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Bibliography:

[1] DePersio, G. (2023) ‘Economics:  What Are Arguments in Favor of Privatizing Public Goods?’. Investopedia. https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/040615/what-are-main-arguments-favor-privatization-public-goods.asp

“The free-rider problem is the burden on a shared resource that is created by its use or overuse by people who aren't paying for their share of it. Because public goods are a shared resource—even people who don't pay for them can use them—they give rise to the free-rider problem….. Another conundrum of a system of public goods is the problem of the forced rider. Through taxation, some people are forced to help pay for public goods that they will never use.…. The second argument that is typically made in favor of privatizing public goods is that introducing competition to the public sector would reduce the price of public goods and increase efficiency.”

[2] Gibb, R., Lowndes, T., & Charlton, C. (1996). ‘The privatization of British Rail.’ Applied Geography, 16(1), 35–51. doi:10.1016/0143-6228(95)00024-0  - “Since 1979, the dominant philosophy of government in Britain has been that of the neoliberal-searching for ways to reduce public-sector involvement, promote market-led policies and encourage free-market economies driven by enhanced competition. At the heart of this policy has been the privatization of public-sector industries”

[3] Wolmar, C. (2005) On the Wrong Line: How Ideology and Incompetence Wrecked Britain's Railways - “Ministers were too concerned with ensuring that the whole edifice was broken up and sold in time for the 1997 election to bother much about the short-term financial effect”

[4] Bowman, A. (2015). An illusion of success: The consequences of British rail privatisation. Accounting Forum, 39(1), 51–63. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.accfor.2014.10.001 “While nominally a ‘private’ company Network Rail’s financial viability has depended on government guarantees to underwrite its bonds. This had the impact of reducing borrowing costs because Network Rail was essentially able to borrow at a risk free rate with Government guarantees.” (p.52)

[5] Wolmar, C. (2005). On the Wrong Line: How Ideology and Incompetence Wrecked Britain's Railways. “The arbitrary division of the Briscos into maintenance and renewal companies was another error which contributed to the lack of control that Railtrack had over the management and maintenance of its own assets.” (p.61)

[6] Wolmar, C. (2005). On the Wrong Line: How Ideology and Incompetence Wrecked Britain's Railways. “In reality Railtrack became even more heavily dependent on subsidy than BR.” (p.68)

[7] Wolmar, C. (2005). On the Wrong Line: How Ideology and Incompetence Wrecked Britain's Railways. “Separating Railtrack from the rest of the industry was crazy enough. But trying to turn it into a conventional profit-making company was even madder.” (p.60)

[8] Wolmar, C. (2005). On the Wrong Line: How Ideology and Incompetence Wrecked Britain's Railways. “In the autumn of 1995, for example, it had produced its first 2,100-page Great Britain Passenger Railway Timetable... there were so many mistakes that two supplements totalling over 300 pages had to be produced simultaneously, a fiasco which led Barry Doe, a timetable expert, to say, Eventually it pulped the whole 80,000 print run.” (p.67)

[9] Wolmar, C. (2005). On the Wrong Line: How Ideology and Incompetence Wrecked Britain's Railways. “As TAS, a business monitoring organisation that researches railway company finances, pointed out, ‘It is clear that some bidders in the first round took too much risk and, as a result, heavy losses are being incurred.’” (p.178)

[10] Wolmar, C. (2005). On the Wrong Line: How Ideology and Incompetence Wrecked Britain's Railways. “The crash at Ladbroke Grove on 5 October 1999... can, like Southall, be linked directly to the changes made as a result of privatisation and fragmentation.” (p.97)

[11] Bowman, A. (2015). An illusion of success: The consequences of British rail privatisation. Accounting Forum, 39(1), 51–63. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.accfor.2014.10.001 “In recognition of this, the Office for National Statistics (ONS) issued an announcement in December 2013 stating that Network Rail would be reclassified as a ‘Central Government body’.” (p.52)

[12] Butcher, L. (2018) ‘A Quick Guide to the Railways’. House of Commons Library. “Train operators lease their trains from rolling stock companies, who own the trains.” (p.15)

[13] Butcher, L. (2018). ‘A Quick Guide to the Railways’. House of Commons Library. “The industry is dominated by just three companies... in 2015, three ROSCOs controlled almost 90 per cent of the market.” (p.18)

[14] Butcher, L. (2018). ‘A Quick Guide to the Railways’. House of Commons Library. “Private train operators still rely on government subsidies to remain viable, despite generating profits and paying dividends to shareholders.” (p.21)

[15] Wolmar, C. (2005). On the Wrong Line: How Ideology and Incompetence Wrecked Britain's Railways. “The loss of life at the Southall and Ladbroke Grove disasters are examples of what happens when safety and maintenance are cut to save costs.” (p.90)

[16] Wolmar, C. (2005). On the Wrong Line: How Ideology and Incompetence Wrecked Britain's Railways. “Privatisation exacerbated a range of safety issues, but it was not until the Ladbroke Grove disaster that the public really became aware of the flaws in the system.” (p.101)

[17] Wolmar, C. (2005). On the Wrong Line: How Ideology and Incompetence Wrecked Britain's Railways. “After Railtrack collapsed in 2002, the government took over the responsibility for the infrastructure, creating National Rail.” (p.103)

[18] Butcher, L. (2018). ‘A Quick Guide to the Railways’. House of Commons Library. “While rail privatisation may have introduced some efficiency in certain areas, ticket prices are among the highest in Europe and the taxpayer is still funding much of the system.” (p.7)

[19] Butcher, L. (2018). ‘A Quick Guide to the Railways’. House of Commons Library. “The amount of government subsidy to the rail industry has increased substantially since privatisation... 2007–08, the total subsidy was £3.9bn.” (p.20)

[20] Butcher, L. (2018). ‘A Quick Guide to the Railways’. House of Commons Library. “While there is a government-imposed limit on certain fares, the rising cost of unregulated fares, such as long-distance tickets, remains an ongoing concern for passengers.” (p.21)

[21] Butcher, L. (2018). ‘A Quick Guide to the Railways’. House of Commons Library. “The privatised rail system is now one of the most expensive in Europe, with high fares and increasing costs to passengers.” (p.22)

[22] Bowman, A. (2015). An illusion of success: The consequences of British rail privatisation. Accounting Forum, 39(1), 51–63. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.accfor.2014.10.001 “Private sector involvement has often been used as a cover for escalating public costs, with the government continuing to provide substantial subsidies to ensure the system’s continued operation.” (p.53)

[23] Wolmar, C. (2005). On the Wrong Line: How Ideology and Incompetence Wrecked Britain's Railways. “At least £8.3bn has been paid out to private rail companies in the form of dividend payments, making it clear that privatisation has shifted profits from taxpayers to shareholders.” (p.110)

[24] Bowman, A. (2015). An illusion of success: The consequences of British rail privatisation. Accounting Forum, 39(1), 51–63. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.accfor.2014.10.001 “Most passengers have no choice but to use the operator that runs services on their route, limiting any potential for competition.” (p.52)

[25] Wolmar, C. (2005). On the Wrong Line: How Ideology and Incompetence Wrecked Britain's Railways. “In the privatised system, fares are manipulated according to demand, particularly during peak hours.” (p.64)

[26] Butcher, L. (2018). ‘A Quick Guide to the Railways’. House of Commons Library. “Many routes have only one operator, limiting consumer choice and leaving passengers with no real alternatives.” (p.19)

[27] Butcher, L. (2018). ‘A Quick Guide to the Railways’. House of Commons Library. “Trains are leased from a small group of rolling stock companies, which are responsible for maintaining and leasing the physical assets.” (p.18)

[28] Bowman, A. (2015). An illusion of success: The consequences of British rail privatisation. Accounting Forum, 39(1), 51–63. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.accfor.2014.10.001 “Despite privatisation, much of the infrastructure and management of the railway network is still controlled by one government-backed entity, Network Rail.” (p.51)

[29] Wolmar, C. (2005). On the Wrong Line: How Ideology and Incompetence Wrecked Britain's Railways. “It’s so bad that, if it wasn’t for the high prices, you’d barely know it was privatised.” (p.65)

[30] Bowman, A. (2015). An illusion of success: The consequences of British rail privatisation. Accounting Forum, 39(1), 51–63. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.accfor.2014.10.001 “The existence of empty first-class seats on crowded trains is a symbol of the inefficiency inherent in the privatised system.” (p.52)

[31] Parris, M. (2002). ‘The Enforcement Problem.’ The Financial Times. “In one case, a transport company spent more on enforcement than they had collected in fines.” (p.23)

[32] Bowman, A. (2015). An illusion of success: The consequences of British rail privatisation. Accounting Forum, 39(1), 51–63. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.accfor.2014.10.001 “Enforcement costs far exceed the benefits, with huge sums spent on protecting profit margins rather than improving service quality.” (p.51)

[33] Wolmar, C. (2005). On the Wrong Line: How Ideology and Incompetence Wrecked Britain's Railways. “Privatisation gave rise to an obsession with protecting profit rather than delivering an efficient, public service.” (p.110)

[34] Bowman, A. (2015). An illusion of success: The consequences of British rail privatisation. Accounting Forum, 39(1), 51–63. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.accfor.2014.10.001 “Despite its claim to improve services, the privatised railway system has become a drain on public resources, offering little benefit to the taxpayer.” (p.52)

[35] Felton, R., Gill, L., & Kendall, L. (2021). We sampled tap water across the US – and found arsenic, lead and toxic chemicals. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/mar/31/americas-tap-water-samples-forever-chemicals
"In Connecticut, a condo had lead in its drinking water at levels more than double what the federal government deems acceptable. At a church in North Carolina, the water was contaminated with extremely high levels of potentially toxic PFAS chemicals (a group of compounds found in hundreds of household products). The water flowing into a Texas home had both – and concerning amounts of arsenic too." (p. 1)

[36] United States Mission to the United Nations. (2023). FACT SHEET: United States Announces $49 Billion in Commitments to Global Water Security and Sanitation. https://usun.usmission.gov/fact-sheet-united-states-announces-49-billion-in-commitments-to-global-water-security-and-sanitation/#:~:text=Today%2C%20more%20than%20two%20million,compared%20to%20non%2DNative%20households.
"Today, more than two million Americans lack access to clean drinking water at home, and more than one million Americans don’t have the plumbing required to flush a toilet. Native American households are 19 times more likely to lack indoor plumbing, compared to non-Native households." (p. 1)

[37] NRDC. (2023). America’s Failing Drinking Water System. October 5, 2023. Nicole Greenfield.
"Poor drinking water quality has plagued Puerto Rico for years. In 2015, more than 3.4 million Puerto Ricans, 99.5 percent of the island’s population, drank from water supply systems with violations under the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA)." (p. 1)

[38] William & Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review. (2008-2009). Water Privatization Trends in the United States: Human Rights, National Security, and Public Safety.
"The amount of all public water services in the United States provided by privately-owned water suppliers is relatively small. They serve about 15% of U.S. water customers (measured in volume of water handled), take in about 14% of total water revenues, and hold about 11% of all water system assets in the United States." (p. 785)

[39] Melosi, M.V. (2011). Precious Commodity: Providing Water for America's Cities. University of Pittsburgh Press. "The trend toward privatization really began in the 1980s, under the Reagan administration and its wider push towards the private sector." (p. 189)

[40] Melosi, M.V. (2011). Precious Commodity: Providing Water for America's Cities. University of Pittsburgh Press. "In many cases privatization has followed the so-called French model that suggests public-private partnerships (PPPs), where the state continues to own the assets but a private entity operates and plans water service." (p. 182)

[41] Aker, A. (2016). Privatized Water Costs More Than Public Water. Food and Water Watch. https://www.foodandwaterwatch.org/2016/02/16/privatized-water-costs-more-than-public-water/
"Private water utilities charge families 59% more on their water bills than public utilities, on average." (p. 1)

[42] Aker, A. (2016). Privatized Water Costs More Than Public Water. Food and Water Watch. https://www.foodandwaterwatch.org/2016/02/16/privatized-water-costs-more-than-public-water/
"Private water utilities charge families 59% more on their water bills than public utilities, on average. In some areas, it’s even worse." (p. 1)

[43] Aker, A. (2016). Privatized Water Costs More Than Public Water. Food and Water Watch. https://www.foodandwaterwatch.org/2016/02/16/privatized-water-costs-more-than-public-water/
"In Pennsylvania, private water costs a whopping $323 more." (p. 1)

[44] Zhang, X., González Rivas, M., Grant, M. E., & Warner, M. (2022). Water pricing and affordability in the US: public vs. private ownership. Water Policy, 24(3), 500–516. https://doi.org/10.2166/wp.2022.283
"Regression results show that, among the largest water systems, private ownership is related to higher water prices and less affordability for low-income families." (p. 1)

[45] Zhang, X., González Rivas, M., Grant, M. E., & Warner, M. (2022). Water pricing and affordability in the US: public vs. private ownership. Water Policy, 24(3), 500–516. https://doi.org/10.2166/wp.2022.283
"Private ownership increases water bills by even more than severe drought." (p. 1)

[46] Zhang, X., González Rivas, M., Grant, M. E., & Warner, M. (2022). Water pricing and affordability in the US: public vs. private ownership. Water Policy, 24(3), 500–516. https://doi.org/10.2166/wp.2022.283
"Even when there is no difference in the way the system is managed, costs increase." (p. 1)

[47] Tsybine, A. (2001). Water Privatization: A Broken Promise. Public Citizen’s Critical Mass Energy and Environment Program.
"A lack of financial transparency prevents the city from evaluating whether the price commanded by the company is reasonable. The company is not required to open its books for a municipal review." (p. 1)

[48] William & Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review. (2008-2009). Water Privatization Trends in the United States: Human Rights, National Security, and Public Safety.
"Most famously, Atlanta granted a twenty-year contract to United Water in 1998 to operate its municipal water system, which Atlanta terminated just four years later for quality-of-service and mismanagement problems." (p. 786)

[49] William & Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review. (2008-2009). Water Privatization Trends in the United States: Human Rights, National Security, and Public Safety.
"Water often had to be boiled due to insufficient water pressure, ran a rusty brown color, and did not even reach many customers for lengthy periods due to backlogged work orders." (p. 786)

[50] William & Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review. (2008-2009). Water Privatization Trends in the United States: Human Rights, National Security, and Public Safety.
"The only notable improvement over the public sector was in their enforcement of unpaid bills." (p. 786)

[51] United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs: Sustainable Development. (2021). Germany - Progress on achieving SDG 6. https://sdgs.un.org/basic-page/germany-34125
"Comparable countries that have a publicly owned nationally led water supply perform much better overall, and are able to provide efficient high-quality water to their entire population." (p. 1)

[52] Cote, S. C. (2019). Oil and Nation: A History of Bolivia’s Petroleum Sector. “The country became an international model for neoliberal 'shock therapy' in 1985. The economy underwent structural adjustment to end hyperinflationary cycles ­ running as high as 23,000 ­ percent.” (p. 27)

[53] Hindery, D. (2010). Enron to Evo: Pipeline Politics, Global Environmentalism, and Indigenous Rights in Bolivia. “The neoliberal economic 'reforms' adopted in the early 1980s... increased unemployment and inequality grew dramatically as shrinking government revenues prevented social spending to protect ­ those most in need.” (p. 28)

[54] Bonifaz, J., & Lefebvre, S. (2014, November 24). Lessons from Bolivia: re-nationalising the hydrocarbon industry. openDemocracyUK. “The state carried out privatizations amid deep budget cuts while opening the economy to foreign companies in order to appease foreign lenders.” (p. 3)

[55] Hindery, D. (2010). Enron to Evo: Pipeline Politics, Global Environmentalism, and Indigenous Rights in Bolivia. “YPFB was broken up into different segments (transport, pipelines, exploration, and so on) and sold off to various companies, including the U.S.-based multinational Enron.” (p. 28)

[56] Bonifaz, J., & Lefebvre, S. (2014, November 24). Lessons from Bolivia: re-nationalising the hydrocarbon industry. openDemocracyUK. “The winners of the auction, including Enron, Shell and Repsol YPF, were not asked to pay for their shares; instead they simply committed themselves to investing an amount at least equal to the sale 'price' over a period of seven years...” (p. 3)

[57] Hindery, D. (2010). Enron to Evo: Pipeline Politics, Global Environmentalism, and Indigenous Rights in Bolivia. “Foreign oil corporations reaped a full 82% of the value of gas produced through various taxes, while the state received only 18%.” (p. 28)

[58] Hindery, D. (2010). Enron to Evo: Pipeline Politics, Global Environmentalism, and Indigenous Rights in Bolivia. “The departments received reduced payments from production revenues; domestic consumption levels no longer dictated export levels...” (p. 28)

[59] Hindery, D. (2010). Enron to Evo: Pipeline Politics, Global Environmentalism, and Indigenous Rights in Bolivia. “Corruption was rife, and transparency non-existent.” (p. 28)

[60] Cote, S. C. (2019). Oil and Nation: A History of Bolivia’s Petroleum Sector. “Foreign investment and production increased, and new natural gas deposits were found, but the public sector’s chronic fiscal deficit worsened.” (p. 27)

[61] Hindery, D. (2010). Enron to Evo: Pipeline Politics, Global Environmentalism, and Indigenous Rights in Bolivia. “The proposed natural gas pipeline to Chile set off mass demonstrations against the government in what came to be known as the Gas War of 2003.” (p. 46)

[62] Cote, S. C. (2019). Oil and Nation: A History of Bolivia’s Petroleum Sector. “Dozens died in what is now known as Black October of 2003.” (p. 152)

[63] Bonifaz, J., & Lefebvre, S. (2014, November 24). Lessons from Bolivia: re-nationalising the hydrocarbon industry. openDemocracyUK. “President Evo Morales came to power in Bolivia in 2006 amid widespread discontent.” (p. 3)

[64] Bonifaz, J., & Lefebvre, S. (2014, November 24). Lessons from Bolivia: re-nationalising the hydrocarbon industry. openDemocracyUK. “A 2004 referendum had already made it clear: over 90% of voters supported nationalisation.” (p. 4)

[65] Bonifaz, J., & Lefebvre, S. (2014, November 24). Lessons from Bolivia: re-nationalising the hydrocarbon industry. openDemocracyUK. “On May 1, 2006, Morales issued a decree returning the gas sector to state control.” (p. 4)

[66] Bonifaz, J., & Lefebvre, S. (2014, November 24). Lessons from Bolivia: re-nationalising the hydrocarbon industry. openDemocracyUK. “The government renegotiated supply contracts with Brazil and Argentina, significantly raising the export price of gas...” (p. 4)

[67] Cote, S. C. (2019). Oil and Nation: A History of Bolivia’s Petroleum Sector. “Control over production was restored, with a larger share of revenues flowing into public coffers rather than corporate bank accounts.” (p. 155)

[68] Bonifaz, J., & Lefebvre, S. (2014, November 24). Lessons from Bolivia: re-nationalising the hydrocarbon industry. openDemocracyUK. “Between 2005 and 2006, Bolivia’s non-financial public sector went from running a deficit to achieving a surplus of 4.5% of GDP.” (p. 4)

[69] Bonifaz, J., & Lefebvre, S. (2014, November 24). Lessons from Bolivia: re-nationalising the hydrocarbon industry. openDemocracyUK. “By 2006, revenues from hydrocarbons had increased nearly sevenfold in nominal terms.” (p. 4)

[70] Hindery, D. (2010). Enron to Evo: Pipeline Politics, Global Environmentalism, and Indigenous Rights in Bolivia. “This surge in revenue allowed Bolivia to rapidly expand public sector investments in health, education, and pensions.” (p. 39)

[71] Bonifaz, J., & Lefebvre, S. (2014, November 24). Lessons from Bolivia: re-nationalising the hydrocarbon industry. openDemocracyUK. “11% of hydrocarbon revenues were earmarked for universities, indigenous groups, and direct cash transfers for the elderly.” (p. 4)

[72] Cote, S. C. (2019). Oil and Nation: A History of Bolivia’s Petroleum Sector. “Public spending on essential services rose by 45% in real terms between 2005 and 2012.” (p. 162)

[73] Cote, S. C. (2019). Oil and Nation: A History of Bolivia’s Petroleum Sector. “The poverty rate fell significantly, lifting about one million Bolivians out of poverty between 2006 and 2012.” (p. 162)

[74] Hindery, D. (2010). Enron to Evo: Pipeline Politics, Global Environmentalism, and Indigenous Rights in Bolivia. “Morales saw nationalisation not only as a financial windfall, but as a means to increase Bolivia’s political clout on the world stage.” (p. 49)

[75] Cote, S. C. (2019). Oil and Nation: A History of Bolivia’s Petroleum Sector. “Foreign companies continued investing in Bolivia, but only under terms that benefited Bolivia’s long-term interests.” (p. 155)

[76] Hindery, D. (2010). Enron to Evo: Pipeline Politics, Global Environmentalism, and Indigenous Rights in Bolivia. “The government required foreign investors to meet technology transfer and local content requirements to ensure national benefits.” (p. 50)

[77] Cote, S. C. (2019). Oil and Nation: A History of Bolivia’s Petroleum Sector. “In 2013, Bolivia opened its first gas liquids separation plant, dramatically increasing the value-added from gas production.” (p. 163)

[78] Hindery, D. (2010). Enron to Evo: Pipeline Politics, Global Environmentalism, and Indigenous Rights in Bolivia. “Social stability and legitimacy were strong under the Morales government, aided by the public’s belief in the nationalisation agenda.” (p. 50)

[79] Investopedia (2024) Natural Monopoly: Definition, How It Works, Types, and Examples. April 30 https://www.investopedia.com/terms/n/natural_monopoly.asp

“A natural monopoly is a type of monopoly in an industry or sector with high barriers to entry and start-up costs that prevent any rivals from competing. As such, a natural monopoly has only one efficient player. This company may be the only provider of a product or service in an industry or geographic location. Natural monopolies can arise in industries that require unique raw materials, technology, or similar factors to operate.”

Corporate Finance Institute (undated) Natural Monopoly https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/economics/natural-monopoly/

“A natural monopoly is a market where a single seller can provide the output because of its size. A natural monopolist can produce the entire output for the market at a cost lower than what it would be if there were multiple firms operating in the market. A natural monopoly occurs when a firm enjoys extensive economies of scale in its production process.”

[80] Referring here broadly to Marx’s concept of capital centralization.

N.I. Bukharin: ‘Chapter 10: Reproduction of the Processes of Concentration and Centralisation of Capital on a World Scale’ Imperialism and World Economy https://www.marxists.org/archive/bukharin/works/1917/imperial/10.htm