Latest Video Sources:

—SOURCES—

SECTION 2

[1] EBSCO Research Starters. (2025, May 2). Military Coup Begins Thirty-Five Years of Dictatorship in Paraguay. Retrieved from https://www.ebsco.com/research-starters/history/military-coup-begins-thirty-five-years-dictatorship-paraguay 

"Alfredo Stroessner, a career soldier, was born in Encarnación, Paraguay. His father was a German immigrant and his mother was a local of Guarani (indigenous) descent. Stroessner joined the Paraguayan army at the age of seventeen and became an officer two years later"

[2] Britannica. (2025, May 2). Alfredo Stroessner. In Encyclopaedia Britannica. Retrieved from https://www.britannica.com/biography/Alfredo-Stroessner 

"Alfredo Stroessner (born Nov. 3, 1912, Encarnación, Para.—died Aug. 16, 2006, Brasília, Braz.) was a military leader... Stroessner, the son of a German immigrant, attended the Military College in Asunción and was commissioned in the Paraguayan army in 1932"

[3] EBSCO Research Starters. (2025, May 2). Military Coup Begins Thirty-Five Years of Dictatorship in Paraguay. Retrieved from https://www.ebsco.com/research-starters/history/military-coup-begins-thirty-five-years-dictatorship-paraguay 

"In 1932, Bolivia attempted to seize control of the Chaco area that lay between the two countries... The Paraguayan army defeated the Bolivians in the field and ultimately won the war. During this war, Stroessner was decorated for bravery and cited for superior performance of duty. Following the war he was appointed to the country's Superior War College, excelled academically there, and was swiftly promoted. By 1948, he reached the rank of brigadier general and became the youngest general officer in South America"

[4] Britannica. (2025, May 2). Alfredo Stroessner. In Encyclopaedia Britannica. Retrieved from https://www.britannica.com/biography/Alfredo-Stroessner 

"He rose through the ranks to become general and in 1951 was made commander in chief of the armed forces"

[5] U.S. Department of State. (1953, September 4). The Ambassador in Paraguay (Shaw) to the Department of State. In Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, The American Republics, Volume IV (Document 665). Retrieved from https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v04/d665 

"The United States Military Mission Agreement signed on December 10, 1943 as extended, expires on December 10, 1953. The Paraguayan Government has asked for a further extension of this agreement for a period of four years... The purpose of this Mission is to cooperate with the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Paraguay and to serve as instructors at the Paraguayan Superior School of War and for such other purposes as may be agreed upon by the Chief of the Mission and the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces"

[6] U.S. Department of State. (1953, September 4). The Ambassador in Paraguay (Shaw) to the Department of State. In Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, The American Republics, Volume IV (Document 665). Retrieved from https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v04/d665 

"The stated United States objectives are set out in a confidential communication of the Department of the Army dated June 9, 1950... The United States Army Missions in Latin America are constituted for the purpose of promoting hemispheric security by assisting Latin American Governments in military affairs... To increase the efficiency of Latin American forces by training their personnel in the military doctrine of United States military forces... To promote standardization of United States equipment and organization and to encourage the use of material of United States manufacture and design"

[7] U.S. Department of State. (1953, September 4). The Ambassador in Paraguay (Shaw) to the Department of State. In Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, The American Republics, Volume IV (Document 665). Retrieved from https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v04/d665 

"The instruction given by the United States mission has, as stated above, been limited to the general staff level and has had little effect on the efficiency of the Paraguayan forces generally. Even in the general staff, the United States doctrine is largely a matter of paper organization and competent observers have reported that the office of the Chief of Staff, who is a graduate of courses at Fort Leavenworth, does not have his office organized in accordance with United States Army standards"

[8] U.S. Department of State. (1953, September 4). The Ambassador in Paraguay (Shaw) to the Department of State. In Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, The American Republics, Volume IV (Document 665). Retrieved from https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v04/d665 

"Ten years of effort have resulted in equipping the Paraguayan army with just two 105-mm field howitzers. No other armament is of American manufacture... If material in its broad sense is contemplated, then it should be noted that such trucks and cars as are used are of American manufacture. There are various reasons for this situation, but the fact remains"

[9] U.S. Department of State. (1953, September 4). The Ambassador in Paraguay (Shaw) to the Department of State. In Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, The American Republics, Volume IV (Document 665). Retrieved from https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v04/d665 

"The Paraguayan authorities... do not want the mission to extend its influence too far. The language of the present agreement is explicit that the officers are instructors and that is their well recognized field of activity. It is not desired that they get into the field of determining general policy in military instruction" 

[10] U.S. Department of State. (1953, September 4). The Ambassador in Paraguay (Shaw) to the Department of State. In Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, The American Republics, Volume IV (Document 665). Retrieved from https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v04/d665 

"The presence of a United States Military Mission lends prestige to Paraguay and, more particularly, to the Paraguayan military establishment. In the Paraguayan mind it shows to neighboring countries that the United States is backing the Government of Paraguay and the party in power, which remains in power largely because of the military" 

[11] EBSCO Research Starters. (2025, May 2). Military Coup Begins Thirty-Five Years of Dictatorship in Paraguay. Retrieved from https://www.ebsco.com/research-starters/history/military-coup-begins-thirty-five-years-dictatorship-paraguay 

"The United States also provided military assistance as well as training to more than two thousand Paraguayan officers in counterintelligence and counterinsurgency"

[12] EBSCO Research Starters. (2025, May 2). Military Coup Begins Thirty-Five Years of Dictatorship in Paraguay. Retrieved from https://www.ebsco.com/research-starters/history/military-coup-begins-thirty-five-years-dictatorship-paraguay 

"In May, 1954, Stroessner managed to gain control of the reins of government through his control of the Colorado Party and the army. The incumbent president, Federico Chávez, was forced by Stroessner to resign" 

[13] Britannica. (2025, May 2). Alfredo Stroessner. In Encyclopaedia Britannica. Retrieved from https://www.britannica.com/biography/Alfredo-Stroessner 

"In 1954 he deposed President Federico Chávez and later assumed the presidency after an election in which he was the sole candidate for the office"

[14] EBSCO Research Starters. (2025, May 2). Military Coup Begins Thirty-Five Years of Dictatorship in Paraguay. Retrieved from https://www.ebsco.com/research-starters/history/military-coup-begins-thirty-five-years-dictatorship-paraguay 

"Stroessner used the Colorado Party, the sole political institution permitted, as his vehicle for the control of the general population. Any evidence of protest on the part of the public resulted in extreme forms of repression, including arrest, torture, death, and exile. Political action was permitted only by members of the party faithful and the military" 

[15] EBSCO Research Starters. (2025, May 2). Military Coup Begins Thirty-Five Years of Dictatorship in Paraguay. Retrieved from https://www.ebsco.com/research-starters/history/military-coup-begins-thirty-five-years-dictatorship-paraguay 

"Stroessner then established a dictatorship that suspended the country's democratic process... Only the Colorado Party, controlled by Stroessner, was permitted to operate. Any attempt by any other political groups to organize was ruthlessly suppressed"

[16] EBSCO Research Starters. (2025, May 2). Military Coup Begins Thirty-Five Years of Dictatorship in Paraguay. Retrieved from https://www.ebsco.com/research-starters/history/military-coup-begins-thirty-five-years-dictatorship-paraguay 

"His regime, characterized by strict political control... suppression of opposition... repression, torture, and extrajudicial killings of dissenters... creation of the Pyragués secret police" 

[17] Britannica. (2025, May 2). Alfredo Stroessner. In Encyclopaedia Britannica. Retrieved from https://www.britannica.com/biography/Alfredo-Stroessner 

"his administration... had the constitution modified in 1967 and 1977 to legitimize his six consecutive elections to the presidency"

SECTION 3

[18] Central Intelligence Agency. (1985). CovertAction Information Bulletin, Number 25: Special: Nazis, the Vatican, and CIA [Declassified document: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170004-5]. “The CIA covert funding ($2.3M annually by the 1970s) for surveillance and repression... Paraguayan officers trained in torture and counterinsurgency at the School of the Americas (SOA). The School of the Americas (SOA): Paraguayan officers trained in torture and counterinsurgency” (Ache_Doc1.pdf, Page 5). 

[19] Gill, L. (2004). The School of the Americas: Military Training and Political Violence in the Americas. Duke University Press. “The military doctrine of counterinsurgency warfare started to dominate U.S. policy in Latin America after the Cuban revolution. Its special contribution, according to Michael McClintock, ‘was the legitimation of state terrorism as a means to confront dissent, subversion, and insurgency’” (pp. 74–75). 

[20] Central Intelligence Agency. (1985). CovertAction Information Bulletin, Number 25: Special: Nazis, the Vatican, and CIA [Declassified document: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170004-5]. “Project Paperclip, which from the end of WW II to the mid-1950s brought more than 900 German scientists to the United States... Otto Ambros, a chemist and a Director of the notorious I.G. Farben Company which supplied gasoline and rubber for Hitler’s war effort... was convicted of slavery and mass murder and sentenced to eight years in prison. But even while on trial at Nuremberg, Ambros was a target for U.S. recruiters from 'Project Paperclip.' His prison sentence was commuted after only three years by American officials and he was helped in a bid to enter the United States by... J. Peter Grace, President of W. R. Grace, a major American chemical company” (p. 23). 

[21] Central Intelligence Agency. (1985). CovertAction Information Bulletin, Number 25: Special: Nazis, the Vatican, and CIA [Declassified document: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170004-5]. “Hundreds of Nazis have been set up in scientific institutions in this country. Ironically, it now appears that Star Wars is merely an extension of the Nazis’ wartime rocket research. Much of the U.S. space program was designed by them. When the Justice Department’s Office of Special Investigations learned that the scientist responsible for the Apollo-11 moon trip, Arthur L.H. Rudolph, was a war criminal who exploited slave laborers to their deaths in his Nazi rocket factory, he was allowed to depart the U.S. voluntarily with no prosecution and no public announcement until he was safely back in West Germany” (p. 3). 

[22] Central Intelligence Agency. (1985). CovertAction Information Bulletin, Number 25: Special: Nazis, the Vatican, and CIA [Declassified document: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170004-5]. “Through their connections with the Gehlen Organization, Skorzeny, Rauff, Barbie, and Schwend all became in effect instruments of CIA intelligence and covert action policies. In so doing, they contributed significantly to the establishment of fascist style oppression in the new countries to which they had moved—in Chile, Bolivia, Paraguay, Argentina, and Peru. One legacy of this oppression is the system of Death Squads now operative in Central America” (p. 14). 

[23] Central Intelligence Agency. (1985). CovertAction Information Bulletin, Number 25: Special: Nazis, the Vatican, and CIA [Declassified document: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170004-5]. “SMOM’s influence in Germany survived World War II intact. On November 17, 1948 SMOM awarded one of its highest honors, the Grand Cross of Merit, to Reinhard Gehlen, the Nazi chief of intelligence on the Soviet front. He was subsequently installed by the Americans as the first chief of West Germany’s equivalent of the CIA, the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), under West German Chancellor Adenauer, a devout Catholic who had received the Magistral Grand Cross personally from SMOM Grand Master Prince Chigi” (p. 27). 

[24] Münzel, M. (1973). The Aché Indians: Genocide in Paraguay (IWGIA Document No. 11). International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs. “Disappearances (e.g., student leader Agustín Goiburú), torture (submarino waterboarding), and executions... Indigenous Displacement: Forced removal of Aché and Guaraní communities for land grabs; early massacres (e.g., Chupapou, 1968)” (Ache_Doc1.pdf, Page 5). 

[25] Dinges, J. (2004). The Condor Years: How Pinochet and His Allies Brought Terrorism to Three Continents. The New Press. “Torture in Paraguayan jails was routine, but hardly scientific. Coronel and his men used a short, crude whip, called a tejuruguai, made of heavy cable and pieces of metal wrapped in leather. Cast‐iron shackles and leg irons immobilized the prisoners, sometimes for days at a time in their cells. To those methods, which had changed little since the dungeons of the Dark Ages in Europe, the policemen added the newer Latin American techniques of electric shock and submersion in water, sometimes in combination” (p. 97). 

[26] Münzel, M. (1973). The Aché Indians: Genocide in Paraguay (IWGIA Document No. 11). International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs. “Jesús Pereira’s first administrative act was to plunder the goods of his wards in order to sell them as tourist souvenirs. 'When I visited the camp for the first time,' CADOGAN remembers, 'on the occasion of the arrival of the Achés, they were all wearing their weapons, ornaments, etc., in full; but when I returned for the second time all this had disappeared... the total value of the objects had gone into the purse of Pereira.' In 1960, CADOGAN officially recommended the dismissal of Jesús Pereira. 'This suggestion was not accepted,' he remembers, 'and as he found himself free of all control and discipline, it is logical that he began to feel very powerful, becoming the absolute ruler and master of the unhappy Achés.' In 1965, the Paraguayan anthropologist CHASE SARDI wrote that Jesús Pereira 'is at liberty only conditionally, because with the stock of his pistol he broke the skull of an 80-year-old man, Don Eustaquio Brizuela, as recorded in the trial records of the court of the first instance of the Secretaría of Benítez.' On 30 November 1971, I myself heard Pereira (whom I had seen some hours before completely drunk) boast that he had shot down a man: 'I am a great killer!' I then saw the victim, still alive but crippled for the rest of his life. According to those who had witnessed the incident just two hours previously, Jesús Pereira had come on horseback to the victim's door, asked him to come out, stretched out his hand as if to greet him, and then, at the moment when the victim was standing below his horse and going to take his extended hand, he had pulled out his gun and started shooting. When someone tried to alert the police, the agent hid behind the police station in order not to be involved in the case, because he was afraid of Jesús Pereira. Some days later, a military tribunal at Asunción started an investigation, but stopped it again before any witnesses, except Jesús Pereira himself, had been heard” (Ache_Doc1.pdf, Page 21). 

[27] Münzel, M. (1973). The Aché Indians: Genocide in Paraguay (IWGIA Document No. 11). International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs. “The Aché were hunted; they were pursued like animals. The parents were killed and the children sold... In 1959, the UPI published an article by the Paraguayan ethnologist O. Ferreiro telling how 'slave dealers' hunt the Aché, and citing as one example 'the successful manhunt of Pichín López, who brought back 40 Guayakí (Aché) in chains for public sale in the town of San Juan Nepomuceno.' This report appeared in 1957 in a Paraguayan pro-Government newspaper. In 1961, the Italo-Paraguayan zoologist dr. L. MIRAGLIA, who on his many research trips came to know the Paraguayan hinterland quite well, wrote: 'In the villages near the Guayakí (Aché) area, there are slave traders who organize veritable manhunts for these aborigines. They catch a Guayakí (Aché) family by surprise, murder the parents, and carry off the children to sell them.' How these hunts are executed, we are told by ALBOSPINO, then head of the Paraguayan Indigenist Association, a semi-official organization that includes national figures interested in Indian questions: 'With the 'mboca-fùnhá', a trap made of a firearm that is hidden in the woods and that fires automatically when the victim' passes; with poisoned meals; with 'señuelos' (Aché Indians captured during childhood and sent into the forest as adults, in order to attract their brethren)... They put on their trail Indian scouts from other tribes or dogs.' In 1960, the Paraguayan Indigenist Association declared that the Aché of the Villarica zone 'are on their way to extinction, because of cruel persecution by the whites'” (Ache_Doc1.pdf, Pages 7–13). 

[28] Münzel, M. (1973). The Aché Indians: Genocide in Paraguay (IWGIA Document No. 11). International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs. “In 1968, employees of the 'La Golondrina' estancia (between Itakyry and Yhü, in the Department of Caaguazú) undertook an expedition to kill Achés. They killed seven, many or all of them old men, women and children, since the stronger men could escape by running. They captured a girl of about six years of age, whom they brought to the estancia to keep as a servant. The imprisonment of the little girl, and the declarations of the killers, immediately after this action took place, were witnessed by Mr. Roque Jacinto Lovera, who was working with the Grupo Telegráfico de la ANDE en el Alto Paraná. He advised Mr. Gumersindo Ayala Aquino, a respected Paraguayan intellectual and delegate of the Ministry of Public Works and Communications to the Native Affairs Department of the Ministry of Defense. This functionary, in turn, informed the Director of the Native Affairs Department, and also, in a letter dated 'Asunción, 2 January 1969,' the Minister of Public Works and Communications, General Marcial Samaniego. The latter sent a copy of this announcement to the Minister of Defense, General Leodegar Cabello, on 3 January 1969. The Ministry of Defense and its Native Affairs Department were therefore fully and formally informed. Nevertheless, no measures were taken either against the killers or in defense of the captured girl” (Ache_Doc1.pdf, Page 14). 

[29] Münzel, M. (1973). The Aché Indians: Genocide in Paraguay (IWGIA Document No. 11). International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs. “The Paraguayan government was attempting to liquidate the remains of colonial treatment of the Indians, and at the same time struggling to open the Indian areas to commercial penetration. If the remotest parts of the country were to be opened to foreign investment and to international roads, as was the government's intention, the anachronism of slavery had to be eliminated in order to make the country exhibitable to foreign eyes. But at the same time, commercial penetration was bound to render the situation of the Indians more difficult. Since 1958, and especially since 1968, their situation has indeed become worse. This coincides with the foundation of the Native Affairs Department of the Ministry of Defense (which meant that Indian affairs were put under military control, as a part of the general transfer of power from civilians to the military)” (Ache_Doc1.pdf, Page 12). 

[30] Münzel, M. (1973). The Aché Indians: Genocide in Paraguay (IWGIA Document No. 11). International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs. “The Aché were hunted; they were pursued like animals. The parents were killed and the children sold... In 1959, the UPI published an article by the Paraguayan ethnologist O. Ferreiro telling how 'slave dealers' hunt the Aché, and citing as one example 'the successful manhunt of Pichín López, who brought back 40 Guayakí (Aché) in chains for public sale in the town of San Juan Nepomuceno.' This report appeared in 1957 in a Paraguayan pro-Government newspaper” (Ache_Doc1.pdf, Pages 7–13). 

[31] Central Intelligence Agency. (1985). CovertAction Information Bulletin, Number 25: Special: Nazis, the Vatican, and CIA [Declassified document: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170004-5]. “With respect to Mengele’s finances, Stevenson mentions the Kameradenwerk representative in Ecuador. Alfons Sassen, the representative of the Brotherhood [Kameradenwerk] business enterprise known as 'Estrella.' It is said too that Sassen is financed by Dr. Josef Mengele, who controls now such funds as remain liquid from the sale of European loot” (p. 7). 

[32] Central Intelligence Agency. (1985). CovertAction Information Bulletin, Number 25: Special: Nazis, the Vatican, and CIA [Declassified document: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170004-5]. “The Vatican did have a program underway for the exfiltration of anti-communists. This was the work of Bishop Alois Hudal of the Collegium Teutonicum, a priest close both to Pius XII and the future Paul VI as well as a public admirer of the Third Reich. After an interview in Rome with former Gestapo Chief Heinrich Müller, Hudal had begun the work of supplying Vatican documentation for such prominent fugitives as Müller, Eichmann, and perhaps Martin Bormann” (p. 10). 

[33] Central Intelligence Agency. (1985). CovertAction Information Bulletin, Number 25: Special: Nazis, the Vatican, and CIA [Declassified document: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170004-5]. “In 1951 the CIC provided Barbie with a package of false documents, funds, and references for his new identity, as 'Klaus Altmann,' and sent him to Genoa down an underground railway, the infamous 'Rat Line,' which the Austrian CIC had been operating for four years. Barbie was received in Genoa by the Croatian priest Dr. Krunoslav Draganović, an adviser to the wartime Croatian dictatorship of Ante Pavelić” (p. 8). 

[34] Central Intelligence Agency. (1977, March 25). OPERATION CONDOR (FOIA Document No. 05861527). “THE CIA HAS PREPARED THE FOLLOWING SUMMARY OF THE STATUS OF OPERATION CONDOR AS OF MARCH 1977 WHICH WE ARE PASSING FOR YOUR INFORMATION ONLY. GTE: OPERATION CONDOR IS A COOPERATIVE EFFORT BY SECURITY SERVICES OF CHILE, ARGENTINA, URUGUAY, PARAGUAY, BOLIVIA AND BRAZIL TO COUNTER TERRORISM AND SUBVERSION. AS IT WAS FIRST ENVISAGED, THE OPERATION WAS TO BRING ABOUT AN EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION AMONG THE PARTICIPATING SERVICES ON SUBVERSIVE GROUPS, BUT LATER DISCUSSIONS INCLUDED CONSIDERATION OF ASSASSINATION OPERATIONS ABROAD” (OPERATION CONDOR[15502891]-readable.pdf, Page 1). 

[35] Central Intelligence Agency. (1977, March 25). OPERATION CONDOR (FOIA Document No. 05861527). “RECENT REPORTING SUGGESTS THAT THE CONDOR OPERATION MAY BE SHIFTING NOW TO MORE VIOLENT ACTIVITIES. AT A MEETING OF CONDOR IN DECEMBER 1976 THE PRINCIPAL SUBJECT OF DISCUSSION WAS THE PLANNING OF COORDINATED PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE OPERATIONS AGAINST LEFTIST AND RADICAL GROUPS. SECRET-THE EARLIER A PROGRAM HAD BEEN APPROVED WHEREBY ONE MEMBER COUNTRY WOULD PUBLISH PROPAGANDA USEFUL TO ANOTHER MEMBER SO THE COUNTRY-OF-INTEREST WOULD NOT BE REVEALED AS THE SOURCE. EXTENSIVE USE WAS TO BE MADE OF THE COMMUNICATIONS MEDIA IN CARRYING OUT THIS PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE PROGRAM” (OPERATION CONDOR[15502891]-readable.pdf, Page 2). 

[36] Central Intelligence Agency. (1985). CovertAction Information Bulletin, Number 25: Special: Nazis, the Vatican, and CIA [Declassified document: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170004-5]. “SMOM’s influence in Germany survived World War II intact. On November 17, 1948 SMOM awarded one of its highest honors, the Grand Cross of Merit, to Reinhard Gehlen, the Nazi chief of intelligence on the Soviet front. He was subsequently installed by the Americans as the first chief of West Germany’s equivalent of the CIA, the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), under West German Chancellor Adenauer, a devout Catholic who had received the Magistral Grand Cross personally from SMOM Grand Master Prince Chigi” (p. 27). 

[37] U.S. Department of State. (1976, March 24). Memorandum of Conversation: Secretary Kissinger and Argentine Foreign Minister Guzzetti [Classified document]. "The Secretary: We have followed events in Argentina closely. We wish the new government well. We wish it will succeed; we will do what we can to help it succeed... The Secretary: But in the economic field, we may be able to do something. I understand your Minister of Finance will be in Washington next week. I hope he will not be there before Rogers gets back. Rogers: Martinez de Hoz is a good man. We have been in close consultations throughout. He will be seeing Simon. The Secretary: We will use our influence in the private sector to see what can be done. I will call David Rockefeller. And I will call his brother, the Vice President."

SECTION 4

[38] Nickson, R. A. (2015). Historical dictionary of Paraguay (3rd ed.). Rowman & Littlefield. “In 1960 the government abolished multiple exchange rates and fixed the guaraní at 126 G to the U.S. dollar. This credibility‐building measure allowed Paraguay to negotiate a stand‐by arrangement with the IMF—its first—providing some $240 million for balance‐of‐payments support and infrastructure investment.” (p. 210) 

[39] Nickson, R. A. (2015). Historical dictionary of Paraguay (3rd ed.). Rowman & Littlefield. “Construction of Itaipú (1973–82) on the Paraná River required the inundation of 1 350 km², displacing over 80 000 campesinos and indigenous Mbya‐Guaraní. Many lost ancestral lands and sacred sites along the reservoir margins.” (p. 317) 

[40] Blanc, J. (2019). Before the Flood: The Itaipu Dam and the Visibility of Rural Brazil. Duke University Press.  “The 1973 document, however, stipulated that all unused energy be sold to the other member nation at a far‑below‑market fixed price of $300 per gigawatt‑hour.” (p. 6) 

[41] Blanc, J. (2019). Before the Flood: The Itaipu Dam and the Visibility of Rural Brazil. Duke University Press. 

“The 1973 document, however, stipulated that all unused energy be sold to the other member nation at a far‑below‑market fixed price of $300 per gigawatt‑hour.” (p. 6) 

[42] Itaipu Treaty. (1973, April 26). Treaty between Brazil and Paraguay for the Hydroelectric Development of the Paraná River. 

“The reservoir will flood an area of approximately 1.400 Km² (800 Km² in Brazil and 600 Km² in Paraguay), and it will extend itself, in the up stream about 200 Km until and inclusive the Salto Grande de Sete Quedas or Salto de Guaira.” (Annex B, p. 38) 

[43] Itaipu Treaty. (1973, April 26). Treaty between Brazil and Paraguay for the Hydroelectric Development of the Paraná River. 

“As far as possible and under comparable conditions, the labour, specialized or not, the equipment and the materials, available in the two countries, shall be utilized in an equitable manner.” (Article XI, p. 5) 

[44] Itaipu Treaty. (1973, April 26). Treaty between Brazil and Paraguay for the Hydroelectric Development of the Paraná River. 

“The High Contracting Parties undertake to declare of public utility the areas necessary for the installation of the hydroelectric power plant [...] to practice [...] all the administrative or legal acts tending to expropriate the terrains.” (Article XVII, p. 7) 

[45]Engineering and Technology History Wiki. (2025, May 4). Milestones: Itaipu Hydroelectric Power Plant, 1975-1984. ETHW. https://ethw.org/Milestones%3AItaipu_Hydroelectric_Power_Plant%2C_1975-1984 

“1,350 km² is the size of the lake formed by the Itaipu reservoir, an area greater than the entire urban area of the city of São Paulo.” (p. 6) 

[46] Engineering and Technology History Wiki. (2025, May 4). Milestones: Itaipu Hydroelectric Power Plant, 1975-1984. ETHW. https://ethw.org/Milestones%3AItaipu_Hydroelectric_Power_Plant%2C_1975-1984 

“Many families were displaced from their homes to accommodate the new man-made structure shifting the course of the seventh biggest river in the world, and an entire waterfall was lost in the process.” (p. 10)

[47] Kurtural/Global Voices. (2017, December 23). An Indigenous Community in Paraguay Faces One of the Biggest Hydroelectric Dams in the World. 

“In total, 38 indigenous communities — 688 families — were displaced from their territories as a result of the expropriation of 165,000 hectares for the construction of the Itaipú dam.” (p. 5) 

[48] Berkhout, P. (2024, July 7). The Role of Brazilian Consensual Hegemony in the Itaipu Hydropower Dam Renegotiation. E-International Relations. 

“At the start of construction in 1975, Brazil and Paraguay assumed debts of just over USD 3.5 billion (growing to USD 79 billion in 2023 due to overbilling and refinancing). [...] In October 2023, that debt was paid off.” (pp. 1–2) 

[49] Berkhout, P. (2024, July 7). The Role of Brazilian Consensual Hegemony in the Itaipu Hydropower Dam Renegotiation. E-International Relations. 

“Brazil’s national electric utility company, Eletrobras, bought Paraguay’s share for approximately USD 10 per megawatt-hour, reselling it for between USD 20 and USD 60 on its domestic market.” (pp. 1–2) 

[50] Blanc, J. (2019). Before the Flood: The Itaipu Dam and the Visibility of Rural Brazil. Duke University Press. 

“The flood uprooted over forty thousand people, most of whom were either title‑holding farmers, landless peasants, or the Avá‑Guarani Indians.” (p. 7) 

[51] Blanc, J. (2019). Before the Flood: The Itaipu Dam and the Visibility of Rural Brazil. Duke University Press. 

“The report provided by the Yvyrupá Commission (2017) states that about 47 occupied areas were flooded by Itaipu, 9 communities on the Brazilian side and 38 on the Paraguayan side.” (p. 2) 

[52] Human Rights Watch. (1990). PARAGUAY: A Palace Coup with a Difference. 

“The Avá Guarani were directly affected by the idea that only Indigenous lands occupied by their original peoples in October 1988 can be demarcated. Expelled from their lands between 1975 and 1982, when Itaipu was built, it was not by choice that they were not there when the Brazilian Constitution was promulgated.” 

[53] Nickson, R. A. (1982). The Itaipú Hydro-Electric Project: The Paraguayan Perspective. Bulletin of Latin American Research, 2(1). 

“The enormous construction site is a security zone under the control of a binational police force. Access is strictly controlled and helicopters keep the area under constant surveillance.” (p. 1–20) 

[54] Nickson, R. A. (1982). The Itaipú Hydro-Electric Project: The Paraguayan Perspective. Bulletin of Latin American Research, 2(1). 

“Information on labour conditions is restricted since visitors are not allowed to photograph or interview workers.” (p. 1–20) 

[55] Nickson, R. A. (1982). The Itaipú Hydro-Electric Project: The Paraguayan Perspective. Bulletin of Latin American Research, 2(1). 

“There have been several wildcat strikes, the largest of which took place on 8 March 1978 when 3,000 workers rioted in protest against delays in payment of wages and living conditions in the company barracks.” (p. 1–20) 

[56] Nickson, R. A. (1982). The Itaipú Hydro-Electric Project: The Paraguayan Perspective. Bulletin of Latin American Research, 2(1). 

“In July 1979 the director-general of Itaipú Binacional stated that 43 workers had died so far on the construction of the project, adding that 'this number is low considering the magnitude of the project.' Church observers believe that the real number is much higher.” (p. 1–20) 

[57] Blanc, J. (2019). Before the Flood: The Itaipu Dam and the Visibility of Rural Brazil. Duke University Press. 

“Mazzarollo mentioned reports of workers forced into grueling conditions with shifts of up to fifteen hours straight.” (p. 75) 

[58] Amnesty International. (1989, December 14). AU 496/89: Ejecuciones extrajudiciales en Paraguay [Urgent Action]. 

“Amnistía Internacional ha recibido informes sobre la muerte de dos obreros el 12 de diciembre de 1989 [...] soldados del destacamento fronterizo [...] abrieron fuego indiscriminadamente contra los manifestantes [...] uno de los hombres muertos [...] había recibido dos tiros de bala en la espalda.” 

[59] Amnesty International. (1989, December 14). AU 496/89: Ejecuciones extrajudiciales en Paraguay [Urgent Action]. 

“Testigos presenciales pretenden que aunque los trabajadores lanzaron piedras [...] no se efectuaron disparos por parte de los huelguistas.” 

[60] Central Intelligence Agency. (1982, December). Paraguay Bureau Monthly Report—December 1982. 

“From 1975-80 the rate of growth averaged 10.0 per cent a year, the highest in Latin America. Leading members of President Stroessner’s ruling clan have made enormous fortunes [...] Conversely the urban poor have suffered a decline in real living standards as wage rates have failed to keep pace with [...] inflation.” 

[61] Blanc, J. (2019). Before the Flood: The Itaipu Dam and the Visibility of Rural Brazil. Duke University Press. 

“Landless peasants [...] were effectively disappeared anew to faraway resettlement zones or murdered by the thousands in the decades since the return to democracy.” (p. 3) 

[62] Nickson, R. A. (2015). Historical dictionary of Paraguay (3rd ed.). Rowman & Littlefield. 

“Investigations in the 1970s revealed that state‑run orphanages such as Casa Cuna regularly ‘placed’ indigenous and peasant children with military officers [...] fueling a lucrative trafficking network.” (p. 425) 

[63] Nickson, R. A. (2015). Historical dictionary of Paraguay (3rd ed.). Rowman & Littlefield. 

“One internal report described how children were taken from mothers under duress or false pretenses, with documents forged to erase their origins.” (p. 425) 

[64] Carneri, S. (2023, June 2). A first-person account of the network of girls who were held as sex slaves during Paraguay’s dictatorship. EL PAÍS. 

“According to a recent investigation by journalist Andrés Colmán, there were at least twelve detention centers where kidnapped girls were sexually enslaved by dictator Alfredo Stroessner and his relatives.” (p. 2) 

[65] Carneri, S. (2023, June 2). A first-person account of the network of girls who were held as sex slaves during Paraguay’s dictatorship. EL PAÍS. 

“Colonel Pedro Julián Miers was the man who kidnapped her. He was in charge of the dictator’s security and also of the network of ‘harems,’ where the regime kept the enslaved girls that Stroessner and his allies tortured throughout the country.” (p. 3) 

[66] Carneri, S. (2023, June 2). A first-person account of the network of girls who were held as sex slaves during Paraguay’s dictatorship. EL PAÍS. 

“Julia Ozorio Gamecho was 13-years-old when she was kidnapped. It was February 4, 1968... ‘I’ll take this little one with me,’ he told her mother, before putting the girl in a car.” (p. 2) 

[67] Carneri, S. (2023, June 2). A first-person account of the network of girls who were held as sex slaves during Paraguay’s dictatorship. EL PAÍS. 

“In 1975, Malena Ashwell... saw that the neighbors were crowding in front of a nearby house. She entered the courtyard. ‘I was horrified to see the lifeless bodies of three girls... two of them were about eight-years-old, the other was nine. [They were all] lying naked on a pile of sand behind the house.’” (p. 5) 

[68] Carneri, S. (2023, June 2). A first-person account of the network of girls who were held as sex slaves during Paraguay’s dictatorship. EL PAÍS. 

“Paraguay is the country with the highest proportion of adolescent pregnancies in South America. 72 of every 1,000 births are to women between the ages of 15 and 19.” (p. 7) 

[69] Carneri, S. (2023, June 2). A first-person account of the network of girls who were held as sex slaves during Paraguay’s dictatorship. EL PAÍS. 

“Every year in Paraguay, about 2,000 reports of sexual abuse against children and adolescents are filed. Around 80% of them occur within the family.” (p. 8) 

[70] Diario HOY. (2020, July 26). Pedofilia y múltiples hijos no reconocidos: reflotan “prontuario” de Stroessner. 

“Cuando Stroessner se cansaba de una mujer, la hacía casar con alguno de los jerarcas del régimen [...] quienes posteriormente se veían beneficiados con promociones en sus carreras a cambio de hacerse cargo de los eventuales embarazos.” (p. 3) 

[71] Diario HOY. (2020, July 26). Pedofilia y múltiples hijos no reconocidos: reflotan “prontuario” de Stroessner. 

“La pedofilia del exdictador era un secreto a voces. ‘Mucha gente sabía y había comentarios sotto voce, pero nadie abría la boca en público...’ escribió Aníbal Miranda en su libro titulado ‘Stroessner’.” (p. 3) 

[72] Diario HOY. (2020, July 26). Pedofilia y múltiples hijos no reconocidos: reflotan “prontuario” de Stroessner. 

“Una de ellas fue Martina Rojas, conocida como ‘Tina’ o ‘China’i’, quien en 1950 tenía solo 13 años de edad cuando Stroessner [...] se fijó en ella. En aquella época, el militar ya tenía 40 años.” (p. 2) 

[73] Diario HOY. (2020, July 26). Pedofilia y múltiples hijos no reconocidos: reflotan “prontuario” de Stroessner. 

“La segunda y seguramente más conocida relación fue con María Estela Legal, popularmente conocida como ‘Ñata’, quien también tenía 13 años cuando se conocieron entre finales de 1959 e inicios de 1960.” (p. 2) 

[74] Diario HOY. (2020, July 26). Pedofilia y múltiples hijos no reconocidos: reflotan “prontuario” de Stroessner. 

“En su libro ‘El Último Supremo’, el periodista paraguayo Bernardo Neri Farina sostiene que la mujer llegó a convertirse en una suerte de segunda Primera Dama debido al vínculo estrecho con el expresidente.” (p. 2) 

[75] Diario HOY. (2020, July 26). Pedofilia y múltiples hijos no reconocidos: reflotan “prontuario” de Stroessner. 

“En otros casos, acudía a casas regentadas por cómplices de la dictadura en donde él y los demás jerarcas abusaban de niñas de entre 10 y 15 años.” (p. 3) 

[76] Diario HOY. (2020, July 26). Pedofilia y múltiples hijos no reconocidos: reflotan “prontuario” de Stroessner. 

“Muchas de las menores que eran sometidas habían sido secuestradas o ‘compradas’. En la mayoría de los casos, se trataba de niñas de bajo recursos [...] ‘Ninguna de ellas superaba los 15 años, con la más joven de 11’.” (p. 3) 

[77] Diario HOY. (2020, July 26). Pedofilia y múltiples hijos no reconocidos: reflotan “prontuario” de Stroessner. 

“‘El dictador no sólo fue un vendepatria, ladrón, asesino, torturador, sino además un perverso sexual, que violaba niñas’, manifestó [...] Rogelio Goiburú.” (p. 4) 

[78] Diario HOY. (2020, July 26). Pedofilia y múltiples hijos no reconocidos: reflotan “prontuario” de Stroessner. 

“Stroessner estuvo formalmente casado hasta su muerte en 2006 con Eligia Mora, con quien tuvo tres hijos [...] Estos son los únicos hijos reconocidos del dictador.” (p. 2)

[79] Dinges, J. (2004). Operation Condor. Columbia University. Retrieved from https://latinamericanstudies.org/chile/operation-condor.htm 

“Operation Condor was an intelligence organization in which multinational teams tracked down dissidents outside their home countries, captured and interrogated them, and in many cases delivered them back to the disappearance apparatus of the military governments they had fled. [...]”

Context summary, all info verified: The documents established that Condor was formally created in November 1975, when Pinochet’s spy chief, Manuel Contreras, invited intelligence officers from Chile, Uruguay, Argentina, Paraguay, Bolivia and Brazil to the Army War Academy on La Alameda, Santiago’s central avenue.— This info is spread over the rest of the document following the ellipse. 

[80] McSherry, J. P. (2002). Tracking the Origins of a State Terror Network: Operation Condor. Latin American Perspectives, 29(1), 38–60. 

“A secret CIA Weekly Summary (no. 1398) of July 2, 1976 contained almost identical language as the June 23 report, but the above information was blacked out. It did establish the date when the Condor countries set up their computerized database on 'subversion': 'intelligence representatives from Bolivia, Uruguay, Paraguay, Brazil, Chile, and Argentina decided at a meeting in Santiago early in June [1976] to set up a computerized intelligence data bank—known as operation "Condor"—and to establish an international communications network.'” (p. 46) 

[81] Plan Cóndor. (n.d.). Historical Context. Retrieved from https://plancondor.org/en/historical-context 

“The Condor System rested on three main pillars: 1. A database situated in Santiago de Chile, which centralised all the intelligence information about subversion in the region; 2. Condortel, a secret and encrypted communications channel enabling member countries to exchange information about prisons and sought individuals; 3. Condoreje, the office for coordination and advanced commands.” (p. 2) 

[82] National Security Archive. (1976). Chile and Operation Condor. Retrieved from https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB125/index.htm 

“This is an action cable signed by Secretary of State Kissinger. It reflects a decision by the Latin American bureau in the State Department to try to stop the Condor plans known to be underway, especially those outside of Latin America. Kissinger instructs the ambassadors of Argentina, Chile and Uruguay to meet as soon as possible with the chief of state or the highest appropriate official of their respective countries and to convey a direct message, known in diplomatic language as a 'demarche.' The ambassadors are instructed to tell the officials the U.S. government has received information that Operation Condor goes beyond information exchange and may 'include plans for the assassination of subversives, politicians and prominent figures both within the national borders of certain Southern Cone countries and abroad.'” (Document 6, p. 3–4) 

[83] National Security Archive. (n.d.). The Condor years: How Pinochet's secret police used the CIA's counterinsurgency program to hunt down and kill leftist opponents in Chile (NSAEBB No. 125). George Washington University. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB125/condor01.pdf  “This "immediate action" cable is the State Department reaction to a succession of violent deaths of major exile leaders in Argentina following the military coup on March 24, 1976. It instructs ambassadors to report any evidence that the governments of Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Bolivia, Paraguay and Brazil are making "international arrangements" to carry out assassinations of exile leaders. The assassination victims up to this point include: Edgardo Enriquez, leader of the Chilean MIR (Movement of the Revolutionary Left) and the leftist coalition, the Junta de Coordinacion Revolucionaria (JCR); Zelmar Michelini, Uruguayan senator; Hector Gutierrez, president of Uruguay's house of deputies; and Juan Jose Torres, former president of Bolivia”

[84] National Security Archive. (2002). Argentina: Secret U.S. Documents Declassified on Dirty War Atrocities. Retrieved from https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB73/index.htm 

“The cooperation between intelligence and security forces of Argentina and Brazil in illegal cross border detentions as well as with other Southern Cone intelligence services, mainly Uruguay and Chile, under Operation Condor in the mid 1970’s; The spill over of counterinsurgency operations of Argentina's intelligence and security units into neighboring Bolivia, Peru and Brazil, as well as Spain in the early 1980’s.” (p. 4) 

[85] National Security Archive. (1976). Chile and Operation Condor (Document 14). Retrieved from https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB125/index.htm 

“The CIA station chief in Uruguay learns that two Uruguayan officers have threatened to kill U.S. Congressman Edward Koch, a prominent human rights critic. The information is reported to CIA headquarters but no action is taken because the threats were delivered while the men were drinking, and because the CIA did not believe the Southern Cone governments were capable of such a mission in the United States.” (p. 9) 

[86] Tremlett, G. (2020, September 3). Operation Condor: The cold war conspiracy that terrorised South America. The Guardian. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/news/2020/sep/03/operation-condor-the-illegal-state-network-that-terrorised-south-america 

“Formal coordinating offices existed in several countries, and the network generated considerable paperwork as documents and encrypted cables were sent back and forth over a dedicated communications network called Condortel. [...] The first was the abandoned car repair garage, Automotores Orletti, where Anatole Larrabeiti was held and his mother Victoria was last seen alive. Larrabeiti still recalls seeing a jar of glittering metal in the garage, in which victims’ wedding rings were kept.” (p. 3) 

[87] Dinges, J. (2004). Operation Condor. Columbia University. Retrieved from https://latinamericanstudies.org/chile/operation-condor.htm 

“The Justice Department has declassified a letter, dated June 6, 1975, showing that an FBI officer, Robert Scherrer, had taken great interest in the arrest of the two revolutionaries. The document is a letter from Scherrer [...] to a Chilean police official in which he passes on information that the men had revealed under interrogation.” (p. 7) 

[88] Plan Cóndor. (n.d.). Historical Context. Retrieved from https://plancondor.org/en/historical-context 

“The transnational network of Operation Condor allowed dictatorships to specifically target exiles who had fled their home countries and continued to denounce the dictatorships in power from abroad. [...] The Condor System rested on three main pillars: 1. A database situated in Santiago de Chile, which centralised all the intelligence information about subversion in the region; 2. Condortel, a secret and encrypted communications channel enabling member countries to exchange information about prisons and sought individuals; 3. Condoreje, the office for coordination and advanced commands.” (p. 2) 

[89] National Security Archive. (1976). Chile and Operation Condor. Retrieved from https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB125/index.htm 

“This is an action cable signed by Secretary of State Kissinger. [...] The ambassadors are instructed to tell the officials the U.S. government has received information that Operation Condor goes beyond information exchange and may 'include plans for the assassination of subversives, politicians and prominent figures both within the national borders of certain Southern Cone countries and abroad.'” (Document 6, p. 3–4) 

[90] Arnoso, M., Bobowik, M., & Beristain, C. (2015). La Comisión de Verdad y Justicia en Paraguay: la experiencia emocional en los rituales de conmemoración y la eficacia percibida de la comisión. Psicología Política, 15(32), 137–155. 

“Durante este periodo, el stronismo apoyado en los distintos aparatos del Estado, cometió graves violaciones a los Derechos Humanos de forma sistemática que incluyeron la desaparición, el exilio, la tortura y demás violaciones a los derechos sociales, políticos y económicos especialmente contra opositores, miembros de comunidades como Ligas Agrarias, y líderes de movimientos sociales y políticos disidentes.” (p. 4) 

[91] Münzel, M. (1973). The Aché Indians: Genocide in Paraguay (IWGIA Document No. 11). International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs. 

“In 1903, Paraguayans shot several Achés, and even cut one of the bodies into pieces and put him in a cage-trap as jaguar bait. MAYNTZHUSEN saw a settler pull out of his hunting bag the finger of an Aché and boast about it.... They had followed the traces of the Aché (in 1907), and they reached the camp of the Aché, slaughtered 7 women and children, and caught 7 small children.” (p. 5) 

[92] Münzel, M. (1973). The Aché Indians: Genocide in Paraguay (IWGIA Document No. 11). International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs. 

“In 1959, the UPI published an article by the Paraguayan ethnologist O. Ferreiro telling how 'slave dealers' hunt the Aché, and citing as one example 'the successful manhunt of Pichín López, who brought back 40 Guayakí (Aché) in chains for public sale in the town of San Juan Nepomuceno.'” (p. 7) 

[93] Münzel, M. (1973). The Aché Indians: Genocide in Paraguay (IWGIA Document No. 11). International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs. 

“In 1961, the Italo-Paraguayan zoologist Dr. L. MIRAGLIA... wrote: 'In the villages near the Guayakí (Aché) area, there are slave traders who organize veritable manhunts for these aborigines. They catch a Guayakí (Aché) family by surprise, murder the parents, and carry off the children to sell them.'” (p. 7) 

[94] Münzel, M. (1973). The Aché Indians: Genocide in Paraguay (IWGIA Document No. 11). International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs. 

“In September or October of 1968, employees of the 'La Golondrina' estancia (between Itakyry and Yhü, in the Department of Caaguazú) undertook an expedition to kill Achés. They were directed by the foreman of the estancia, who declared that he had orders (apparently from the owners of the estancia, the Retamozo Melgarejo family, to liquidate the savages. They killed seven, many or all of them old men, women and children, since the stronger men could escape by running. They captured a girl of about six years of age, whom they brought to the estancia to keep as a servant.” (p. 14) 

[95] Münzel, M. (1973). The Aché Indians: Genocide in Paraguay (IWGIA Document No. 11). International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs. 

“In August 1971... a killing raid against the Aché was undertaken from the estancia of Mr. Parini. This raid was organized towards the end of August 1971, by Parini's foreman Marcial Enciso, who contracted for the purpose some specialists in killing Achés... The killing took place... with 'machete' knives... There were between 12 and 20 killed, some of them most probably the mothers of kidnapped children. At least five small children were captured alive.” (p. 16) 

[96] Münzel, M. (1973). The Aché Indians: Genocide in Paraguay (IWGIA Document No. 11). International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs. 

“In February 1972, close to San Joaquin... a massacre seems to have taken place about the middle of 1971. Various children of slain Aché parents were then deported. The kidnappers are said to have declared that the only reason why they did not take even more children was that they were not able to carry off more at one time, and that they were forced to leave several children with their dead parents, but that they would return to the forest later on to seize them.” (p. 18–19) 

[97] Münzel, M. (1973). The Aché Indians: Genocide in Paraguay (IWGIA Document No. 11). International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs. 

“In 1959, a band of Aché... surrendered to Pereira at Torrín... Afraid of legal prosecution, Jesús Pereira did not dare sell his new Indians, but used them instead as a cheap labour force on his farm... He was nominated as a functionary of the Native Affairs Department of the Ministry of Defense, and his farm transformed into a 'reservation'... CADOGAN remembers: 'When I visited the camp for the first time... they were all wearing their weapons, ornaments, etc., in full; but when I returned for the second time all this had disappeared... the total value of the objects had gone into the purse of Pereira.'” (p. 20–21) 

[98] Münzel, M. (1973). The Aché Indians: Genocide in Paraguay (IWGIA Document No. 11). International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs. 

“In June 1962, the Reservation numbered at least 100 Achés, probably 110... In July 1968, only 68 Indians were left. This demographic reduction... CADOGAN asked in 1965: 'Can we admit that a country like ours... passively allows the last remnants of the most primitive and most interesting tribe... to perish because of the lack of a little bit of Christian charity?'” (p. 22–23) 

[99] Münzel, M. (1973). The Aché Indians: Genocide in Paraguay (IWGIA Document No. 11). International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs. 

“Jesús Pereira punched [Kandepukúgi] brutally in the genital organs several times, then kicked the same parts until Kandepukúgi fell to the ground... continued this treatment until the Indian lost consciousness.” (p. 31) 

[100] Münzel, M. (1973). The Aché Indians: Genocide in Paraguay (IWGIA Document No. 11). International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs. 

“The necessities of hunting limit the size of the traditional Aché band to little more than from 40 to 60 persons. The hunting grounds of each band are divided into sub-zones, successively hunted in the course of a cycle of rotation... Commercial penetration means, from the Aché point of view, that the forest, the indispensable basis for their hunting life, is cut down or at least crossed by roads that frighten away the game.” (p. 9, 13) 

[101] Münzel, M. (1973). The Aché Indians: Genocide in Paraguay (IWGIA Document No. 11). International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs. 

“The ethnologist CLASTRES notes the sharp contrast between the two kinds of relations the Aché know: 'For an Aché tribe, there is no kind of relation to strangers other than hostility. The Whites, the Guarani and even the other Aché, are all potential enemies. There is only one language for them, and that is violence.'” (p. 6) 

[102] Münzel, M. (1973). The Aché Indians: Genocide in Paraguay (IWGIA Document No. 11). International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs. 

“In July 1972, it was finally admitted by those in charge that the nutrition problem is serious... Visiting the latrines on the Reservation, one can easily observe that many of the Indians suffer from diarrhea... 'What impressed me most was the lack of food necessary for the subsistence of the Aché.'” (p. 34–35) 

[103] Münzel, M. (1973). The Aché Indians: Genocide in Paraguay (IWGIA Document No. 11). International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs. 

“The Director of the Native Affairs Department, Colonel Infanzón... declared that there were no concrete indications of massacres of Indians in Paraguay, and that he had received the first unconfirmed details only eight days previously. General Bejarano... described massacres as 'problems' that were 'normal in any part of the world'.” (p. 20) 

[104] ABC Color. (2012, November). Un tenebroso viaje. Abc.com.py; ABC Color. https://www.abc.com.py/especiales/memorias-del-stronismo/la-tecnica-un-tenebroso-viaje-al-pasado-472337.html

“The place, inaugurated as an exhibition point in 2005, still preserves the old punishment and torture cells and several original elements of the National Directorate of Technical Affairs, known simply as "La Técnica".

The dictatorship prepared the siege, located on Chile Nº 1,072 almost Jejuí, with the advice of American Colonel Robert Thierry.

“It was a place installed to end communism. 80 people entered the cells," says Martín Ibarrola, current manager of the Museum of Memory.

It is estimated that between 1956 and 1992, about 10,000 opponents were taken to the place, of which 3,000 died due to torture, according to him.” 

[105] Arnoso, M., Bobowik, M., & Beristain, C. (2015). La Comisión de Verdad y Justicia en Paraguay: la experiencia emocional en los rituales de conmemoración y la eficacia percibida de la comisión. Psicología Política, 15(32), 137–155. 

“La desaparición de trabajadores de LOZADUR [...] son el resultado de una operación de seguridad en el área, presumiblemente por elementos de inteligencia que operan desde la Escuela de Comunicaciones del Ejército en Campo de Mayo. [...] (Otra fuente que consuena con agentes de inteligencia del Ejército ha alegado que 19 trabajadores de cerámica fueron ejecutados en Campo de Mayo en noviembre de 1977).” (p. 9) 

[106] National Security Archive. (1976). Chile and Operation Condor (Document 14). Retrieved from https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB125/index.htm 

“The CIA station chief in Uruguay learns that two Uruguayan officers have threatened to kill U.S. Congressman Edward Koch, a prominent human rights critic. The information is reported to CIA headquarters but no action is taken because the threats were delivered while the men were drinking, and because the CIA did not believe the Southern Cone governments were capable of such a mission in the United States.” (p. 9) 

[107] Arnoso, M., Bobowik, M., & Beristain, C. (2015). La Comisión de Verdad y Justicia en Paraguay: la experiencia emocional en los rituales de conmemoración y la eficacia percibida de la comisión. Psicología Política, 15(32), 137–155. 

“Durante este periodo, el stronismo apoyado en los distintos aparatos del Estado, cometió graves violaciones a los Derechos Humanos de forma sistemática que incluyeron la desaparición, el exilio, la tortura y demás violaciones a los derechos sociales, políticos y económicos especialmente contra opositores, miembros de comunidades como Ligas Agrarias, y líderes de movimientos sociales y políticos disidentes.” (p. 4) 

[108] Dinges, J. (2004). Operation Condor. Columbia University. Retrieved from https://latinamericanstudies.org/chile/operation-condor.htm 

“In May 1975, Paraguayan police arrested two men representing [...] a united underground organization [...] called the Revolutionary Coordinating Body (JCR). The arrests were seen as an intelligence bonanza, according to Paraguayan and US documents. The military operation growing out of the arrests involved the intelligence agencies of at least four countries, including the US FBI.” 

[109] Dinges, J. (2004). Operation Condor. Columbia University. Retrieved from https://latinamericanstudies.org/chile/operation-condor.htm 

“When the Paraguayans were finished with Fuentes, they turned him over to Chile. One document sums up his fate in bureaucratic language: 'By higher order, he [Fuentes] was freed on September 23, 1975, and expelled by way of Presidente Stroessner airport.' [...] Contreras conveys 'the most sincere thanks for the cooperation given us to help in the mission my agents had to carry out in the sister republic of Paraguay, and I am sure that this mutual cooperation will continue and increase in the accomplishment of the common objectives of both services.'”

[110] Federal Reserve History. (2013, November 22). Latin American Debt Crisis of the 1980s. Retrieved from https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/latin-american-debt-crisis. “During the 1970s, two large oil price shocks created current account deficits in many Latin American countries. At the same time, these shocks created current account surpluses among oil-exporting countries. With the encouragement of the US government, large US money-center banks were willing intermediaries between the two groups, providing the exporting countries with a safe, liquid place for their funds and then lending those funds to Latin America. Latin American borrowing from US commercial banks and other creditors increased dramatically during the 1970s. At the end of 1970, total outstanding debt from all sources totaled only $29 billion, but by the end of 1978, that number had skyrocketed to $159 billion. By 1982, the debt level reached $327 billion.”

[111] Operations Evaluation Department. (2001, September 17). Paraguay Country Assistance Evaluation (Report No. 22874). World Bank. “In 1989, total external debt outstanding and disbursed reached $2,522 million, up from $453 million in 1977. Total debt service rose from $43 million in 1977 to $239 million in 1987, equivalent to over 22 percent of exports of goods and services” (pp. 23–24). 

[112] Operations Evaluation Department. (2001, September 17). Paraguay Country Assistance Evaluation (Report No. 22874). World Bank. “However, with completion of the major works on the Itaipu dam in the early 1980s and economic problems in Argentina and Brazil, Paraguay slid into recession. The Government attempted to offset the recession through expanded spending. Rather than stimulating economic growth, the increased external and domestic borrowing that financed over‑dimensioned, unprofitable projects led to accelerating inflation and debt service problems” (p. 6). 

[113] Operations Evaluation Department. (2001, September 17). Paraguay Country Assistance Evaluation (Report No. 22874). World Bank. “Domestic credit to the Government was expanded at a rate of over 25 percent a year during 1978‑84, contributing to inflation. Consumer price increases, which had been in the 10 percent annual range, accelerated to 20‑30 percent” (p. 6). 

[114] Operations Evaluation Department. (2001, September 17). Paraguay Country Assistance Evaluation (Report No. 22874). World Bank. “Ceilings on interest rates resulted in financial disintermediation. The Government instituted a multiple exchange rate system wherein exporters were required to surrender part of their foreign exchange earnings at below market prices, and the Central Bank sold foreign exchange to favored importers at even lower rates. This policy resulted in inflationary Central Bank losses, skewed incentives against exports and encouraged corruption” (p. 6). 

[115] Farah, D. (1986, May 5). Paraguay Restless With Ruler. The Washington Post. “A $100 million Central Bank scandal that broke last year... Under the fraud, dummy import invoices drew dollars from the bank at the artificially low rate of 240 Paraguayan guarants per dollar. The U.S. currency was then sold on the free market, where the dollar at the time was worth more than 1,000 guarants” (p. 3). 

[116] Farah, D. (1986, May 5). Paraguay Restless With Ruler. The Washington Post. “We need a reordering of the economy and a peaceful transition to a democratic system... Stroessner has completed his time” (Tito Scavone, president of the Federation of Production, Industry and Commerce) (p. 3). 

[117] International Monetary Fund. (2025). Prevention and Resolution of Sovereign Debt (Chapter 1: The 1980s Debt Crisis). Retrieved from https://www.elibrary.imf.org/display/book/9781484371329/ch001.xml. “In the U.S., interest rates were raised to a peak of 20 percent in June 1981, with many other advanced economies acting similarly. [...] The combination of higher interest rates and a stronger dollar significantly raised the real burden of dollar-denominated debt” (p. 4). 

[118] Farah, D. (1986, May 5). Paraguay Restless With Ruler. The Washington Post. “Even the business community has soured on the aging president, who has refused even to admit that troubles exist. He and his aides would not acknowledge, for instance, a drought in late 1985 that did serious crop damage” (p. 2). 

[119] Farah, D. (1986, May 5). Paraguay Restless With Ruler. The Washington Post. “Last month, 4,000 medical workers in Asuncion marched on government buildings to complain about salaries of $35 to $55 a month—levels significantly below even the official minimum wage of $80” (p. 4). 

[120] UPI. (1986, May 22). Police break up protest march. “Police used tear gas and electric prods Thursday to break up a march by about 3,500 people demanding higher wages for public hospital employees... Among the demonstrators... were 1,500 doctors seeking increases in their wages, which now range from $32 a month to $65 a month... Some of the demonstrators yelled, ‘It will end, it will end, the military dictatorship will end’” (p. 1). 

[121] Farah, D. (1986, May 5). Paraguay Restless With Ruler. The Washington Post. “To disperse the crowd, the police fired U.S.-made tear gas canisters, which bore an expiration date of August 1970” (p. 4). 

[122] Library of Congress. (n.d.). Political Developments Since 1986. Retrieved from https://countrystudies.us/paraguay/57.htm. “The opposition... did cooperate in holding numerous lightning demonstrations (mitines relampagos), especially in rural areas. Such demonstrations were held and disbanded quickly before the arrival of the police” (p. 2). 

[123] Brooke, J. (1986, May 22). Paraguay Regime Buffeted by Unrest. The New York Times. “Younger people are not interested in Paraguay’s past. They don’t know a Paraguay without Stroessner, but they want something different now” (p. 6). 

[124] UPI. (1986, May 22). Police break up protest march. “Police moved on the marchers as they gathered near the Finance Ministry. ‘We marched and sang the national anthem but were severely beaten,’ said a student protester” (p. 1). 

[125] Brooke, J. (1986, May 22). Paraguay Regime Buffeted by Unrest. The New York Times. “Local Roman Catholic bishops are increasingly vocal in their criticism of the Government and in their calls for a ‘national dialogue’ to restore democracy... ‘You can’t stop history... The country is asking for change and the proper path is peaceful change’” (Auxiliary Bishop Jorge Livieres Banks) (p. 2). 

[126] International Monetary Fund. (2025). Prevention and Resolution of Sovereign Debt (Chapter 1: The 1980s Debt Crisis). Retrieved from https://www.elibrary.imf.org/display/book/9781484371329/ch001.xml. “The combination of higher interest rates and a stronger dollar significantly raised the real burden of dollar-denominated debt” (p. 4). 

[127] Farah, D. (1986, May 5). Paraguay Restless With Ruler. The Washington Post. “Even the business community has soured on the aging president, who has refused even to admit that troubles exist. He and his aides would not acknowledge, for instance, a drought in late 1985 that did serious crop damage” (p. 2). 

[128] Farah, D. (1986, May 5). Paraguay Restless With Ruler. The Washington Post. “Seeking to restore the heavily policed tranquility... authorities last week used tear gas, clubs, water hoses, brass knuckles, horse whips, and electrically charged cords to choke a mounting series of street demonstrations by opposition politicians, independent trade unionists, medical workers and university students” (p. 1). 

[129] Library of Congress. (n.d.). Political Developments Since 1986. Retrieved from https://countrystudies.us/paraguay/57.htm. “In early February 1988, police arrested 200 people attending a National Coordinating Committee meeting in Coronel Oviedo. Forty-eight hours before the elections, Láino and several other National Accord members were placed under house arrest” (p. 2). 

[130] Farah, D. (1986, May 5). Paraguay Restless With Ruler. The Washington Post. “The government has offered no formal response to repeated

appeals from Scavone's group of leading private industrialists for a

free exchange rate, revision of energy prices, sale of state

enterprises and elimination of monopolies.

A $100 million Central Bank scandal that broke last year has

further disturbed many in the business and political establishment

who had turned a blind eye toward Paraguay's prevalent

corruption. Under the fraud, dummy import invoices drew dollars

from the bank at the artificially low rate of 240 Paraguayan

guaranis per dollar. The U.S. currency was then sold on the free

market, where the dollar at the time was worth more than 1,000

guaranis.” (p. 4). 

[131] The Washington Post. (1989, February 4). Paraguay’s New Ruler Had Disputes With Stroessner. “In late January, in what was widely perceived to be a move against Rodriguez’s Cambios Guarani, Stroessner ordered the closing of all foreign exchange companies, citing a run on the national currency. At the same time, Stroessner allowed another son-in-law, a bank owner, to open a foreign exchange division, opposition sources said” (p. 2). 

[132] The Washington Post. (1989, February 4). Paraguay’s New Ruler Had Disputes With Stroessner. “Rodriguez had amassed a fortune from smuggling cigarettes, whiskey and possibly illicit drugs, the sources said. Smuggling goods into Paraguay and reshipping them to neighboring Brazil and Argentina is believed to be Paraguay’s main source of income by far. Reports of Rodriguez’s alleged involvement in drug trafficking most recently surfaced in 1985, when his personal pilot, Juan D. Viveros, was captured along with a plane carrying 43 kilos of cocaine. The cargo earlier had been placed in custody of Rodriguez’s 1st Cavalry Regiment, according to published reports at the time” (p. 1). 

[133] The Washington Post. (1989, February 4). Paraguay’s New Ruler Had Disputes With Stroessner. “If you think of Paraguay as run by a Mafia, then you’ll understand it better. [...] This is like one family in a Mafia organization fighting against another” (p. 2). 

[134] The Washington Post. (1989, February 4). Paraguay’s New Ruler Had Disputes With Stroessner. “Recently, Rodriguez had sided with the ‘traditionalist’ wing of Stroessner’s ruling Colorado Party, which had sought to distance itself from the Paraguayan strongman. The rift between the two generals grew wider when their two children split up amid reports that Stroessner’s son Alfredo was undergoing drug and alcohol treatment” (p. 2).

[135] Farah, D. (1986, May 5). Paraguay Restless With Ruler. The Washington Post. “The party’s existing formulas are spent... Authoritarianism and the personality cult survive from a different era. We need to look for new formulas to resolve our problems” (p. 5). 

[136] Library of Congress. (n.d.). Political Developments Since 1986. Retrieved from https://countrystudies.us/paraguay/57.htm. “Prominent traditionalists, among them the head of the Central Electoral Board and the minister of foreign relations, lost their government positions. Luis María Argafia left his post as chief justice of the Supreme Court... and was replaced by a militant” (p. 4). 

[137] The Washington Post. (1989, February 4). Paraguay’s New Ruler Had Disputes With Stroessner. “Recently, Rodriguez had sided with the ‘traditionalist’ wing of Stroessner’s ruling Colorado Party, which had sought to distance itself from the Paraguayan strongman. The rift between the two generals grew wider when their two children split up amid reports that Stroessner’s son Alfredo was undergoing drug and alcohol treatment” (p. 2). 

[138] Operations Evaluation Department. (2001, September 17). Paraguay Country Assistance Evaluation (Report No. 22874). World Bank. “1.2 During the 1960s and 1970s, the Paraguayan economy experienced relatively high rates of economic growth coupled with low inflation. Agricultural expansion was an important source of

growth and during the 1960-70s land under cultivation expanded rapidly, with cotton and soybeans emerging as important export crops. Paraguay's growth also reflected the influence of triangular trade with its neighbors. Some of this trade is legal: goods are imported into Paraguay, low Paraguayan tariffs are paid, and the goods are then sold to "tourists" from Brazil and Argentina. However, some of the merchandise is smuggled into Paraguay and/or smuggled from Paraguay into Brazil and Argentina. It is very difficult to estimate the value of this trade, or its trend, but the Bank's 1999 Country Economic Memorandum (CEM) estimated that the value added from "tourist trade" and smuggling was equivalent to 25 percent of GDP. Although profitable, this activity is not an unmixed blessing. As the CEM notes, smuggling encourages corruption, affects governance and encourages other illegal activities (such as money

laundering).” (p. 1).

[189] EBSCO Research Starters. (n.d.). Aché (indigenous people). "The Aché are an Indigenous people from the subtropical rainforests of eastern Paraguay, known for their traditional hunter-gatherer lifestyle."

[191] EBSCO Research Starters. (n.d.). Aché (indigenous people). "While Europeans and others have known about the existence of the Aché since the late 1500s or early 1600s, little is known about their origins or earlier history."

[192] EBSCO Research Starters. (n.d.). Aché (indigenous people). "Jesuit missionaries who attempted to convert the Aché in the 1600s considered them 'savages.'"

[193] EBSCO Research Starters. (n.d.). Aché (indigenous people). "The Europeans' descriptions of the Aché emphasized their tendency to wear little to no clothing—perhaps just a piece of fabric on their backs that apparently helped protect their skin from thorns on low-hanging greenery as they moved through the forest."

[195] EBSCO Research Starters. (n.d.). Aché (indigenous people). "The Aché historically lived the simple lives of hunter-gatherers. They hunted small game with bows and arrows and ate from the abundance of mammals, birds, fish, amphibians, and reptiles that lived in their rainforest home."

[196] EBSCO Research Starters. (n.d.). Aché (indigenous people). "The four main groups of Aché, which have little in common as far as language and interaction, include the Northern Aché, the Ñacunday Aché, the Yvytyruzu Aché, and the Ypety Aché."

[197] EBSCO Research Starters. (n.d.). Aché (indigenous people). "The four groups often fought with or kidnapped one another."

[198] EBSCO Research Starters. (n.d.). Aché (indigenous people). "For a long time, the Aché were intentionally evasive about their history. They preferred not to interact with outsiders."

[199] EBSCO Research Starters. (n.d.). Aché (indigenous people). "Instead, they pursued the nomadic lifestyle of hunter-gatherers who lived on what they could find to eat and followed the available food sources."

SECTION 5

[139] Klas Lundstrom. (n.d.). Remembering the ‘Stronismo’: How ghost of a brutal dictator haunts Paraguay. 

“With a population of 6.8 million, a mere 12,000 people own 90 percent of all Paraguayan land, the rest is split between about 280,000 small and medium-sized producers” (p. 5). 

[140] Comisión de Verdad y Justicia. (2008). Informe Final de la Comisión de Verdad y Justicia: Tomo III – Grupos vulnerables y en situación de riesgo. 

“De las 394 comunidades consultadas sobre la posesión y titularidad de sus tierras, 247 cuentan con tierras tituladas, 56 con tierras pero sin título y 91 no tienen tierras” (p. 161). 

(Translation: “Of the 394 communities consulted about land possession and ownership, 247 have titled lands, 56 have lands without titles, and 91 have no lands.”) 

[141] Comisión de Verdad y Justicia. (2008). Informe Final de la Comisión de Verdad y Justicia: Tomo III – Grupos vulnerables y en situación de riesgo. 

“En el año de 1995, las instituciones indigenistas nucleadas … hicieron un recuento de las tierras aseguradas a los pueblos y comunidades indígenas, unas 487 522 hectáreas en total… y de las tierras reivindicadas y pendientes de restitución, unas 1 396 886 hectáreas” (p. 160). 

(Translation: “In 1995, indigenous institutions… tallied the lands secured for Indigenous peoples and communities: 487,522 hectares in total… and 1,396,886 hectares of lands claimed and pending restitution.”) 

[142] Bertelsmann Stiftung. (2024). BTI 2024 Country Report — Paraguay. 

“66.2% of Indigenous people live in poverty, with 34.4% experiencing extreme poverty... Attacks on Indigenous property are rarely prosecuted or sanctioned” (p. 7). 

[143] Bertelsmann Stiftung. (2024). BTI 2024 Country Report — Paraguay. 

“In 2021, the poverty rate ranged from 20.9% (ECLAC) to 26.9% (National Statistics)... Rural areas have higher rates of poverty and extreme poverty (34.6% in poverty, 7.7% in extreme poverty) than urban areas” (p. 19). 

[144] Thomas C. Bruneau. (1991). The Political Situation in Paraguay Two Years After the Coup. 

“Since the coup it has been reported that 291,000 acres have been redistributed to approximately 20,000 peasant families in some thirty-four colonies. There are, however, at least 350,000 landless peasants remaining” (p. 19). 

[145] Thomas C. Bruneau. (1991). The Political Situation in Paraguay Two Years After the Coup. 

“Rather, a special organization within the police (the Fuerzas de Operaciones Policiales Especiales, FOPE) are now tasked to handle evictions” (p. 19). 

[146] Klas Lundstrom. (n.d.). Remembering the ‘Stronismo’: How ghost of a brutal dictator haunts Paraguay. 

“Cartes now controls the Colorado Party and, as described by various observers, ‘owns three-quarters of Congress’” (pp. 15, 18). 

[147] Bertelsmann Stiftung. (2024). BTI 2024 Country Report — Paraguay. 

“95% of cultivated soy plants in Paraguay come from genetically modified varieties... Cattle ranching and commercial agriculture are major drivers of deforestation” (p. 29). 

[148] Latoya Abulu. (2024). Collagen and meat giants fuel deforestation and rights violations in Paraguay: Report. Mongabay. 

“75,000 hectares (185,000 acres) of forest clearance in Paraguay’s Gran Chaco between 2021 and 2023... 18,000 hectares (44,000 acres) occurred on lands of the Ayoreo Totobiegosode... threatening their cultural survival” (pp. 1, 2). 

[149] Thomas C. Bruneau. (1991). The Political Situation in Paraguay Two Years After the Coup. 

“Paraguay has ample reasons to want to renegotiate [the Itaipu Treaty] including the following: 1. The established price is low, and even at that Brazil has not been paying Paraguay; 2. There is a clause which prohibits Paraguay from selling energy to other countries and water has been allowed to run off that could have been used by Paraguay to generate electricity to be sold to Argentina and Uruguay” (pp. 26–27). 

[150] Lambert, P., & Nickson, A. (Eds.). (1997). The Transition to Democracy in Paraguay. Palgrave Macmillan UK. 

“The 1970s was the decade of the hydro-electric boom, when contracts for binational hydro-electric projects were signed with both Brazil (Itaipu) and Argentina (Yacyreta). … Contrary to the official rhetoric, the economic boom had very harmful effects on the environment” (pp. 166–167). 

[151] August 14, L. B. |, & 2019. (n.d.). Why Has Energy Spawned a Political Crisis in Paraguay? Americas Quarterly. https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/why-has-energy-spawned-a-political-crisis-in-paraguay/ 

“The unfolding scandal centers on the vast Itaipú dam. Bridging the

Paraná River between Paraguay and Brazil, the shared hydroelectric facility was built by the countries’ military dictatorships in the 1970s following a border crisis. Its construction was mired in allegations of billions of dollars in kickbacks, the murder of an ambassador and the mass eviction of indigenous communities.” 

[152] Thomas C. Bruneau. (1991). The Political Situation in Paraguay Two Years After the Coup. 

“SENAD [Servicio Nacional Antidrogas] is under the command of an anti-drug czar, General David Marcial Samaniego. General Samaniego has powers to demand cooperation from other government agencies, and his office is responsible for coordination and oversight of all counterdrug policy” (p. 24). 

[153] Lambert, P., & Nickson, A. (Eds.). (1997). The Transition to Democracy in Paraguay. Palgrave Macmillan UK. 

“In 1945, 50 per cent of the Eastern Region of the country was covered by forests. This figure had fallen to less than 25 per cent by the early 1990s” (p. 171). 

[154] Comisión de Verdad y Justicia. (2008). Informe Final de la Comisión de Verdad y Justicia: Tomo III – Grupos vulnerables y en situación de riesgo. 

“El 15,5% de los niños, niñas y adolescentes que dieron su testimonio en la CVJ fueron víctimas de la violencia sexual, 63,5% de ellas eran niñas y adolescentes” (p. 120). 

(Translation: “15.5% of the children and adolescents who testified before the CVJ were victims of sexual violence, 63.5% of whom were girls and adolescents.”) 

[155] Klas Lundstrom. (n.d.). Remembering the ‘Stronismo’: How ghost of a brutal dictator haunts Paraguay. 

“94% of 20,000 arbitrarily arrested civilians during Stroessner’s rule were tortured” (p. 11). 

[156] Klas Lundstrom. (n.d.). Remembering the ‘Stronismo’: How ghost of a brutal dictator haunts Paraguay. 

“The Archives of Terror... list 50,000 murdered, 30,000 ‘disappeared,’ and 400,000 imprisoned” (p. 2). 

[157] Klas Lundstrom. (n.d.). Remembering the ‘Stronismo’: How ghost of a brutal dictator haunts Paraguay. 

“Cartes now controls the Colorado Party and, as described by various observers, ‘owns three-quarters of Congress’” (pp. 15, 18). 

[158] Americas Watch. (1992, October 18). Paraguay: An Encouraging Victory in the Search for Truth and Justice. 

“Five other witnesses, who were prisoners that day in the precinct, also testified that they saw Schaerer in extremely poor physical condition, and that they themselves had been tortured. In addition, two prisoners testified that defendant Juan Martínez told them, by way of a threat, that he had killed Mario Schaerer” (p. 12). 

[159] Thomas C. Bruneau. (1991). The Political Situation in Paraguay Two Years After the Coup. 

“The day before the 14 July 1991 party convention, President Rodriguez criticized the Colorados and very strongly expressed his distress at the factionalization. In referring to the five goals in the 3 February 1989 proclamation, 'We still have not achieved granite unity within the ANR. I have requested and desire that unity and I am distressed because we have not yet achieved it'” (p. 9). 

[160] Lambert, P., & Nickson, A. (Eds.). (1997). The Transition to Democracy in Paraguay. Palgrave Macmillan UK. 

“With his public presence in traditional ceremonies, the constant public adulation and his own rhetoric, Stroessner, ironically of German descent, became a central part of Paraguayan identity. He was the Segundo Reconstructor del País, Benefactor de la Patria, and el Único Líder” (p. 4). 

[161] Lambert, P., & Nickson, A. (Eds.). (1997). The Transition to Democracy in Paraguay. Palgrave Macmillan UK. 

“Although this figure may seem small, US aid as a percentage of GDP reached 2.7 per cent (1953–61) and 4.9 per cent between 1962 and 1965” (p. 608). 

[162] Nickson, R. A. (1995). Paraguay’s Archivo del Terror. Latin American Research Review. 

“The lack of competitive tendering and over‑invoicing was a principal cause of the escalation in project costs from an original estimate of $2,000 m in 1973 to $21,000 m by 1991” (p. 134). 

[163] Inter-American Development Bank. (1992). Paraguay: Structural adjustment program and sector investment programs. Inter-American Development Bank. https://publications.iadb.org/publications/english/document/Paraguay-Structural-Adjustment-Program-and-Sector-Investment-Programs.pdf. 

“Kannonikoff and Schaerer were taken to police precinct No. 11, and then to the Department of Investigations. Kannonikoff testified that she saw Mario Schaerer three times during the course of the next day. She recalled that she first saw him being taken to another room by two plainclothes agents and that a few minutes later she could hear his screams of pain. The last time she saw him, he was being held up by two men, his head against his chest, his eyes closed, and

wounds on his face. Five other witnesses, who were prisoners that day in the precinct, also testified that they saw Schaerer in extremely poor physical condition, and that they themselves had been tortured. In addition, two prisoners testified that defendant Juan MartÌnez told them, by way of a threat, that he had killed Mario Schaerer.” 

[164] Thomas C. Bruneau. (1991). The Political Situation in Paraguay Two Years After the Coup. 

“Under the State Department's International Narcotics Matters, Paraguay received $300,000 in 1991 for various training requirements, cooperative programs, and purchasing dogs. There is no security assistance program, but there was $175,000 in FY-91 for International Military Education and Training” (p. 24). 

[165] Sondrol, P. C. (1992). Paraguay's "unique" politics: The breakdown of the Stroessner regime and the prospects for democracy. U.S. Army War College.

“THE POLITICAL evolution of Paraguay suggests that its civil-military elites are overseeing a controlled liberalization of society that will lead to a "dictablanda' (or liberal autocracy), rather than to a real democracy. The Rodriguez government has initiated something akin to a "Prague Spring" in Asuncion.Authoritarian controls have relaxed, but democratic consolida-tion remains problematic. Paraguayan civilians played little role in ending the stronato, the armed forces revolted. Praetorianism remains the persistent pattern in Paraguay” (p. 150). 

[166] Coup attempt fails in Paraguay. (2000, May 19). Deseret News. 

“Forces loyal to a fugitive coup leader tried to topple the Paraguayan government, driving tanks through the center of the capital and blasting a hole in the Congress building before being persuaded to lay down their arms and be arrested early today” (p. 1). 

[167] U.S. Library of Congress. (n.d.). Political Developments Since 1986. In Paraguay: A Country Study. 

“The government reported that 88.7 percent of the vote went to Stroessner, 7.1 percent to PLR candidate Luis María Vega, and 3.2 percent to PL candidate Carlos Ferreira Ibarra... The National Coordinating Committee rejected the government's figures, contending that abstention was as high as 50 percent in some areas” (p. 3). 

[168] Americas Watch. (1992, October 18). Paraguay: An Encouraging Victory in the Search for Truth and Justice. 

“Numerous high ranking [officials] made the transition from the old regime to the government of the 'Revolución Libertadora' without significant protest from the opposition” (p. 3). 

[169] Lambert, P., & Nickson, A. (Eds.). (1997). The Transition to Democracy in Paraguay. Palgrave Macmillan UK. 

“Although this figure may seem small, US aid as a percentage of GDP reached 2.7 per cent (1953–61) and 4.9 per cent between 1962 and 1965 (Nickson, 1993b: 608). In addition, Stroessner received indirect US support through loans from the World Bank, totalling US $504 million, and the Inter-American Development Bank, totalling US $619 million.” (p. 166) 

[170] Lambert, P., & Nickson, A. (Eds.). (1997). The Transition to Democracy in Paraguay. Palgrave Macmillan UK. 

“The lack of competitive tendering and over‑invoicing was a principal cause of the escalation in project costs from an original estimate of $2,000 m in 1973 to $21,000 m by 1991. Although most of the kickbacks went to Brazilian politicians, the Consorcio Nacional de Empresas Paraguayas (CONEMPA)… held a virtual monopoly of all contracts awarded to Paraguay, totalling $1,475 m between 1973–83.” (p. 134) 

[171] Americas Watch. (1992, October 18). Paraguay: An Encouraging Victory in the Search for Truth and Justice (Vol. IV, No. 9). 

“As a unit dedicated to enforcing drug laws, DINAR receives assistance from the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA).” (p. 20) 

[172] Special Collections, Leonard H. Axe Library. (2022). Paraguay Archives of Terror collection, 1957-1999. Pittsburg State University. 

“The United States… provided planning, coordination, training on torture, financial & military aid to Operation Condor regimes.” (p. 2) 

[173] U.S. Library of Congress. (n.d.). Political Developments Since 1986. In Paraguay: A Country Study. Retrieved from https://countrystudies.us/paraguay/57.htm 

“The government reported that 88.7 percent of the vote went to Stroessner, 7.1 percent to PLR candidate Luis María Vega, and 3.2 percent to PL candidate Carlos Ferreira Ibarra… The National Coordinating Committee rejected the government’s figures, contending that abstention was as high as 50 percent in some areas.” (p. 3) 

[174] U.S. Library of Congress. (n.d.). Political Developments Since 1986. In Paraguay: A Country Study. Retrieved from https://countrystudies.us/paraguay/57.htm 

“Election monitors from twelve countries, including the United States, France, Spain, Brazil, and Argentina, reported extensive irregularities.” (p. 3) 

[175] Americas Watch. (1992, October 18). Paraguay: An Encouraging Victory in the Search for Truth and Justice (Vol. IV, No. 9). 

“The February 1989 coup was, in fact, a relatively successful attempt to preempt the demise of the armed forces and avoid, or at least postpone, an opposition take-over. Stroessner’s power and stability had been based on an Alliance between the Colorado Party, the armed forces and himself as the military strong-man in the presidency. Though Stroessner has been replaced by General Andrés Rodríguez, in effect the tripartite power base remains in place. One manifestation of this is the fact that numerous high ranking [officials] made the transition from the old regime to the government of the ‘Revolución Libertadora’ without significant protest from the opposition.” (p. 3) 

[176] Bruneau, T. C. (1991). The Political Situation in Paraguay Two Years After the Coup (Report No. NPS-NS-91-013). Naval Postgraduate School. 

“President Rodriguez, unlike his predecessor, attempts to get along well with the Church, and publicly practices the religion. Church-state relations are good, but for criticism of the government to halt corruption.” (p. 17) 

[177] Bruneau, T. C. (1991). The Political Situation in Paraguay Two Years After the Coup (Report No. NPS-NS-91-013). Naval Postgraduate School. 

“The United States does have a number of relatively small assistance programs with Paraguay… $175,000 in FY-91 for International Military Education and Training. In addition, the United States and Paraguayan military train jointly in a number of exercises.” (p. 24) 

[178] Americas Watch. (1992, October 18). Paraguay: An Encouraging Victory in the Search for Truth and Justice (Vol. IV, No. 9). 

“During 1990, the [parliamentary human rights] commissions continued to receive denunciations of new human rights violations, in particular the beating and arbitrary arrest of thousands of peasant squatters and the torture of adolescent and adult suspects in police precincts. They organized visits around the country to confirm such reports and provided information to the press.” (p. 5) 

[179] Comisión de Verdad y Justicia. (2008). Informe Final de la Comisión de Verdad y Justicia: Tomo III – Grupos vulnerables y en situación de riesgo. Asunción, Paraguay. 

“El 4 de abril de 1968 el coronel Miers llegó a mi casa con dos soldados… Tenía 13 años… me llevaron a su amplio dormitorio y… al tomar el segundo vaso empezó a destrozarme mi solerita, mi ropa que me llevaba puesta… y me dejó todo con mordidas mi pechito y con heridas profundas, sangraba…” 

Translation: “On April 4, 1968, Colonel Miers arrived at my house with two soldiers… I was 13 years old… they took me to his large bedroom… after the second drink, he began to destroy my little slip, the clothes I was wearing… and left my chest covered in bites and deep wounds, bleeding…” (p. 124) 

[180] Amnesty International. (2008, August 20). Major step forward in Paraguay’s investigations into sexual slavery of girls. 

“These violations include sexual violence against women. Girls as young as seven are believed to have been snatched from their homes and ‘groomed’ to serve high ranking military officials.” (para. 3)

[181] Comisión de Verdad y Justicia. (2008). Informe Final de la Comisión de Verdad y Justicia: Tomo III – Grupos vulnerables y en situación de riesgo. Asunción, Paraguay. 

“Kamonikoff testificó que vio a Mario Schaerer tres veces durante el día siguiente. Recordó que la primera vez que lo vio lo llevaban a otra habitación por dos agentes de civil y que unos minutos después podía escuchar sus gritos de dolor. La última vez que lo vio, estaba siendo sostenido por dos hombres, la cabeza contra el pecho, los ojos cerrados y heridas en la cara… dos prisioneros testificaron que el acusado Juan Martínez les dijo, a modo de amenaza, que él había matado a Mario Schaerer.” 

Translation: “Kamonikoff testified that she saw Mario Schaerer three times the following day. She recalled that the first time she saw him, he was being taken to another room by two plainclothes agents, and a few minutes later she could hear his screams of pain. The last time she saw him, he was being held up by two men, his head against his chest, eyes closed, and wounds on his face… two prisoners testified that defendant Juan Martínez told them, by way of a threat, that he had killed Mario Schaerer.” (p. 12) 

[182] Special Collections, Leonard H. Axe Library. (2022). Paraguay Archives of Terror collection, 1957-1999. Pittsburg State University. 

“The Archives of Terror… list 50,000 murdered, 30,000 ‘disappeared,’ and 400,000 imprisoned… confirm U.S. involvement from Johnson to Reagan.” (p. 2) 

[183] Americas Watch. (1992, October 18). Paraguay: An Encouraging Victory in the Search for Truth and Justice (Vol. IV, No. 9). 

“Four high-ranking police officers were convicted of the 1976 torture and homicide of Mario Schaerer Prono, a political prisoner, and were sentenced to the maximum twenty-five years imprisonment. In addition, a retired army general was convicted for participating in the cover-up of the same case and given five years.” (p. 2) 

[184] Comisión de Verdad y Justicia. (2008). Informe Final de la Comisión de Verdad y Justicia: Tomo III – Grupos vulnerables y en situación de riesgo. Asunción, Paraguay. 

“Hace más de 35 años que esa empresa tan rica llamada Itaipú, que se apropió de la tierra y la alambró expulsando a los indígenas, viene diciendo de los indígenas que son haraganes, que no quieren trabajar… Pero cuánta mentira…” 

Translation: “For over 35 years, that wealthy company called Itaipú, which seized and fenced off land, expelling Indigenous people, has been claiming that Indigenous people are lazy and don’t want to work… But what a lie…” (p. 229) 

[185] Americas Watch. (1992, October 18). Paraguay: An Encouraging Victory in the Search for Truth and Justice (Vol. IV, No. 9). 

“During 1990, the [parliamentary human rights] commissions continued to receive denunciations of new human rights violations, in particular the beating and arbitrary arrest of thousands of peasant squatters and the torture of adolescent and adult suspects in police precincts.” (p. 5) 

[186] Comisión de Verdad y Justicia. (2008). Informe Final de la Comisión de Verdad y Justicia: Tomo III – Grupos vulnerables y en situación de riesgo. Asunción, Paraguay. 

“En el articulado se establece que el gobierno dictará un reglamento especial ‘que armonice en estos momentos con la índole de los habitantes (…) por manera que pueda hacérseles perder gradualmente sus antiguos usos’.” 

Translation: “The law stipulates that the government will enact a special regulation ‘to harmonize with the nature of the inhabitants […] so that they may gradually lose their former customs’.” (p. 165) 

[187] Comisión de Verdad y Justicia. (2008). Informe Final de la Comisión de Verdad y Justicia: Tomo III – Grupos vulnerables y en situación de riesgo. Asunción, Paraguay. 

“Somos discriminados y esto se extiende a la identidad, la salud, la educación; tanta es la negación de la identidad, de la ciudadanía, que muchos indígenas ni siquiera tienen cédula.” 

Translation: “We are discriminated against, and this extends to our identity, healthcare, and education. The denial of identity and citizenship is so severe that many Indigenous people don’t even have ID cards.” (p. 164) 

[188] Bertelsmann Stiftung. (2024). BTI 2024 Country Report — Paraguay. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung. 

“66.2% of Indigenous people live in poverty, with 34.4% experiencing extreme poverty… Attacks on Indigenous property are rarely prosecuted or sanctioned.” (p. 7) 

[189] Klas Lundstrom. (n.d.). Remembering the ‘Stronismo’: How ghost of a brutal dictator haunts Paraguay. 

“Conservative voices… draw on the epoch of ‘Stronismo’ against a modern society where insecurity and crime are rampant… forget[ting] to mention that the same political party and the late dictator's heirs remain in total control.” (p. 18)