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December 16, 2024

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Section 2

  • Potter, G. (n.d.). The history of policing in the United States. https://plsonline.eku.edu/sites/plsonline.eku.edu/files/the-history-of-policing-in-us.pdf “The genesis of the modern police organization in the South is the ‘Slave Patrol’ (Platt 1982). The first formal slave patrol was created in the Carolina colonies in 1704 (Reichel 1992). Slave patrols had three primary functions: 1. To chase down, apprehend, and return to their owners, runaway slaves. 2. To provide a form of organized terror to deter slave revolts. 3. To maintain a form of discipline for slave-workers who were subject to summary justice, outside of the law, if they violated any plantation rules.” (p.3)

  • Spruill, L. H. (2016). Slave patrols, “packs of Negro dogs” and policing Black communities. Phylon (1960-), 53(1), 42-66. Clark Atlanta University. https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/phylon1960.53.1.42 “The literature purports that white society’s fear of rebellious enslaved Blacks required strict laws governing their lives and mobility. The need for repressive supervision of Blacks led to the formation of local police to ensure white domination and Black subordination. This responsibility was given to a trinity of southern law enforcers: slave patrols, slave hunters and their non-human partners, ‘packs of negro dogs.’” (p.43)

  • Spruill, L. H. (2016). Slave patrols, “packs of Negro dogs” and policing Black communities. Phylon (1960-), 53(1), 42-66. Clark Atlanta University. https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/phylon1960.53.1.42 “Mass protests against police violence neglected Ferguson’s engagement of ‘packs of negro dogs,’ currently known as canine (K-9) units as agents of racial repression. It traces the white supremacy origins, general acceptance, and continuity of this inhumane police practice and its prosecution as a war crime following the Civil War.” (p.42)

  • Spruill, L. H. (2016). Slave patrols, “packs of Negro dogs” and policing Black communities. Phylon (1960-), 53(1), 42-66. Clark Atlanta University. https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/phylon1960.53.1.42 “The legal order sustained slavery, segregation, and discrimination for Atmost of our nation’s history—and the fact that the police were bound to uphold that order—set a pattern for police behavior and attitudes toward minority communities that has persisted until the present day. That pattern includes the idea that minorities have fewer civil rights, that the task of police is to keep them under control, and that the police have little responsibility for protecting them from crime within their communities.” (p.43)

  • Spruill, L. H. (2016). Slave patrols, “packs of Negro dogs” and policing Black communities. Phylon (1960-), 53(1), 42-66. Clark Atlanta University. https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/phylon1960.53.1.42  “A century of studies by Howell Henry (1914), Seldon Bacon (1939), Richard Wade (1964), Harrison Trexler (1969), Stanley Campbell (1970), Samuel Walker (1977), Hubert Williams and Patrick Murphy (1990), Sally E. Hadden (2003), and Philip Reichel (2013) advanced the thesis that slave patrols, the colonial and antebellum law enforcement network organized to control slaves’ activities were the precursors to contemporary patterns of Southern policing.” (p.43)

  • Potter, G. (n.d.). The history of policing in the United States. https://plsonline.eku.edu/sites/plsonline.eku.edu/files/the-history-of-policing-in-us.pdf “The key question, of course, is what was it about the United States in the 1830s that necessitated the development of local, centralized, bureaucratic police forces? One answer is that cities were growing. The United States was no longer a collection of small cities and rural hamlets. Urbanization was occurring at an ever-quickening pace, and the old informal watch and constable system was no longer adequate to control disorder.” (p.3)

  • Potter, G. (n.d.). The history of policing in the United States. https://plsonline.eku.edu/sites/plsonline.eku.edu/files/the-history-of-policing-in-us.pdf “More than crime, modern police forces in the United States emerged as a response to ‘disorder.’ What constitutes social and public order depends largely on who is defining those terms, and in the cities of 19th century America, they were defined by the mercantile interests, who through taxes and political influence supported the development of bureaucratic policing institutions.” (p.3-4)

  • Potter, G. (n.d.). The history of policing in the United States. https://plsonline.eku.edu/sites/plsonline.eku.edu/files/the-history-of-policing-in-us.pdf “These economic interests had a greater interest in social control than crime control. Private and for-profit policing was too disorganized and too crime-specific in form to fulfill these needs. The emerging commercial elites needed a mechanism to ensure a stable and orderly work force, a stable and orderly environment for the conduct of business, and the maintenance of what they referred to as the ‘collective good.’” (p.4)

  • Potter, G. (n.d.). The history of policing in the United States. https://plsonline.eku.edu/sites/plsonline.eku.edu/files/the-history-of-policing-in-us.pdf “The presence of police, authorized to use force, could stop crime before it started by subjecting everyone to surveillance and observation. The concept of the police patrol as a preventative control mechanism routinized the insertion of police into the normal daily events of everyone’s life, a previously unknown and highly feared concept in both England and the United States (Parks 1976).” (p.5)

  • Potter, G. (n.d.). The history of policing in the United States. https://plsonline.eku.edu/sites/plsonline.eku.edu/files/the-history-of-policing-in-us.pdf “By the mid-19th century, municipal police departments increasingly turned their attention to strike-breaking. Many of the ‘riots’ which so concerned local economic elites were actually strikes called against specific companies.” (p.5-6)

  • Potter, G. (n.d.). The history of policing in the United States. https://plsonline.eku.edu/sites/plsonline.eku.edu/files/the-history-of-policing-in-us.pdf “Police strike-breaking took two distinct forms. The first was the most obvious: the forced dispersal of demonstrating workers, usually through the use of extreme violence. The second was more subtle. In order to prevent the organization of workers in the first place, municipal police made staggering numbers of ‘public order’ arrests.” (p.6)

  • Potter, G. (n.d.). The history of policing in the United States. https://plsonline.eku.edu/sites/plsonline.eku.edu/files/the-history-of-policing-in-us.pdf “In the post-Civil War era, municipal police departments increasingly turned their attention to strike-breaking. By the late 19th century, union organizing and labor unrest was widespread in the United States. New York City had 5,090 strikes, involving almost a million workers from 1880 to 1900; Chicago had 1,737 strikes, involving over a half a million workers in the same period (Barkan 2001; Harring 1983).” (p.5-6)

  • Potter, G. (n.d.). The history of policing in the United States. https://plsonline.eku.edu/sites/plsonline.eku.edu/files/the-history-of-policing-in-us.pdf “Early American police departments shared two primary characteristics: they were notoriously corrupt and flagrantly brutal.” (p.5)

  • Potter, G. (n.d.). The history of policing in the United States. https://plsonline.eku.edu/sites/plsonline.eku.edu/files/the-history-of-policing-in-us.pdf “Police systematically took payoffs to allow illegal drinking, gambling, and prostitution. Police organized professional criminals, like thieves and pickpockets, trading immunity for bribes or information.” (p.5)

  • Potter, G. (n.d.). The history of policing in the United States. https://plsonline.eku.edu/sites/plsonline.eku.edu/files/the-history-of-policing-in-us.pdf  “In this system of vice, organized violence and political corruption, it is inconceivable that the police could be anything but corrupt (Walker 1996).” (p.5)

  • Potter, G. (n.d.). The history of policing in the United States. https://plsonline.eku.edu/sites/plsonline.eku.edu/files/the-history-of-policing-in-us.pdf  “Walker goes so far as to call municipal police ‘delegated vigilantes,’ entrusted with the power to use overwhelming force against the ‘dangerous classes’ as a means of deterring criminality.” (p.5)

  • Potter, G. (n.d.). The history of policing in the United States. https://plsonline.eku.edu/sites/plsonline.eku.edu/files/the-history-of-policing-in-us.pdf “By the mid-1960s police officers had responded with an aggressive and widespread police unionization campaign. Aided by court rulings more favorable to the organizing of public employees … nearly every large-city police department had been unionized by the early 1970s.” (p.12)

  • Potter, G. (n.d.). The history of policing in the United States. https://plsonline.eku.edu/sites/plsonline.eku.edu/files/the-history-of-policing-in-us.pdf “...Police officers struck in New York City in 1971; in Baltimore in 1974; and in San Francisco in 1975….” (p.12)

  • https://plsonline.eku.edu/sites/plsonline.eku.edu/files/the-history-of-policing-in-us.pdf “By the late 19th century, the use of public employees to serve private economic interests confused the issue of workers’ rights with the issue of crime.” (p.5)

Section 3

  • Vitale, A. S. (2017). The end of policing. Verso Books. ISBN: 978-1-78478-289-4. “In some ways, training is actually part of the problem. In recent decades, the emphasis has shifted heavily toward officer safety training. Seth Stoughton, a former police officer turned law professor, shows how officers are repeatedly exposed to scenarios in which seemingly innocuous interactions with the public, such as traffic stops, turn deadly. The endlessly repeated point is that any encounter can turn deadly in a split second if officers don’t remain ready to use lethal force at any moment. When police come into every situation imagining it may be their last, they treat those they encounter with fear and hostility and attempt to control them rather than communicate with them—and are much quicker to use force at the slightest provocation or even uncertainty. Take the case of John Crawford, an African American man shot to death by an officer in a Walmart in Ohio. Crawford had picked up an air gun off a shelf and was carrying it around the store while shopping. Another shopper called 911 to report a man with a gun in the store. The store’s video camera shows that one of the responding officers shot without warning while Crawford was talking on the phone. In Ohio it is legal to carry a gun openly, but the officer had been trained to use deadly force upon seeing a gun. The officer involved was not charged, and Crawford’s girlfriend was intimidated and threatened while being questioned after the incident.” (p. 17).

  • Vitale, A. S. (2017). The end of policing. Verso Books. ISBN: 978-1-78478-289-4. “Similarly, in South Carolina, a state trooper drove up to a young man in his car at a gas station and asked him for his driver’s license. He leaned into the car to comply and the officer shot him without warning: see unexpected movement, shoot.” (p. 17).

  • Vitale, A. S. (2017). The end of policing. Verso Books. ISBN: 978-1-78478-289-4. “This problem is especially acute when it comes to SWAT teams. Initially created in the early 1970s to deal with rare acts of extremist violence, barricaded suspects, or armed confrontations with police, these units now deal almost exclusively with serving drug warrants and even engage in regular patrol functions armed with automatic weapons and body armor. These units regularly violate people’s constitutional rights, kill and maim innocent people—often as a result of being in the wrong location—and kill people’s pets.” (p. 18).

  • Vitale, A. S. (2017). The end of policing. Verso Books. ISBN: 978-1-78478-289-4. “These units undergo a huge amount of in-service training, funded in part by seizing alleged drug money. The federal government also began to fund training and equipment for SWAT teams in the 1970s as part of the last round of major national policing reforms, which were intended to improve police-community relations and reduce police brutality through enhanced training. These reforms instead poured millions into training programs that resulted in the rise of SWAT teams, drug enforcement, and militarized crowd control tactics.” (p. 18).

  • Vitale, A. S. (2017). The end of policing. Verso Books. ISBN: 978-1-78478-289-4. “In each of these cases, officers relied on standard procedure for an armed suspect, which is to yell commands and prepare to use deadly force—even though most of them had received training in how to de-escalate confrontations with PMI.” (p. 79).

  • Vitale, A. S. (2017). The end of policing. Verso Books. ISBN: 978-1-78478-289-4. “Another form of this dynamic is ‘suicide by cop,’ in which someone who is suicidal counts on the willingness of an armed police officer to respond to a threat with deadly force. In these tragic cases, the suicidal individuals arm themselves with toy guns or other harmless devices in hopes that they will be sufficient to provoke a deadly response by police, who too often quickly oblige them. In some ways this seems like an unavoidable problem. There are, however, some important caveats. This whole scenario rests on the suicidal person’s assumption that they will be confronted by an armed police officer. The dynamic might be very different if the responder instead was an experienced civilian mental health worker, or even an unarmed police officer. Suicide by cop is extremely rare in the United Kingdom, where police are unlikely to be armed.” (p. 79–80).

  • Eisenberg, A. K. (2023). Policing the danger narrative. Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 113(3), 473. https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc/vol113/iss3/1. “When officers are primed to anticipate dangerous situations—to ‘expect the worst’—they are more likely to perceive their circumstances as dangerous, even if they are not actually at risk. An overemphasis on danger generates increased risk of harm, both to police and to the persons they police. Expectation bias—one among many cognitive biases relevant to policing—helps to explain this rift between the actual and perceived risks of policing. Also called the ‘observer-expectancy effect,’ this phenomenon explains the human tendency to perceive what we expect to perceive, often putting in motion a set of events that were not at all inevitable and originate with a mistaken perception. In the policing context, studies have shown that, in cases that are not inherently high risk, ‘[m]ere expectation that a suspect will be violent may engender a self-fulfilling prophecy: the officer may behave in such a way to elicit aggressive behavior from the suspect resulting in an escalation of the situation.’” (p. 505–506).

  • Vitale, A. S. (2017). The end of policing. Verso Books. ISBN: 978-1-78478-289-4. “Part of the problem stems from a “warrior mentality.” Police often think of themselves as soldiers in a battle with the public rather than guardians of public safety. That they are provided with tanks and other military-grade weapons, that many are military veterans, and that militarized units like Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) proliferated during the 1980s War on Drugs and post-9/11 War on Terror only fuels this perception, as well as a belief that entire communities are disorderly, dangerous, suspicious, and ultimately criminal. When this happens, police are too quick to use force.” (p. 11).

  • Vitale, A. S. (2017). The end of policing. Verso Books. ISBN: 978-1-78478-289-4. “Part of this emphasis on the use of deadly force comes from the rise of independent training companies that specialize in in-service training, staffed by former police and military personnel. Some of these groups serve both military and police clients and emphasize military-style approaches and the ‘warrior mentality.’ The company CQB (Close Quarters Battle) boasts of training thousands of local, state, and federal police as well as American and foreign military units such as the US Marines, Navy Seals, and Danish, Canadian, and Peruvian special forces. Its emphasis is on ‘battle-proven tactics.’” (p. 17–18).

  • Vitale, A. S. (2017). The end of policing. Verso Books. ISBN: 978-1-78478-289-4. “Trojan Securities trains both military and police units and offers police training in a variety of weapons in numerous settings, including a five-day ‘Police Covert Surveillance and Intelligence Operations’ course.” (p. 18).

  •  Vitale, A. S. (2017). The end of policing. Verso Books. ISBN: 978-1-78478-289-4. “Finally, as mentioned in chapter 1, standard police training instills a warrior mentality. Police are trained to see the potential threat in any encounter and to use their presence, body language, and verbal commands to take charge and to react quickly and aggressively to any threat of violence or the presence of a weapon. This goes directly against best practices for dealing with most PMI. Studies show that standard police approaches actually tend to escalate and destabilize encounters. Yelling commands and displaying weapons may cause a mentally ill person to flee or become more aggressive. Just as problematic, someone having delusions or a psychotic episode may be unable to hear, understand, or comply with police orders. This can have tragic consequences.” (p. 83).

  • Eisenberg, A. K. (2023). Policing the danger narrative. Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 113(3), 473. https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc/vol113/iss3/1. “Police departments cultivate the mindset, consistent with the danger narrative, that officers are ‘soldiers going to war against their fellow citizens.’ In many cases, this begins with the police department’s recruitment video. A study of recruitment videos from the 200 largest U.S. police departments found that about half of these videos included the ‘display of drawn firearms’ and that active paramilitary policing deployment occurred in about one-third of the videos. One such video, featuring car chases, military-like drills and weaponry, street fighting, and multiple instances of civilian encounters ending with gunfire, poses the challenge: ‘Do you have what it takes?’ Another features images of camouflage-clad officers with assault rifles in armored vehicles breaking down a door with a battering ram to rescue a young girl who has been kidnapped, along with the voiceover text: ‘We train to protect this city, but prepare for the worst.’ SWAT recruitment videos are particularly militaristic, featuring footage of police ‘practicing with assault rifles, throwing grenades, traveling in armored vehicles, training as snipers.’ One such video begins: ‘The rules of engagement of SWAT are simple: Defeat the enemy . . . any way you can.’” (p. 485).

  • Eisenberg, A. K. (2023). Policing the danger narrative. Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 113(3), 473. https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc/vol113/iss3/1. “Police training materials inculcate and reinforce the danger narrative. New recruits in some departments are taught that ‘[e]verybody wants to murder you.’ Gruesome video footage is shown to recruits, such as the 1998 murder of Deputy Kyle Dinkheller after a traffic stop in rural Georgia. More than twenty years later, this video continues to be shown as part of departmental trainings across the country. Simulation games teach recruits that survival is predicated on the ‘preoccupation with violence and constant consideration of the worst possible outcome of interactions.’” (p. 487).

  • Vitale, A. S. (2017). The end of policing. Verso Books. ISBN: 978-1-78478-289-4. “This Essay’s central insight is that incentives created by the class structure lead police to go into warrior mode and reinforce racialized class boundaries through excessive force. That brings us back to the way policing is differentiated between the rich and white Summerlin, Las Vegas versus the poor and black and brown Westside of Las Vegas. These forms of policing make these places into ‘good’ and ‘bad’ neighborhoods.” (p. 63).

  • Eisenberg, A. K. (2023). Policing the danger narrative. Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 113(3), 473. https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc/vol113/iss3/1. “Police advocates rely on the danger narrative to justify passage of Blue Lives Matter laws, which seek to include law enforcement as a protected category in hate crime laws, alongside such categories as race, religion, and sexual identity. These laws provide an increased criminal penalty for crimes against officers that are motivated by prejudice. Since 2016, nearly fifty Blue Lives Matter hate crime laws have been introduced in twenty states and in Congress.” (p. 491).

  • Eisenberg, A. K. (2023). Policing the danger narrative. Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 113(3), 473. https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc/vol113/iss3/1. “Police have also asserted their status as ‘victims’ to benefit from the legal protection afforded by Marsy’s Laws. In recent years, some police officers have invoked these laws to prevent the release of their names and identifying information in use-of-force cases. These officers claim that they were threatened—thus rendered victims—and that their use of force was in self-defense. When invoking a state’s Marsy’s Law, officers have referenced both the threat they face from criminals and the threat they experience because of the ‘war on cops.’” (p. 495).

  • Warren v. District of Columbia, 444 A.2d 1 (D.C. 1981). “Establishment by the Court of a new, privately enforceable duty to use reasonable diligence in the performance of public functions would not likely improve services rendered to the public. The creation of direct, personal accountability between each government employee and every member of the community would effectively bring the business of government to a speedy halt.” (p. 8).

  • Vitale, A. S. (2017). The end of policing. Verso Books. ISBN: 978-1-78478-289-4. “Is there an explosive increase in police violence? There is no question that American police use their weapons more than police in any other developed democracy. Unfortunately, we don’t have fully accurate information about the number or nature of homicides at the hands of police. Despite a 2006 law requiring the reporting of this information (reauthorized in 2014), many police departments do not comply. Researchers have had to rely on independent information such as local news stories to cobble together numbers. One effort by the Guardian and Washington Post documented 1,100 deaths in 2014, 991 in 2015, and 1,080 in 2016—fewer than in the 1960s and 1970s, but still far too many.” (p. 9-10).

  •  Vitale, A. S. (2017). The end of policing. Verso Books. ISBN: 978-1-78478-289-4. “African Americans are disproportionately victims of police shootings; black teens are up to twenty-one times more likely than white teens to be killed by police, though these rates are often proportional to the race of gun offenders and shooting victims more broadly.” (p. 9-10).

  • Vitale, A. S. (2017). The end of policing. Verso Books. ISBN: 978-1-78478-289-4. “Racial profiling remains widespread, and many communities of color experience invasive and disrespectful policing.” (p. 10).

  • Vitale, A. S. (2017). The end of policing. Verso Books. ISBN: 978-1-78478-289-4. “At the department level, more diverse police forces fare no better in measures of community satisfaction, especially among nonwhite residents. These departments are also often just as likely to have systematic problems with excessive use of force, as seen in federal interventions in Detroit, Miami, and Cleveland in recent years.” (p. 19-20).

  • Prison Policy Initiative. (2024). People in Jail and Prison in 2024.  https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/peopleinprison2024.html. “United States: Total incarcerated population: Over 2 million (October 2021 data). Share of the world’s prisoners: 25%. Incarceration rate: 629 per 100,000 people—the highest globally. Historical comparison: The U.S. prison population increased from 200,000 in 1972 to its current total.” (p. 1).

  • Prison Policy Initiative. (2024). People in Jail and Prison in 2024.  https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/peopleinprison2024.html. “Top countries by incarcerated population: United States: 1,767,200, China: 1,690,000, Brazil: 839,672, India: 573,220, Russia: 433,006, Turkey: 341,497, Indonesia: 266,512, Thailand: 262,319, Mexico: 231,906, Iran: 189,000.” (p. 1).
    [27] Byrd, D. (2017). Challenging Excessive Force: Why Police Officers Disproportionately Exercise Excessive Force Towards Blacks and Why This Systemic Problem Must End. Alabama Civil Rights & Civil Liberties Law Review, 8(1), 93-123. “US Mid-20th century: 110 people per 100,000.” (p. 100).

  • Byrd, D. (2017). Challenging Excessive Force: Why Police Officers Disproportionately Exercise Excessive Force Towards Blacks and Why This Systemic Problem Must End. Alabama Civil Rights & Civil Liberties Law Review, 8(1), 93-123. “US Current: approximately 700 people per 100,000.” (p. 100).

  • Byrd, D. (2017). Challenging Excessive Force: Why Police Officers Disproportionately Exercise Excessive Force Towards Blacks and Why This Systemic Problem Must End. Alabama Civil Rights & Civil Liberties Law Review, 8(1), 93-123. “1985-2000: Long prison sentences nearly doubled for drug possession.” (p. 101).

  • Vitale, A. S. (2017). The end of policing. Verso Books. ISBN: 978-1-78478-289-4. “Even wealthy and more powerful people of color are not immune: in 2009, Harvard professor and PBS personality Henry Louis Gates Jr. was arrested by Cambridge police in his own home; he had lost his keys, and a neighbor had called the police to report a break-in.” (p. 10-11).

  •  Vitale, A. S. (2017). The end of policing. Verso Books. ISBN: 978-1-78478-289-4. “This form of policing is based on a mindset that people of color commit more crime and therefore must be subjected to harsher police tactics.” (p. 10).

  • Vitale, A. S. (2017). The end of policing. Verso Books. ISBN: 978-1-78478-289-4. “Having more black and brown police officers may sound like an appealing reform, but as long as larger systems of policing are left in place, there is no evidence that would give cause to expect a significant reduction in brutality or over-policing.” (p. 20).

Section 4

  • U.S. Department of Justice. (2024). Assets Forfeiture Fund and Seized Asset Deposit Fund: Annual financial statements fiscal year 2023 (Audit Division Report No. 24-018). Office of the Inspector General. “Total Seized Items: 76,829 (ending balance for FY 2023). Value of Seized Property: $6,049,836,000 (net of liens and claims).” (p. 43)

  • U.S. Department of Justice. (2024). Assets Forfeiture Fund and Seized Asset Deposit Fund: Annual financial statements fiscal year 2023 (Audit Division Report No. 24-018). Office of the Inspector General. “Total Forfeited Items: 63,436 (ending balance for FY 2023). Value of Forfeited Property: $105,996,000 (net of liens and claims).” (p. 40)

  • Los Angeles Times. (2023). Sheriff’s department announces long-awaited policy banning deputy gangs. “For five decades, the Sheriff’s Department has been beset by allegations about rogue groups of deputies running roughshod over certain stations and promoting a culture of violence.” https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2024-09-18/sheriffs-department-announces-long-await-policy-banning-deputy-gangs.

  • Los Angeles Times. (2023). L.A. County Sheriff’s Department has a gang problem. “Though the central allegation is that the Executioners ‘dominate’ the Compton sheriff’s office, at least nine other such gangs are known to operate across the department, and have done so for decades. ‘Vikings, Reapers, Regulators, Little Devils, Cowboys, 2000 Boys and 3000 Boys, Jump Out Boys, and most recently the Banditos and the Executioners,’ Matthew Burson, chief of the department’s professional standard division, told KABC last month of the LASD’s gang problem.” https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2020/09/l-a-county-sheriffs-department-has-a-gang-problem.html.

  • Los Angeles Times. (2023). Sheriff’s department announces long-awaited policy banning deputy gangs. “Deputy Miguel Vega, who shot 18-year-old Andres Guardado during a June incident that sparked protests, was a prospective member of the Executioners, a dozen or so deputies who allegedly operate as a gang.”  https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2024-09-18/sheriffs-department-announces-long-await-policy-banning-deputy-gangs.

  • Los Angeles Times. (2023). L.A. County Sheriff’s Department has a gang problem. “Misconduct claims linked to these sheriff’s gangs have cost the county $21 million in settlements and associated legal costs.”  https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2020/09/l-a-county-sheriffs-department-has-a-gang-problem.html.

  • Los Angeles Times. (2023). Sheriff’s department announces long-awaited policy banning deputy gangs. “Oversight officials at the Office of Inspector General issued a 50-page report highlighting gaps in efforts to rein in gangs and criticizing the department’s repeated failure to meaningfully investigate the groups.”  https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2024-09-18/sheriffs-department-announces-long-await-policy-banning-deputy-gangs.

  • [Stinson, P. M., Liederbach, J., Brewer, S. L., & Mathna, B. E. (2014). Police sexual misconduct: A national scale study of arrested officers. Criminal Justice Policy Review, 26(7), 665–690. “Police sexual misconduct includes serious forms of sex-related crime and that victims of sex-related police crime are typically younger than 18 years of age.” (p. 665)

  • Stinson, P. M., Liederbach, J., Brewer, S. L., & Mathna, B. E. (2014). Police sexual misconduct: A national scale study of arrested officers. Criminal Justice Policy Review, 26(7), 665–690. “Victim-Officer Contact Context: On-duty (professional context): 349 (55.8%).” (p. 676)

  • Stinson, P. M., Liederbach, J., Brewer, S. L., & Mathna, B. E. (2014). Police sexual misconduct: A national scale study of arrested officers. Criminal Justice Policy Review, 26(7), 665–690. “37% of victims were aged 13 to 15, and 12% were aged 12 or younger.” (p. 676)

  • Contrera, J., Harden, J. D., & Abelson, J. (2024). When police officers are predators: Hundreds of law enforcement officials have been charged with sexual abuse crimes against children over the past two decades. Washington Post. “Accused cops have used their knowledge of the legal system to stall cases, get charges lowered, or evade convictions.”  https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/interactive/2024/police-officers-child-sexual-abuse-in-america/.

  • Contrera, J., Harden, J. D., & Abelson, J. (2024). When police officers are predators: Hundreds of law enforcement officials have been charged with sexual abuse crimes against children over the past two decades. Washington Post. “The Post identified at least 1,800 state and local law enforcement officers who were charged with crimes involving child sexual abuse from 2005 through 2022.”  https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/interactive/2024/police-officers-child-sexual-abuse-in-america/.

  • Stinson, P. M., Liederbach, J., Brewer, S. L., & Mathna, B. E. (2014). Police sexual misconduct: A national scale study of arrested officers. Criminal Justice Policy Review, 26(7), 665–690. “Cases of sex-related misconduct and crime have been described as hidden offenses that are likely to go unreported.” (p. 666)

  • [Neidig, P. H., Russell, H. E., & Seng, A. F. (1992). Interspousal aggression in law enforcement families: A preliminary investigation. Behavioral Science Associates. “40% of officers surveyed report at least one episode of physical aggression during a marital conflict in the previous year.” (p. 37)

  • Neidig, P. H., Russell, H. E., & Seng, A. F. (1992). Interspousal aggression in law enforcement families: A preliminary investigation. Behavioral Science Associates. “The overall rates of violence are considerably higher than those reported for a random sample of civilians and somewhat higher than military samples.” (p. 37)

  • Neidig, P. H., Russell, H. E., & Seng, A. F. (1992). Interspousal aggression in law enforcement families: A preliminary investigation. Behavioral Science Associates. “Among civilians: 11% of husbands reported any violence, 3% reported severe violence.” (p. 34).

  • Neidig, P. H., Russell, H. E., & Seng, A. F. (1992). Interspousal aggression in law enforcement families: A preliminary investigation. Behavioral Science Associates. “Divorced or legally separated officers reported significantly higher rates of violence, with 66% experiencing any violence.” (p. 34)

  • Stinson, P. M. (2018). Police misconduct as a cause of wrongful convictions. Wrongful Convictions Review, 14(2), 1–18. “Police planted drugs or weapons on suspects and then fabricated evidence to secure convictions.” (p. 1156)

  • Stinson, P. M. (2018). Police misconduct as a cause of wrongful convictions. Wrongful Convictions Review, 14(2), 1–18. “Procedural perjury occurs when police lie about the circumstances of an encounter in order to ensure that evidence obtained during the encounter is not excluded or excludable. Procedural perjury is a common enough problem that a word—‘testilying’—has been coined to describe the phenomenon. In one survey, insiders in the criminal justice system estimated that police perjury occurs in 20% to 50% of all Fourth Amendment suppression hearings.” (p. 1176).

  • Stinson, P. M. (2018). Police misconduct as a cause of wrongful convictions. Wrongful Convictions Review, 14(2), 1–18. “More than two hundred people have had convictions vacated or charges dismissed as a result of confessed misconduct implicating at least five officers in wrongdoing.” (p. 1142)

  • Stinson, P. M. (2018). Police misconduct as a cause of wrongful convictions. Wrongful Convictions Review, 14(2), 1–18. “The Rampart scandal exposed hundreds of instances in which evidence or contraband was planted on suspects, false statements were coerced or fabricated, and police officers offered perjured testimony in court.” (p. 1137)

Section 5

  • Knox, N. (2022). Qualified Immunity: Rectifying a detrimental doctrine. Arizona State Law Journal, 53, 945-949. “When the Court created qualified immunity in 1967, it explained that the doctrine would protect government officials acting in good faith from financial liability. Fifteen years later, the Court expanded the list of government interests advanced by qualified immunity to include protection against ‘the diversion of official energy from pressing public issues,’ ‘the deterrence of able citizens from acceptance of public office,’ and ’the danger that fear of being sued will dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible [public officials], in the unflinching discharge of their duties.’” p. 1803.

  • Schwartz, J. C. (2018). The case against qualified immunity. Notre Dame Law Review, 93(5), 1797–1836. “However, the Court in Harlow v. Fitzgerald found that the subjective, good-faith element was incompatible with qualified immunity’s goal of preventing insubstantial claims from proceeding to trial. The court reasoned that because questions of fact are not generally decided by the court on a motion for summary judgment, an officer’s subjective intent, which is a question of fact, should be resolved by a jury. Litigating an officer’s subjective intentions created substantial costs.” pp. 948-949.

  • Schwartz, J. C. (2018). The case against qualified immunity. Notre Dame Law Review, 93(5), 1797–1836. “In Sampson v. County of Los Angeles, the plaintiff, who was obtaining legal guardianship of her niece, brought suit alleging that the social worker assigned to her case sexually harassed her. The Ninth Circuit reluctantly affirmed the district court’s grant of qualified immunity to the social worker. It reasoned that the plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment right to be free from sexual harassment by a social worker was not clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct.” pp. 951-952.

  • Schwartz, J. C. (2018). The case against qualified immunity. Notre Dame Law Review, 93(5), 1797–1836. “As of 2018, in the thirty-five years since the Harlow Court implemented qualified immunity’s modern objective standard, the Supreme Court found a clear violation of the law in only two of thirty qualified immunity cases. These two cases, which occurred over a decade ago, involved an obvious mistake in a search warrant and a violation of well-established, long-standing circuit precedent.” p. 954.

  • Schwartz, J. C. (2018). The case against qualified immunity. Notre Dame Law Review, 93(5), 1797–1836. “The possibility of qualified immunity disposing of the case in its earliest stages may encourage victims to never file suit or to settle prematurely. Available evidence shows that only 1% of people who believe law enforcement violated their rights actually file suit.” p. 953.

  • Schwartz, J. C. (2018). The case against qualified immunity. Notre Dame Law Review, 93(5), 1797–1836. “When the Supreme Court and circuit courts issue opinions announcing new constitutional rights—or clarifying that rights do not exist—law enforcement agencies modify their policies and trainings to conform to those opinions.” p. 1819.

  • Kleinig, J. (2001). The blue wall of silence: An ethical analysis. International Journal of Applied Philosophy, 15(1), 1–23. “The ‘blue wall of silence’- the rule that police officers will not testify against each other- has its roots in an important associational virtue, loyalty, which, in the context of friendship and familial relations, is of central importance.” p. 1.

  • Kleinig, J. (2001). The blue wall of silence: An ethical analysis. International Journal of Applied Philosophy, 15(1), 1–23. “In many ways the formation of a police officer is like making new friends or ‘marrying into a family.’ Robert Leuci’s memorable remark in Prince of the City that ‘I sleep with my wife, but I live with my partner,’ captures the intimate bonds that police frequently forge with their partners, bonds that may be felt more intimately than those of family.” p. 4-5.

  • Kleinig, J. (2001). The blue wall of silence: An ethical analysis. International Journal of Applied Philosophy, 15(1), 1–23. “The NYPD Academy toilet wall graffito says it well: ‘The Commissioner is the Mayor’s puppet. The Mayor doesn’t care for us. The media puts us down and the public hates us. All we have is each other. Stick together.’” p. 6.

  • Kleinig, J. (2001). The blue wall of silence: An ethical analysis. International Journal of Applied Philosophy, 15(1), 1–23. “Most significant is the cost of breaching it. There is a huge social cost: ostracism, hate mail, harassment, denigration, threats, and so on. There is also likely to be a career cost: those who breach the wall may be reassigned or transferred (often to less desirable work), subjected to false complaints of misconduct, have their own violations reported, be given poor evaluations, not promoted, or even ‘forced out’ of the job.” p. 6.

  • [Kleinig, J. (2001). The blue wall of silence: An ethical analysis. International Journal of Applied Philosophy, 15(1), 1–23. “The fourth motivating factor also has its own normative twist. It is a sense that one is in no moral position to breach the wall. It is not uncommon for officers to be party or privy to forms of deviance that would attract sanctions were they reported.” p. 7.

  • Kleinig, J. (2001). The blue wall of silence: An ethical analysis. International Journal of Applied Philosophy, 15(1), 1–23. “Cops are my kind-my buddies, my brothers, my family-those with whom I identify, and I owe it to them as I owe it to myself and to those who are mine.” p. 6.

Section 6

  • Lopez, C. E. (2022). Abolish carceral logic. Stanford Journal of Civil Rights & Civil Liberties, 17(379), 379–418. Georgetown Law, Center for Innovations in Community Safety. https://law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/Lopez_Abolishing-Carceral-Logic_02.27.22-Eds-Edit-2.pdf. “First, carceral logic facilitates and perpetuates a definition of public safety that is overly narrow. In his article, What is Public Safety?, Barry Friedman sets out how artificially narrow our concept of public safety is. He notes that we typically assume that public safety means “freedom from injury to one’s person, and to one’s property in particular from violent crime or events,” and thus we tend to describe public safety with reference to “the police, as well as fire departments and emergency medical services.” As Friedman goes on to point out, however, “Surely . . . being safe means much more than freedom from sudden, violent, physical harm.” For while it is true that people feel neither safe nor secure if they are threatened by violent harm, nor do they feel safe and secure if “they are forced to sleep on the streets, to forage in trash cans for food, or are facing starvation. If they are lacking an education and cannot earn a living or find a job. They do not feel safe if they are confronting grievous illness or face health costs they cannot afford.” Friedman advocates for understanding public safety “more capaciously” that we do at present to include these concerns, and to increase the government’s obligation to meet these public safety needs.” (p. 391).

  • Lopez, C. E. (2022). Abolish carceral logic. Stanford Journal of Civil Rights & Civil Liberties, 17(379), 379–418. Georgetown Law, Center for Innovations in Community Safety. https://law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/Lopez_Abolishing-Carceral-Logic_02.27.22-Eds-Edit-2.pdf. “Secondly, within the already artificially narrow concept of public safety, in which “protecting public safety” concerns itself largely with preventing precipitous violence, property crimes, and drug offenses, the carceral logic causes us to take a narrow view of how to achieve even those artificially narrow public safety aims. In other words, in addition to investing in education, recreation, employment, and health care to enhance public safety broadly speaking, we should also be investing in those same things much more than we do in order to decrease rates of crime as traditionally defined.” (p. 391).

  • Lopez, C. E. (2022). Abolish carceral logic. Stanford Journal of Civil Rights & Civil Liberties, 17(379), 379–418. Georgetown Law, Center for Innovations in Community Safety. https://law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/Lopez_Abolishing-Carceral-Logic_02.27.22-Eds-Edit-2.pdf. “Purnell’s description and the police reports from Ferguson give texture to what experience and data tell us more broadly: that the current approach to public safety is premised on a carceral logic that is inconsistent with approaches that would provide communities what they actually need to be safe and to thrive. Further, carceral logic pushes public safety responders to cause unnecessary harm and fail to solve the problem, even when pursuing traditional public-safety goals. As a result, the communities most in need of public safety support are instead under-protected, even as they bear a disproportionate portion of police violence and misconduct.” (p. 393).

  • Lopez, C. E. (2022). Abolish carceral logic. Stanford Journal of Civil Rights & Civil Liberties, 17(379), 379–418. Georgetown Law, Center for Innovations in Community Safety. https://law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/Lopez_Abolishing-Carceral-Logic_02.27.22-Eds-Edit-2.pdf. “A third feature of carceral logic is that it has proven remarkably amenable to being co-opted by public officials or special interests to promote objectives only related to crime tangentially, if at all. There is thus now a now well-trod path for ever more carceral policies and practices to infiltrate broad areas of our lives. As Mariame Kaba writes, starting in the 1970s, carceral logic “crept into nearly every government function, including those seemingly removed from prisons.” She describes some of these functions: “those seeking food stamps are subject to mandatory and/or random drug testing. Immigration and Customs Enforcement has become the largest enforcement agency in the United States. Post-secondary education applications ask about criminal records, and many states bar those with felony convictions from voting.” Promoting the use of police in schools on the grounds that police make good mentors and role models to students is a further normalization of carceral logic. It is otherwise a wholly insensible use of public funds to pay police officers, often carrying handcuffs and guns—and always with the power to arrest—to promote students’ healthy emotional and social growth, especially given that this comes at the expense of having trained counselors, mental health professionals, and social workers carry out this critically important work.” (p. 396-397).

  • Lopez, C. E. (2022). Abolish carceral logic. Stanford Journal of Civil Rights & Civil Liberties, 17(379), 379–418. Georgetown Law, Center for Innovations in Community Safety. https://law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/Lopez_Abolishing-Carceral-Logic_02.27.22-Eds-Edit-2.pdf. “As noted at the outset, eradicating carceral logic may not do all the work that abolitionists envision in “undoing the carceral state,” in Akbar’s words. But it is a big lift on its own. It is, however, not only worth the effort, but is also necessary to fundamentally transform policing while ensuring that the current undesirable aspects and unnecessary harms of policing do not recur in new entities, systems, or processes.” (p. 398).

  • Lopez, C. E. (2022). Abolish carceral logic. Stanford Journal of Civil Rights & Civil Liberties, 17(379), 379–418. Georgetown Law, Center for Innovations in Community Safety. https://law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/Lopez_Abolishing-Carceral-Logic_02.27.22-Eds-Edit-2.pdf. “In short, we must transform the logic of policing and our public safety system so that it is no longer possible for the chokehold to mutate into something new. This means recognizing that current harm caused by policing derivative of the more foundational pathology of carceral logic. To effectively eradicate this harm we must recognize the carceral logic as its primary source, identify the instruments that have been used to operationalize this logic—whether in law, policy, or elsewhere—and work to dismantle or remake all of these paradigms and structures so that they no longer operate pursuant to carceral logic. As the abolitionists have taught us, we must work not just to end prisons but ultimately, “to end carceral society—a society that is governed by the logic of incarceration.”” (p. 418-419).