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November 29, 2024

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Section 2

  • Central Intelligence Agency. (2024, November 4). The World Factbook: Korea, North. Retrieved from https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/korea-north/ “Eastern Asia, northern half of the Korean Peninsula bordering the Korea Bay and the Sea of Japan, between China and South Korea.”

  • Central Intelligence Agency. (2024, November 4). The World Factbook: Korea, North. Retrieved from https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/korea-north/ “total area: 120,538 sq km.”

  • Central Intelligence Agency. (2024, November 4). The World Factbook: Korea, North. Retrieved from https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/korea-north/ “Population: total: 26,298,666; male: 12,828,269; female: 13,470,397 (2024 est.).”

  • Central Intelligence Agency. (2024, November 4). The World Factbook: Korea, North. Retrieved from https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/korea-north/ “In 1948, North Korea (formally known as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea or DPRK) was founded under President KIM Il Sung, who consolidated power and cemented autocratic one-party rule under the Korean Worker’s Party (KWP). North Korea declared a central ideology of juche (‘self-reliance’) as a check against outside influence, while continuing to rely heavily on China and the Soviet Union for economic support.”

  • Henry, T. A. (2014). Assimilating Seoul: Japanese rule and the politics of public space in colonial Korea, 1910–1945. University of California Press. “When Japan annexed the peninsula in 1910, early colonial officials hijacked these reforms and began to institute their own improvements, remaking the city’s spaces into a showcase of Japanese modernity. However, the modern project of physically and symbolically transforming the capital initiated by the leaders of the Great Han Empire continued after 1910. The major change was, of course, that thereafter a colonial state now attempted to use spatial reorganization to incorporate Koreans as subjects of the Japanese emperor.” (p. 28)

  • Henry, T. A. (2014). Assimilating Seoul: Japanese rule and the politics of public space in colonial Korea, 1910–1945. University of California Press. “In most accounts, the colonial period is described as beginning with a decade of “military rule” (1910–19), epitomized by the repression carried out by police officers against resistant Koreans.” (p. 15)

  • Henry, T. A. (2014). Assimilating Seoul: Japanese rule and the politics of public space in colonial Korea, 1910–1945. University of California Press. “In Keijo-, such forms of capitalist exploitation not only forced Koreans to imbibe the modern gospel of productivity and cleanliness as subordinated and nonthreatening members of the labor force but also encouraged them to become loyal subjects of the no Japanese emperor.” (p. 5)

  • Henry, T. A. (2014). Assimilating Seoul: Japanese rule and the politics of public space in colonial Korea, 1910–1945. University of California Press. “To be sure, mandatory visits to Shinto- shrines and classroom education aimed at inculcating imperial ethics and the ‘national language’ (Japanese) constituted some of the most important manifestations of assimilation.” (p. 4)

  • Henry, T. A. (2014). Assimilating Seoul: Japanese rule and the politics of public space in colonial Korea, 1910–1945. University of California Press. “For example, some performed Confucian forms of ancestor worship, such as the deep bow (k’ǔn chǒl), rather than Japanese rituals associated with Shinto -. That the colonial state, in turn, used these unconventional practices of emperor worship as propagandistic fodder for its Pan-Asian ideology of coprosperity makes locating and analyzing resistance to the wartime project of differential incorporation that much more difficult.” (p. 169-170)

  • Snyder, S., & Lee, J. (2010). The impact of the Korean War on the political-economic system of North Korea. International Journal of Korean Studies, 14(2), 161-182. “The devastation of war also creates a need for rebuilding and establishment of new political systems designed to restore social stability and to recover lost prosperity. At the same time, war does not wipe everything away; social and political organizations are remade based on pre-war influences while adapting to a new social and political equilibrium.” (p. 162)

  • Snyder, S., & Lee, J. (2010). The impact of the Korean War on the political-economic system of North Korea. International Journal of Korean Studies, 14(2), 161-182. “Before the war began, there were four factions in the North Korean politics: the Domestic faction led by Park Hon-Yong, Yenan faction led by Kim Tu-Bong, Soviet faction led by Ho Ka-I, and Guerrilla faction led by Kim Il-Sung. Both during and after the war, Kim cautiously but skillfully eliminated leaders of rival factions until his own guerrilla faction held almost a complete monopoly of power over the country in the early 1960s.” (p. 165)

  • Snyder, S., & Lee, J. (2010). The impact of the Korean War on the political-economic system of North Korea. International Journal of Korean Studies, 14(2), 161-182. “The availability of archival documents regarding the start of the Korean War has provided a useful corrective to dominant Western interpretations of the origins of the Korean War, in which the war was portrayed primarily through the lens of U.S.-Soviet confrontation, with Stalin masterminding efforts to extend communist domination while opening a second front for confrontation in Asia. However, the archives show that Kim Il Sung was the primary instigator of confrontation, and attempted to mobilize support from both Stalin and Mao for his aims.” (p. 171)

  • Snyder, S., & Lee, J. (2010). The impact of the Korean War on the political-economic system of North Korea. International Journal of Korean Studies, 14(2), 161-182. “Kim Il Sung’s feelings of betrayal by the Russians, along with other factors such as the fierce fight with the pro-Chinese and pro-Soviet factions of the Korean Communist movement and Moscow’s new line of de-Stalinization, prompted Kim Il Sung to develop Juche and to keep a political distance from Moscow while continuously depending on the influx of economic and military assistance from the Soviet Union.” (p. 172)

  • Snyder, S., & Lee, J. (2010). The impact of the Korean War on the political-economic system of North Korea. International Journal of Korean Studies, 14(2), 161-182. “The Korean War and its aftermath were politically devastating to North Korea. The devastation of the war provided the context for Kim Il Sung’s efforts to impose exclusive leadership and put into place a new system of internal solidarity. In other words, this was a period of political consolidation, through which Kim utilized national-level failures as a means by which to blame others while strengthening his direct political position and control.” (p. 164)

  • Snyder, S., & Lee, J. (2010). The impact of the Korean War on the political-economic system of North Korea. International Journal of Korean Studies, 14(2), 161-182. “Kim’s efforts to mobilize Chinese and Soviet support for Korean reunification had complex reverberations on the Sino-Soviet relationship. Chen Jian’s study on China’s decision to enter the Korean War provides several important findings in the discussion of the influence of the Sino-Soviet alliance on their relations with North Korea. Chen argues that the Sino-Soviet alliance treaty, which came into being only four months prior to the outbreak of Korean War, had a close connection with China’s attitude toward Korea.” (p. 171-172)

  • Snyder, S., & Lee, J. (2010). The impact of the Korean War on the political-economic system of North Korea. International Journal of Korean Studies, 14(2), 161-182. “For Kim Il Sung, the challenge was to reconstruct a relationship with China and the Soviet Union that would maximize his own autonomy and flexibility despite the manifest asymmetries that existed in North Korea’s relations (and economic dependency upon) both major communist powers.” (p. 173)

Section 3

  • Cumings, B. (1981). The Origins of the Korean War, Volume 1: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945-1947. Princeton University Press. “The Korean peninsula was ripe for revolution in 1945. Even if the Soviets and the Americans had not entered Korea, revolution would have overtaken the country in a matter of months. Korea had Asia’s oldest communist movement, with a plethora of experienced leaders. And land conditions and relationships, especially in the south, augured revolution” (p. xxvii).

  • Cumings, B. (1981). The Origins of the Korean War, Volume 1: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945-1947. Princeton University Press. “Syngman Rhee’s manipulation of southern politics must be judged a marvel… He could provide two things no other Korean could: patriotism and a sure bulwark against communism. He needed the Americans as well, also for two things: to provide the conditions in which he could emerge on top in the south and to guarantee the south against communism” (p. 431).

  • Cumings, B. (1981). The Origins of the Korean War, Volume 1: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945-1947. Princeton University Press. “In short, as 1946 drew to a close, the rightist entrenchment in the bureaucracy was the basic and irremovable element of American plans, while everything to the Left was negotiable and contingent on proof of reliability, responsibility, loyalty—all words the Occupation used to characterize acceptance of American-imposed arrangements in the south… [American standards] excluded social forces represented by strong organization throughout the south” (p. 259).

  • Cumings, B. (1981). The Origins of the Korean War, Volume 1: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945-1947. Princeton University Press. “The greatest loss to the Korean peasants in the aftermath of the uprisings was the effective demise of the local organs that had defended their interests… The leaders of most of the important organizations of the Left on the national and local levels wound up dead, in jail, hunted, or underground” (p. 381).

  • Cumings, B. (1981). The Origins of the Korean War, Volume 1: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945-1947. Princeton University Press. “The unrest proved to be greatest in the regions where the Japanese impact had been deepest, in provinces and counties where population change and agrarian disorder went hand in hand, where favorable geography provided time to organize and establish roots” (p. xxv).

  • Cumings, B. (1981). The Origins of the Korean War, Volume 1: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945-1947. Princeton University Press. “In the first year after liberation, the northern half of Korea accomplished what most Koreans and many Western observers thought would be the inevitable result of the end of Japanese rule—a thoroughgoing revolution. Within nine months of the liberation, landlordism had disappeared, the land had been redistributed, major industries had been nationalized” (p. 382).

  • Cumings, B. (1981). The Origins of the Korean War, Volume 1: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945-1947. Princeton University Press. “By the end of 1946, north Korea, like the south, had delineated the contours of the separate state that formally emerged there in September 1948… done quickly, efficiently, not to say ruthlessly, but comparatively speaking, with a minimum of bloodshed” (p. 382).

  • Lee, S. H. (2001). The Korean War. Routledge. “While South Korea had some opportunity to begin its economic reconstruction after 1951, North Korea continued to bear the brunt of American aerial bombing. For the first time in modern warfare, American Air Force pilots dropped napalm—32,357 tons of the flammable liquid—on civilians and soldiers alike” (p. 73).

  • Lee, S. H. (2001). The Korean War. Routledge. “Between 1950 and 1953, the North Korean civilian population declined by almost two million people, from about 9 million to roughly 7 million” (p. 73).

  • [Lee, S. H. (2001). The Korean War. Routledge. “In the fall of 1950, the U.S. military assessed that it had ‘destroyed a thoroughly integrated portion of the Soviet Far Eastern Economy’ through the destruction of North Korea’s industrial facilities” (p. 153).

  • Cumings, B. (1981). The Origins of the Korean War, Volume 1: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945-1947. Princeton University Press. “In 1953 the Korean peninsula was a smoldering ruin… In the north, modern edifices scarcely stood anymore; P’yöngyang and other cities were heaps of bricks and ashes, factories stood empty, massive dams no longer held their water” (p. xix).

  • Cumings, B. (1981). The Origins of the Korean War, Volume 1: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945-1947. Princeton University Press. “The Korea Commodity Corporation was given responsibility for buying up much of the annual rice harvest and distributing it at fixed prices. But as one American wrote, Koreans viewed it as ‘a huge exploitative organization determined to take all and give nothing’” (p. 205).

  • Lee, S. H. (2001). The Korean War. Routledge. “The communist side accepted the UNC position on 4 June… In order to get the ROK to acquiesce to the armistice agreement, the United States agreed to negotiate a Mutual Defense Treaty. However, the South Korean government refused to be a party to the armistice, and it has never signed the document” (p. 95).

  • Cumings, B. (1981). The Origins of the Korean War, Volume 1: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945-1947. Princeton University Press. “Historical memory is a powerful source of state legitimacy… Simply put, the struggle is central to the way Koreans define themselves in the contemporary world” (p. 3).

  • Armstrong, C. K. (2004). The North Korean Revolution, 1945-1950. Cornell University Press. “The rapid end to the war also left Soviet policies toward Korea relatively unformed and thus reactive to American policies in the south. There is little indication that the Soviets thought much about Korea before the war ended… Within the bounds of that outer limit, Koreans were able to carve out a degree of autonomy that was particularly significant in the first year of liberation” (pp. 385–386).

  • Cumings, B. (1981). The Origins of the Korean War, Volume 1: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945-1947. Princeton University Press. “As American power confronted Korean rather than Soviet revolutionaries… a society whose main raison d’etre would be anticommunism” (p. xxv).

Section 4

  • Frank, R. (2006). The political economy of sanctions against North Korea. Asian Perspective, 30(3), 5-36. “In 80 percent of U.S.-imposed sanctions, the policy was pursued with “no more than minor cooperation” from its allies or international organizations, i.e., unilaterally. The enormous growth in U.S. power after the collapse of the Soviet Union becomes evident when we consider that during the four years of President Bill Clinton’s first term alone, U.S. laws and executive actions imposed new unilateral economic sanctions sixty-one times on a total of thirty-five countries. These countries were home to 2.3 billion people, or 42 percent of the world’s population, and purchased exports of $790 billion, or 19 percent of the global export market.” (p. 9)

  • Frank, R. (2006). The political economy of sanctions against North Korea. Asian Perspective, 30(3), 5-36. “Sanctions are propagated by the sender as a way to bring down a regime or a leader, pointing at the unacceptably low standard of living and the gap of these standards between ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ parts of the society. This technique is indeed applied to North Korea.” (p. 17)

  • Maass, M. (2011). Beyond Economic Sanctions: Rethinking the North Korean Sanctions Regime. North Korean Review, 7(2), 45–56. “In many cases, there is a high risk that sanctions actually strengthen the regime that they were supposed to weaken. A typical response of a people in the face of sanctions is to ‘rally around the flag’ and support the leadership in the face of foreign coercion. Again, evidence from North Korea suggests that this might indeed be taking place.” (p. 17)

  • Korea Peace Now! (2019). The Humanitarian Impact of Sanctions on North Korea. “Sanctions passed in 2017 prohibit the transport of any metal goods, significantly hampering the shipment of basic medical supplies. A shipment of reproductive health kits was subjected to significant delay because it contained aluminum steam sterilizers—the most important part of the kit.”

  • Frank, R. (2006). The political economy of sanctions against North Korea. Asian Perspective, 30(3), 5-36. “Historical evidence suggests that a reduction of the available resources, no matter what its cause, will have the effect of a distribution of the remainder based on power; this means that still, the elite and the military will serve themselves first and that the weak will suffer.” (p. 16)

  • U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security. (2020). North Korea Ballistic Missile Procurement Activities Advisory. “License Exception Servicing and Replacement of Parts and Equipment (RPL) is not available for North Korea. Therefore, an individual validated license is required to export or reexport to North Korea replacement parts and components that are subject to the EAR, including for use in medical devices.” (p. 3)

  • Korea Peace Now! (2019). The Humanitarian Impact of Sanctions on North Korea. “Unilateral US sanctions delay or outright block vital humanitarian shipments to the North Korean people. One NGO recently reported that it took them over a year and a half to ship 16 boxes of beans to the DPRK.”

  • Smith, H. (2020). The ethics of United Nations sanctions on North Korea: effectiveness, necessity, and proportionality. Critical Asian Studies, 52(3), 1–21. “The new UNSC oil sanctions fall disproportionately on the civilian economy. Unlike other UN-sanctioned states such as Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Russia, North Korea is not an oil-producing country. All refined oil products, including diesel and gasoline, must be imported or produced from imported crude oil in the country’s one oil refinery.” (p. 10)

  • Korea Peace Now! (2019). The Humanitarian Impact of Sanctions on North Korea. “Fuel shortages, exacerbated by sanctions, have caused hospitals and clinics in remote areas to limit operations, leaving communities without basic healthcare services. This is particularly dangerous for pregnant women and young children.”

  • Frank, R. (2006). The political economy of sanctions against North Korea. Asian Perspective, 30(3), 5-36. “In October 2005, the manager of a South Korean enterprise in Gaeseong complained during a private conversation with the author at this site that to make a phone call to Seoul, he had to have it re-routed via China at the final cost of $3.60 per minute because the United States blocked the installation of a direct connection due to concerns over dual-use technologies.” (p. 28)

  • Maass, M. (2011). Beyond Economic Sanctions: Rethinking the North Korean Sanctions Regime. North Korean Review, 7(2), 45–56. “The U.S. attempted to improve the existing economic sanctions regime, but on the other side, Washington admitted its frustration with the outcome of years of economic sanctions imposed on the DPRK.” (p. 49)

  • Katzeff Silberstein, B. (2019). The true impact of North Korean sanctions. East Asia Forum. “Sanctions on the fishing, garment and coal industries, coupled with South Korea’s decision to close a joint factory complex employing more than 50,000 North Koreans, will deprive many people of income in an increasingly market-based economy.”

  • Korea Peace Now! (2019). The Humanitarian Impact of Sanctions on North Korea. “Sanctions indirectly promote illicit trade and black markets by creating shortages in essential goods, as citizens are forced to resort to alternative means of acquiring basic necessities.”

  • Katzeff Silberstein, B. (2019). The true impact of North Korean sanctions. East Asia Forum. “Under the sanctions, North Korea is unable to sell its most crucial export goods.”

  • Frank, R. (2006). The political economy of sanctions against North Korea. Asian Perspective, 30(3), 5-36. “Chinese trade data might not be fully reliable, particularly on politically sensitive topics like imports of sanctioned goods from North Korea. It certainly doesn’t cover smuggling, for example.”

  • Katzeff Silberstein, B. (2019). The true impact of North Korean sanctions. East Asia Forum. “In 2018, Chinese imports from North Korea plummeted by 88 percent.”

  • Frank, R. (2006). The political economy of sanctions against North Korea. Asian Perspective, 30(3), 5-36. “Chinese imports of North Korean coal, iron ore and other natural resources increased dramatically from 2010 onwards. But China imported no coal from North Korea between January and March 2018.” (p. 28)

  • Katzeff Silberstein, B. (2019). The true impact of North Korean sanctions. East Asia Forum. “Smuggling is expensive. Whatever goods North Korea imports through smuggling have an added risk premium, and it likely gets paid much less than it normally would for whatever it exports through illicit channels.”

  • Maass, M. (2011). Beyond Economic Sanctions: Rethinking the North Korean Sanctions Regime. North Korean Review, 7(2), 45–56. “The U.S. pushed the Macau-based Banco Delta Asia to freeze North Korean assets.” (p. 50)

  • Korea Peace Now! (2019). The Humanitarian Impact of Sanctions on North Korea. “A shipment of reproductive health kits was subjected to significant delay because it contained aluminum steam sterilizers—the most important part of the kit.”

  • [Smith, H. (2020). The ethics of United Nations sanctions on North Korea: effectiveness, necessity, and proportionality. Critical Asian Studies, 52(3), 1–21. “Stringent energy sanctions introduced in 2017 contributed significantly to a precipitous fall in agricultural production in 2018 such that the country could no longer feed about a third of the 25 million population.” (p. 1)

  • Maass, M. (2011). Beyond Economic Sanctions: Rethinking the North Korean Sanctions Regime. North Korean Review, 7(2), 45–56. “Economic sanctions were still seen as a critical lever that would indicate resolve on the part of the council members and press for a change in North Korean nuclear policy.” (p. 51)

  • Smith, H. (2020). The ethics of United Nations sanctions on North Korea: effectiveness, necessity, and proportionality. Critical Asian Studies, 52(3), 1–21. “Broad UN sanctions on the DPRK are neither effective nor proportionate and are, therefore, unethical.” (p. 15)

  • Smith, H. (2020). The ethics of United Nations sanctions on North Korea: effectiveness, necessity, and proportionality. Critical Asian Studies, 52(3), 1–21. “The implementation of post-2016 comprehensive sanctions has breached the proportionality principle.” (p. 9)

  • Korea Peace Now! (2019). The Humanitarian Impact of Sanctions on North Korea. “Unilateral US sanctions delay or outright block vital humanitarian shipments to the North Korean people.”

  • Frank, R. (2006). The political economy of sanctions against North Korea. Asian Perspective, 30(3), 5-36. “Since nobody would defend North Korea on its human rights record and few would deny the possibility of its involvement in crime, these were issues on which Washington could expect to be able to mobilize support.” (p. 9)

  • Maass, M. (2011). Beyond Economic Sanctions: Rethinking the North Korean Sanctions Regime. North Korean Review, 7(2), 45–56. “These political demands were flanked by additional economic sanctions. Economic sanctions were still seen as a critical lever.” (p. 50)

  • Korea Peace Now! (2019). The Humanitarian Impact of Sanctions on North Korea. “Unilateral US sanctions delay or outright block vital humanitarian shipments to the North Korean people.”

  • Katzeff Silberstein, B. (2019). The true impact of North Korean sanctions. East Asia Forum. “Under the sanctions, North Korea is unable to sell its most crucial export goods.”

  • Korea Peace Now! (2019). The Humanitarian Impact of Sanctions on North Korea. “Fuel shortages, exacerbated by sanctions, have caused hospitals and clinics in remote areas to limit operations, leaving communities without basic healthcare services.”

  • U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security. (2020). North Korea Ballistic Missile Procurement Activities Advisory. “Medical devices include medical supplies, instruments, equipment, equipped ambulances, institutional washing machines for sterilization, and vehicles with medical testing equipment.” (p. 3)

Section 5

  • AP News. (2024). The US and South Korea reach new deal on costs for the American troop presence. “There are about 28,500 U.S. forces in South Korea to help deter potential aggression from North Korea and fewer than a handful of major bases.”

  • AP News. (2024). The US and South Korea reach new deal on costs for the American troop presence. “The agreement, which must still be approved by the South Korean government and ratified by its parliament before taking effect, would see Seoul’s contribution rise by 8.3% during the first year of the five-year deal, to $1.125 billion. Additional increases, capped at 5% per year, would then be applied.”

  • AP News. (2024). The US and South Korea reach new deal on costs for the American troop presence. “The current agreement was not due to expire until next year, but the Biden administration had been pushing to complete the ‘Special Measures Agreement’ with South Korea before November’s U.S. presidential election, in part to allay South Korean concerns that a possible victory by former President Donald Trump might complicate future negotiations.”

  • AP News. (2024). The US and South Korea reach new deal on costs for the American troop presence. “The new agreement, if approved by the South Koreans, would run until 2030, beyond the four-year term of the next U.S. president.”

  • AP News. (2024). US, South Korea begin joint military drills. “U.S. and South Korean troops kicked off a large-scale exercise Monday aimed at strengthening their combined defense capabilities against nuclear-armed North Korea, which again accused the allies of practicing an invasion.”

  • AP News. (2024). US, South Korea begin joint military drills. “The Ulchi Freedom Shield drills, which continue for 11 days, through Aug. 29, include both computer-simulated war games and more than 40 kinds of field exercises, including live-fire drills. The allies said this year’s program is focused on enhancing their readiness against various North Korean threats, including missiles, GPS jamming and cyberattacks and will also reflect lessons learned from recent armed conflicts.”

  • AP News. (2024). US, South Korea begin joint military drills. “About 19,000 South Korean military personnel will participate in the drills, which will be held concurrently with civil defense and evacuation drills from Monday through Thursday that will include programs based on North Korean nuclear attack scenarios.”

  • AP News. (2024). US, South Korea begin joint military drills. “The U.S. military has not confirmed the number of American troops participating in the drills or said whether they will involve U.S. strategic assets. The United States in recent months has increased its regional deployment of long-range bombers, submarines and aircraft carrier strike groups to train with South Korean and Japanese forces.”

  • AP News. (2024). US, South Korea begin joint military drills. “The annual summertime exercise comes amid heightened tensions on the Korean Peninsula as the pace of both North Korea’s weapons demonstrations and the U.S.-South Korea combined military exercises have intensified in a cycle of tit-for-tat.”

  • AP News. (2024). US, South Korea begin joint military drills. “Earlier this month, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un staged a huge ceremony in the country’s capital, Pyongyang, to mark the delivery of 250 nuclear-capable missile launchers to frontline military units and called for a ceaseless expansion of his military’s nuclear program.”

  • AP News. (2024). US, South Korea begin joint military drills. “During last year’s Ulchi Freedom Shield exercises, North Korea conducted ballistic missile tests that it described as simulating ‘scorched earth’ nuclear strikes on South Korean targets.”

  • Sukin, L. (2024). Why calls for regime change in North Korea can be counterproductive. United States Institute of Peace. “For example, President Biden’s 2022 National Defense Strategy includes the statement that ‘there is no scenario in which the Kim regime could employ nuclear weapons and survive.’ The line has been echoed often by Biden and his top officials.”

  • Sukin, L. (2024). Why calls for regime change in North Korea can be counterproductive. United States Institute of Peace. “Former Central Intelligence Agency director Mike Pompeo recalled President Donald Trump asking the agency in 2017 to develop options that would ‘separate’ the North Korean regime from its missiles and nuclear weapons.”

  • Sukin, L. (2024). Why calls for regime change in North Korea can be counterproductive. United States Institute of Peace. “Korea. So, if North Korea agreed to a deal that set limits on or reduced its nuclear program, it would have no way to ensure that the United States wouldn’t simply take advantage of that weakness down the line. After all, the United States pursued regime change in Libya after its disarmament deal and has also pursued decapitation strategies in Iraq and elsewhere. The fear of regime change doesn’t exist — at least not at the same scale — when adversaries have similar military capabilities. In those cases, a viable threat of regime change couldn’t persist in the first place and demands for denuclearization or demilitarization would be nonstarters.”

Section 6

  • Bleiker, R. (2003). A rogue is a rogue is a rogue: US foreign policy and the Korean nuclear crisis. International Affairs, 79(4), 719–737. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.00333 “The West tends to project a very one-sided image of North Korea—one that sees it solely as a rogue outlaw, and thus a source of danger and instability.” p. 720

  • Bleiker, R. (2003). A rogue is a rogue is a rogue: US foreign policy and the Korean nuclear crisis. International Affairs, 79(4), 719–737. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.00333 “The rhetoric of rogue states is indicative of how US foreign policy continues to be driven by dualistic and militaristic Cold War thinking patterns.” p. 721

  • Bleiker, R. (2003). A rogue is a rogue is a rogue: US foreign policy and the Korean nuclear crisis. International Affairs, 79(4), 719–737. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.00333 “Very few policy-makers, security analysts and journalists ever make the effort to imagine how threats are perceived from the North Korean perspective.” p. 721

  • Bleiker, R. (2003). A rogue is a rogue is a rogue: US foreign policy and the Korean nuclear crisis. International Affairs, 79(4), 719–737. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.00333 “The image of North Korea as a ‘rogue state’ severely hinders both an adequate understanding and a possible resolution of the crisis.” p. 721

  • Bleiker, R. (2003). A rogue is a rogue is a rogue: US foreign policy and the Korean nuclear crisis. International Affairs, 79(4), 719–737. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.00333 “Dealing with communist North Korea has become one of the most difficult challenges in global politics today. Totalitarian and reclusive, ideologically isolated and economically ruined, it is the inherent ‘other’ in a globalized and neoliberal world order. And yet North Korea goes on surviving, not least because it leaders periodically rely on threats to gain concessions from the international community.” p. 719

  • Bleiker, R. (2003). A rogue is a rogue is a rogue: US foreign policy and the Korean nuclear crisis. International Affairs, 79(4), 719–737. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.00333 “Of particular significance here is an official policy review, conducted by then former Defense Secretary Perry. In some respects the report advocated little new. It called for a realist approach based on ‘a hard-headed understanding of military realities’, which, translated into practice, meant no changes to Washington’s ‘strong deterrent posture towards the Korean Peninsula’. Not surprisingly, the Perry Report located the main threat in North Korea’s ambition to acquire nuclear weapons or to develop, test and deploy long-range missiles. ’The United States must, therefore, have as its objective ending these activities.’” p. 723

  • Bleiker, R. (2003). A rogue is a rogue is a rogue: US foreign policy and the Korean nuclear crisis. International Affairs, 79(4), 719–737. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.00333 “At the same time, though, the Perry Report called for a fundamental review of US policy towards Pyongyang, advocating a position that rests not only on military deterrence, but also on a ‘new, comprehensive and integrated approach’ to negotiations with North Korea.” p. 723

  • Gordy, K., & Lee, J. S. (2009). Rogue specters: Cuba and North Korea at the limits of US hegemony. Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, 34(3), 229–248. https://doi.org/10.1177/030437540903400301 “They [Cuba and North Korea] are portrayed as unrepentant, unredeemable, old-fashioned Marxist-Leninist states with one foot in the grave.” p. 230

  • Gordy, K., & Lee, J. S. (2009). Rogue specters: Cuba and North Korea at the limits of US hegemony. Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, 34(3), 229–248. https://doi.org/10.1177/030437540903400301 “Why? The conventional explanation suggests that, as relics of the past and as states out of step with the progress of history, Cuba and North Korea are hazardous because their desperate autocrats are willing to put the world and their own populations at risk to achieve their malevolent objectives or to hold onto their power.” p. 230

  • Gordy, K., & Lee, J. S. (2009). Rogue specters: Cuba and North Korea at the limits of US hegemony. Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, 34(3), 229–248. https://doi.org/10.1177/030437540903400301 “The contradiction in US discourse is clear: North Korea and Cuba are placed front and center as dangerous rogue states whose present economic and political systems are completely unacceptable. This same discourse, however, consigns them to the dustbin of history, characterizing their systems as archaic, retrograde, in the final stages of decay, and as the last holdouts against the global tide of liberal, free-market democratization.” p. 238-239

  • Gordy, K., & Lee, J. S. (2009). Rogue specters: Cuba and North Korea at the limits of US hegemony. Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, 34(3), 229–248. https://doi.org/10.1177/030437540903400301 “Contemporary treatments of North Korea and Cuba tend to ignore history, attributing the current situation to maniacal leaders and a brainwashed populace.” p. 235

  • Kang, B. S. (2024). North Korean propaganda arts. Advanced Center for Korean Studies, Andong. “The substances of the North Korean pi-ra were to persuade the UN and US armies to surrender and submit, especially the leaflet ‘US airman writes to his buddies,’ which imitated the form of a letter by a war prisoner in expressing the desire that UN and US armies return to their hometowns.” p. 198

  • Kang, B. S. (2024). North Korean propaganda arts. Advanced Center for Korean Studies, Andong. “After the Korean War, a few pi-ra were scattered from the north to the south, and vice versa. The contents of North Korean pi-ra were more political than those of South Korea; they advertised the new fabulous buildings in Pyongyang as well as condemning the president of South Korea who defamed the dignity and authority of the president.” p. 198

  • Kang, B. S. (2024). North Korean propaganda arts. Advanced Center for Korean Studies, Andong. “Although leaflet drops from the South continue, now it is the work of individuals. Some leaflets are sent by balloons that contain an American dollar bill and biting criticism of the economic failure of Kim Jong-Il.” p. 199

  • Lankov, A. (2011). Telling the subversive truth: Information dissemination and North Korea’s future. Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, 23(1), 19–35. “Radio broadcasts still seem to be the best media to reach the North Korean audience. It is affordable, with a radio receiver of acceptable quality costing US$20–50, and the content is delivered free of charge.” p. 26

  • Lankov, A. (2011). Telling the subversive truth: Information dissemination and North Korea’s future. Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, 23(1), 19–35. “The scale of the audience is difficult to estimate, but different sources indicate that the audience is significant, even though it is still a far cry from Eastern Europe of the 1970s and 1980s. For example, in early 2010 Peter Beck estimated that the number of listeners might have reached one million (or some 5% of the total population).” p. 26-27

  • Lankov, A. (2011). Telling the subversive truth: Information dissemination and North Korea’s future. Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, 23(1), 19–35. “Radio was used widely in the Cold War era, so a large and valuable body of experience has been amassed.” p. 26

  • Lankov, A. (2011). Telling the subversive truth: Information dissemination and North Korea’s future. Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, 23(1), 19–35. “Another traditional medium is leaflets, which are now delivered exclusively by the refugees’ NGOs. This author is skeptical of the efficacy of the balloon program.” p. 27

  • Lankov, A. (2011). Telling the subversive truth: Information dissemination and North Korea’s future. Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, 23(1), 19–35. “The occasional encounter with a short piece of information provided by a printed text is unlikely to seriously change the worldview of a North Korean.” p. 27

  • Lankov, A. (2011). Telling the subversive truth: Information dissemination and North Korea’s future. Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, 23(1), 19–35. “Leaflet distribution activities are supported by private channels. This is welcome, and the involvement of different groups with sometimes very different agendas should be welcomed.” p. 33

  • Lankov, A. (2011). Telling the subversive truth: Information dissemination and North Korea’s future. Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, 23(1), 19–35. “It is instructive that the balloon/leaflet programs were tried by the Western media in the early stages of the Cold War, only to be largely abandoned by 1960 since the experience showed that leaflets were less efficient when compared to radio broadcasts.” p. 27