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[1] Page, B. I., Bartels, L. M., & Seawright, J. (2013). Democracy and the policy preferences of wealthy Americans. Perspectives on Politics, 11(1), 51–73. “By comparison, in the American National Election Study survey conducted shortly after the 2008 presidential election, just 14 percent of the general-population respondents reported having contributed money to a candidate, party, or Political Action Committee.” (p. 54). 

[2] Page, B. I., Bartels, L. M., & Seawright, J. (2013). Democracy and the policy preferences of wealthy Americans. Perspectives on Politics, 11(1), 51–73. “Table 2.- 68% of wealthy Americans contributed money to a candidate, party, or PAC.” (p. 54). 

[3] Page, B. I., Bartels, L. M., & Seawright, J. (2013). Democracy and the policy preferences of wealthy Americans. Perspectives on Politics, 11(1), 51–73. “A remarkable 21 percent of our wealthy respondents solicited or ‘bundled’ other peoples’ political contributions—not an activity that is common among ordinary citizens.” (p. 54). 

[4] Weiner, D. I., & Lau, T. (2019, December 12). Citizens United Explained. Brennan Center for Justice. “Citizens United arose in 2007 when a conservative nonprofit organization challenged campaign finance rules that stopped it from promoting and airing a film criticizing then presidential candidate Hillary Clinton. The Supreme Court eventually decided 5–4 that Citizens United was within its First Amendment rights to spend its money disseminating the film. But rather than opining solely on the case before it as it had been asked to do, the Court took the opportunity to entirely strike down century-old prohibitions on corporate ‘independent’ spending — money that doesn’t go directly to a candidate or party. This applied to labor unions as well.” 

[5] Weiner, D. I., & Lau, T. (2019, December 12). Citizens United Explained. Brennan Center for Justice. “Super PAC money, which largely comes from a small group of the very wealthiest donors, started influencing elections almost immediately after Citizens United. From 2010 to 2022, super PACs spent approximately $6.4 billion on federal elections. In the 2024 election, they set a record of at least $2.7 billion. Super PAC money has largely eclipsed donations by small donors (people giving $200 or less), despite funds from small donors growing. For example, in the 2022 midterms, just 21 of the biggest donor families contributed $783 million and billionaires provided 15 percent of all federal election financing —most of which went to super PACs supporting congressional campaigns.” 

[6] Weiner, D. I., & Lau, T. (2019, December 12). Citizens United Explained. Brennan Center for Justice. “Citizens United allowed big political spenders to exploit the growing lack of transparency in political spending. This has contributed to a surge in secret spending from outside groups in federal elections. Dark money expenditures increased from less than $5 million in 2006 to more than $1 billion in the 2024 presidential elections alone.” 

[7] OpenSecrets. (2025, February 6). Pharmaceutical manufacturing lobbying. OpenSecrets.org. “$151,052,170, 2024 Total for Pharmaceutical Manufacturing (lobbying).” 

[8] OpenSecrets. (2025, February 6). Pharmaceutical manufacturing lobbying. OpenSecrets.org. “Pharmaceutical Research & Manufacturers of America: $31,720,000; Merck & Co: $9,190,000; Pfizer Inc: $8,860,000; Bayer AG: $8,470,000; Eli Lilly & Co: $8,430,000; Novartis AG: $6,220,000; Sanofi: $5,525,000; Bristol-Myers Squibb: $5,280,000; Novo Nordisk: $5,260,000; GSK plc: $4,790,000.” 

[9] Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America. (n.d.). About. PhRMA. “1. AbbVie; 2. Alkermes plc; 3. Amgen Inc.; 4. Astellas Pharma; 5. AstraZeneca; 6. Bayer Corporation; 7. BioMarin Pharmaceutical Inc; 8. Biogen; 9. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, Inc.; 10. Bristol Myers Squibb; 11. CSL; 12. Daiichi-Sankyo (Daiichi Sankyo, Inc.); 13. Eisai Inc.; 14. Eli Lilly and Company; 15. EMD Serono; 16. Genentech (Roche Group); 17. Genmab US, Inc.; 18. Gilead Sciences, Inc.; 19. GSK; 20. Incyte Corporation; 21. Ipsen Biopharmaceuticals, Inc.; 22. Johnson & Johnson; 23. Lundbeck LLC; 24. Merck & Co., Inc.; 25. Neurocrine Biosciences, Inc.; 26. Novartis Pharmaceuticals; 27. Novo Nordisk Inc.; 28. Otsuka America Pharmaceutical, Inc. (OAPI); 29. Pfizer Inc.; 30. Sanofi; 31. Takeda Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.; 32. UCB.” 

[10] Accountable.US. (n.d.). PhRMA financial contributions. “An Accountable.US review of tax documents shows that in 2022, PhRMA gave a combined $16.1 million to groups that directly spoke out against CMS price negotiation. Several groups received a majority or almost all of their revenue from PhRMA.” 

[11] Bowman, J. (2020). Do the affluent override average Americans? Measuring policy disagreement and unequal influence. Social Science Quarterly, 101(3), 1019–1037. “It is worth emphasizing that unequal influence is not the same as policy congruence. Even though average Americans have minimal influence on the policy-making process, they often still see the policies they prefer implemented. This is because the preferences of different income groups generally overlap. As Enns (2015b) points out, this is true even when the preferences of income groups differ (i.e., a preference gap exists) because ‘the policies that receive the most (least) support among the middle typically receive the most (least) support among the affluent.’ This ‘coincidental representation’ may reduce average Americans’ dissatisfaction with government, but it falls short of the democratic ideal of equal representation and leaves a powerless majority dependent on a powerful minority to get their preferred policies enacted. This study focuses on two groups of actors: middle- and high-income Americans. While these income groups are particularly relevant to the theories of majoritarian democracy and economic elite domination, other scholars have compared the relative policy influence of low- and high-income Americans. I repeat the above analyses to compare the relative policy influence of the poor (10th income percentile) to that of the affluent. Of the full sample of 1,779 survey questions, nearly 60 percent represent cases of disagreement between the affluent and poor by at least one of the 22 definitions. Results, which can be found in the Online Appendix, show strong evidence of unequal responsiveness between the affluent and poor, with 20 of 22 definitions of disagreement indicating that the affluent wield significant negative influence over the likelihood of policy change and all definitions indicating they wield significant positive influence. Conversely, only one definition indicates that the poor have significant positive influence, and none indicate they have significant negative influence.” (p. 1034). 

[12] Accountable.US. (2022). PhRMA gave $16M to block drug price negotiations in 2022. https://accountable.us/research/phrma-gave-16m-to-block-drug-price-negotiations-in-2022/. “An Accountable.US review of tax documents shows that in 2022, PhRMA gave a combined $16.1 million to groups that directly spoke out against CMS price negotiation. Several groups received a majority or almost all of their revenue from PhRMA.” 

[13] “On June 6, 2023, Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) joined with several other industry groups to challenge the Biden Administration’s prescription drug price negotiation measures introduced as part of the Inflation Reduction Act. The complaint argued price negotiations were unconstitutional and would lead to ‘drug shortages, rationing, and declining innovation.’ PhRMA also targeted price negotiation through extensive lobbying efforts. Since 2020, PhRMA has spent over $105 million while lobbying against the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), Build Back Better Act, Elijah E. Cummings Lower Drug Costs Now Act, Medicare Prescription Drug Price Negotiation Act of 2019, and Medicare Drug Price Negotiation Act. An Accountable.US review of tax documents shows that in 2022, PhRMA gave a combined $16.1 million to groups that directly spoke out against CMS price negotiation. Several groups received a majority or almost all of their revenue from PhRMA.” 

[14] OpenSecrets. (2025, February 6). Pharmaceutical manufacturing lobbying. OpenSecrets.org. “(47% of PHaRMA members lobbied in addition to the organization.” 

[15] Pew Research Center. (2017, April 14). Top frustrations with tax system: Sense that corporations, wealthy don’t pay fair share. Pew Research Center. “Among the public overall, 62% say they are bothered ‘a lot’ by the feeling that some corporations don’t pay their fair share of taxes, and 60% say the same about some wealthy people not paying their fair share.” (p. 1). 

[16] Tax Policy Center. (2017, December 18). Distributional analysis of the conference agreement for the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act. Tax Policy Center. “On average, taxes would be little changed for taxpayers in the bottom 95 percent of the income distribution. Taxpayers in the bottom two quintiles of the income distribution would face an average tax increase of 0.1 percent of after-tax income; taxpayers in the middle income quintile would see no material change on average; and taxpayers in the 95th to 99th income percentiles would receive an average tax cut of 0.2 percent of after-tax income. Taxpayers in the top 1 percent of the income distribution would receive an average tax cut of 0.9 percent of after-tax income, accounting for 83 percent of the total benefit for that year.” 

[17] Poll: 34 percent approve of Trump's tax law. (2017, December 18). The Hill. “A poll released Wednesday found that more people disapprove of President Trump’s 2017 tax-cut law than approve of it — the latest sign that the law is unpopular with voters. Thirty-four percent of adults surveyed by Monmouth University Poll said they approved of the plan, compared with 43 percent who disapproved of it.” 

[18] Congressional Budget Office. (2024, April). Final report on the Troubled Asset Relief Program (Report No. 59919). Congressional Budget Office. “About 70 percent of the disbursements went to support financial institutions. All told, those transactions yielded a net gain to the government. The largest cost was for the mortgage programs, which stemmed from an initial commitment by the Treasury of $50 billion in TARP funds for programs to help homeowners avoid foreclosure. Subsequent legislation reduced that amount, and the final $642 million of available funding was deobligated on May 31, 2023, closing the mortgage programs. Net disbursements of TARP funds for all mortgage programs were $31.4 billion. Because most of those funds” (p. 3). 

[19] Paulson, H. M., Jr. (2009, January 15). [Letter to Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke regarding Citigroup liquidity facility]. U.S. Department of the Treasury. “During this period of financial turmoil, we have worked together to enhance the stability, liquidity and orderliness of our financial markets. In the early part of November, 2008, it became clear that the situation at Citigroup presented a substantial and systemic threat to those financial markets. Citigroup is the second largest banking organization in the United States, with more than $2 trillion in total assets.” 

[20] National Employment Law Project. (n.d.). States and cities can respond to workers’ demands for economic security, health and safety protections, and workplace democracy. Retrieved from https://www.nelp.org/insights-research/states-cities-can-respond-workers-demands-economic-security-health-safety-protections-workplace-democracy/. “So-called right-to-work laws, passed in 27 states, make it harder for workers to form strong labor unions through which they can organize and speak with one voice on the job. Right-to-work laws are designed to dilute unions’ resources, by prohibiting requirements that all workers who benefit from collective bargaining pay a fair share of dues or fees for the services provided. These laws have led to declining union membership and declining wages and benefits for union and nonunion workers alike. At a time of extreme inequality in our country and a global pandemic, governors and legislators should make it easier, not harder, for workers to unite. They should repeal state right-to-work laws currently on the books and fight any new right-to-work efforts—including efforts to adopt right-to-work measures at the local level.” 

[21] Navigator Research. (2023, August 31). Most Americans see unions as a gateway to financial stability and job security [Report]. Navigator Research. “While ‘right to work’ laws are popular across party lines, ‘anti-union laws’ are deeply unpopular with Democrats (net -47 favorable), independents (net -35), and Republicans (net -16). Even among those favorable to labor unions, ‘right to work’ laws are viewed favorably (net +34), indicating that the term may be unfamiliar or confusing.” 

[22] Sensible Safeguards. (n.d.). Polling shows voters overwhelmingly support tougher regulation of big business. Sensible Safeguards. “Tougher regulatory enforcement enjoys overwhelming bipartisan support. Voters in both parties believe there should be increased enforcement of laws and regulations by astonishing margins (87 percent to 11 percent). Even after hearing arguments against it, three out of four voters still want tougher enforcement. Support for stronger Wall Street reform is massive. More than nine in 10 voters agree that it is important to regulate financial services and products to make sure they are fair for consumers. Four out of five voters say Big Banks on Wall Street should be held accountable with tougher rules and enforcement for the practices that caused the 2008 financial crisis. By a nearly three-to-one margin, voters want more, not less, oversight of financial companies.” 

[23] Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy. (n.d.). Amazon has record-breaking profits in 2020, avoids $2.3 billion in federal income taxes. ITEP. “Amazon’s winning streak in its battle against the U.S. tax system remains intact. This week the retail giant announced record-breaking sales and income for 2020, and an effective federal income tax rate of just 9.4 percent, less than half the statutory corporate tax of 21 percent. By any measure, Amazon’s growth in the pandemic year has been remarkable. Its worldwide pretax income for 2020 was $24 billion, up 73 percent from the $14 billion it enjoyed in the last pre-pandemic year. Its sales were up 38 percent over the prior year—during a pandemic. The company’s U.S. income in 2020 was $20 billion. If Amazon had paid 21 percent of its profits in federal income tax, that would have come to $4.1 billion. The company’s reported current tax of $1.8 billion was less than half that, meaning last year Amazon avoided $2.3 billion in taxes. Over the first three years of the Trump-GOP tax law, which dropped the statutory corporate tax rate to 21 percent, Amazon paid an effective federal income tax rate of just 4.3 percent on U.S. income. From 2018 through 2020, Amazon enjoyed tax subsidies of $7.2 billion. This is the difference between what the company would have paid if subject to the full 21 percent rate and what it actually paid. The mechanisms the company is using to drop its effective tax rate are mostly unchanged: the company saved $1.8 billion using tax breaks for stock options, and it saved $639 million using various tax credits.” 

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[24] Zaki, N. (2024). The Environmental Toll of Tax Dodging by the Ultra-Wealthy: What’s at Stake? “In Germany, middle-class families pay a higher effective tax rate (43%) than billionaires (26%), far below the national maximum tax rate (47.5%). This is because most of the money of the ultra-wealthy comes from investments, i.e. profits, dividends, and investment returns from their businesses, which are taxed less than salaries, from which most middle-class people derive their income.” 

[25] Zaki, N. (2024). The Environmental Toll of Tax Dodging by the Ultra-Wealthy: What’s at Stake? “Germany discontinued its wealth tax in 1997, but still taxes real property, which disproportionately affects the middle class, as these taxes fail to account for debt and primarily target immovable assets like real estate. This situation contributes to low homeownership rates and exacerbates wealth inequality, as wealthier households with diverse financial assets are less impacted.” 

[26] Zaki, N. (2024). The Environmental Toll of Tax Dodging by the Ultra-Wealthy: What’s at Stake? “Around 70% of billionaire wealth in Germany stems from inheritances and gifts rather than personal economic performance (Fratzscher, 2023), partly due to Germany’s regressive tax system, in which smaller inheritances (under EUR 500,000) face effective tax rates exceeding 10%, while inheritances over EUR 20 million are taxed at just 1.8% (OECD, 2020). Germany attempts to tax the ultra-wealthy’s income from wealth primarily through corporate equity, which constitutes the majority of their wealth, but the system remains regressive.” 

[27] Zaki, N. (2024). The Environmental Toll of Tax Dodging by the Ultra-Wealthy: What’s at Stake? “Billionaires often use holding companies to avoid paying personal income taxes on dividends and can indefinitely delay paying capital gains taxes by not selling shares. Ultra-wealthy individuals often find ways to move their profits to low-tax jurisdictions, which helps them pay less overall.” 

[28] Tax Justice Network. (2024). State of tax justice 2024. https://taxjustice.net/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/State-of-Tax-Justice-2024-English-Tax-Justice-Network.pdf “The UK and its network of tax havens is responsible for a third of global corporate tax abuse risks;” 

[29] ActionAid. (2011, October). Addicted to tax havens: The secret life of the FTSE 100. https://www.actionaid.org.uk/taxhavens. “Of the 100 biggest groups listed on the London Stock Exchange, 98 use tax havens. ActionAid’s research shows just how embedded the use of tax havens is in the structures of nearly all Britain’s biggest companies. The findings are of particular concern because many FTSE 100 groups are set to benefit from plans currently under consideration by the Treasury to give multinational companies using tax havens an £840 million tax break, by relaxing the very rules designed to prevent tax-haven abuse. An expanded tax revenue base in developing countries is the only sustainable source of funding for governments to invest in reducing poverty and inequality. It means that they don’t need to depend on aid and can achieve self-reliance. Yet, the OECD estimates that developing countries lose almost three times more to tax havens than all the aid they receive each year.” 

[30] TaxWatch UK. (n.d.). Seven large tech groups estimated to have dodged £2bn in UK tax in 2021. https://www.taxwatchuk.org/seven-large-tech-groups-estimated-to-have-dodged-2bn-in-uk-tax-in-2021/. “There are two branches of Luxembourg companies which register UK branches at Companies House but do not produce public returns for the branch (though a return will be made to HMRC). Amazon EU Sarl is the European retail business. The accounts for 2021 show income of €51bn but, after costs of raw materials and consumables at €37bn, include a deduction of €15bn described as ‘Other external expenses’. Further details explain that this includes the provision of services from affiliated undertakings, i.e. other companies in the international group. This deduction appears to tip the company into a loss of around €2bn before tax but there is no detail about what the services are or which countries the affiliated undertakings are registered in. This is an example of how it is impossible to understand where income and costs are allocated within the group and therefore to analyse whether this is appropriate. As a result of the overall loss in 2021 it is assumed that the UK branch did not pay any UK tax. Amazon Web Services EMEA Sarl is the other Luxembourg company. This did make profits and shows a total €36m tax paid. However, it has branches in all parts of Europe and the Middle East so it’s likely that any tax paid in the UK is only a small portion of this. No amounts have been included in the UK tax figure for these branches. There are also a large number of UK Amazon subsidiaries — many appear to be companies which they have recently bought. Applying a 19% tax rate to their total UK declared profits suggests a tax charge of £50.6m. Using our methodology we estimate around £308m in UK tax may have been avoided.” 

[31] Le Monde. (2025, May 20). Après la suppression de l’ISF, les revenus des 0,1 % les plus riches ont explosé en France. https://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2020/10/08/apres-la-suppression-de-l-isf-les-revenus-des-tres-aises-et-la-distribution-de-dividendes-ont-explose-en-france_6055276_823448.html. “Si ce deuxième rapport précise de nouveau qu’une évaluation complète des deux réformes reste impossible – il s’est appuyé principalement sur des données de l’année 2018 –, les informations qu’il fournit sont plus précises. Les dividendes distribués ont augmenté de plus de 60 % en 2018, passant de 14,3 milliards d’euros en 2017 à 23,2 milliards, « et la hausse se poursuit en 2019 », expliquent les auteurs de l’étude. De plus, « l’augmentation des dividendes est de plus en plus concentrée dans la population » : en 2018, 0,1 % des foyers fiscaux (38 000 personnes environ) ont perçu les deux tiers des montants totaux, alors qu’ils n’en recevaient que la moitié en 2017. Et les ultrariches (0,01 % des foyers fiscaux, 3 800 personnes environ) qui en captaient un cinquième, en ont reçu le tiers. Si l’on s’intéresse aux revenus, « les 0,1 % de Français les plus aisés sont un quart de fois plus riches que les 0,1 % de 2017 », souligne France Stratégie. Plusieurs éléments laissent clairement penser que la forte hausse des dividendes reçus par les ménages en 2018 est en partie causée par la réforme du PFU », insiste le rapport. Sur l’exil fiscal, que la réforme de 2018 cherchait à endiguer, le rapport livre des conclusions « prudentes » : certes, le nombre de départs hors de France des contribuables aisés a baissé dès 2017 et l’annonce des intentions du gouvernement, et le nombre de retours dans l’Hexagone a tendance à s’intensifier. Mais les comparaisons sont rendues délicates par le changement de périmètre (l’IFI a entre-temps remplacé l’ISF). Toute la question est de savoir ce que ces Français très aisés ont fait et feront de cet argent : l’épargner, le dépenser, l’investir dans l’économie ? Là encore, les données actuellement à la disposition du comité ne leur permettent pas de trancher. Mais ils ont, en parallèle, étudié une autre réforme de la fiscalité, plus ancienne et « inverse » : celle de 2013.” 

[32] Singh, A. (2022, October 10). A tale of two countries: A history of the Greek debt crisis. Berkeley Economic Review. https://economy.sws.studentorg.berkeley.edu/a-tale-of-two-countries-a-history-of-the-greek-debt-crisis/. “In Greece, the stabilization of debts would have required massive tax increases and spending cuts, measures for which there was no political will. A 2010 poll found that more than 75% of Greeks disapproved of pension and salary cuts, the backbone of any austerity program. With few palatable alternatives, Greece agreed to a series of debt rescheduling regimes, agreeing to slash its deficit and actually promising to run a surplus. The International Monetary Fund (IMF), European Council (EC), and European Central Bank (ECB) – a group the media labeled the Troika – had bailed out Greece, but imposed extremely strict austerity in return. These included cuts to the minimum wage, pensions, health spending, and an increase in the retirement age. The draconian move portended severe consequences for the rest of the Greek economy. Unemployment reached 12% in 2010; for young people, that number was 30%. Riots broke out in the streets of Athens, and clashes between the police and protestors were commonplace. For the Greek government, however, it seemed as if no other option was available: as a result of their debt burden, interest rates on their bonds had become so high that they prevented the Greeks from accessing financial markets. When Greece inevitably could not deliver on the Germans’ harsh terms, a series of debt write-downs followed in 2012. The situation seemed so bad that many put forth the possibility of Grexit: a Greek departure from the European Union.” 

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[37] Olivera, O., & Lewis, T. (2004). ¡Cochabamba! Water War in Bolivia. South End Press. “Once Aguas del Tanai began operation it took advantage of its exclusive rights to water distribution under Law 2029 and announced the confiscation of all existing water networks. Curiously, something else began to happen-at least according to the water company. People were suddenly consuming more water. That is what the water bills said. But everyone knew they were using the same amount as always. Many people still only had access to water for about two hours a day. But there were bills that said water usage increased from 5 cubic meters to 20 cubic meters Per person in one month. It simply was not possible. Hence, not only did the price per cubic meter go up, but also the supposed use. Aguas del Tunari never sufficiendy explained the increases. In some cases people's water bills skyrocketed as much as 300 percent. A pensioner, or a teacher who made $80 a month, might see his or her bill jump from $5 to $25 a month. It was very hard for people because they did not have the monev.” (p. 10-11) 

[38] Olivera, O., & Lewis, T. (2004). ¡Cochabamba! Water War in Bolivia. South End Press. “Beyond an inability to pay, we Cochabambinos vehemendy opposed Law 2029 because, as I said, we believe that water is a natural gift and that its distribution should be considered a public service instead of a business. Water distribution should take into account the needs of the population. It should be designed not from the point of view of mercantile logic and the pursuit of profit, but rather from a perspective that cleady subordinates the business aspects-investment criteria, expansion plans, and rates-to the common interest. We believe that it is crucial to preserve the social character and the accrued rights of the local water committees, the city's neighborhood cooperatives, and the rural communities. The monopolistic character of the distribution of water as enshrined in Law 2029 cannot adequatelv serve the public's needs. Indexing water rates to the dollar, moreover, has no other purpose than to insure maximum profitabiliq, for transnational corporations at the expense of ordinary working people.” (p. 10-11) 

[39] Olivera, O., & Lewis, T. (2004). ¡Cochabamba! Water War in Bolivia. South End Press. “What became known as the 'Last Battle' took place over the course of eight days, during which blockades cut off the main highway and masses of protesters occupied the citv center. On the final day, we would mobilize one hundred thousand people and would win the expulsion of Aguas del Tunai. We would also win a drastic modification of Law 2029 based on a proposal put forth by, the Coordinadora.” (p. 37) 

[40] Olivera, O., & Lewis, T. (2004). ¡Cochabamba! Water War in Bolivia. South End Press. “An army sniper killed seventeen-year-old Victor Hugo Daza u,hen he was walking home from work. Daza was not even part of the batde; he had iust stopped to see what was happening. Daza's assassin, Captain Robinson Iriarte, who graduated from the US School of the Americas, the training center for state terrorists in Ft. Benning, Georgia, was later acquitted of any wrongdoing by a militarv court and reinstated in his post.” (p. 41-42) 

[41] Olivera, O., & Lewis, T. (2004). ¡Cochabamba! Water War in Bolivia. South End Press. “The Information Minister Ronald Mclean, who now works for the World Bank, claimed that the mobilization was being financed by drug trafficking. I remember a tiny nun-a Dominican nun-who replied to this charge by saying that she was 'standing on the blockade in Arocagua, and I'm not a drug dealer!'” (p. 41-42) 

[42] Olivera, O., & Lewis, T. (2004). ¡Cochabamba! Water War in Bolivia. South End Press. “When those inside saw me enter they were horrified. You can imagine the way I looked! And when the compaieros saw how scared those in the meeting became, they became frightened, too. Thatt when the archbishop, who had tears in his eyes, informed us that various conversations with the prefect had led to the decision to break the government's contrac t with Aguas del Tunari.” (p. 41-42) 

[43] Estevez, D. (2013, June 26). Most Mexicans oppose President Peña Nieto's plans to open up Pemex to private investment. Forbes. “But Mexicans are less than ready to support Peña Nieto’s most ambitious and controversial reform to date. A new poll by the Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas (CIDE), a research institute, shows that 65 out of every 100 Mexicans are against opening up Pemex, the world’s seventh-largest oil producer with annual sales of more than $100 billion. 'Energy, particularly oil, continues to be the stronghold of Mexican nationalism,' said CIDE.” 

[44] Estevez, D. (2013, June 26). Most Mexicans oppose President Peña Nieto's plans to open up Pemex to private investment. Forbes. “Foreign oil companies were expropriated by Mexican President Lazaro Cárdenas in 1938, and ever since Mexico’s vast oil resources -- 13.9 billion barrels of crude-oil and possibly the world's fourth-largest shale-gas reserves-- became forbidden to outsiders. Wall Street Journal said the announcement highlights a 'willingness to break with the past among young, reformist members' of the PRI, Peña Nieto’s party. Exxon Mobil and Royal Dutch Shell are reported to be ready to return to Mexico, if Congress passes the measure. Both were among the group of American and British companies expropriated 75 years ago.” 

[45] Lang, V. (2021). The economics of the democratic deficit: The effect of IMF programs on inequality. The Review of International Organizations, 16(3), 599–623. “According to the results presented in this article, IMF programs increase income inequality within countries. The effect is largest 3 years after a program year and observable for about 5 years. An analysis of decile-specific income data shows that the effect is due to decreasing absolute incomes for the poor, while, on average, there are no significant income gains for any income decile. An analysis of IMF conditionality suggests that IMF-mandated austerity measures and labor-market reforms are among the channels.” (p. 618-619) 

[46] The Nation. (2025, May 9). The post-future has arrived in Argentina—and it looks remarkably like the past. “Just seven years earlier, during Trump’s first term, then–Argentine President Mauricio Macri secured a $57 billion loan from the IMF—the largest in the institution’s history. At the time, the Fund reasoned that this massive infusion of capital would stabilize the Argentine economy and lay the groundwork for foreign investment. Instead, the country’s GDP shrank 2.6 percent in 2018 and 2 percent in 2019 as the center-right administration implemented a series of IMF-directed austerity measures.” 

[47] CADTM. (n.d.). Argentina: Examples and alternatives for understanding the debt crisis. “The historic agreement signed by the IMF with Argentina in 2018—and the dose of austerity that went with it—has had very concrete consequences for the working classes, specifically for women. Here are just a few examples: Layoffs of civil servants; Withdrawal of pensions for women who had worked at home all their lives (at the de-mand of the IMF); Public budget cuts; Multiplication of soup kitchens; Increase in the poverty rate from 27% to 40% during Mauricio Macri’s term of office.” 

[48] Center for Legal and Social Studies. (2024, October). The impact of foreign debt and harsh austerity on Argentina's social protection system. Global Coalition for Social Protection Floors. “In 2018, Argentina signed a Stand-By agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), a type of short-term financial assistance typically provided to countries facing a financial crisis. The IMF committed to lending Argentina US$57 billion. Of these, US$44.5 billion were actually transferred. The rest of the funds were rejected by the Argentine State after the change of government in December 2019. The money received is equivalent to about 10% of Argentina’s GDP and 1000% of its quota in the IMF. It is the largest loan granted to a country in the history of the organization.” (p. 1) 

[49] Mesquita, A. D. (2025, May 20). The case for pension reform in Brazil: An unequal and exhausted retirement system on the verge of collapse. Wilson Center. “In Brazil, only a constitutional amendment can modify pension laws because the right to retirement benefits is engraved in the 1988 Constitution. The system, devised during the transitional period from dictatorship to democracy, functions as a pay-as-you-go model: the current working population pays a tax which is transferred to recipients as pension payments. If expenditures were equal to or less than revenues from this tax, then the accounts would be balanced. In 2017, however, the government accumulated a deficit of more than R$200 billion (US$61.3 billion) in order to meet its pension obligations.” 

[50] Mesquita, A. D. (2025, May 20). The case for pension reform in Brazil: An unequal and exhausted retirement system on the verge of collapse. Wilson Center. “Public opinion on pension reform has evolved over the past year. In April of 2017, Datafolha found that 71 percent of respondents rejected pension reform. Nine months later, in January 2018, a new poll commissioned by the government and conducted by IBOPE found that only 44 percent of the population rejected pension reform. The change demonstrates a growing awareness of the problems caused by the current system, but acceptance of the recent legislation proposed by President Michel Temer and Speaker of the House Rodrigo Maia remains low: 57 percent of the population does not agree with the proposed bill.” 

[51] González, J. (2019, October 29). Chile's protests, explained: Why the country is erupting over a 4-cent subway fare hike. Vox. “At least, that’s the case in Chile, where a 4 percent fare hike raising the price of a ride on the capital’s metro system by 30 pesos, or about $0.04, ignited mass protests on October 18 that have yet to subside. That day, students in Santiago called for widespread fare evasion on social media using the hashtag EvasionMasiva. The turnstile-hopping rapidly devolved into larger demonstrations and chaos, with looting in supermarkets, rioting in the streets, and the torching of 22 metro stations.” 

[52] González, J. (2019, October 29). Chile's protests, explained: Why the country is erupting over a 4-cent subway fare hike. Vox. “Soon after midnight, Chile’s center-right president, Sebastián Piñera, called for a state of emergency, sending military out onto the streets and installing a curfew in cities across the nation for the first time since the end of the brutal dictatorship of the 1970s and ’80s. Since then, escalating protests have left 19 dead, according to figures from the Ministry of Interior and Public Security. Efforts by the government to quell the unrest — including shuffling the president’s cabinet — have failed spectacularly. Demonstrations have grown in size to encompass a raft of issues from dismal pensions to poor public services.” 

[53] González, J. (2019, October 29). Chile's protests, explained: Why the country is erupting over a 4-cent subway fare hike. Vox. “A recent study by Santiago-based think tank Fundación SOL shows that 50 percent of Chilean workers earn less than 400,000 pesos per month (roughly $550), making a small change to public transportation costs a plausible breaking point. Meanwhile, a UN report from 2017 found that the richest 1 percent of the population earns 33 percent of the nation’s wealth, making Chile the most unequal member of the OECD (an intergovernmental economic organization of largely developed nations).” 

[54] González, J. (2019, October 29). Chile's protests, explained: Why the country is erupting over a 4-cent subway fare hike. Vox. “More than 100,000 protesters joined a symbolic march Sunday along the coast from the beachfront city of Viña del Mar to the Congress building in neighboring Valparaiso.” 

[55] Schipani, A. (2022, July 7). Chile's constitutional rewrite: A difficult path ahead is a recipe for inclusion. Council on Foreign Relations. “Constitutional reform has long been a rallying cry for Chilean politicians to the left of center, serving as a core promise in Michelle Bachelet’s 2013 presidential campaign. However, the current reform effort first began with demonstrations in October 2019 against a $0.04 metro fare hike, soon escalating into a mass social movement, which at times became violent, that targeted the Chilean constitution as the source of deep-rooted social and economic disparities.” 

[56] Schipani, A. (2022, July 7). Chile's constitutional rewrite: A difficult path ahead is a recipe for inclusion. Council on Foreign Relations. “The movement’s first major victory arrived only a month after the outbreak of protests when President Sebastián Piñera agreed to schedule a referendum on whether to rewrite the nation’s constitution, a proposition that received 78% approval in an October 2020 plebiscite. In accordance with these results, popular hopes for a democratic rewrite of the country’s foundational document will be in the hands of the Constitutional Assembly, a 155-member body mandated to have equal gender representation and 17 seats reserved for representatives of indigenous groups. Once elected, the Assembly will have nine months to draft a new constitution—with the option of a one-time three-month extension. The draft constitution must be approved by two thirds of members and then proposed to the public in another referendum.” 

[57] Politi, D. (2022, September 5). Chile rejects new constitution in referendum. Time. “The proposed draft—a result of more than a year of negotiations and drafting by 154 elected delegates—was intended to scrap a constitution many saw as a roadblock to reform the political and economic systems put in place by Pinochet. But critics argued that the draft document—comprising 388 articles—went too far, enshrining a long list of unworkable rights and equalities in law that would scare off investors and lead to chaos.” 

[58] Politi, D. (2022, September 5). Chile rejects new constitution in referendum. Time. “These included rights to free speech, abortion, clean air and water, a publicly-funded national health service, and equitable political and professional representation for minorities. These protections were backed by many voters, says Gabriel Negretto, a politics professor at Pontifical Catholic University of Chile (PUC). 'Chileans have long criticized the lack of access to housing, good healthcare, education, and pensions,' he says. 'That has been a constant for many years, and the social explosion of 2019 simply made it visible.'” 

[59] Politi, D. (2022, September 5). Chile rejects new constitution in referendum. Time. “The misconduct of some of the elected delegates, misinformation, and deliberate attempts by right-leaning delegates to delay proceedings also undermined public trust in the process.” 

[60] González, J. (2019, October 29). Chile's protests, explained: Why the country is erupting over a 4-cent subway fare hike. Vox. “But a shared theme among the protesters I spoke to is the restoration of social rights and a systematic change to address rising costs of living and stagnant wages. 'This protest is not about 30 pesos, but 30 years,' says Stephanie Díaz, a 28-year-old sports teacher from the working-class Quinta Normal neighborhood in Santiago. 'It’s 30 years since the return to democracy, but we have preserved a constitution made under the dictatorship.' Chile’s constitution, which was written into law during the military rule of Augusto Pinochet in 1980, calls for a highly privatized economy. Even water is a privately traded commodity.”

[61] Mesquita, A. D. (2025, May 20). The case for pension reform in Brazil: An unequal and exhausted retirement system on the verge of collapse. Wilson Center. “Public opinion on pension reform has evolved over the past year. In April of 2017, Datafolha found that 71 percent of respondents rejected pension reform. Nine months later, in January 2018, a new poll commissioned by the government and conducted by IBOPE found that only 44 percent of the population rejected pension reform. The change demonstrates a growing awareness of the problems caused by the current system, but acceptance of the recent legislation proposed by President Michel Temer and Speaker of the House Rodrigo Maia remains low: 57 percent of the population does not agree with the proposed bill.” 

[62] González, J. (2019, October 29). Chile's protests, explained: Why the country is erupting over a 4-cent subway fare hike. Vox. “At least, that’s the case in Chile, where a 4 percent fare hike raising the price of a ride on the capital’s metro system by 30 pesos, or about $0.04, ignited mass protests on October 18 that have yet to subside. That day, students in Santiago called for widespread fare evasion on social media using the hashtag #EvasionMasiva. The turnstile-hopping rapidly devolved into larger demonstrations and chaos, with looting in supermarkets, rioting in the streets, and the torching of 22 metro stations.” 

[63] González, J. (2019, October 29). Chile's protests, explained: Why the country is erupting over a 4-cent subway fare hike. Vox. “Soon after midnight, Chile’s center-right president, Sebastián Piñera, called for a state of emergency, sending military out onto the streets and installing a curfew in cities across the nation for the first time since the end of the brutal dictatorship of the 1970s and ’80s. Since then, escalating protests have left 19 dead, according to figures from the Ministry of Interior and Public Security. Efforts by the government to quell the unrest — including shuffling the president’s cabinet — have failed spectacularly. Demonstrations have grown in size to encompass a raft of issues from dismal pensions to poor public services.” 

[64] González, J. (2019, October 29). Chile's protests, explained: Why the country is erupting over a 4-cent subway fare hike. Vox. “A recent study by Santiago-based think tank Fundación SOL shows that 50 percent of Chilean workers earn less than 400,000 pesos per month (roughly $550), making a small change to public transportation costs a plausible breaking point. Meanwhile, a UN report from 2017 found that the richest 1 percent of the population earns 33 percent of the nation’s wealth, making Chile the most unequal member of the OECD (an intergovernmental economic organization of largely developed nations).” 

[65] González, J. (2019, October 29). Chile's protests, explained: Why the country is erupting over a 4-cent subway fare hike. Vox. “More than 100,000 protesters joined a symbolic march Sunday along the coast from the beachfront city of Viña del Mar to the Congress building in neighboring Valparaiso.” 

[66] Schipani, A. (2022, July 7). Chile's constitutional rewrite: A difficult path ahead is a recipe for inclusion. Council on Foreign Relations. “Constitutional reform has long been a rallying cry for Chilean politicians to the left of center, serving as a core promise in Michelle Bachelet’s 2013 presidential campaign. However, the current reform effort first began with demonstrations in October 2019 against a $0.04 metro fare hike, soon escalating into a mass social movement, which at times became violent, that targeted the Chilean constitution as the source of deep-rooted social and economic disparities.” 

[67] Schipani, A. (2022, July 7). Chile's constitutional rewrite: A difficult path ahead is a recipe for inclusion. Council on Foreign Relations. “The movement’s first major victory arrived only a month after the outbreak of protests when President Sebastián Piñera agreed to schedule a referendum on whether to rewrite the nation’s constitution, a proposition that received 78% approval in an October 2020 plebiscite. In accordance with these results, popular hopes for a democratic rewrite of the country’s foundational document will be in the hands of the Constitutional Assembly, a 155-member body mandated to have equal gender representation and 17 seats reserved for representatives of indigenous groups. Once elected, the Assembly will have nine months to draft a new constitution—with the option of a one-time three-month extension. The draft constitution must be approved by two thirds of members and then proposed to the public in another referendum.” 

[68] Politi, D. (2022, September 5). Chile rejects new constitution in referendum. Time. “The proposed draft—a result of more than a year of negotiations and drafting by 154 elected delegates—was intended to scrap a constitution many saw as a roadblock to reform the political and economic systems put in place by Pinochet. But critics argued that the draft document—comprising 388 articles—went too far, enshrining a long list of unworkable rights and equalities in law that would scare off investors and lead to chaos.” 

[69] Politi, D. (2022, September 5). Chile rejects new constitution in referendum. Time. “These included rights to free speech, abortion, clean air and water, a publicly-funded national health service, and equitable political and professional representation for minorities. These protections were backed by many voters, says Gabriel Negretto, a politics professor at Pontifical Catholic University of Chile (PUC). ‘Chileans have long criticized the lack of access to housing, good healthcare, education, and pensions,’ he says. ‘That has been a constant for many years, and the social explosion of 2019 simply made it visible.’” 

[70] Politi, D. (2022, September 5). Chile rejects new constitution in referendum. Time. “The misconduct of some of the elected delegates, misinformation, and deliberate attempts by right-leaning delegates to delay proceedings also undermined public trust in the process.”

[71] González, J. (2019, October 29). Chile's protests, explained: Why the country is erupting over a 4-cent subway fare hike. Vox. https://www.vox.com/world/2019/10/29/20938402/santiago-chile-protests-2019-riots-metro-fare-pinera 

“More than 100,000 protesters joined a symbolic march Sunday along the coast from the beachfront city of Viña del Mar to the neighboring Congress building in Valparaiso.” 

[72] Schipani, A. (2022, July 7). Chile's constitutional rewrite: A difficult path ahead is a recipe for inclusion. Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/blog/chiles-constitutional-rewrite-difficult-path-ahead-recipe-inclusion 

“The movement’s first major victory arrived only a month after the outbreak of protests when President Sebastián Piñera agreed to schedule a referendum on whether to rewrite the nation’s constitution, a proposition that received 78% approval in an October 2020 plebiscite. In accordance with these results, popular hopes for a democratic rewrite of the country’s foundational document will be in the hands of the Constitutional Assembly, a 155-member body mandated to have equal gender representation and 17 seats reserved for representatives of indigenous groups.” 

[73] Politi, D. (2022, September 5). Chile rejects new constitution in referendum. Time. https://time.com/6210924/chile-rejects-new-constitution-referendum/ 

“These included rights to free speech, abortion, clean air and water, a publicly-funded national health service, and equitable political and professional representation for minorities.” 

[74] Politi, D. (2022, September 5). Chile rejects new constitution in referendum. Time. https://time.com/6210924/chile-rejects-new-constitution-referendum/ 

“These protections were backed by many voters, says Gabriel Negretto, a politics professor at Pontifical Catholic University of Chile (PUC). ‘Chileans have long criticized the lack of access to housing, good healthcare, education, and pensions,’ he says. ‘That has been a constant for many years, and the social explosion of 2019 simply made it visible.’” 

[75] Politi, D. (2022, September 5). Chile rejects new constitution in referendum. Time. https://time.com/6210924/chile-rejects-new-constitution-referendum/ 

“The misconduct of some of the elected delegates, misinformation, and deliberate attempts by right-leaning delegates to delay proceedings also undermined public trust in the process.” 

[76] Politi, D. (2022, September 5). Chile rejects new constitution in referendum. Time. https://time.com/6210924/chile-rejects-new-constitution-referendum/ 

“The proposed draft—a result of more than a year of negotiations and drafting by 154 elected delegates—was intended to scrap a constitution many saw as a roadblock to reform the political and economic systems put in place by Pinochet. But critics argued that the draft document—comprising 388 articles—went too far, enshrining a long list of unworkable rights and equalities in law that would scare off investors and lead to chaos.” 

[77] Politi, D. (2022, September 5). Chile rejects new constitution in referendum. Time. https://time.com/6210924/chile-rejects-new-constitution-referendum/ 

“As one delegate argued, it sought to prioritize ‘the needs of the population, not mercantile logic.’” 

[78] González, J. (2019, October 29). Chile's protests, explained: Why the country is erupting over a 4-cent subway fare hike. Vox. https://www.vox.com/world/2019/10/29/20938402/santiago-chile-protests-2019-riots-metro-fare-pinera 

“‘This protest is not about 30 pesos, but 30 years,’ says Stephanie Díaz, a 28-year-old sports teacher from the working-class Quinta Normal neighborhood in Santiago.”

IN-PK | NR-CG

[79] Oxfam International. (2023, January 16). India's richest 1% own more than 40% of total wealth: Oxfam. The Economic Times. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/india/indias-richest-1-own-more-than-40-of-total-wealth-oxfam/articleshow/97016329.cms. “The richest one per cent in India now own more than 40 per cent of the country's total wealth, while the bottom half of the population together share just 3 per cent of wealth, a new study showed on Monday.” 

[80] Oxfam International. (2023, January 16). India's richest 1% own more than 40% of total wealth: Oxfam. The Economic Times. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/india/indias-richest-1-own-more-than-40-of-total-wealth-oxfam/articleshow/97016329.cms. “Releasing the India supplement of its annual inequality report on the first day of the World Economic Forum Annual Meeting here, rights group Oxfam International said that taxing India's ten-richest at 5 per cent can fetch entire money to bring children back to school.” 

[81] Oxfam International. (2023, January 16). India's richest 1% own more than 40% of total wealth: Oxfam. The Economic Times. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/india/indias-richest-1-own-more-than-40-of-total-wealth-oxfam/articleshow/97016329.cms. “A one-off tax on unrealized gains from 2017-2021 on just one billionaire, Gautam Adani, could have raised Rs 1.79 lakh crore, enough to employ more than five million Indian primary school teachers for a year.” 

[82] Ellis-Petersen, H. (2025, May 21). Indian PM Narendra Modi to repeal farm laws after year of protests. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/may/21/indian-pm-narendra-modi-to-repeal-farm-laws-after-year-of-protests. “Modi had passed the three farm laws in 2020 in an attempt to overhaul India’s archaic agriculture sector by rolling back farm subsidies and price regulation on crops. The agriculture sector still employs about 60% of India’s workforce, but is riddled with issues of poverty, debt and inefficiency.” 

[83] Ellis-Petersen, H. (2025, May 21). Indian PM Narendra Modi to repeal farm laws after year of protests. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/may/21/indian-pm-narendra-modi-to-repeal-farm-laws-after-year-of-protests. “After the government refused to repeal the laws last year, hundreds of thousands of farmers marched to Delhi’s borders, met on the way with barricades, teargas and water cannon, and set up protest camps along the main highways into the capital.” 

[84] Ellis-Petersen, H. (2025, May 21). Indian PM Narendra Modi to repeal farm laws after year of protests. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/may/21/indian-pm-narendra-modi-to-repeal-farm-laws-after-year-of-protests. “Tens of thousands of farmers have remained at the several camps around Delhi borders ever since, maintaining one of the most sustained challenges to the Modi government, even through the harsh winters, baking summers and the brutal second wave of Covid-19.” 

[85] Ellis-Petersen, H. (2025, May 21). Indian PM Narendra Modi to repeal farm laws after year of protests. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/may/21/indian-pm-narendra-modi-to-repeal-farm-laws-after-year-of-protests. “The protests turned violent in February when the farmers stormed into the centre of Delhi and briefly took over the historic Red Fort in the old city centre.” 

[86] Ellis-Petersen, H. (2025, May 21). Indian PM Narendra Modi to repeal farm laws after year of protests. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/may/21/indian-pm-narendra-modi-to-repeal-farm-laws-after-year-of-protests. “They found support in huge swathes of India, as well as internationally, with figures including Rihanna and Greta Thunberg speaking out in support of their actions, much to the chagrin of the government.” 

[87] Ellis-Petersen, H. (2025, May 21). Indian PM Narendra Modi to repeal farm laws after year of protests. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/may/21/indian-pm-narendra-modi-to-repeal-farm-laws-after-year-of-protests. “Narendra Modi has announced he will repeal three contentious farm laws that prompted a year of protests and unrest in India, in one of the most significant concessions made by his government.” 

[88] Oxfam International. (2023, January 16). India's richest 1% own more than 40% of total wealth: Oxfam. The Economic Times. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/india/indias-richest-1-own-more-than-40-of-total-wealth-oxfam/articleshow/97016329.cms. “The report titled 'Survival of the Richest' further said that if India's billionaires are taxed once at 2 per cent on their entire wealth, it would support the requirement of Rs 40,423 crore for the nutrition of malnourished in the country for the next three years.” 

[89] Council on Foreign Relations. (2023, June 22). What's at stake in Pakistan's power crisis? https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/whats-stake-pakistans-power-crisis. “A wave of darkness engulfed Pakistan on January 24 as its aging power grid strained to meet the country's demand for electricity. The massive outage was the latest in a series of blackouts that have become a chronic symptom of Pakistan’s ailing and climate-vulnerable economy, under duress from devastating natural disasters, a colossal debt load, and the mounting risk of sovereign default.” 

[90] Council on Foreign Relations. (2023, June 22). What's at stake in Pakistan's power crisis? https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/whats-stake-pakistans-power-crisis. “With Islamabad rushing to negotiate a bailout from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), experts fear the response will not be enough to avoid a crisis.” 

[91] Council on Foreign Relations. (2023, June 22). What's at stake in Pakistan's power crisis? https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/whats-stake-pakistans-power-crisis. “Pakistan’s electricity woes have added to the country’s precarious financial dilemma, with the blackout inflicting an estimated $70 million loss to the country’s textile industry, its largest export sector by a wide margin.” 

[92] Council on Foreign Relations. (2023, June 22). What's at stake in Pakistan's power crisis? https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/whats-stake-pakistans-power-crisis. “A series of compounding factors have shaken Pakistan’s economy: double-digit inflation has made everyday goods such as food and fuel more expensive, and interest rate hikes by the U.S. Federal Reserve and other central banks have resulted in rapid devaluation of Pakistan’s currency, the rupee. Meanwhile, an estimated $40 billion in damage caused by last year’s catastrophic flooding, a budget deficit worsened by large government subsidies, and an unforgiving debt load have brought the country to the precipice of default.” 

[93] Council on Foreign Relations. (2023, June 22). What's at stake in Pakistan's power crisis? https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/whats-stake-pakistans-power-crisis. “Extended power outages could also affect Pakistan’s agriculture industry and force the country to import more food, a troubling prospect given that the prices of staples such as grain and vegetable oil have soared in the past year.” 

[94] Council on Foreign Relations. (2023, June 22). What's at stake in Pakistan's power crisis? https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/whats-stake-pakistans-power-crisis. “But even Khan has now said the country has ‘no choice’ but to negotiate with the IMF. To stay afloat, Pakistan has drained its foreign reserves: as of early February, the country’s remaining $3.7 billion in central bank reserves were enough for only three weeks of imports.” 

[95] NCESC. (n.d.). What percentage of Nigerians are poor? Retrieved May 21, 2025, from https://www.ncesc.com/geographic-faq/what-percentage-of-nigerians-are-poor/. “According to the data provided, 63% of persons living within Nigeria, which amounts to 133 million people, are multidimensionally poor. This means that they experience deprivations in multiple aspects of their lives.” 

[96] Energy News Africa. (2024, November 13). Nigeria fuel subsidy reforms. https://energynews.africa/2024/11/13/nigeria-fuel-subsidy-reforms/. “Nigeria’s gasoline subsidies were originally instituted to render fuel accessible and assist low-income households, functioning as a safeguard against fluctuating fuel costs. The Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) administers subsidies that incur an annual expense of around $4.5 billion for the government, as reported by the International Monetary Fund.” 

[97] Energy News Africa. (2024, November 13). Nigeria fuel subsidy reforms. https://energynews.africa/2024/11/13/nigeria-fuel-subsidy-reforms/. “In response, labour unions and civil society organizations orchestrated protests, asserting that the removal disproportionately impacts low-income households, which experience the price increases most severely. Urban inhabitants, dependent on transportation, and rural populations, confronting elevated expenses for necessary goods, have both experienced significant hardships.” 

[98] NCESC. (n.d.). What percentage of Nigerians are poor? Retrieved May 21, 2025, from https://www.ncesc.com/geographic-faq/what-percentage-of-nigerians-are-poor/. “It is also worth noting that 65% of the poor, which comes to approximately 86 million people, live in the North region of Nigeria, while the remaining 35% (around 47 million) reside in the South.” 

[99] NCESC. (n.d.). What percentage of Nigerians are poor? Retrieved May 21, 2025, from https://www.ncesc.com/geographic-faq/what-percentage-of-nigerians-are-poor/. “The article does not provide specific data on the percentage of Nigerians who are considered rich. However, it mentions that the richest 0.003% of Nigerians have 1.4 times more wealth than 107 million other Nigerians. It also states that three of the richest men in the country are wealthier than 83 million Nigerians.” 

[100] Associated Press. (2025, May 21). Congo communities forcibly uprooted to make way for mines critical to EVs, Amnesty report says. AP News. https://apnews.com/article/congo-mining-human-rights-73b3edcc2d485d07281db34dc3dcea22c. “The report released Tuesday by Amnesty International and the Congo-based Initiative for Good Governance and Human Rights, or IBGDH, details how the search for the minerals has forcibly uprooted people from their homes and farmland, often without compensation or adequate resettlement.” 

[101] Associated Press. (2025, May 21). Commodities giant Glencore is ordered to pay over $150M in wake of Congo mining bribery case. AP News. https://apnews.com/article/switzerland-glencore-bribery-mining-congo-e62dc7d6f3e9d8abe8f655f85c156abc. “Federal prosecutors in Switzerland said Monday they have found Glencore’s international unit ‘criminally liable’ and ordered the commodities giant to pay over $150 million in fines and compensation after ending a probe of bribery in connection with Congo’s mining industry over a decade ago.” 

[102] Wilkes, T. R. (2023, November 16). Top companies' lobbying undermines their climate pledges, study finds. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/business/environment/top-companies-lobbying-undermines-their-climate-pledges-study-finds-2023-11-16/. “Glencore (GLEN.L), ExxonMobil (XOM.N) and Stellantis (STLAM.MI) are among companies lobbying for policies that conflict with their own pledges to cut carbon emissions, a study published by non-profit think tank InfluenceMap on Thursday found.” 

[103] Wilkes, T. R. (2023, November 16). Top companies' lobbying undermines their climate pledges, study finds. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/business/environment/top-companies-lobbying-undermines-their-climate-pledges-study-finds-2023-11-16/. “Glencore, InfluenceMap said, opposed the introduction of an ongoing climate policy in the European Union and the proposed design of Australia’s Safeguard Mechanism Reform.”

Additional sources

[104] ACLU News. (2017). Police at Standing Rock are using life-threatening crowd-control weapons to crack down on water protectors. Retrieved June 4, 2025, from https://www.aclu.org/news/racial-justice/police-standing-rock-are-using-life-threatening-crowd 

"Indigenous Environmental Network, Angela Bibens describes the devastating effects of tear gas, rubber bullets, concussion grenades, mace, and water cannons used on 400 peaceful protestors in North Dakota by local police in the last 48 hours." 

[105] ACLU News. (2017). Police at Standing Rock are using life-threatening crowd-control weapons to crack down on water protectors. Retrieved June 4, 2025, from https://www.aclu.org/news/racial-justice/police-standing-rock-are-using-life-threatening-crowd 

"A reported 300 people have been injured, 26 hospitalized, and several arrested." 

[106] ACLU News. (2017). Police at Standing Rock are using life-threatening crowd-control weapons to crack down on water protectors. Retrieved June 4, 2025, from https://www.aclu.org/news/racial-justice/police-standing-rock-are-using-life-threatening-crowd 

“The Morton County Sheriff's Department tried to justify their use of force by calling the protestors ”very aggressive” and framing their demonstration as an “ongoing riot,” while simultaneously denying their use of certain less-lethal weapons entirely. In a press conference, Sheriff Kyle Kirchmeier told reporters, ‘We don’t have a water cannon. I don’t know where the term water cannon comes from. This was basically just a fire hose.’” 

[107] Dakota Access Pipeline Facts. (n.d.). Addressing misconceptions about the Dakota Access Pipeline. Retrieved June 4, 2025, from https://daplpipelinefacts.com/thefacts.html 

“The Dakota Access Pipeline (DAPL) is a 1,172-mile underground crude oil pipeline beginning in Bakken oil fields of western North Dakota, then travels southeast through South Dakota and Iowa to an oil terminal near Patoka, Illinois. [...] The 30-inch diameter pipeline is capable of transporting up to 570,000 barrels of crude oil per day.” 

[108] Dakota Access Pipeline Facts. (n.d.). Addressing misconceptions about the Dakota Access Pipeline. Retrieved June 4, 2025, from https://daplpipelinefacts.com/thefacts.html 

“The Dakota Access Pipeline helped increase production in the Bakken by lowering transportation costs for producers, and providing a safer means of transportation over truck or rail. State officials have estimated the pipeline added $3.00 to $5.00 to the value of North Dakota crude, improving profits for producers, netting millions more for royalty owners and generating hundreds of millions in additional tax revenue for the state and local political subdivisions.” 

[109] Mejía, M. (n.d.). The Dakota Access Pipeline. The Indigenous Foundation. Retrieved June 4, 2025, from https://www.theindigenousfoundation.org/articles/the-dakota-access-pipeline 

“Additionally, the construction of the pipeline destroyed places that hold cultural significance to the tribe’s heritage including ancestral burial sites.” 

[110] Mejía, M. (n.d.). The Dakota Access Pipeline. The Indigenous Foundation. Retrieved June 4, 2025, from https://www.theindigenousfoundation.org/articles/the-dakota-access-pipeline 

“The construction of the pipeline took place on land reserved for the Lakota/Dakota peoples through the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1851. The treaty granted millions of acres of land to be reserved for the Great Sioux Reservation and to be used by the Lakota/Dakota peoples forever.” 

[111] Chilakamarri, V. (2025, May 29). Course correction: Supreme Court steers toward greater predictability in NEPA reviews. The National Law Review. Retrieved June 4, 2025, from https://natlawreview.com/article/course-correction-supreme-court-steers-toward-greater-predictability-nepa-reviews 

“The Court stressed that the ‘ultimate question’ under NEPA is not whether an EIS is inadequate in and of itself, but whether the agency’s final decision is ‘reasonable and reasonably explained.’ Because an EIS is only one component of that analysis, a deficient EIS will not automatically require vacatur of the project’s approval.” 

[112] Chilakamarri, V. (2025, May 29). Course correction: Supreme Court steers toward greater predictability in NEPA reviews. The National Law Review. Retrieved June 4, 2025, from https://natlawreview.com/article/course-correction-supreme-court-steers-toward-greater-predictability-nepa-reviews 

“The Court has now joined the chorus of criticisms directed at interminable NEPA reviews, with all three branches of government in alignment that the old mode of NEPA must go. [...] Given these shifts, the rigor of judicial scrutiny of such EISs may need to be adjusted.” 

[113] Geman, B. (2025, May 30). Three takeaways from the Supreme Court's big NEPA ruling. Axios. Retrieved June 4, 2025, from https://www.axios.com/2025/05/30/supreme-court-nepa-ruling 

“Why it matters: Narrowing the National Environmental Policy Act's scope has giant implications for President Trump's pro-fossil ‘energy dominance’ agenda.” 

[114] Geman, B. (2025, May 30). Three takeaways from the Supreme Court's big NEPA ruling. Axios. Retrieved June 4, 2025, from https://www.axios.com/2025/05/30/supreme-court-nepa-ruling 

“The case centered on federal approval of an 88-mile railway to carry oil from Utah's Uinta basin to larger rail networks and Gulf Coast refineries. It reverses an appellate ruling that regulators needed to weigh matters beyond the railway's direct effects, such as drilling impacts, refining pollution and climate change.” 

[115] Geman, B. (2025, May 30). Three takeaways from the Supreme Court's big NEPA ruling. Axios. Retrieved June 4, 2025, from https://www.axios.com/2025/05/30/supreme-court-nepa-ruling 

“The American Petroleum Institute applauded the court's ‘long overdue steps to restore NEPA to its original intent.’”

[116] Ojalá. (n.d.). Mexico's neoliberal water law and systemic crisis. Retrieved June 4, 2025, from https://www.ojala.mx/en/ojala-en/mexicos-neoliberal-water-law-and-systemic-crisis 

"The National Water Law (LAN), which defines the prevailing legal framework, has aggravated the crisis and hindered the search for solutions. Passed in 1992, it is a fundamentally neoliberal law. It was among the reforms made during Mexico’s dramatic neoliberal economic opening and considered a prerequisite for the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement in 1994. It allows national and transnational corporations to participate in the planning and implementation of water policies, making them peers with communities and household users." 

[117] Navarro, F. S. (2022, August 7). Multinational corporations are sucking Mexico dry. The Guardian. Retrieved June 4, 2025, from https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2022/aug/07/mexico-water-crisis-monterrey-coca-cola 

"The system, she notes, was designed to create water markets, and artificial ones at that: once the aquifers were legally determined, some 250,000 licenses were handed out on the spot in order to inflate their prices." 

[118] Navarro, F. S. (2022, August 7). Multinational corporations are sucking Mexico dry. The Guardian. Retrieved June 4, 2025, from https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2022/aug/07/mexico-water-crisis-monterrey-coca-cola 

"Thus were born the 'water millionaires,' a select group of elite families and companies that have accumulated vast water rights to their very lucrative advantage. This includes mining mogul Germán Larrea, Mexico’s second-richest man, and TV magnate Ricardo Salinas Pliego, the nation’s third-richest; the Robinson Bours family, owner of the Bachoco food company; Alonso Ancira Elizondo, owner of the steel company Altos Hornos de México [...] Together, these elites control an estimated 26.6 billion cubic feet of water." 

[119] Ojalá. (n.d.). Mexico's neoliberal water law and systemic crisis. Retrieved June 4, 2025, from https://www.ojala.mx/en/ojala-en/mexicos-neoliberal-water-law-and-systemic-crisis 

"According to Gómez and Moctezuma, this last group includes '966 companies, 1,537 individuals and 801 civil associations.' They hold 22.3 percent of all water concessions in Mexico. This means 1.1 percent of entities with water concessions in the country control more than 20 percent of the country’s water." 

[120] Navarro, F. S. (2022, August 7). Multinational corporations are sucking Mexico dry. The Guardian. Retrieved June 4, 2025, from https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2022/aug/07/mexico-water-crisis-monterrey-coca-cola 

"Meanwhile, Coca-Cola, Pepsi, Danone, Nestlé, Bimbo, and Aga suck another 133 billion liters (35 billion gallons) a year out of the ground. While over a third of Mexican households lack daily, basic piped water in their homes, these and other companies are literally sucking water from under their feet in order to sell it back to them in bottles, cans, and cartons." 

[121] Avispa Midia. (2023, March 9). Resistance grows against water privatization in Mexico. Retrieved June 4, 2025, from https://avispa.org/resistance-grows-against-water-privatization-in-mexico/ 

"Sara refers to a law that was proposed in 2021, going into effect in July of 2022. The law primarily benefits private capital. As a consequence of the law, 'a large number of water concessions were issued to the private water sector,' she adds." 

[122] Avispa Midia. (2023, March 9). Resistance grows against water privatization in Mexico. Retrieved June 4, 2025, from https://avispa.org/resistance-grows-against-water-privatization-in-mexico/ 

"Among other benefits to private companies, the new law allows those with water concessions to 'temporarily provide, totally or partially…the public services of drinking water, potabilization, drainage, sewage treatment, and the disposal of wastewater.' In addition to allowing the private sector to profit from the blue gold, the law opens the door for private companies to participate in making policies, guidelines, and technical specifications for the construction, expansion, rehabilitation, administration, operation, conservation, and maintenance of drinking water supply systems and other services." 

[123] Avispa Midia. (2023, March 9). Resistance grows against water privatization in Mexico. Retrieved June 4, 2025, from https://avispa.org/resistance-grows-against-water-privatization-in-mexico/ 

"'Water continues to be managed in the same way as it has been by previous governments, as it has been since the reform to Article 27 (of the Mexican constitution). Since the enactment of the national water law, through the simulation of a concession system, the privatization and exploitation of water has been approved,' explains the lawyer, Carlos González, of the National indigenous Congress (CNI), who provides legal support to the Otomí community. The lawyer calls the concession system a 'simulation' because 'through the figure of the concession, water is disproportionately handed over to large companies, concentrating it into very few hands in this country: in the mining sector, for soda and beer companies, for the industrial and real estate sector, for industrial agriculture and cattle raising.'" 

[124] Avispa Midia. (2023, March 9). Resistance grows against water privatization in Mexico. Retrieved June 4, 2025, from https://avispa.org/resistance-grows-against-water-privatization-in-mexico/ 

"Carlos González points out that this strategy of privatization is taking place in the Otomí region, principally with the concession of a well located in Barrio 4 of the community. That well is formally administered by the State Water Commission (CEA). 'With this law, there exists the possibility, the high probability, that this well will be handed over to management by a private company,' remarks the CNI lawyer." 

[125] Avispa Midia. (2023, March 9). Resistance grows against water privatization in Mexico. Retrieved June 4, 2025, from https://avispa.org/resistance-grows-against-water-privatization-in-mexico/ 

"Participants from at least eighteen states of Mexico, and people from six other countries—more than 500 people—arrived to rebel Otomí territory, in the community of Santiago Mexquititlán, pertaining to the municipality of Amealco, Querétaro. The majority of whom were there for their first time, enthusiastically attending the Second National Assembly for Water and Life." 

[126] Avispa Midia. (2023, March 9). Resistance grows against water privatization in Mexico. Retrieved June 4, 2025, from https://avispa.org/resistance-grows-against-water-privatization-in-mexico/ 

"Next to the Otomi community’s drinking water well, there sits the remains of an official vehicle of the State Water Commission (CEA), a water truck with a phrase written in graffiti on its 30,000-liter capacity tank: 'It’s not a drought, its exploitation,' alluding to the water crisis in several Mexican states." 

[127] Navarro, F. S. (2022, August 7). Multinational corporations are sucking Mexico dry. The Guardian. Retrieved June 4, 2025, from https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2022/aug/07/mexico-water-crisis-monterrey-coca-cola 

"Keenly aware of the massive market potential of water scarcity, Mexico’s banks — nearly all foreign-owned — have gotten in on the act. Santander has thirty-five licenses; HSBC twenty-five, and BBVA ten. Two of these licenses alone, in Nayarit and the Lerma-Santiago Basin, allow it to exploit over 130 million cubic gallons of water a year." 

[128] Avispa Midia. (2023, March 9). Resistance grows against water privatization in Mexico. Retrieved June 4, 2025, from https://avispa.org/resistance-grows-against-water-privatization-in-mexico/ 

"These water reserves form part of 653 aquifers that provide the groundwater of Mexico, according to studies from the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources (SEMARNAT)."

Here is the precise citation list for the Germany section, numbered 129-145 as they appear in the content:

[129] Zaki, N. (2024). The Environmental Toll of Tax Dodging by the Ultra-Wealthy: What's at Stake? Germanwatch. https://www.germanwatch.org/sites/default/files/2024_fact_sheet_billionaire_taxation.pdf 

"The wealthiest 1% in Germany emit 15 times more carbon than the poorest half"

[130] Deutschlandradio. (2024, May 31). Sind reiche Menschen schuld am Klimawandel? [Are rich people to blame for climate change?]. Retrieved June 4, 2025, from https://www.deutschlandfunk.de/klimawandel-reichtum-vermoegen-co2-fussabdruck-ausstoss-reiche-100.html 

"Bei Energie ist die Schere ebenfalls groß: Das reichste Zehntel ist für fast 40 Prozent des Energiekonsums verantwortlich. Beim ärmsten Zehntel sind es rund zwei Prozent."

[131] Deutschlandradio. (2024, May 31). Sind reiche Menschen schuld am Klimawandel? [Are rich people to blame for climate change?]. Retrieved June 4, 2025, from https://www.deutschlandfunk.de/klimawandel-reichtum-vermoegen-co2-fussabdruck-ausstoss-reiche-100.html 

"Im globalen Vergleich sind die Unterschiede beim Ausstoß noch stärker: Die ärmere Hälfte der Welt emittiert durchschnittlich 1,4 Tonnen CO2-Äquivalente pro Person und Jahr, sagt Klimaforscher Tilman Santarius. Bei den sogenannten Superreichen, den Top 0,01 Prozent, seien es 2300 Tonnen."

[132] Deutschlandradio. (2024, May 31). Sind reiche Menschen schuld am Klimawandel? [Are rich people to blame for climate change?]. Retrieved June 4, 2025, from https://www.deutschlandfunk.de/klimawandel-reichtum-vermoegen-co2-fussabdruck-ausstoss-reiche-100.html 

"Im Fall der oberen 0,01 Prozent vergrößern extreme Luxusgüter wie Privatjets, Jachten und Villen den ökologischen Fußabdruck besonders stark."

[133] Deutschlandradio. (2024, May 31). Sind reiche Menschen schuld am Klimawandel? [Are rich people to blame for climate change?]. Retrieved June 4, 2025, from https://www.deutschlandfunk.de/klimawandel-reichtum-vermoegen-co2-fussabdruck-ausstoss-reiche-100.html 

"Je mehr Geld Menschen haben, desto mehr Treibhausgase werden durch ihr persönliches Konsumverhalten freigesetzt: mehr Online-Warenbestellungen, schnellere Autos, häufige Flugreisen."

[134] Deutschlandradio. (2024, May 31). Sind reiche Menschen schuld am Klimawandel? [Are rich people to blame for climate change?]. Retrieved June 4, 2025, from https://www.deutschlandfunk.de/klimawandel-reichtum-vermoegen-co2-fussabdruck-ausstoss-reiche-100.html 

"Warum verursachen reiche Menschen mehr CO2? ... Aber auch Investitionen wie Unternehmensanteile spielen eine Rolle."

[135] InfluenceMap. (2021, November). German automakers and climate policy: German automakers dominate the fight to weaken climate regulation. https://influencemap.org/report/German-Automakers-and-Climate-Policy-2021 

"road transport estimated to account for 19% of Germany's greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in 2020"

[136] InfluenceMap. (2021, November). German automakers and climate policy: German automakers dominate the fight to weaken climate regulation. https://influencemap.org/report/German-Automakers-and-Climate-Policy-2021 

"Collectively, these groups disclose an EU lobbying spend of over €10 million per year."

[137] InfluenceMap. (2021, November). German automakers and climate policy: German automakers dominate the fight to weaken climate regulation. https://influencemap.org/report/German-Automakers-and-Climate-Policy-2021 

"key groups like BMW and the German Association of the Automotive Industry (VDA) have advocated to weaken near-term climate regulations"

[138] InfluenceMap. (2021, November). German automakers and climate policy: German automakers dominate the fight to weaken climate regulation. https://influencemap.org/report/German-Automakers-and-Climate-Policy-2021 

"The CEO of BMW, Oliver Zipse, is also currently the President of ACEA and the CEO of Daimler, Ola Källenius, is the Vice-President of the VDA."

[139] InfluenceMap. (2021, November). German automakers and climate policy: German automakers dominate the fight to weaken climate regulation. https://influencemap.org/report/German-Automakers-and-Climate-Policy-2021 

"stressing the importance of delayed emission reductions based on currently unviable technologies, as well as a strong reliance on voluntary, industry commitments over legally binding climate legislation"

[140] Rannard, G. (2022, September 26). German government sued over toxic air pollution. BBC News. https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-63012180 

"They live in Berlin, Munich, Frankfurt and Dusseldorf - four of German's seven biggest cities- and claim they are breathing air with concentrations of pollution four to five times higher than the WHO's acceptable limits."

[141] Rannard, G. (2022, September 26). German government sued over toxic air pollution. BBC News. https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-63012180 

"Germany's air pollution levels are in line with the country's own law, but the claimants say the law must change to reflect growing scientific consensus. The WHO slashed the recommended limits in 2021"

[142] Reccessary. (2025). New German coalition government: Climate & energy policy. https://www.reccessary.com/en/news/new-german-coalition-government-climate-energy-policy 

"The agreement places an emphasis on German politics shifting from 'climate protection concerns' to 'the economy and growth', with support for 'market instruments, technical solutions and reduction of bureaucracy'."

[143] Merz, F. (2024, June 6). Merz can leverage Germany's green transition for growth and security. Atlantic Council. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/merz-canleverage-germanys-green-transition-for-growth-and-security/ 

"Using its influence in the EU to expand the bloc’s Net-Zero Industry Act to bring 40 percent of clean tech production back to Europe by 2030"

[144] Merz, F. (2024, June 6). Merz can leverage Germany's green transition for growth and security. Atlantic Council. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/merz-canleverage-germanys-green-transition-for-growth-and-security/ 

"Advancing green hydrogen projects, like those already underway in Namibia"

[145] Merz, F. (2024, June 6). Merz can leverage Germany's green transition for growth and security. Atlantic Council. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/merz-canleverage-germanys-green-transition-for-growth-and-security/ 

"Focusing on high-value, specialized clean tech (offshore wind, hydrogen, advanced battery chemistries) rather than trying to outcompete China in mass production"

SPD, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, & FDP. (2025). Koalitionsvertrag 2025. https://www.koalitionsvertrag2025.de/sites/www.koalitionsvertrag2025.de/files/koav_2025.pdf. This source was consulted to check the “Reccessary” claims for myself but no quotes are needed from it as it’s a granular policy document outside the scope of the video.