially have had a tremendous rise in hours (334 per year). Many of these men are young—the group that suffered the biggest earnings decline. Un- married women have also increased hours substantially. Among married couples, wives, rather than husbands, have had the largest growth in work time. By adding a second income or increasing the wife's hours, many families have averted a real decline in their material standard of living. The trends in income have led to a public consensus that it is no longer possible for families to "make it" on a single income— a view that eight out often Americans now hold. ” (p. 80)

[25] U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. (2025). Annual hours‑worked index, 1990–2022 (Series B4701C0A222NBEA) [Data set]. U.S. Department of Commerce. Retrieved July 14, 2025, from https://www.bea.gov/data. “1990, 196442; 1991, 192286; 1992, 193316; 1993, 196699; 1994, 202067; 1995, 207418; 1996, 210037; 1997, 223010; 1998, 226700; 1999, 230516; 2000, 233233; 2001, 226114; 2002, 223944; 2003, 225996; 2004, 229139; 2005, 231019; 2006, 236856; 2007, 232710; 2008, 234016; 2009, 221534; 2010, 221236; 2011, 227369; 2012, 231933; 2013, 234019; 2014, 241300; 2015, 245656; 2016, 250127; 2017, 256409; 2018, 257751; 2019, 259868; 2020, 242744; 2021, 260070; 2022, 260070”

[26] Garin, A., Jackson, E., Koustas, D., & Miller, A. (2023, May 16). The evolution of platform gig work, 2012–2021 (BFI Working Paper No. 2023-69). Becker Friedman Institute for Economics at the University of Chicago. https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/23rpevolutionofplatformgigwork.pdf. “Figure 7(a) reports overall counts of gig platform work, with separate breakdowns by major gig industry: transporation and delivery;15 “creater/influencer,” defined as platforms where people are paid for posting original content; and all other platforms, which includes platforms providing online tutoring, tele-health and other professional services. As discussed above, we follow over 90 platforms by 2021. The first takeaway is that transportation and delivery work remained the largest com- ponents of gig work, with other platforms continuing to represent only a small share of the overall gig economy. In 2020, we see a jump in gig work by around 1.2 million workers. Over 1 million comes from transportation and delivery, and an additional 150,000 comes from creator/influencer platforms. Platform gig work again expands dramatically by 1.9 million between 2020 and 2021, with 1.8 million having an information return from a transportation or delivery platform. A second takeaway is that this was a period of record entry as well as exit. Figure 7(b) examines flows of entry and exit from platform work, showing that nearly 2.1 million new workers entered the gig economy in 2020 who did not do have an information return from the platform gig economy in 2019, a 100% increase over 2019. An additional 3.1 million entered in 2021 who were not participating in 2020. At the same time, exits also jumped. 1.2 million who had a platform gig 1099 in 2020 left by 2021. Table 1a provides an update of Table 1 from Collins, Garin, Ja” (p. 17)

[27] World Population Review. (2022). Average vacation days by country. Retrieved July 15, 2025, from https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/average-vacation-days-by-country. “Country;MTPL;LRMV;PH;TDO

Canada;25;15;10;50

France;42;31;11;84

Germany;30;20;10;60

Italy;32;20;12;64

Japan;15;15;;30

United Kingdom;29;20;9;58

United States;;;0”

[28] U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. (2024, October 2). Full‑time and part‑time employees [Data series A4201C0A173NBEA]. In FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Retrieved July 15, 2025, from https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/A4201C0A173NBEA. “1991, 115525; 1992, 115968; 1993, 117604; 1994, 120379; 1995, 123236; 1996, 125461; 1997, 128316; 1998, 131563; 1999, 134350; 2000, 137228; 2001, 136872; 2002, 135840; 2003, 135473; 2004, 136851; 2005, 138756; 2006, 141153; 2007, 142596; 2008, 141576; 2009, 135574; 2010, 134714; 2011, 136258; 2012, 138885; 2013, 141104; 2014, 143758; 2015, 146634; 2016, 148735; 2017, 150654; 2018, 153176; 2019, 155325; 2020, 146544; 2021, 150637”

[29] International Labour Organization. (n.d.). Statistics on labour productivity. ILOSTAT. Retrieved July 11, 2025, from https://ilostat.ilo.org/topics/labour-productivity/.  “Top 10 Countries (Highest Labour Productivity)

1. Luxembourg – $166.1 

2. Ireland – $139.1 

3. Norway – $123.6 

4. Guyana – $113.9 

5. Denmark – $97.0 

6. Singapore – $96.9 

7. Belgium – $91.6 

8. Netherlands – $90.4 

9. Austria – $90.1 

10. Sweden – $85.7 

 Bottom 10 Countries (Lowest Labour Productivity)

1. Burundi – $0.9 

2. Liberia – $1.5 

3. Central African Republic – $1.6 

4. Madagascar – $1.9 

5. Niger – $2.3 

6. Democratic Republic of the Congo – $2.4 

7. Mozambique – $2.4 

8. Solomon Islands – $2.6 

9. Sierra Leone – $2.6 

10. Malawi – $2.8 ”

[30] International Labour Organization. (n.d.). Statistics on labour productivity. ILOSTAT. Retrieved July 11, 2025, from https://ilostat.ilo.org/topics/labour-productivity/.  “G7 Countries (Ranked by Productivity)

United States – $81.8 (Global Rank: 14)

France – $82.2 (Global Rank: 13) (Note: Slightly higher than US due to rounding)

Germany – $80.5 (Global Rank: 16)

Italy – $74.4 (Global Rank: 24)

Canada – $67.0 (Global Rank: 34)

United Kingdom – $69.5 (Global Rank: 31)

Japan – $53.7 (Global Rank: 45)”

[31] Economic Policy Institute (2025, May 15). The productivity–pay gap. Retrieved July 11, 2025, from https://www.epi.org/productivity-pay-gap/. “Productivity +86.0%, Hourly pay, +32.0%; Productivity has grown 2.7x as much as pay”

[32] Dahmus, J. B., & Gutowski, T. G. (2005). Efficiency and production: Historical trends for seven industrial sectors [Conference presentation]. 3rd Biennial Conference of the US Society for Ecological Economics, Tacoma, WA, United States. “However, on average, production increases outpaced efficiency increases by substantial margins leading to average increases in total resource usage. For example, while the energy efficiency of pig iron production has improved by an average of over 1% annually for the last 185 years, worldwide production of pig iron over this same period of time has increased by an average of 4% annually. Aluminum production, nitrogen fertilizer production, electricity production from coal, oil, and gas, and air travel all exhibit similar trends.” (p. 1)

[33] Dahmus, J. B., & Gutowski, T. G. (2005). Efficiency and production: Historical trends for seven industrial sectors [Conference presentation]. 3rd Biennial Conference of the US Society for Ecological Economics, Tacoma, WA, United States. “Technical efficiency improvements are by no means new; “naturally occurring” or “autonomous” efficiency improvements have been taking place for centuries a. In production activities, process efficiencies are continually being improved, thus allowing more useable output to be produced per unit of input. However, in many cases, while efficiency has improved, production has at the same time also increased, resulting in a situation in which the overall inputs to production have increased, not decreased. In addition to bringing the win-win scenario into debate, these trends have also raised questions regarding the possible causality of these trends.” (p. 2)

[34] Witzel, M. (2002). A short history of efficiency. Business Strategy Review, 13(4), 38-47. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8616.00232. “Typically, approaches to efficiency focus on areas such as cost reduction (reducing inputs), quality control (reducing waste), technology investment and time management (increasing productivity). The ultimate aim is to increase output, to reduce inputs or (more usually) both, thereby improving profitability. The standard approach to organisational efficiency is to break down the organisation into its component elements, studying each process and each part of each process and looking for areas where improvements can be made. This was the approach pioneered by the leading figures of the scientific management movement, notably Frederick Winslow Taylor, and Frank and Lillian Gilbreth.” (p. 39)

[35] Witzel, M. (2002). A short history of efficiency. Business Strategy Review, 13(4), 38-47. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8616.00232. “This idea of requisite organisation, or organisational fitness for purpose (to use terms introduced by later writers) is at the core of Emerson’s philosophy of efficiency. Efficiency, he says, has two prerequisites: the right standards and the right organisation. As noted, he agreed with Taylor that standards are essential, not only in tasks, processes and tools but also working conditions and environments. His concept of standards, however, is more flexible. Standards are not cast in stone but should be adapted to suit circumstances. But before standards are set, it is first necessary to get the organisation right. Here Emerson was deeply influenced by the example of Moltke and the German General Staff, the efficiency of which Emerson believed was the major force behind the German victory in the Franco- Prussian War. He believed that the best form of organisation was what he called the “line and staff organisation”, where the functional departments (the Taylorism and Emerson's view of efficiency contrasted A short history of efficiency 42 line) were backed up and supported by technical and support departments (the staff), the primary function of which was to enable the line to achieve greater levels of efficiency.” (p. 42)

[36] Witzel, M. (2002). A short history of efficiency. Business Strategy Review, 13(4), 38-47. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8616.00232. “Emerson does not even try to answer this question; he would have regarded it as irrelevant. He never intended that his ideas on organisation and on efficiency should be taken absolutely literally or that his books should be treated as manuals. His is a picture of organisation, not a circuit diagram, and he believes it is up to managers to take on board the ideals of efficiency and translate them into action to suit their own circumstances. His approach is twofold. Create the right organisation, in which efficiency is seen as natural and likely to happen of its own accord, where coordination rather than control is the dominant virtue. And when this is in place set the right standards, based in part on scientific observation of working practices, in part on knowledge of what best practice entails, and in part on the needs of the organisation and its circumstances and environment.” (p. 46)

[37 Witzel, M. (2002). A short history of efficiency. Business Strategy Review, 13(4), 38-47. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8616.00232. “Today many – indeed most – Western manufacturing companies are under increasing pressure to cut costs and increase productivity in order to deal with low- cost competitors.” (p. 47)

[38] Cai, C. (2024, April 1). Old age but no rest: A political‑economic reflection on delayed retirement policy. Monthly Review. Retrieved July 13, 2025, from https://monthlyreview.org/2024/04/01/old-age-but-no-rest-a-political-economic-reflection-on-delayed-retirement-policy/. “With the advent of the great industrial age of machines, there has been an explosion in the productive capacity of human society. The material production capacity for satisfying the basic needs of human beings grew much faster than population growth in this era. Today, the production capacity of the society again has seen a phenomenal increase. Comparing absolute social productivity with the population, the industrialized countries are fully capable of solving the problem of social security for the majority of the people—so why can they not solve the problem of retirement for people in their twilight years?”

SECTION 3

[39] Social Security Administration. (n.d.). Social Security history. https://www.ssa.gov/history/50mm2.html. “By the end of the First World War, a primarily agrarian American society had become a primarily urban, industrialized one. Thus, on the eve of the Great Depression of the 1930's, a larger proportion of the American people were dependent on cash wages for their support than ever before. By 1932, however, unemployment reached 34 percent of the nonagricultural workforce. Between 1929 and 1932, national income dropped by 43 percent, per capita income by 19 percent. By the mid-1930's, the lifetime savings of millions of people had been wiped out. For vast numbers of aged people, and people nearing old age, the loss of their savings brought with it the prospect of living their remaining years in destitution. At the height of the Depression, many old people were literally penniless. One-third to one-half of the aged were dependent on family or friends for support. The poor houses and other relief agencies that existed at the time to assist people who had fallen on hard times were financed mainly from charity and local funds. They could not begin--either financially or conceptually--to respond adequately to the special needs of the aged brought about by the cataclysmic events of the Depression.”

[40] Social Security Administration. (n.d.). Social Security history. https://www.ssa.gov/history/50mm2.html. “Yet, amid some controversy about the feasibility and constitutionality of such a plan, there developed from the work of the Committee a proposal for compulsory, contributory old-age insurance, which was ultimately enacted as part of the Social Security Act.”

[41] Social Security Administration. (n.d.). Social Security history. https://www.ssa.gov/history/50mm2.html. “The Social Security Act, enacted on August 14, 1935, provided a new federally administered system of social insurance for the aged financed through payroll taxes paid by employees and their employers. Under the system, which applied only to workers in commerce and industry, people would earn retirement benefit eligibility as they worked. With some exceptions, benefits would be related to workers' average covered earnings, and workers could not have earnings and still be eligible for benefits. No benefits were provided for spouses or children, and lump-sum refunds were provided to the estates of workers who died before age 65 or before receiving at least the equivalent in benefits of their taxes plus interest. Collection of payroll taxes began in 1937, and benefit payments were scheduled to begin in 1942.”

[42] Social Security Administration. (n.d.). Social Security history. https://www.ssa.gov/history/50mm2.html. “The Council's fundamental finding was an endorsement of contributory old-age insurance as a way of preventing dependency in old age and thereby reducing reliance on needs-tested assistance. Further, the Council recommended a benefit structure that, in addition to basic benefits for workers, would provide protection for aged wives, widows, and surviving children starting in 1940. Based on the Advisory Council's recommendations and recognizing the heavy dependence of most families on the male wage earner at that time, the Congress, in 1939, enacted legislation that eliminated lump-sum payroll tax refunds and provided benefits for aged wives and widows, young children of retired and deceased workers, young widows caring for a child beneficiary, and dependent parents of retired and deceased workers.”

[43] Social Security Administration. (n.d.). Social Security history. https://www.ssa.gov/history/50mm2.html. “The 1939 legislation also provided a new method of computing benefits, based on average monthly earnings instead of on cumulative wages. The net effect of the 1939 amendments was to increase the annual cost of benefits payable during the early years and to decrease the annual cost of benefits payable during later years. Over the long range, the average annual cost of benefits remained about the same as under prior law.In addition to these changes in benefits, the 1939 amendments made basic changes in the financing of the Social Security program by establishing the Old-Age and Survivors Insurance Trust Fund and by changing the size of the financial reserves held by the program. The provisions of prior law would have resulted in the accumulation of a huge reserve fund over the years, similar to the reserves built up by private pension plans. The new legislation was designed to constrain the accumulation of reserves and, in effect, to move the financing of the program toward "pay-as-you-go" financing. This change in the reserve concept allowed the immediate payment of benefits to retired workers and to their dependents and survivors without increasing Social Security tax rates. This change in financing also permitted a 3-year postponement of the increases in the Social Security tax rate that had been scheduled for 1940. Other recommendations of the 1938 Council that were enacted in 1939 included: Provision for benefits to start in 1940 instead of 1942; Revision of the earnings test, allowing earnings of $14.99 a month before benefits were withheld; and A method of measuring whether an individual had worked long enough in covered employment to get a benefit--based on "quarters of coverage" the measure on which today's methods are based. Following implementation of the 1939 amendments, the basic Social Security program was in place. It would remain essentially unchanged over the 1940's as the Nation concentrated its efforts on fighting World War II and toward building a healthy post-war economy. Social Security legislation enacted during these years included further postponement of tax rate increases, minor changes in coverage, and provision for coordinating the survivor benefits payable under the Social Security and Railroad Retirement Acts.”

[44] Social Security Administration. (n.d.). Age 65 retirement. https://www.ssa.gov/history/age65.html. “Germany became the first nation in the world to adopt an old-age social insurance program in 1889, designed by Germany's Chancellor, Otto von Bismarck. The idea was first put forward, at Bismarck's behest, in 1881 by Germany's Emperor, William the First, in a ground- breaking letter to the German Parliament. William wrote: ". . . those who are disabled from work by age and invalidity have a well-grounded claim to care from the state." One persistent myth about the German program is that it adopted age 65 as the standard retirement age because that was Bismarck's age. In fact, Germany initially set age 70 as the retirement age (and Bismarck himself was 74 at the time) and it was not until 27 years later (in 1916) that the age was lowered to 65. By that time, Bismarck had been dead for 18 years.”

[45] Social Security Administration. (n.d.). Age 65 retirement. https://www.ssa.gov/history/age65.html. “By the time America moved to social insurance in 1935 the German system was using age 65 as its retirement age. But this was not the major influence on the Committee on Economic Security (CES) when it proposed age 65 as the retirement age under Social Security. This decision was not based on any philosophical principle or European precedent.”

[46] Social Security Administration. (n.d.). Age 65 retirement. https://www.ssa.gov/history/age65.html. “It was, in fact, primarily pragmatic, and stemmed from two sources. One was a general observation about prevailing retirement ages in the few private pension systems in existence at the time and, more importantly, the 30 state old-age pension systems then in operation. Roughly half of the state pension systems used age 65 as the retirement age and half used age 70. The new federal Railroad Retirement System passed by Congress earlier in 1934, also used age 65 as its retirement age. Taking all this into account, the CES planners made a rough judgment that age 65 was probably more reasonable than age 70.”

[47] Social Security Administration. (n.d.). Age 65 retirement. https://www.ssa.gov/history/age65.html. “The studies showed that using age 65 produced a manageable system that could easily be made self-sustaining with only modest levels of payroll taxation. So these two factors, a kind of pragmatic judgment about prevailing retirement standards and the favorable actuarial outcome of using age 65, combined to be the real basis on which age 65 was chosen as the age for retirement under Social Security.”

[48] Feller, E. (2005). Retirement in France in the early twentieth century: From suspicion to the "French model". Frames, 33, 1–7. http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.0642292.0033.020. “In 1910 when the law on Retraites Ouvrières et Paysannes (ROP) came into force, there were already several old-age protection measures in place, at least for certain segments of the population. The state provided pensions, albeit parsimonious ones, for veterans and former civil servants. Mutual aid societies encouraged saving for retirement among those able to do so but were unable to provide substantial pensions. Businesses that were the most concerned with recruiting and retaining a highly skilled and specialized work force, such as in mining, transportation, and metallurgy, created management-directed retirement schemes. Yet these measures affected only a small percentage of the total workforce: 660,000 out of eleven million, or just five percent of the total work force, including domestic servants. In order to redress the poverty that afflicted the many elderly in both rural and urban areas who had no pensions, the radical Republic instituted a program of compulsory assistance to the indigent elderly. This 1905 law significantly influenced later developments in the protection of the elderly.  Given these sparse provisions for the elderly, the 1910 law was a major step in which reformers invested significant hope and effort. The law instituted an obligatory retirement system that relied on double contributions, from wage-earners and from their employers, for about twelve million workers and peasants who earned less than 3,000 francs per year. Recipients' state-guaranteed pensions began at age sixty-five, lowered to sixty in 1912. Small farmers, artisans, or shopkeepers could also opt into the system. Despite the ambitious scale of the project, it provoked resistance from several directions, some of them unexpected. Often, those whose opposition was least anticipated proved the most decisive. Historians often refer to the mistrust of organized labor, and it is true that the Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT) called on its members to boycott the system of "retirement for the dead." The CGT believed that sixty-five was far too late for workers to claim their pensions and feared that speculators, rather than workers, would profit from the investment of worker contributions. The union also insisted that the administrative framework of the system, especially the identification cards in which workers would paste stamps to mark their contributions, was reminiscent of the worker livrets (passbooks) that had previously served to control workers' private lives and employment trajectories. Outright worker hostility was limited to a few regions like the Nord, however, and the retirement scheme divided the workers' movement. Jean Jaurès opposed Jules Guesde and supported the system. In 1912 when the age threshold was lowered to sixty and flexible arrangements for those in their late fifties were introduced, opposition died down and workers did join the scheme en masse.”

[49] Feller, E. (2005). Retirement in France in the early twentieth century: From suspicion to the "French model". Frames, 33, 1–7. http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.0642292.0033.020. “The law of 14 April 1924 marked the political and social coming of age of a generational cohort and was a key step toward the construction of the French model of retirement. It established an innovative system characterized by: a legally-recognized right to a pension based on wages and on the period of contribution; contributions that were neither invested nor managed by a retirement fund; contributions paid in one year went directly, via the Treasury, to the payment of that year's pensions; a level of pension determined by the employees' wages in the final three years of employment; the equalization of pension; that is, pensions were occasionally reevaluated taking wage trends into consideration. In 1924 pensions were recalculated based on 1919 wage scales, and in the early 1930s new equalization measures took 1920 wage scales as a guide. Whenever they retired and whatever damage inflation might inflict afterwards, all retirees who retired at the same rank would enjoy the same income, which would rise with current salaries for that rank. Under this system, pensions were not the result of savings, an insurance product, nor a public assistance measure. They were a "continued wage" derived from the "socialized wages" of those still working whose contributions paid pensions directly. It was a system of regular cash flow rather than of investment and risk. Equalization made the pension something better than a fragile and limited income supplement; rather it was a genuine old age income that permitted recipients to maintain their lifestyle into old age and to look forward to retirement. At the same time, publications aimed at retired persons increasingly promoted new forms of sociability organized around leisure (travel, gardening) or well being (health, consumer issues, social interaction). The success of their movement and the benefits paid to state retirees exerted a powerful influence among white-collar workers, especially the better paid. Despite some setbacks in the 1930s (with the Great Depression, deflation policies, and the 1934 pension reductions as well as the Popular Front government and the return to inflation) and 1940s (the Second World War, the occupation, and shortages), the civil servants’ retirement model continued to function and even attracted some imitators. In the 1930s, employees of public institutions like hospitals or public transport followed the lead of civil servants and sometimes achieved similar benefits. Thus railway workers won an equalization of their pensions based on 1924 wage scales. After the nationalization of railroads in 1937 the newly-created SNCF had a single, mixed-style retirement fund that invested some contribution money and paid some directly out to pensioners and that was jointly run by workers and management. Although at the time of the Liberation there were plans to create a single social security system, these individual systems persisted and were even improved. Increasing pensions in tandem with increases in the salaries of those still in the workforce became automatic for civil servants in 1948 and for railway workers in 1949.”

[50] Feller, E. (2005). Retirement in France in the early twentieth century: From suspicion to the "French model". Frames, 33, 1–7. http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.0642292.0033.020. “In the 1930s, however, this assistance program responded less and less to the social reality of the elderly poor. The aging population, particularly those over fifty, was among the main victims of unemployment. Debates and complaints in the 1930s no longer had as their reference point the "indigent elderly" reduced to poverty by past improvidence and present age and weakness. Rather, these discussions confronted the "aging worker," rejected despite himself by the labor market after a lifetime of work and savings which bought him no security in old age. Increasingly, his defenders demanded not an expanded system of relief but retirement: a national retirement system for elderly workers or “la Retraite des Vieux.” With the Popular Front's victory, the Communist party was able in 1937 to launch a campaign with the slogan "Work for the young and bread for the old!" The campaign denounced what it called the "misery of old age" in posters, pamphlets, meetings, film screenings (J.-P. Chanois' Le Temps des cerises was commissioned for the campaign), and the organization of the elderly into groups like the "Elderly Worker's Assembly" or the "National Association of Elderly Pensioners." They demanded comprehensive retirement (la Retraite des Vieux) by which they meant not the creation of a new system of contributions and payments, but the extension of aid to the elderly based on the principle of a social debt, as exemplified in the 1905 law, to new categories of recipients. Although the Popular Front was unable to respond to these demands, the Vichy government addressed them almost immediately. A law of 14 March 1941 established the Allocation aux Vieux Travailleurs Salariés which provided for workers or the unemployed aged sixty-five or older (or sixty for those judged unable to work) whose total resources amounted to less than 9,000 francs and who agreed not to seek further waged labor. Payments did not reflect worker contributions, and individuals who had never paid into the ROP or the Assurances sociales were eligible. These payments did, nonetheless, reflect a wage model because they were only available to individuals who had held regular employment in the previous five years. Funds for these payments did not derive from taxation as had earlier aid to the indigent elderly; rather, they were funds redistributed from Assurances sociales, where worker contributions had been invested and growing since 1930. The AVTS program, which was later absorbed by the old age provisions of social security, achieved a synthesis between the logic of a republican "social debt" on the one hand and the logic of a contributive "wage model" on the other. This synthesis, which relied on the pay-as-you-go system (système par répartition), brought pensions to the working-class majority. By the end of the war, the suspicion of retirement systems that characterized discussion a few decades earlier had vanished among workers. A survey conducted in 1946 by the Institut national d'études démographiques (I.N.E.D.) revealed that over half of wage earners were benefiting from or expected to benefit from some income in their old age that they describe as "retirement." They also clearly looked forward to enjoying that period of their lives.”

[51] Stetler, H. (2023, February). Emmanuel Macron’s plan to raise the pension age is class war: An interview with Michaël Zemmour. Jacobin. https://jacobin.com/2023/02/emmanuel-macron-pension-reform-retirement-age-france-protests. “French president Emmanuel Macron plans to hike the retirement age to 64, sparking massive protests. The government claims the current retirement age is unsustainable: but what French workers really can’t afford is to work till they drop.”

[52] Stetler, H. (2023, February). Emmanuel Macron’s plan to raise the pension age is class war: An interview with Michaël Zemmour. Jacobin. https://jacobin.com/2023/02/emmanuel-macron-pension-reform-retirement-age-france-protests. ”Macron’s ministers and surrogates argue that the financial sustainability of the pension system requires a lengthening of the careers of French workers.”

[53] Stetler, H. (2023, February). Emmanuel Macron’s plan to raise the pension age is class war: An interview with Michaël Zemmour. Jacobin. https://jacobin.com/2023/02/emmanuel-macron-pension-reform-retirement-age-france-protests. “The economic argument for the government’s plan has likewise been criticized by the French state’s own consultation on the retirement system, the Conseil d’orientation des retraites. Kept on the sidelines during the government’s preparation of the legislation, French unions claim that the changes further erode the right to a digni!ed retirement.”

[54] Stetler, H. (2023, February). Emmanuel Macron’s plan to raise the pension age is class war: An interview with Michaël Zemmour. Jacobin. https://jacobin.com/2023/02/emmanuel-macron-pension-reform-retirement-age-france-protests. ”At its core, this reform pushes back the minimum age of eligibility for retirement by two years. Today it is at sixty-two — with some exceptions — and would be raised to sixty-four. This is the main cost-saving component of the reform. More speci!cally, the calculation of an individual’s pension is a function of the duration of a worker’s career, which is today at forty-two years for the generation born in 1974 and after, and which was supposed to lengthen to forty-three years at a very slow pace — which the government again wants to accelerate. They’re doing two things: shifting the minimum retirement age and increasing the length of a worker’s contribution into the pension system. Over the next ten years, this reduces pension costs by carving out savings from people now on the cusp of retirement and then on all later generations.”

[55] Stetler, H. (2023, February). Emmanuel Macron’s plan to raise the pension age is class war: An interview with Michaël Zemmour. Jacobin. https://jacobin.com/2023/02/emmanuel-macron-pension-reform-retirement-age-france-protests. “The government’s line is, “We want to save the system, it is in danger.” But this is not very credible when you look at the big picture. In fact, the government has two objectives. The first is to change the structure of the labor market by pushing people to work more and thereby intensify competition among workers and apply downward pressure on wages. The other objective is the unwinding of certain state functions in the economy: lowering taxes, especially on companies, on the one hand, and lowering public spending on the other. Basically, the government is using pension reform as part of a broader supply-shock strategy.”

[56] Stetler, H. (2023, February). Emmanuel Macron’s plan to raise the pension age is class war: An interview with Michaël Zemmour. Jacobin. https://jacobin.com/2023/02/emmanuel-macron-pension-reform-retirement-age-france-protests. “It’s playing with words. In fact, the project doesn’t finance anything: it reduces expenses. Above all, they’re hoping to decrease the budgetary weight of pensions. To spruce things up, there are measures like a small increase in the minimum pension. On the other hand, the three hundred thousand additional people in the labor force will pay taxes and contributions, which reinforces money streams for things that do not go into pensions. But it’s not going to bring in much: essentially, it’s a decrease in public spending.”

[57] Stetler, H. (2023, February). Emmanuel Macron’s plan to raise the pension age is class war: An interview with Michaël Zemmour. Jacobin. https://jacobin.com/2023/02/emmanuel-macron-pension-reform-retirement-age-france-protests. ”The first thing that must be said is that because of previous reforms, pension spending in France is no longer increasing and will even decrease in the coming years — even though we have more pensioners.”

[58] Stetler, H. (2023, February). Emmanuel Macron’s plan to raise the pension age is class war: An interview with Michaël Zemmour. Jacobin. https://jacobin.com/2023/02/emmanuel-macron-pension-reform-retirement-age-france-protests. ”This is written everywhere! The real reason for this reform and its timing is to balance out tax cuts. This is written in the budget and in commitments and communications with the European Union. Finance Minister Bruno Le Maire has been saying it for two years: “My strategy is to lower spending in order to lower taxes.” This, of course, would make the reform politically unacceptable, which is why the narrative has changed again in recent months, so that we now hear that “the system is in financial danger, if we don’t do this, it will collapse.” This is not true. There are deficits, and there are funding issues, but there is no structural danger.”

[59] Stetler, H. (2023, February). Emmanuel Macron’s plan to raise the pension age is class war: An interview with Michaël Zemmour. Jacobin. https://jacobin.com/2023/02/emmanuel-macron-pension-reform-retirement-age-france-protests. “The average length of retirement reached a peak for the generation born in 1950, before shortening when the retirement age was pushed back to sixty-two from sixty. Since then, the increase in the retirement age has been faster than gains in life expectancy, which is still increasing but very slowly. Even without this latest reform package, we’d have to wait for the 1980 generation to retire to return to the retirement duration which those born in 1950 had. This is a real setback. But if we go ahead with this reform, the gap will grow even wider.”

[60] Stetler, H. (2023, February). Emmanuel Macron’s plan to raise the pension age is class war: An interview with Michaël Zemmour. Jacobin. https://jacobin.com/2023/02/emmanuel-macron-pension-reform-retirement-age-france-protests. ”But we’re returning to Macron and Le Maire’s old economic strategy. With pension and unemployment reform, they’re betting on 1980s-style structural reforms to revive growth.”

[61] Martinez, M. (2024, September 4). Germany approves pension reform to incentivize later retirement. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/germany-approves-pension-reform-incentivize-later-retirement. “Germany's cabinet approved a pension reform on Wednesday which includes incentives to keep workers in the labour market for longer as part of measures to foster growth in the euro zone's largest economy.”

[62] Martinez, M. (2024, September 4). Germany approves pension reform to incentivize later retirement. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/germany-approves-pension-reform-incentivize-later-retirement. ”The move comes as governments across Europe try to address worker shortages and ease the burden on their pension systems as populations age. In 2030, Germany's working population will probably have decreased by 6.3 million people from 2010, according to an interior ministry demography report. This will push down GDP per person because there will be fewer workers for each retiree.”

[63] Martinez, M. (2024, September 4). Germany approves pension reform to incentivize later retirement. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/germany-approves-pension-reform-incentivize-later-retirement. ”Retirement age, childcare provision and immigration policies were all political decisions which could influence the extent to which a low birthrate affects the economy, Holger Schmieding, chief economist at Berenberg told Reuters”

[64] Martinez, M. (2024, September 4). Germany approves pension reform to incentivize later retirement. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/germany-approves-pension-reform-incentivize-later-retirement. “A further increase in the retirement age was highly controversial among Germany's coalition partners, so the only option was to make it voluntary by giving incentives for people to work longer if they feel healthy and capable. Under the reform, anyone who postpones the start of their pension and is employed for at least twelve months will receive a one-off payment equivalent to the lost pension payments. Furthermore, employer contributions to pension and unemployment insurance will be paid directly to employees who decide to continue working, in addition to their salaries. This would correspond to a gross wage increase of 10.6%.”

[65] Martinez, M. (2024, September 4). Germany approves pension reform to incentivize later retirement. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/germany-approves-pension-reform-incentivize-later-retirement. ”Labour market researcher Enzo Weber told Reuters that if the labour market participation of people aged over 60 years was raised to the same rate as those five years younger, Germany could have 2.5 million additional workers. "That's clearly a big potential," Weber said.”

[66] Devesa, E., & Doménech, R. (2021, December 10). Una década de reformas y contrarreformas en pensiones. BBVA Research. [A decade of reforms and counter-reforms in Pensions] https://www.bbvaresearch.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/EnriqueDevesa_RafaelDomenech_Una_decada_de_reformas_y_contrarreformas_en_pensiones_El_Mundo_WB.pdf. “El sistema público de pensiones en España entró en déficit en 2011. La expectativa de un déficit creciente llevó entonces a emprender una reforma, seguida por otra en 2013. A pesar de ello, el déficit ha seguido creciendo durante la última década. El déficit contributivo acumulado en los últimos cuatros trimestres hasta el tercero de 2021 es de 28.000 millones de euros, a lo que hay que añadir otros 2.000 millones adicionales por compensación de la mayor inflación, alcanzando en total un 2,5% del PIB. La reforma de 2011, acordada con los agentes sociales, retrasó gradualmente la edad de retiro desde los 65 hasta los 67 años en 2027, aumentó el número de años cotizados de 15 a 25, y propuso el Factor de Sostenibilidad (FS), en función de la esperanza de vida, para mantener la proporcionalidad entre contribuciones al sistema y prestaciones esperadas. Hay que tener en cuenta que las pensiones iniciales entran en el sistema con un elevado déficit actuarial, es decir, en valor presente las personas jubiladas reciben más de lo que han cotizado. El aumento de la edad de jubilación reducía ligeramente ese déficit actuarial y el FS evitaba su aumento como consecuencia de los incrementos de la esperanza de vida. Según la AIReF (2019), la reforma de 2011 iría conteniendo progresivamente el gasto en pensiones hasta en 2,9 puntos porcentuales del PIB en 2048.” (p. 1)  [The public pension system in Spain went into deficit in 2011. The expectation of a growing deficit led Then to undertake a reform, followed by another in 2013. Despite this, the deficit has continued to grow during The last decade. The contribution deficit accumulated in the last four quarters until the third of 2021 is 28 billion euros, to which must be added another 2,000 million additional for compensation of the major Inflation, reaching a total of 2.5% of GDP. The 2011 reform, agreed with the social partners, gradually delayed the retirement age from 65 to 67 years in 2027, increased the number of years contributed from 15 to 25, and proposed the Sustainability Factor (SF), in Function of life expectancy, to maintain the proportionality between contributions to the system and benefits Expected. It must be taken into account that initial pensions enter the system with a high actuarial deficit, That is, in present value retired people receive more than they have contributed. The increase in the age of Retirement slightly reduced that actuarial deficit and the FS avoided its increase as a result of the increases Of life expectancy. According to AIReF (2019), the 2011 reform would progressively contain spending on Pensions up to 2.9 percentage points of GDP in 2048.]

[67] Devesa, E., & Doménech, R. (2021, December 10). Una década de reformas y contrarreformas en pensiones. BBVA Research. [A decade of reforms and counter-reforms in Pensions] https://www.bbvaresearch.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/EnriqueDevesa_RafaelDomenech_Una_decada_de_reformas_y_contrarreformas_en_pensiones_El_Mundo_WB.pdf. “Estas previsiones han cambiado con las medidas propuestas en 2021, que pueden calificarse como una contrarreforma completa de la reforma de 2013 y parcial de la de 2011, al derogar el FS. Primero, se ha optado por la revalorización con el IPC, trasladando al Estado el déficit del sistema de pensiones y rompiendo el principio de separación de fuentes. Segundo, se ha sustituido el FS por el denominado Mecanismo de Equidad Intergeneracional (MEI), que sube las cotizaciones sociales en 0,6 puntos durante la próxima década (equivalentes a 0,2 puntos del PIB) y demora a 2033 la introducción de ajustes adicionales. Tercero, se modifican los coeficientes reductores para la pensión anticipada. Cuarto, se aumentan los incentivos a la jubilación demorada. El retraso en la edad efectiva de jubilación con estos mecanismos supondrá un ahorro de unas décimas en el mejor de los casos, y no puede descartarse incluso que suponga algo más de gasto, si los futuros jubilados eligen óptimamente su retiro.” (p. 3) [These forecasts have changed with the measures proposed in 2021, which can be qualified as a Complete counter-reform of the 2013 reform and partial of the 2011 reform, by repealing the FS. First, it has been chosen for the Revaluation with the CPI, transferring the deficit of the pension system to the State and breaking the principle of Separation of sources. Second, the FS has been replaced by the so-called Intergenerational Equity Mechanism (MEI), which raises social contributions by 0.6 points during the next decade (equivalent to 0.2 points of the GDP) and delays the introduction of additional adjustments to 2033. Third, the reducing coefficients are modified for the early pension. Fourth, incentives for delayed retirement are increased. The delay in the effective age of retirement with these mechanisms will mean a saving of a few tenths in the best of cases, and it cannot be ruled out even that it involves a little more expense, if future retirees optimally choose their retirement.]

[68] Devesa, E., & Doménech, R. (2021, December 10). Una década de reformas y contrarreformas en pensiones. BBVA Research. [A decade of reforms and counter-reforms in Pensions] https://www.bbvaresearch.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/EnriqueDevesa_RafaelDomenech_Una_decada_de_reformas_y_contrarreformas_en_pensiones_El_Mundo_WB.pdf

https://www.bbvaresearch.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/EnriqueDevesa_RafaelDomenech_Una_decada_de_reformas_y_contrarreformas_en_pensiones_El_Mundo_WB.pdf

. ”Llama la atención que el aumento de las cotizaciones sociales para sustituir al FS se presente como un mecanismo más equitativo. El argumento está sujeto a la falacia de reducir y sesgar el análisis a una evaluación parcial. Se compara el aumento de las cotizaciones en la próxima década con la reducción de la pensión inicial en 2050 o 2070, sin tener en cuenta que, a ese horizonte, el aumento necesario de las cotizaciones para compensar íntegramente el FS sería de 3,5 puntos. Si el MEI sustituyese íntegramente al FS, tendría efectos similares, y si no lo hace, aumentará el déficit. En cualquier caso, el MEI solo compensa una parte del mayor gasto en pensiones, que las generaciones más jóvenes pagarán con impuestos. También sorprende que el MEI se presente como un mecanismo para corregir los efectos de la jubilación del baby boom cuando el compromiso es que compense la desviación de gasto provocada por la derogación del FS y el aumento de la esperanza de vida. Si se mantiene el diseño actual con sus topes, el déficit acumulado en 2067 sería de casi 8 puntos del PIB, aproximadamente un punto por año entre 2060 (cuando acabaría de aplicarse el MEI) y 2067.” (p. 3) [It is striking that the increase in social contributions to replace the FS is presented as a mechanism More equitable. The argument is subject to the fallacy of reducing and biasing the analysis to a partial evaluation. Itself Compares the increase in contributions in the next decade with the reduction in the initial pension in 2050 or 2070, Without taking into account that, on that horizon, the necessary increase in contributions to fully compensate the FS would be 3.5 points. If the MEI were to fully replace the FS, it would have similar effects, and if it does not, it will increase The deficit. In any case, the MEI only compensates for a part of the higher spending on pensions, which the generations More young people will pay with taxes. It is also surprising that the MEI is presented as a mechanism to correct the effects of the baby's retirement Boom when the commitment is to compensate for the expenditure deviation caused by the repeal of the FS and the Increased life expectancy. If the current design is maintained with its caps, the accumulated deficit in 2067 would be Of almost 8 points of GDP, approximately one point per year between 2060 (when the MEI would have just been applied) and 2067]

[69] Jones, G. (2022, November 16). Italy's Meloni needs urgent fix for ballooning pensions bill. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/markets/europe/italys-meloni-needs-urgent-fix-ballooning-pensions-bill-2022-11-16/. “Italy's new prime minister Giorgia Meloni needs urgently to rein in a bloated pension system which absorbs most social spending and looks increasingly unsustainable in the face of surging inflation. Rome already has the highest pension bill in the 38-nation Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, and says outlays will climb by 58 billion euros ($60.35 billion), or 19.5%, by 2025 as rising prices boost index-linked payouts.”

[70] Jones, G. (2022, November 16). Italy's Meloni needs urgent fix for ballooning pensions bill. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/markets/europe/italys-meloni-needs-urgent-fix-ballooning-pensions-bill-2022-11-16/. “With one of the world's oldest populations and low birth and employment rates, Italy has too few workers to support a growing army of pensioners, many of whom left work when the system allowed much earlier retirement than it does now.”

[71] Jones, G. (2022, November 16). Italy's Meloni needs urgent fix for ballooning pensions bill. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/markets/europe/italys-meloni-needs-urgent-fix-ballooning-pensions-bill-2022-11-16/. “And pensions remain generous: in 2020 pensioners' average income was 90% that of employees', Treasury data shows. "Italy has to increase the retirement age to reduce the number of pensioners in proportion to the labour force," said Lorenzo Codogno, head of LC Macro Advisors and former chief economist at Italy's Treasury. Advertisement · Scroll to continue "We need to free up resources to reduce the tax burden and increase investment in infrastructure, the climate transition and digitalisation to grow the economy."”

[72] Jones, G. (2022, November 16). Italy's Meloni needs urgent fix for ballooning pensions bill. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/markets/europe/italys-meloni-needs-urgent-fix-ballooning-pensions-bill-2022-11-16/. “Salvini is now pushing to allow people to retire next year after 41 years of work regardless of age. Codogno said this would be "far too generous", arguing instead for a flexible system allowing people to retire below Fornero's statutory age of 67 if they accept corresponding cuts in their pensions.”

[73] Department for Work and Pensions. (2023, March 30). State Pension Age Review published [Press release]. GOV.UK.   https://www.gov.uk/government/news/state-pension-age-review-2023. “State Pension age rise to 67 will take place as planned between 2026-2028. Review within two years of next Parliament to reconsider rise to age 68. Delivers on Government responsibility to ensure the State Pension remains sustainable and fair across the generations. The Government has confirmed the State Pension age will rise to 67 by the end of 2028, following a review published today. After carefully considering expert evidence, including two independent reports, the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions has concluded the planned pension age rise from 66 to 67 for those born after April 1960 remains appropriate.”

[74] Department for Work and Pensions. (2023, March 30). State Pension Age Review published [Press release]. GOV.UK.   https://www.gov.uk/government/news/state-pension-age-review-2023. “As the number of people over State Pension age increases, the Government must ensure it remains sustainable and fair for current and future generations. The Government plans to have a further review within two years of the next Parliament to reconsider the rise to age 68. This gives the Government appropriate time to take into account evidence which is not yet available on the long-term impact of recent challenges, including the Covid pandemic and global inflationary pressures. These events bring a level of uncertainty in relation to the current data on life expectancy, labour markets and the public finances.”

[75] Maun, E. (2024, October 3). Rising State Pension age will push more dying people into poverty. Marie Curie. https://www.mariecurie.org.uk/blog/rising-state-pension-age-will-push-more-dying-people-into-poverty. “Our analysis shows that, each year, over 92,000 adults die before they can draw their pension. This figure will rise by thousands for every year the pension age increases. That means thousands more dying people and their families will lose out on this crucial benefit. The poorest in our society and those living in areas with low life expectancy and high working age poverty will be most badly affected. Nobody should die in poverty, and we are calling for change.”

[76] Maun, E. (2024, October 3). Rising State Pension age will push more dying people into poverty. Marie Curie. https://www.mariecurie.org.uk/blog/rising-state-pension-age-will-push-more-dying-people-into-poverty. “Marie Curie research has found that one in four people dying at working age were living in poverty in the last year of their lives. Deteriorating health can lead to people reducing their work hours or having to stop working completely. Extra costs in the last year of life can be substantial, including home adaptations, transport to hospital and payment for care.”

[77] Maun, E. (2024, October 3). Rising State Pension age will push more dying people into poverty. Marie Curie. https://www.mariecurie.org.uk/blog/rising-state-pension-age-will-push-more-dying-people-into-poverty. “In 2022, 1 in 7 deaths (14%) in the UK were of adults who died before they were able to access their pension at the age of 66 (excluding those who died from causes such as poisoning, injury, accidents or related to pregnancy and birth), equating to 92,000 people. State Pension age is due to rise to 67 in 2026/7, which will lead to an extra 7,700 individuals dying before receiving any of their pension. With an increase to age 68, as currently proposed to happen between 2041 and 2043, an extra 15,800 people per year compared to today would be denied their pension before they died. This would equate to 108,000 people each year.”

[78] Maun, E. (2024, October 3). Rising State Pension age will push more dying people into poverty. Marie Curie. https://www.mariecurie.org.uk/blog/rising-state-pension-age-will-push-more-dying-people-into-poverty. “Although the percentage of people dying before State Pension age is comparable across the UK nations, it varies across local areas, reflecting factors such as levels of deprivation as well as population age structure. For example, in 2022, just under 9% of deaths occurred under the age of 66 in Dorset, 22% in Manchester and in London boroughs such as Haringey this figure was over 25%. Similar disparities exist in each nation: Scotland (highest deaths under age 66 in Glasgow City, 22%), Northern Ireland (18% in Derry City and Strabane) and Wales (17% in Torfaen). Rising State Pension age should be of particular concern for these areas, as areas with a high proportion of deaths before the age of 68 also have higher poverty rates among working age people. In fact, Marie Curie research has found levels of poverty are much higher among working age people in their last 12 months of life (28%) than those living longer than 12 months (21%). Groups experiencing greater risk of poverty earlier in life are more likely to also die in poverty, for instance, working age people from minoritised ethnic groups are two thirds more likely to die in poverty than working age white ethnic groups.”

[79] Reznik, G. L., Shoffner, D., & Weaver, D. A. (2006). Coping with the demographic challenge: Fewer children and living longer. Social Security Bulletin, 66(4), 37–48. https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v66n4/v66n4p37.html. “Due to demographic changes, the U.S. Social Security system will face financial challenges in the near future. Declining fertility rates and increasing life expectancies are causing the U.S. population to age. Today 12 percent of the total population is aged 65 or older, but by 2080, it will be 23 percent. At the same time, the working- age population is shrinking from 60 percent today to a projected 54 percent in 2080. Consequently, the Social Security system is experiencing a declining worker-to-beneficiary ratio, which will fall from 3.3 in 2005 to 2.1 in 2040 (the year in which the Social Security trust fund is projected to be exhausted).”

[80] USA Today. (2025, May 22). Retirement age rising: Social Security, Medicare. USA Today. Retrieved July 13, 2025, from https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2025/05/22/retirement-age-rising-social-security-medicare/83767525007/. “The average retirement age of American workers is creeping steadily up, according to a new report from a prominent economist.   And that trend invites a question: When will America's retirement age stop rising?   Over the past three decades, the average retirement age has risen by about three years, economist Alicia Munnell reports in an April research brief. The typical retirement age in 2024 was 64 for men, 62 for women.   The upward trend is slow, but striking. In 1994, the average man worked to age 61, while the typical woman clocked out at 59.”

[81] USA Today. (2025, May 22). Retirement age rising: Social Security, Medicare. USA Today. Retrieved July 13, 2025, from https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2025/05/22/retirement-age-rising-social-security-medicare/83767525007/. “We’re working longer for several reasons: Americans are living longer, staying healthier, and working in less physically demanding jobs. Workplace pensions have given way to 401(k) plans, which reward workers who delay retirement. Social Security changes have pushed the “full retirement” age from 65 to 67, penalizing those who claim the benefit earlier. Fewer employers offer health insurance to workers who retire before 65, the year Medicare benefits begin. “There were a lot of forces that encouraged people to work longer,” said Munnell, senior adviser at the Center for Retirement Research at Boston College, an organization she founded.”

[82] USA Today. (2025, May 22). Retirement age rising: Social Security, Medicare. USA Today. Retrieved July 13, 2025, from https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2025/05/22/retirement-age-rising-social-security-medicare/83767525007/. “On the other hand, a 2024 AARP survey found that one-fifth of over-50 adults have no retirement savings, and that many worry they won’t have enough funds to last through retirement.    “So, for a meaningful share of workers, postponing retirement is likely a necessity to keep their main income stream going,” said Nicola Bianchi, assistant professor of strategy at Northwestern University’s Kellogg School of Management.”

[83] USA Today. (2025, May 22). Retirement age rising: Social Security, Medicare. USA Today. Retrieved July 13, 2025, from https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2025/05/22/retirement-age-rising-social-security-medicare/83767525007/. “If the age of eligibility for full Social Security benefits rose from 67 to, say, 70, America’s average retirement age would probably resume its upward drift, Munnell said.    If Congress were to raise the age of eligibility for Medicare, retirement ages could rise even more dramatically. But retirement experts say it’s hard to imagine that scenario, given the high costs of health insurance.”

[84] Consolato Generale d'Italia a Edimburgo [Consulate General of Italy in Edinburgh]. (2025, July 16). Pensions and Social Security. Retrieved July 16, 2025, from https://consedimburgo.esteri.it/en/servizi-consolari-e-visti/servizi-per-il-cittadino-italiano/pensioni-e-sicurezza-sociale/“Italy’s social security system The Italian social security system is a contributory system. People in Italy pay a part of their income from employment to one of a number of national social security schemes. Employers also pay a contribution on behalf of employees. The rate of benefit payable generally depends on the contributions made and the period they were made for.  The main Italian insurance fund is the National Social Security Institute (Istituto Nazionale della Previdenza Sociale) which is known by the acronym INPS.  In addition to the contribution based system there is also a welfare system which gives benefits to people who are not covered by the contributory system.  I.N.P.S. OLD AGE PENSION  To be eligible for an I.N.P.S. pension you must have worked in Italy and contributed into the I.N.P.S. social security insurance scheme. The minimum number of years of contribution to the Italian pension system has been extended gradually from 15 to 20 years for both wage-earners and self-employed persons. The age limit has also been extended to 65 for men and 60 for women.  I.N.P.S. LONG SERVICE PENSION  The long-service pension scheme requires 35 years of contribution and at least 57 years of age. If you have paid contributions for 40 years or more, you are entitled to a pension regardless of your age. Particular rules apply to self-employed persons who have contributed to the I.N.P.S. pension scheme.”

SECTION 4

[85] Parramore, L. (2024, May 8). Work Longer, Die Sooner! America’s Dire Need to Expand Social Security and Medicare. Institute for New Economic Thinking. Retrieved July 13, 2025, from https://www.ineteconomics.org/perspectives/blog/work-longer-die-sooner-americas-dire-need-to-expand-social-security-and-medicare.
“Are we all really living longer? Let’s first point out that Princeton economists Anne Case and Angus Deaton, noted for their research in health and economics, recently showed that many Americans are not, in fact, enjoying extended lives. As they stated in their own New York Times op-ed, those without college degrees are “scarred by death and a staggeringly shorter life span.” According to their investigation, the expected lifespan for this group has been falling since 2010. By 2021, people without college degrees were expected to live to about 75, nearly 8.5 years shorter than their college-educated counterparts”

[86] Parramore, L. (2024, May 8). Work Longer, Die Sooner! America’s Dire Need to Expand Social Security and Medicare. Institute for New Economic Thinking. Retrieved July 13, 2025, from https://www.ineteconomics.org/perspectives/blog/work-longer-die-sooner-americas-dire-need-to-expand-social-security-and-medicare.
“Overall life expectancy in America dropped in 2020 and 2021, with increases in mortality across the leading causes of death and among all ages, not just due to COVID-19. In August 2022, data confirmed that Americans are dying younger across all demographics. Again, the U.S. is an outlier. It was one of two developed countries where life expectancy did not bounce back in the second year of the pandemic. So the argument that everyone is living longer greatly stretches the truth—unless, of course, you happen to be rich: A Harvard study revealed that the wealthiest Americans enjoy a life expectancy over a decade longer than their poorest counterparts.”

[87] Cai, C. (2024, April 1). Old age but no rest: A political‑economic reflection on delayed retirement policy. Monthly Review. Retrieved July 13, 2025, from https://monthlyreview.org/2024/04/01/old-age-but-no-rest-a-political-economic-reflection-on-delayed-retirement-policy/.
“Delaying the retirement age of active workers across the board is really an attempt to expand the supply of labor time and reduce social pension expenditures (essentially, labor wages) in the face of increased labor costs. It is important to point out that while many scholars tend to cite the increase in life expectancy per capita to suggest that the entire population’s life expectancy has gone up, and that the expected number of years for which workers receive a pension has thus also increased. That the labor hours of the working population should increase alongside life expectancy is a commonsense error, as it misinterprets life expectancy per capita. Life expectancy per capita does not refer to the actual life expectancy of all people, but only to the life expectancy of the birth cohort—that is, the number of years a person born in a particular year is expected to live. The increase in this indicator is mainly a reflection of the advancement in the level of social development. Moreover, life expectancy is not equal to healthy life expectancy, which, for many people is much lower than their actual life expectancy.”

[88] Parramore, L. (2024, May 8). Work Longer, Die Sooner! America’s Dire Need to Expand Social Security and Medicare. Institute for New Economic Thinking. Retrieved July 13, 2025, from https://www.ineteconomics.org/perspectives/blog/work-longer-die-sooner-americas-dire-need-to-expand-social-security-and-medicare.
“But the reality is different. Economist Teresa Ghilarducci, a professor at the New School for Social Research, focuses on the economic security of older workers and flaws in U.S. retirement systems in her new book, Work, Retire, Repeat: The Uncertainty of Retirement in the New Economy. She calls those praising the health perks of working longer “oddballs” – those fortunate folks in cushy positions who have a lot of autonomy and purpose. Like lawmakers or tenured professors, for example. She points out that academic researchers often base their theories about the benefits of working longer on a hypothetical person who just tacked on a few extra years in the same position, noting that researchers often make the faulty assumption that people are not only living longer, but can also easily choose to work longer, keep their jobs without facing pay cuts, and continue stacking up savings into later life.”

[89] Parramore, L. (2024, May 8). Work Longer, Die Sooner! America’s Dire Need to Expand Social Security and Medicare. Institute for New Economic Thinking. Retrieved July 13, 2025, from https://www.ineteconomics.org/perspectives/blog/work-longer-die-sooner-americas-dire-need-to-expand-social-security-and-medicare.
“That’s not really how it plays out in real life for most folks. Ghilarducci found that most people don’t actually get to decide when they retire, noting that “the verb ‘retire’ isn’t a verb that really belongs to the agency of the worker – it’s the employers’ choice.” Retirement often means somebody above you telling you it’s time to go. You’re ousted—laid off or pushed out because your productivity’s slipping or your skills are aging like last year’s tech.”

[90] Oshio, T. (2021). Job dissatisfaction as a predictor of poor health among middle-aged workers: A 14-wave mixed model analysis in Japan. Scandinavian Journal of Work, Environment & Health, 47(8), 591–599. https://doi.org/10.5271/sjweh.3985.
“Second, we observed that a longer JD duration moderately added to the risks of each poor health outcome, as shown in both the descriptive and mixed model analyses. While studies have shown that JD tended to discourage workers from staying in the workplace, the results suggest that a prolonged JD duration was associated with an average deterioration in health outcomes. Third, behind this accumulating effect of JD duration, there may be cumulative causation between JD and health outcomes. As seen in table 4, JD was not only affected by JD duration until the previous year but also by the previous year’s PD and poor SRH, which had been affected by JD duration beforehand, as suggested by the results in table 3. The existence of the latter route suggests that PD and poor SRH may mediate the impact of previous PD experience on current PD. This mediation mechanism is likely to enhance JD’s self-sustainability and thus make JD adversely affect health over time.” (p. 596)

[91] Parramore, L. (2024, May 8). Work Longer, Die Sooner! America’s Dire Need to Expand Social Security and Medicare. Institute for New Economic Thinking. Retrieved July 13, 2025, from https://www.ineteconomics.org/perspectives/blog/work-longer-die-sooner-americas-dire-need-to-expand-social-security-and-medicare.
“There’s also the fact that continuing to work in an unfulfilling job might be hazardous to your health. The reality is, a lot of us are grinding in jobs that are stressful and insecure, and that constant stress ties into a whole host of health issues — hypertension, heart problems, messed up digestion, and a weaker immune system, not to mention it can kickstart or worsen mental health troubles like depression and anxiety. Many are stuck in what anthropologist David Graeber memorably dubbed “bullshit jobs” — roles that feel meaningless and draining. Graeber described these jobs as a form of ‘spiritual violence,’ and found them linked to heightened anxiety, depression, and overall misery among workers. His research found strong evidence that seeing your job as useless deeply impacts your psychological well-being. The link between job dissatisfaction and poor health has been found to be significant in study after study. Unrewarding work can demotivate people from staying active, eating well, or sleeping regularly, potentially leading to obesity, type 2 diabetes, and other health issues. In contrast, retiring from such a job could free up time and energy for wellness activities, enjoyable hobbies, and a healthier lifestyle overall.”

[92] Parramore, L. (2024, May 8). Work Longer, Die Sooner! America’s Dire Need to Expand Social Security and Medicare. Institute for New Economic Thinking. Retrieved July 13, 2025, from https://www.ineteconomics.org/perspectives/blog/work-longer-die-sooner-americas-dire-need-to-expand-social-security-and-medicare.
“She also highlights the problem of subordination, explaining that it can be “lethal” to remain in a job where you lack control over the content or pace of your work. According to her, such factors can lead to higher morbidity and lower mortality rates. Okay, what about social engagement? That’s crucial for seniors, right? True, but demanding or unfulfilling jobs can make it hard to find the time and energy to socialize, leading to isolation and loneliness, which are major factors in declining mental health and quality of life for the elderly. Also, when talking about delaying retirement, we can’t ignore cognitive decline. Sure, working longer might keep your mind sharp if the job is stimulating. However, research indicates the opposite for dull jobs. Florida State University researchers found that not only can tedious work accelerate cognitive decline, leading to increased stress and reduced life satisfaction, but “dirty” work does as well. They show that jobs in unclean environments with exposure to chemicals, mold, lead, or loud noises significantly impact brain health as we age.”

[93] Wasik, J. (2016, June 3). Longevity bonus: Work longer, live longer. Forbes. Retrieved July 13, 2025, from https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnwasik/2016/06/03/longevity-bonus-work-longer-live-longer/.
“And on its face, working longer doesn't necessarily promote longer life. Just those who were observed in this study who were happy in their vocation and reasonably healthy tended to live longer. Although the researchers didn't really answer this question, it's not clear what "meaningful" work really means. Social workers and first responders do meaningful work, but it's often incredibly stressful and often injurious. I would also assume that the majority of those involved in meaningful labor are not doing highly physical work such as roofing or other building trades. They are likely white-collar employees.”

[94] Kehler, D. S. (2019). Age-related disease burden as a measure of population ageing. The Lancet Public Health, 4(3), e123–e124. https://doi.org/10.1016/s2468-2667(19)30026-x
“Improvements in health care and social circumstances have resulted in people living longer. Still, not all people thrive in good health as they age: the oldest old might be long lived but many suffer from multiple, interacting health problems that can profoundly affect the management of their numerous and often complex health issues. In population health, common population ageing metrics, such as longevity, do not accurately reflect the state of health in which people who are living longer find themselves.” (p. 123)

[95] Kehler, D. S. (2019). Age-related disease burden as a measure of population ageing. The Lancet Public Health, 4(3), e123–e124. https://doi.org/10.1016/s2468-2667(19)30026-x
“On average, poor health in old age increases the risk of death. What is tricky about health in old age is that it involves more than just disease. Health problems that increase with age go beyond what disease alone can capture, such as impairments in cognition, mood, and physical performance. These remain relevant, even when not disabling. This is why many believe that we have reached “the end of the disease era”. If so, we can ask whether DALYs can optimally capture population ageing. By contrast, a broader approach to quantifying how health changes with age motivated the frailty index.4 The frailty index score represents the fraction of health problems of old age—which encompasses diseases, disabilities, clinically observable signs and symptoms, and biomarkers that they have—relative to the number that were measured. This approach recognises that health problems other than diseases are important and that such problems interact on various levels and do not accumulate independently of each other. Although heterogeneous across individuals, over any given time interval, health deficits accumulate characteristically. The accumulation is, on average, gradual and occurs chiefly as a function of the number of baseline deficits. Its characteristic patterns make the frailty index useful in understanding the complexities of ageing,5 including how age-related deficit accumulation modifies both disease risk and expression for common maladies of old age” (p. 123)

[96] Martinez, R., Morsch, P., Soliz, P., Hommes, C., Ordunez, P., & Vega, E. (2021). Life expectancy, healthy life expectancy, and burden of disease in older people in the Americas, 1990–2019: A population-based study. Revista Panamericana de Salud Pública, 45, 1–14. https://doi.org/10.26633/rpsp.2021.114
“The reductions in highly prevalent infectious diseases, infant mortality and fertility, together with increased human longevity have led to fast population aging. Moreover, rapid urbanization and the increase in unhealthy lifestyles, among other determinants, have accelerated the epidemiological transition and fueled the epidemic of noncommunicable diseases (NCDs)” (p. 2)

[97] Martinez, R., Morsch, P., Soliz, P., Hommes, C., Ordunez, P., & Vega, E. (2021). Life expectancy, healthy life expectancy, and burden of disease in older people in the Americas, 1990–2019: A population-based study. Revista Panamericana de Salud Pública, 45, 1–14. https://doi.org/10.26633/rpsp.2021.114
“Globally, NCDs accounted for 41.1 million deaths in 2017, representing 73.5% of total deaths and over 80.0% of deaths at age 60 years and older. In addition, avoidable NCDs accounted for 83.9% of all NCD deaths worldwide (7). The effect of NCDs is higher and more extensive in low- and middle-income countries. In 2011, in response to the global NCD epidemic and population aging, the United Nations General Assembly called for countries to tackle NCDs and their risk factors (8). In 2020, the General Assembly declared 2021–2030 the Decade of Healthy Ageing” (p. 2)

[98] Prince, M. J., Wu, F., Guo, Y., Gutierrez Robledo, L. M., O’Donnell, M., Sullivan, R., & Yusuf, S. (2015). The burden of disease in older people and implications for health policy and practice. The Lancet, 385(9967), 549–562. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0140-6736(14)61347-7
“The worldwide epidemic of chronic disease is, to a large and increasing extent, concentrated in older people and people living in low-income and middle-income countries. Global burden of disease in older people is projected to increase more or less in line with the increase in the older population, consistent with population ageing being the most important driver of the chronic disease epidemic. The largest increases in disease burden will occur for those disorders that are particularly strongly age-associated (dementia, stroke, COPD, and diabetes). The association between biological age and morbidity and loss of function underpins the link between population ageing and increasing burden; however, this association is neither constant nor immutable, leaving much scope for intervention to promote health and prevent disease in older people.136 In low-income and middle-income countries, the epidemiological transition will result in growing exposure to cardiovascular risk factors in older people, particularly in poor people, an increase in the incidence and prevalence of cardiovascular diseases, and 10 a surge in health inequalities.” (p. 10)

[99] Martinez, R., Morsch, P., Soliz, P., Hommes, C., Ordunez, P., & Vega, E. (2021). Life expectancy, healthy life expectancy, and burden of disease in older people in the Americas, 1990–2019: A population-based study. Revista Panamericana de Salud Pública, 45, 1–14. https://doi.org/10.26633/rpsp.2021.114
“The lower rate of increase of healthy life expectancy than life expectancy at 65 years of age in the past three decades means that people are living longer but are spending more of their life time with disabilities and illness. The disability burden revealed underlying conditions that accounted for years of life spent with illness. These conditions ultimately affect quality of life, increase dependence on care, limit the social contribution and opportunities of people of old age, and increase the burden on the family and the health system.”

[100] Martinez, R., Morsch, P., Soliz, P., Hommes, C., Ordunez, P., & Vega, E. (2021). Life expectancy, healthy life expectancy, and burden of disease in older people in the Americas, 1990–2019: A population-based study. Revista Panamericana de Salud Pública, 45, 1–14. https://doi.org/10.26633/rpsp.2021.114
“Diabetes mellitus was the leading cause of YLDs for older people in each age group across countries of the Region in 2019. However, diabetes mellitus is a preventable condition, which is strongly associated with obesity and the obesogenic environment before 65 years. It is also a very manageable clinical condition with good access to and quality of care at all ages, including older ages (29). Indeed, hypertension control combined with cardiovascular disease secondary prevention, which are comprehensive and cost-effective clinical interventions, are still poorly implemented across the world but have enormous potential to reduce both the cardiovascular disease and diabetes mellitus burdens.” (pp. 7–8)

[101] Martinez, R., Morsch, P., Soliz, P., Hommes, C., Ordunez, P., & Vega, E. (2021). Life expectancy, healthy life expectancy, and burden of disease in older people in the Americas, 1990–2019: A population-based study. Revista Panamericana de Salud Pública, 45, 1–14. https://doi.org/10.26633/rpsp.2021.114
“The burden of disability in older adults, characterized by the presence of more than one chronic condition (multimorbidity) and polypharmacy, together with accelerated aging and the epidemiological transition towards NCDs, pose new health challenges. These factors lead to complex clinical situations that require: innovative health systems; health care capacities to tackle multimorbidity, rather than the single health condition approach; primary health services that are responsive to older people and inter-related with new community roles; and improved access to long-term care for all people who need it (36). The burden of multimorbidity in older people in the Americas should be explored in further studies to guide policy development.” (pp. 8–9)

[102] Martinez, R., Morsch, P., Soliz, P., Hommes, C., Ordunez, P., & Vega, E. (2021). Life expectancy, healthy life expectancy, and burden of disease in older people in the Americas, 1990–2019: A population-based study. Revista Panamericana de Salud Pública, 45, 1–14. https://doi.org/10.26633/rpsp.2021.114
“In conclusion, the increase in life expectancy and healthy life expectancy at 65 years and decrease of DALY rates in old people over the past three decades in the Americas are probably the result of economic and social progress, the success of public health policies, and improvements in disease prevention and access to and quality of care. However, the small increase in healthy life expectancy relative to the increase in life expectancy shows that, despite living longer, people spend a substantial amount of their old age with disability and illness, which negatively affect their quality of life, increase the burden of care dependency and limit their social contribution. Despite the decline in disease burden rates among old people in all age groups 65 years and older, its distribution is shifting toward the more older people. Aging and greater longevity are leading to a situation of increased morbidity and disability at old ages. Preventable or potentially controllable diseases throughout the lifespan are responsible for most of the burden of disease among older people in the Americas. Society-wide and life- course approaches, health investment, and adequate health services are needed to respond to the new health needs of older people, which is critical to achieving the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and for the Decade of Healthy Aging.” (p. 11)

[103] Prince, M. J., Wu, F., Guo, Y., Gutierrez Robledo, L. M., O’Donnell, M., Sullivan, R., & Yusuf, S. (2015). The burden of disease in older people and implications for health policy and practice. The Lancet, 385(9967), 549–562. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0140-6736(14)61347-7
“The societal costs of these disorders is enormous, particularly in high-income countries with welfare-based social care systems; in the UK, the societal cost of dementia is estimated to exceed that of cardiovascular disease, cancer, and diabetes combined.139 The Institute of Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME) disability weights used to compute years lived with disability (YLD) have compounded this issue.140 Seismic shifts in the burden of disease between WHO 2004 estimates and the IHME 2010 estimates38 have neither been highlighted nor explained. Findings from this Review show that, in older people for whom the discrepancies were most striking, the burden of dementia has been cut by half, the burden of visual impairment by two-thirds, and the burden of musculoskeletal disorders has increased nearly four times. This result is due to changes in disability weights rather than in the estimates of the frequency of these disorders. Disability weights will be affected by choice of respondents used to measure them, the information provided about the health states, and the way that the questions are framed. WHO GBD weights were measured through a consensus of international experts, whereas the IHME weights portrayed judgments of the general public.140 IHME weights link to relative health rather than relative disability, and the extent to which the IHME GBD notion of health loss maps on to conventional notions of disability and dependence is open to question.” (p. 10)

[104] Hickel, J., & Sullivan, D. (2024). How much growth is required to achieve good lives for all? Insights from needs-based analysis. World Development Perspectives, 35, 100612. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.wdp.2024.100612. “good lives can be achieved for all without requiring large increases in total global throughput and output. Provisioning decent living standards (DLS) for 8.5 billion people would require only 30% of current global resource and energy use, leaving a

substantial surplus for additional consumption, public luxury, scientific advancement, and other social investments. Such a future requires planning to provision public services, to deploy efficient technology, and to build sovereign industrial capacity in the global South.”

FIGURES

[F1] Garin, A., Jackson, E., Koustas, D., & Miller, A. (2023, May 16). The evolution of platform gig work, 2012–2021 (BFI Working Paper No. 2023-69). Becker Friedman Institute for Economics at the University of Chicago. https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/23rpevolutionofplatformgigwork.pdf. Figure 7 (p. 39)

[F2] World Population Review. (2022). Average vacation days by country. Retrieved July 15, 2025, from https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/average-vacation-days-by-country. Custom Chart from [27]