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Section 2

• [1] Wood, E. M. (2002). The Origin of Capitalism: A Longer View. Verso. “The traditional account - which appears in classical political economy, Enlightenment conceptions of progress, and many more modern histories - is as follows. With or without a natural inclination to ‘truck, barter, and exchange’ (in Adam Smith’s famous formulation), rationally self-interested individuals have been engaging in acts of exchange since the dawn of history. These acts became increasingly specialized with an evolving division of labour, which was also accompanied by technical improvements in the instruments of production” (p. 11).

• [2] Gelderblom, O., & Jonker, J. (2004). “The Formative Years of the Modern Corporation.” The Economic History Review, 57(4), 1050–1073. “The intercontinental trading companies set up by the British and Dutch at the turn of the seventeenth century are generally considered key institutional innovations because of their corporate form. The English East India Company (EIC), founded in 1600, and the Dutch East India Company (VOC), founded in 1602, pioneered features which later became textbook characteristics of modern corporations: a permanent capital, legal personhood, separation of ownership and management, limited liability for shareholders and for directors, and tradable shares” (pp. 1050–1051).

• [3] Wood, E. M. (2002). The Origin of Capitalism: A Longer View. Verso. “Like other commercial leaders in Europe (before the dominance of capitalist Britain), the Dutch typically relied, for their successes in international trade, on extra-economic superiority in negotiating separate markets, rather than on competitive production in a single market: on dominance in shipping and command of trade routes, on monopolies and trading privileges, on an elaborate network of far-flung trading posts and settlements, on the development of sophisticated financial practices and instruments. These ‘extra-economic’ advantages often relied heavily on military force” (p. 90).

• [4] Gelderblom, O., & Jonker, J. (2004). “The Formative Years of the Modern Corporation.” The Economic History Review, 57(4), 1050–1073. “Mounting competition, however, initiated a process of corporate consolidation in which the balance between directors, company, and investors shifted decisively. The rivalry between various Dutch companies weakened their overall position in the Asian trade, and in 1600 Britain also entered the fray” (p. 1054).

• [5] Gelderblom, O., & Jonker, J. (2004). “The Formative Years of the Modern Corporation.” The Economic History Review, 57(4), 1050–1073. “The VOC charter created a large concern with 6.4 million guilders’ capital, but the financial organization of the business did not really change. Whereas the charter and trade monopoly bestowed by the Estates General were to run 21 years, the new company itself was conceived as a succession of separate, overlapping expeditions, the returns of one financing the next” (p. 1054).

• [6] Gelderblom, O., & Jonker, J. (2004). “The Formative Years of the Modern Corporation.” The Economic History Review, 57(4), 1050–1073. “The financial structure created in 1602 put an effective limit on the scale of the VOC’s military operations. With circulating capital, the company could only afford intermittent campaigns, so it repeatedly lost positions built up on Malaka and on the Molucas” (p. 1059).

• [7] Gelderblom, O., & Jonker, J. (2004). “The Formative Years of the Modern Corporation.” The Economic History Review, 57(4), 1050–1073. “Immediately following the acquisition of permanence and the related restructuring of dividend payments in the second half of 1612, directors needed to secure the company’s cash position for 1616, when the final installment of cash dividends fell due” (pp. 1067–1068).

• [8] Wood, E. M. (2002). The Origin of Capitalism: A Longer View. Verso. “The case of the Dutch Republic in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries is probably the most complex. It is the case for which the strongest argument can be made as a rival to England’s claims as the first ‘modern’ or capitalist economy” (p. 87).

• [9] Wood, E. M. (2002). The Origin of Capitalism: A Longer View. Verso. “Like other commercial leaders in Europe (before the dominance of capitalist Britain), the Dutch typically relied, for their successes in international trade, on extra-economic superiority in negotiating separate markets, rather than on competitive production in a single market” (p. 90).

• [10] Wood, E. M. (2002). The Origin of Capitalism: A Longer View. Verso. “The Dutch constructed their commercial empire on the strength of other advantages outside the sphere of production. Nor is it clear that Dutch producers, and farmers in particular, who were deeply engaged in production for the market, were subject to the competitive imperatives we associate with capitalism” (p. 90).

• [11] Wood, E. M. (2002). The Origin of Capitalism: A Longer View. Verso. “The commercial system of pre-capitalist Europe, then, was characterized by a series of disjunctions: the geographic separation between the production of grain and its consumption by countries whose wealth derived from trade in other commodities” (pp. 83–84).

• [12] Chomsky, N. (1999). Profit over People: Neoliberalism and Global Order. Seven Stories Press. “The first major experiment was carried out two hundred years ago, when the British rulers in India instituted the ‘Permanent Settlement,’ which was going to do wondrous things. The results were reviewed by an official commission forty years later, which concluded that ‘the settlement fashioned with great care and deliberation has unfortunately subjected the lower classes to most grievous oppression’” (pp. 22–23).

• [13] Chomsky, N. (1999). Profit over People: Neoliberalism and Global Order. Seven Stories Press. “The British governor-general observed that ‘the “Permanent Settlement,” though a failure in many other respects and in most important essentials, has this great advantage, at least, of having created a vast body of rich landed proprietors deeply interested in the continuance of the British Dominion and having complete command over the mass of the people’” (p. 23).

• [14] Chomsky, N. (1999). Profit over People: Neoliberalism and Global Order. Seven Stories Press. “India financed 40 percent of Britain’s trade deficit while providing a protected market for its manufacturing exports; contract laborers for British possessions, replacing earlier slave populations; and the opium that was the staple of Britain’s exports to China” (p. 23).

• [15] Wood, E. M. (2002). The Origin of Capitalism: A Longer View. Verso. “The pre-capitalist character of the Dutch economy is visible in other ways too. Perhaps the most important is the extent to which the Dutch ruling class depended on ‘extra-economic’ modes of appropriation for its wealth” (p. 91).

• [16] Wood, E. M. (2002). The Origin of Capitalism: A Longer View. Verso. “International trade is the economic activity that above all created the great commercial centres, such as Venice, Florence, and Genoa in the Middle Ages and later Antwerp, Amsterdam, and London. This was essentially carrying trade, with merchants buying goods in one location to be sold for a profit in another” (p. 78).

Section 3

• McKinnon, R., & Schnabl, G. (2006). The East Asian Dollar Standard, Fear of Floating, and Original Sin. Review of Development Economics, 10(4), 631–651. “In the aftermath of the Plaza Agreement, the appreciation of the Japanese yen of about 50% between March 1985 and February 1988 led to a sharp high-yen induced recession (endaka fukyo) as profits of Japan’s export industries strongly declined. Overvaluation, worsened by a further ‘forced’ yen appreciation in 1995, contributed to lower domestic spending (including for imported goods) and declining real growth. Throughout the depressed 1990s, imports as well as exports fell resulting in no obvious reductions in Japan’s large current account surplus as a share of its slumping GNP.” (p. 691)

• [2] Obstfeld, M. (2009). Time of Troubles: The Yen and Japan’s Economy, 1985-2008. In Monetary and Economic Studies. Bank of Japan, 1–34. “The aftermath of the Plaza accord saw a dramatic move in the yen’s dollar exchange rate, as illustrated in Figure 3. Having been around 260 yen per dollar in early 1985, the yen price of dollars had fallen to around 125 by early 1988, an appreciation of roughly 73 percent (in log points) over only three years. In its latter stages, the yen’s rise was encouraged by somewhat easier U.S. monetary policy immediately following the October 1987 stock market crash. Estimates such as those reported by Ahearne and others (2002) suggest that Japan’s GDP was below potential in 1986 and 1987 as exporters struggled.” (p. 8)

• McKinnon, R., & Schnabl, G. (2006). The East Asian Dollar Standard, Fear of Floating, and Original Sin. Review of Development Economics, 10(4), 631–651. “History repeats itself. From the 1980s to the mid-1990s, it was Japan rather than China that had the largest and most rapidly growing trade surplus—both bilaterally with the United States and multilaterally. The result was what is popularly called ‘Japan bashing’: serial threats by the U.S. government of trade sanctions on particular Japanese exports coupled with pressure to appreciate the yen—what McKinnon and Ohno (1997) called ‘the syndrome of the ever higher yen.’ The yen went all the way from 360 to the dollar in 1971 at the end of the Bretton Woods period of fixed dollar parities to touch 80 to the dollar in April 1995.” (pp. 685–686)

• McKinnon, R., & Schnabl, G. (2006). The East Asian Dollar Standard, Fear of Floating, and Original Sin. Review of Development Economics, 10(4), 631–651. “One interpretation is that the large appreciations of foreign currencies projected in Table 1 are just necessary conditions for the U.S. current account to improve, but are not themselves sufficient. However, suppose no improvement in the U.S. saving-investment balance is forthcoming, then is not the advocacy of dollar devaluation a rather dangerous one? In effect, Japan bashing to get the yen up from the 1970s to the mid-1990s, and China bashing now to appreciate the renminbi, fall into this category of forcing exchange rate changes on foreigners without concomitant improvements in the saving-investment balance in the United States. As we have seen, the forced appreciations of the yen from the mid-1980s to mid-1990s had disastrous consequences for Japan.” (p. 692)

• Frankel, J. (2015). The Plaza Accord, 30 Years Later. NBER Working Paper No. 21813. “On 22 September, the G-5 ministers and central bankers met at the Plaza and agreed on an announcement that ‘some further orderly appreciation of the non-dollar currencies is desirable’ and that they ‘stand ready to cooperate more closely to encourage this when to do so would be helpful,’ language that by the standards of such communiques was considered (at least in retrospect) to have constituted strong support for concerted intervention, even though the word intervention did not appear.” (p. 7)

• Frankel, J. (2015). The Plaza Accord, 30 Years Later. NBER Working Paper No. 21813. “The value of the dollar had climbed 44 percent against other major currencies in the five years leading up to 1985. Largely as a result of the strong dollar and lost price competitiveness, the US trade balance had fallen to record lows as of 1985, a deficit of $122 billion. The trade deficit spurred congressional support for proposed trade interventions that an economist would have found damaging.” (p. 2)

• McKinnon, R., & Schnabl, G. (2006). The East Asian Dollar Standard, Fear of Floating, and Original Sin. Review of Development Economics, 10(4), 631–651. “History repeats itself. From the 1980s to the mid-1990s, it was Japan rather than China that had the largest and most rapidly growing trade surplus—both bilaterally with the United States and multilaterally. The result was what is popularly called ‘Japan bashing’: serial threats by the U.S. government of trade sanctions on particular Japanese exports coupled with pressure to appreciate the yen—what McKinnon and Ohno (1997) called ‘the syndrome of the ever higher yen.’” (pp. 685–686)

• Obstfeld, M. (2009). Time of Troubles: The Yen and Japan’s Economy, 1985-2008. In Monetary and Economic Studies. Bank of Japan, 1–34. “At the same time, Japan’s policy interest rates, having been raised abruptly late in 1985 to support the Plaza policy, were lowered sharply through 1986 and 1987. From a high point above 8 percent in late 1985, the overnight call money rate fell to just above 3 percent in the first half of 1987. And early in 1986, the prices of equity and land began to rise sharply. Many observers, for example, Ahearne and others (2002), Ito and Mishkin (2006), and Hamada and Okada (2007), link the Japanese authorities’ policy response to this emerging asset bubble to the macro landscape in the late 1980s.” (pp. 8–9)

• Obstfeld, M. (2009). Time of Troubles: The Yen and Japan’s Economy, 1985-2008. In Monetary and Economic Studies. Bank of Japan, 1–34. “In Japan’s economic history after the generation and collapse of the great asset price bubble, the yen’s strong real appreciation in 1990-95 stands out as a pivotal episode. From the point of view of the Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson theory, prior sectoral growth trends changed around this time, and it is doubtful that foreign exchange market participants were able to foresee these structural shifts.” (p. 32)

• Fischer, A. M. (2015). The Enduring Centrality of the Periphery in Global Development. Development and Change, 46(4), 700–725. “The truism that development needs to be understood as context-specific runs the danger of diverting our attention away from systemic global processes that constrain peripheries in similar ways despite their diversity… the failures of development over the last three decades have not necessarily been due to a one-size-fits-all approach to development policy per se, but instead to the fact that the neoliberal one-size was particularly detrimental to national development strategies in countries that attempted to wear the size.” (p. 727)

• Fischer, A. M. (2015). The Enduring Centrality of the Periphery in Global Development. Development and Change, 46(4), 700–725. “The pattern of propagation, Prebisch argued, favoured technological development in the centre and dependence on this technological development in the peripheries.” (p. 705)

• Fischer, A. M. (2015). The Enduring Centrality of the Periphery in Global Development. Development and Change, 46(4), 700–725. “Peripheral capitalist economies: declining terms of trade; marginalization of disadvantaged populations in the peripheries; imitative metropolitan consumption patterns of periphery elites; and macroeconomic instability.” (p. 705)

• Landesmann, M. A., & Stöllinger, R. (2018). Structural Change, Trade, and Industrial Policy. wiiw Working Paper No. 152. “Developments over the past 30 years were characterised by strong features of international and regional integration: the ‘rules of the game’ of such integration were such as to, on the one hand, constrain countries with respect to the instruments they could use to undertake ‘industrial policy’ as compared to past experiences.” (p. 2)

• [14] Landesmann, M. A., & Stöllinger, R. (2018). Structural Change, Trade, and Industrial Policy. wiiw Working Paper No. 152. “Thus, for example, in Europe we observed a strong move of industrial capacities towards a ‘Central Manufacturing Core’ while industry withdrew from other countries and regions.” (p. 2)

• [15] Landesmann, M. A., & Stöllinger, R. (2018). Structural Change, Trade, and Industrial Policy. wiiw Working Paper No. 152. “The rules of the game of such integration constrain countries with respect to the instruments they could use to undertake ‘industrial policy’ as compared to past experiences.” (p. 2)

Section 4

• Igan, D., & Lambert, T. (2019). Bank lobbying: Regulatory capture and beyond (IMF Working Paper No. WP/19/171). International Monetary Fund. “Regulatory capture arises when banks exert excessive influence on the regulators such that regulators act primarily in the interest of the industry they regulate rather than in the public interest. In this context, regulators are not only the agencies establishing and enforcing the final rules by which banks need to abide but also the legislature whose actions form the basis for these rules. Hence, we use the term “regulatory capture”2 to encompass “legislative capture” whereby elected representatives are also motivated by pursuing private interests of the regulated industry instead of the public interest.” (p. 5).

• Igan, D., & Lambert, T. (2019). Bank lobbying: Regulatory capture and beyond (IMF Working Paper No. WP/19/171). International Monetary Fund. “Overall, the findings are consistent with regulatory capture, which lessens the support for tighter rules and enforcement. This in turn allows riskier practices and worse economic outcomes. The evidence provides insights into how the rising political power of banks in the early 2000s propelled the financial system and the economy into crisis. While these findings should not be interpreted as a call for an outright ban of lobbying, they point in the direction of a need for rethinking the framework governing interactions between regulators and banks” (p. 2).

• AI Now Institute. (2024). Antitrust and competition: It’s time for structural reforms to Big Tech. AI Now Institute. “Weak enforcement of antitrust laws by government has allowed a handful of Big Tech companies to mediate many domains of life. But a reinvigorated interest in antitrust enforcement is cutting to the heart of concentrated tech power.”

• AI Now Institute. (2024). Antitrust and competition: It’s time for structural reforms to Big Tech. AI Now Institute. “These firms intentionally took an approach that would ensure their eventual dominance: they rapidly and aggressively acquired competitors as they emerged, leveraging data they were able to vacuum up through surveillance and acquisition to favor their own products and reinforce their dominance. They specifically designed their systems with the intent to lock in users, raising the costs to switch to different platforms.”

• AI Now Institute. (2024). Antitrust and competition: It’s time for structural reforms to Big Tech. AI Now Institute. “Competition law… provides for both structural and behavioral remedies that can, when combined, end the kinds of practices that have allowed these companies to get so big. It includes both ex ante interventions that can prevent firms from gaining too much market power and ex post enforcement measures that can address abuses of dominance when they occur.”

•  Antitrust Division. (2000). Final judgment: U.S. v. Microsoft Corporation; State of New York, et al. United States District Court for the District of Columbia. https://www.justice.gov/atr/final-judgment-us-v-microsoft-corporation-state-new-york-et-al-v-microsoft-corporation “The Court having entered judgment in accordance with the Findings of Fact and the Conclusions of Law on April 3, 2000, that Microsoft has violated §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2.”

• Antitrust Division. (2000). Final judgment: U.S. v. Microsoft Corporation; State of New York, et al. United States District Court for the District of Columbia. https://www.justice.gov/atr/final-judgment-us-v-microsoft-corporation-state-new-york-et-al-v-microsoft-corporation “Ban on Contractual Tying. Microsoft shall not condition the granting of a Windows Operating System Product license, or the terms or administration of such license, on an OEM or other licensee agreeing to license, promote, or distribute any other Microsoft software product that Microsoft distributes separately from the Windows Operating System Product in the retail channel or through Internet access providers, Internet content providers, ISVs or OEMs, whether or not for a separate or positive price.” (p. 13).

• Antitrust Division. (2000). Final judgment: U.S. v. Microsoft Corporation; State of New York, et al. United States District Court for the District of Columbia. https://www.justice.gov/atr/final-judgment-us-v-microsoft-corporation-state-new-york-et-al-v-microsoft-corporation “Agreements Limiting Competition. Microsoft shall not offer, agree to provide, or provide any consideration to any actual or potential Platform Software competitor in exchange for such competitor’s agreeing to refrain or refraining in whole or in part from developing, licensing, promoting or distributing any Operating System Product or Middleware Product competitive with any Windows Operating System Product or Middleware Product.”

• [10] Antitrust Division. (2000). Final judgment: U.S. v. Microsoft Corporation; State of New York, et al. United States District Court for the District of Columbia. https://www.justice.gov/atr/final-judgment-us-v-microsoft-corporation-state-new-york-et-al-v-microsoft-corporation “Ban on Exclusive Dealing. Microsoft shall not enter into or enforce any Agreement in which a third party agrees, or is offered or granted consideration, to: i. restrict its development, production, distribution, promotion or use of, or payment for, any non-Microsoft Platform Software, ii. distribute, promote or use any Microsoft Platform Software exclusively, iii. degrade the performance of any non-Microsoft Platform Software, or iv. in the case of an agreement with an Internet access provider or Internet content provider, distribute, promote or use Microsoft software in exchange for placement with respect to any aspect of a Windows Operating System Product.”

• Columbia Business School. (2024). As Big Tech gets bigger, antitrust issues loom larger: Here’s what voters need to know. Columbia Business School. “With the U.S. Department of Justice considering a breakup of Google while the presidential election approaches, many people will be watching closely to see where candidates stand on Big Tech monopolies.”

•  Columbia Business School. (2024). As Big Tech gets bigger, antitrust issues loom larger: Here’s what voters need to know. Columbia Business School. “One approach to competition is to view large firms as anti-competitive and work to break them up. This is similar to the approach taken with phone companies decades earlier. There are some serious drawbacks to this approach. One drawback is that unlike phone lines, data can be easily copied. We could end up with multiple mini-firms, each of which has access to all our data. Second, given that firms use data to run their businesses better, if these companies each have access to less data, they will operate less efficiently and deliver users a worse experience.”

• Columbia Business School. (2024). As Big Tech gets bigger, antitrust issues loom larger: Here’s what voters need to know. Columbia Business School. “As tech plays a bigger and bigger role in our lives, many consumers are, in essence, locked into tech platforms that make it hard to migrate elsewhere. What could change that would be data portability laws that made it easier for consumers to move their information to another location. Such laws would have a similar effect to the universal wall sockets we can use for virtually any piece of electrical equipment.”

• Columbia Business School. (2024). As Big Tech gets bigger, antitrust issues loom larger: Here’s what voters need to know. Columbia Business School. “Many consumers are worried that Big Tech firms are stealing or selling their data. In response, many politicians around the world have proposed limits to what firms can do with customers’ data. However, such limits might undermine customers’ ability to benefit from sharing their data. When customers transact with a business, that business values the data from that transaction and benefits from doing more of these transactions.”

• Wu, T. (2018). The curse of bigness: Antitrust in the new gilded age. Columbia Global Reports. “Look at the global economy and witness the rule of concentrated oligopolies and monopolies, in industries like finance, media, airlines, and telecommunications, just to name the most obvious—firms whose size allows them to treat customers and competitors with impunity.”

• Wu, T. (2018). The curse of bigness: Antitrust in the new gilded age. Columbia Global Reports. “The large firm, alone or in cooperation, can and usually does invest in ‘moats’—the business school term for barriers that are designed to keep out new competitors who might have better-quality products or cheaper prices.”

• Wu, T. (2018). The curse of bigness: Antitrust in the new gilded age. Columbia Global Reports. “We can see that it is to the George W. Bush era that we owe our present economic state, as the administration dismantled most of the checks on industry concentration. In a run that lasted some two decades, American industry reached levels of industry concentration arguably unseen since the original Trust era.”

• Nazario, P., Saka, O., & Clark, J. (n.d.). Case analysis: PepsiCo’s diversification strategy in 2008. International Business Policies and Strategies. “The aggressive diversification strategy is a major strength of PepsiCo. The company should continue along this path, but should also seek to specifically acquire companies that can offer it excellent strategic fit benefits, in order to capture efficiencies in the value chain.” (p. 15).

• Nazario, P., Saka, O., & Clark, J. (n.d.). Case analysis: PepsiCo’s diversification strategy in 2008. International Business Policies and Strategies. “1970s-1980s Diversification outside snacks and beverages; Acquisition of Pizza Hut, Taco Bell, KFC” (p. 2).

• [21] Luco, F., & Marshall, G. (2020). Vertical integration by multiproduct firms: Evidence from the U.S. hospital industry. American Economic Review, 110(7), 2041–2075. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20171758 “We study the impact of vertical integration on pricing incentives in multiproduct industries. To do so, we exploit recent variation in vertical structure in the U.S. carbonated-beverage industry.”

• Luco, F., & Marshall, G. (2020). Vertical integration by multiproduct firms: Evidence from the U.S. hospital industry. American Economic Review, 110(7), 2041–2075. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20171758 “The FTC reviewed the transactions in 2010 and cleared them in October and November of that year subject to some behavioral remedies.”

• Luco, F., & Marshall, G. (2020). Vertical integration by multiproduct firms: Evidence from the U.S. hospital industry. American Economic Review, 110(7), 2041–2075. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20171758 “The integrated bottlers accounted for about 75 percent of Coca-Cola’s and PepsiCo’s sales of bottled and canned soft drinks in 2009.”

• Wu, T. (2018). The curse of bigness: Antitrust in the new gilded age. Columbia Global Reports. “The airline industry, which had been deregulated in the 1970s with the goal of increasing competition, was allowed to merge into an increasingly smaller number of “major” airlines. Delta bought Northwestern airlines; United bought Continental, and American bought U.S. Airlines, reducing the total number of traditional major airlines to just three. Since then, the airlines have found it easy to cooperate on matters like the shrinking of seats or the introduction of new fees, yielding unprecedented profit for years on end.”

• Wu, T. (2018). The curse of bigness: Antitrust in the new gilded age. Columbia Global Reports. “But to get a sense beyond the statistics it is worth considering some concrete examples: The AT&T monopoly, which had been forced to divide into 8 pieces, was allowed, over the 2000s, to reconstitute itself in two giant firms: Verizon and AT&T.”

• Wu, T. (2018). The curse of bigness: Antitrust in the new gilded age. Columbia Global Reports. “Many of these combinations happened during the Obama administration. President Barack Obama said in 2008 that he wanted “an antitrust division in the Justice Department that actually believes in antitrust law.” He appointed officials who were understood to be more enforcement-oriented.”

• Wu, T. (2018). The curse of bigness: Antitrust in the new gilded age. Columbia Global Reports. “For among the lawyers and economists who staff the agencies, Chicago and Harvard’s influence had been strongly felt. Bork’s insinuation that strict reliance on economic analysis was a mark of good character had became something of a controlling meme. Those demanding a return to the law’s traditions of trustbusting and breakups were cast as wild-eyed radicals in an administration that favored moderation and composure.”

• Wu, T. (2018). The curse of bigness: Antitrust in the new gilded age. Columbia Global Reports. “A full 75 percent of industries witnessed increased concentration from the years 1997 to 2012, according to an extensive study by economist Gustavo Grullon and his co-authors, which was echoed by studies by the Council of Economic Advisors in the White House, and an independent study by the Economist magazine.”

Section 5

• Barros, O. (1989). Chile: The Pinochet Economy. In Collins, J. & Lear, J. (Eds.), Chile’s Free Market Miracle: A Second Look (pp. 17-34). Monthly Review Press. “The experience of Chile is often invoked to justify the policies of the World Bank and the IMF. However, General Pinochet’s post-1973 ‘stabilization’ of the economy under IMF guidance resulted in deindustrialization, an absolute reduction in the number of manufacturing jobs, low investment and the reduction of productive capacity… From 1967 to 1982, total manufacturing employment fell from 327,013 to 223,138, with some sub-sectors, such as textiles, particularly hard hit.” (p. 82)

• Barros, O. (1989). Chile: The Pinochet Economy. In Collins, J. & Lear, J. (Eds.), Chile’s Free Market Miracle: A Second Look (pp. 17-34). Monthly Review Press. “In some cases, financial repayments rose to 50% of the total sales for firms. Consequently, in 1982 there were record numbers of plant closures, capital flight and a ‘desubstitution of imports.’” (p. 82)

• [3] Martin, H.-P., & Schumann, H. (1997). The Global Trap: Globalization and the Assault on Prosperity and Democracy. Zed Books. “Mexico’s experience with SAPs was similar… Mexico implemented SAPs in six out of eight years between 1983 and 1990… Mexico was able to attract substantial portfolio investment because it had previously met all the IMF conditions… [yet] pegging the peso to the US dollar led to an overvaluation of the exchange rate which hurt Mexico’s export competitiveness and encouraged imports.” (p. 83)

• Martin, H.-P., & Schumann, H. (1997). The Global Trap: Globalization and the Assault on Prosperity and Democracy. Zed Books. “From 1988 to 1994, the number of billionaires in US dollar terms rose from 2 to 24 and by 1994, assets of the richest individual in Mexico exceeded the combined assets of the poorest 17 million… Falling incomes for working-class families have forced many young women to find work in the burgeoning maquiladora sector at very low wages and under highly exploitative conditions.” (p. 83)

• McCutchan, A. (2010). Neoliberal Economic Policies in Latin America: Effects on Social Welfare and Political Stability (Master’s thesis). Available from ProQuest Dissertations and Theses database. “On August 8th, 1990, the Peruvian populace awakened to what has become known as ‘Fujishock’… real wages declined by 50%, underemployment reached 80% and by 1994, 59% of the national population was living in poverty.” (p. 30)

Section 6

• Fajgelbaum, P., Goldberg, P. K., Kennedy, P. J., Khandelwal, A., & Taglioni, D. (2023). The US-China trade war and global reallocations. American Economic Review. “In 2018 and 2019, the US and China engaged in a trade war, mutually escalating tariffs that ultimately covered approximately $450 billion in trade flows. These policies upended a decades-long trend toward lower global trade barriers and, unsurprisingly, reduced trade between the US and China, with escalated tariffs persisting until today.” (p. 1)

• Chow, D. C. K., & Sheldon, I. M. (2020). Understanding the economic and political effects of Trump’s China tariffs. William & Mary Business Law Review, 11(2), 367–428. “In the case of the China tariffs, empirical analysis shows unequivocally that the cost of the tariffs has been passed almost entirely to the U.S. consumer, contrary to the assertion of the Trump Administration.” (p. 4)

• Fajgelbaum, P., Goldberg, P. K., Kennedy, P. J., Khandelwal, A., & Taglioni, D. (2023). The US-China trade war and global reallocations. American Economic Review. “The US sharply raised tariffs on China, but except for machinery and metals, did not significantly increase tariffs on other partners. Panel B shows that China’s tariffs increased across all sectors for the US and decreased for non-US partners.” (p. 7)

• Fajgelbaum, P., Goldberg, P. K., Kennedy, P. J., Khandelwal, A., & Taglioni, D. (2023). The US-China trade war and global reallocations. American Economic Review. “China’s tariffs increased across all sectors for the US and decreased for non-US partners.” (p. 7)

• Chow, D. C. K., & Sheldon, I. M. (2020). Understanding the economic and political effects of Trump’s China tariffs. William & Mary Business Law Review, 11(2), 367–428. “The tariffs have resulted in a deadweight loss (or aggregate loss) of $7.3 billion to the U.S. economy.” (p. 4)

• Chow, D. C. K., & Sheldon, I. M. (2020). Understanding the economic and political effects of Trump’s China tariffs. William & Mary Business Law Review, 11(2), 367–428. “Essentially, power-based bargaining by the U.S. has failed in the sense that the bilateral relationship with China has been pushed closer towards the higher tariff, non-cooperative Nash equilibrium.” (p. 16)

• Chow, D. C. K., & Sheldon, I. M. (2020). Understanding the economic and political effects of Trump’s China tariffs. William & Mary Business Law Review, 11(2), 367–428. “Retaliatory tariffs disproportionately affected agricultural products compared to other sectors, with average tariffs on U.S. agricultural products increasing from 8.3 to 28.6 percent on 908 products, accounting for $32 billion worth of U.S. exports.” (p. 20)

• Chow, D. C. K., & Sheldon, I. M. (2020). Understanding the economic and political effects of Trump’s China tariffs. William & Mary Business Law Review, 11(2), 367–428. “China has imposed retaliatory tariffs on U.S. agricultural products to cause maximum pain and distress. U.S. agricultural exports, such as soybeans, are particularly vulnerable to retaliation as China buys about 50 percent of all U.S. soybean exports.” (p. 4)