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Footnotes

Section 1 Footnotes

  • Weissman, S. R. (2010). An Extraordinary Rendition, Intelligence and National Security, 25(2), 198-222. "On 17 January 1961, Patrice Lumumba, the first elected Prime Minister of the former Belgian Congo, was ‘rendered’ by his CIA-supported replacements to the Belgian-backed, secessionist ‘Independent State of Katanga’. He and his two associates were executed within hours. A 1975 investigation of reported intelligence abuses by the US Senate’s special ‘Church Committee’ (popularly named after its Chairman, Democratic Senator Frank Church) revealed that the CIA had taken ‘steps’ towards murdering Lumumba. Nevertheless, the Committee concluded, ‘Lumumba was killed [in January 1961] by Congolese rivals. It does not appear from the evidence that the United States was in any way involved in the killing’." (p. 199). DOI: 10.1080/02684527.2010.489277.

  • Gerard, E., & Kuklick, B. (2015). Death in the Congo: Murdering Patrice Lumumba. Harvard University Press. "In the aftermath of the Watergate scandals and the offenses of President Richard Nixon, the United States Senate explored various compromised activities of American presidents in the 1960s and early 1970s. Among many other things, the Senate discovered plans by the Central Intelligence Agency to assassinate Lumumba. After Lumumba’s death, the United States had propped up Joseph Mobutu, who would rule the Congo for thirty years." (p. 3).

  • Gerard, E., & Kuklick, B. (2015). Death in the Congo: Murdering Patrice Lumumba. Harvard University Press. "The CIA had an exaggerated reputation for providing instant answers for troubling issues. In the late 1940s, America had formed the Central Intelligence Agency as part of the fight against the Soviets. The CIA gathered information, but had a security dimension that grew rapidly, despite the hostility of other governmental departments. By the mid-1950s the Cold War had enveloped American politics, and the Eisenhower administration relied more and more on the organization to put out of commission or hijack regimes that the United States disliked. The Agency engaged in underhanded tactics, dirty tricks, and antidemocratic activities in covert operations. In extreme circumstances, policymakers might even mandate that the CIA permanently cripple, imprison, or exile enemies thought to be drifting dangerously close to communism or the USSR. Tensions between America and Russia might spiral into a civilization-ending thermonuclear war, and for Eisenhower undercover enterprises offered a comparatively humane way to keep the peace in certain parts of the world. The CIA justified hidden escapades by arguing that they would avoid a 'hot war.' The USSR and the United States might circumvent a showdown if they struggled for advantage out of sight. The president could turn his eyes away from the ambiguities of efforts that chipped away at democratic ideals. If the CIA uprooted or banished a few foreigners, the United States paid a tiny moral price for the greater good of finding a way around a confrontation. Even if these people lost their lives because the CIA made unsavory decisions, the president still faced a small cost. Despite receiving criticism, Eisenhower let the Agency get away with murder—at first figuratively, then literally." (pp. 135-136).

  • Weissman, S. R. (2010). An Extraordinary Rendition, Intelligence and National Security, 25(2), 198-222. "The US quickly joined Belgium in sponsoring and guiding the opposition to Lumumba. Their first major success came on 5 September when President Kasavubu dismissed the Prime Minister in a legally controversial move. Four days earlier, the NSC’s ‘Special Group’ had approved ‘provision of funds to President Kasavubu in connection with anti-Lumumba program’ according to an unreleased study of Congo covert action by the Church Committee." (p. 202). DOI: 10.1080/02684527.2010.489277.

  • Weissman, S. R. (2010). An Extraordinary Rendition, Intelligence and National Security, 25(2), 198-222. "When Lumumba obtained UN military protection and Mobutu hesitated to accept CIA and Belgian Government urgings to attempt another arrest, the Agency launched its own, more direct assassination effort. No one would ever have found out about it except for a 1962 recorded complaint to the CIA Inspector-General by a case officer named Justin O’Donnell that surfaced during the CIA scandal of 1974–75." (p. 204). DOI: 10.1080/02684527.2010.489277.

  • Langer, N. (2014). The American Empire in the Congo: The Assassination of Patrice Lumumba. The Undergraduate Historical Journal at UC Merced, 2(1). "In the weeks leading to his assassination, Lumumba and his cabinet had been captured by the US and Belgian backed Mobutu Seko—leader of the separatist Katangan government. However, the direct role of the Belgian government in the assassination is extremely apparent; for as Lumumba and his cabinet were prepared for their execution, '[Commissioner Frans] Versheure [Belgian advisor to the Katangan police] removed the handcuffs' himself. Furthermore, 'the police [who carried out the execution] had Vigneron sten guns, [while] the [three Belgian] soldiers FAL rifles.'" (p. 62). DOI: 10.5070/H321025692.

  • Weissman, S. R. (2010). An Extraordinary Rendition, Intelligence and National Security, 25(2), 198-222. "Even as their prisoner was being brutalized, the Congolese authorities, together with their Belgian advisers, began working to transfer him to Katanga. An early concern was that Lumumba’s magnetic political presence could ‘contaminate’ the restive garrison guarding him at Thysville, 80 miles outside of Leopoldville. But Katangan President Moise Tshombe was reluctant to accept his foe. As an alternative, he suggested ‘Emperor’ Albert Kalonji’s secessionist mini-state of South Kasai, which was also backed by Belgian military officers and economic interests. Either destination would pose a clear and present danger to Lumumba’s life." (p. 207). DOI: 10.1080/02684527.2010.489277.

  • Weissman, S. R. (2010). An Extraordinary Rendition, Intelligence and National Security, 25(2), 198-222. "Devlin himself testified that when he learned that Lumumba was transferred to Katanga, he assumed ‘that his goose was cooked’. As for South Kasai, on 10 October Kalonji called Lumumba ‘an assassin who must be tried and executed’. In February 1961, several prominent Lumumbists would be transferred to South Kasai by the Congo Government and executed in horrific circumstances." (p. 207). DOI: 10.1080/02684527.2010.489277.

  • Weissman, S. R. (2010). An Extraordinary Rendition, Intelligence and National Security, 25(2), 198-222. "On 12 January Allen Dulles informed the National Security Council, ‘In Leopoldville, our Ambassador is alarmed over developments and skeptical about Mobutu’s ability to remain in power. Lumumba may even return to power.’ The next day, following the Thysville mutiny, Devlin reported: ‘Station and Embassy believe present government may fall within few days. Result would almost certainly be chaos and return [Lumumba] to power.’" (p. 208). DOI: 10.1080/02684527.2010.489277.

  • Weissman, S. R. (2010). An Extraordinary Rendition, Intelligence and National Security, 25(2), 198-222. "Even as their prisoner was being brutalized, the Congolese authorities, together with their Belgian advisers, began working to transfer him to Katanga. An early concern was that Lumumba’s magnetic political presence could ‘contaminate’ the restive garrison guarding him at Thysville, 80 miles outside of Leopoldville." (p. 207). DOI: 10.1080/02684527.2010.489277.

  • Weissman, S. R. (2010). An Extraordinary Rendition, Intelligence and National Security, 25(2), 198-222. "Devlin himself testified that when he learned that Lumumba was transferred to Katanga, he assumed ‘that his goose was cooked’. As for South Kasai, on 10 October Kalonji called Lumumba ‘an assassin who must be tried and executed’. In February 1961, several prominent Lumumbists would be transferred to South Kasai by the Congo Government and executed in horrific circumstances." (p. 207). DOI: 10.1080/02684527.2010.489277.

  • Weissman, S. R. (2010). An Extraordinary Rendition, Intelligence and National Security, 25(2), 198-222. "The Church Committee's 1975 investigation revealed that while the CIA took steps towards assassinating Lumumba, it was ultimately his Congolese rivals who executed him. Nonetheless, the investigation shed light on the CIA's deep entanglement in Lumumba's demise, contradicting claims of mere passive involvement." (p. 199). DOI: 10.1080/02684527.2010.489277.

  • Langer, N. (2014). The American Empire in the Congo: The Assassination of Patrice Lumumba. The Undergraduate Historical Journal at UC Merced, 2(1). "The Church Committee hearing—a Senate committee which investigated American covert actions during the Cold War and which published their findings in 1975—that would confirm active American involvement in a plot to kill Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba, and thus its arguments relied heavily on the official policy statements and news material that was available at the time." (p. 61). DOI: 10.5070/H321025692.

  • Langer, N. (2014). The American Empire in the Congo: The Assassination of Patrice Lumumba. The Undergraduate Historical Journal at UC Merced, 2(1). "The day after Mobutu’s coup, the [CIA] Station Officer reported that he was serving as an advisor to a Congolese effort to ‘eliminate’ Lumumba." (p. 63). DOI: 10.5070/H321025692.

  • Langer, N. (2014). The American Empire in the Congo: The Assassination of Patrice Lumumba. The Undergraduate Historical Journal at UC Merced, 2(1). "The Church Committee Senate investigation into American interventions abroad provides the most damning evidence of America’s candid role in the assassination of Lumumba: 'It is clear that the Director of Central Intelligence, Allen Dulles, authorized an assassination plot and that [strong] expressions of hostility toward Lumumba from the President and his national security assistant, followed immediately by CIA steps in the furtherance of an assassination operation against Lumumba, are part of a sequence of events that, at the least, make it appear that Dulles believed assassination was a permissible means of complying with pressure from the President to remove Lumumba from the political scene.'" (p. 63). DOI: 10.5070/H321025692.

Section 2 Footnotes

  • New York Times. (1971, July 1). U.S. and Diem's Overthrow: Step by Step. "The Pentagon's secret study of the Vietnam war discloses that President Kennedy knew and approved of plans for the military coup d'état that overthrew President Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963." (p. 1). Retrieved from New York Times Archive.

  • Pentagon Papers. (1971). Part IV, B-5. "For the military coup d'etat against Ngo Dinh Diem, the U.S. must accept its full share of responsibility. Beginning in August of 1963 we variously authorized, sanctioned, and encouraged the coup efforts of the Vietnamese generals and offered full support for a successor government. In October we cut off aid to Diem in a direct rebuff, giving a green light to the generals." (p. 7).

  • Pentagon Papers. (1971). Part IV, B-5. "The U.S. policy of support for South Vietnam's struggle against the Hanoi-supported Viet Cong insurgency was founded on unequivocal support of Diem, whom the U.S. had long regarded as the only national leader capable of unifying his people for their internal war." (p. 8).

  • Pentagon Papers. (1971). Part IV, B-5. "The catalytic event that precipitated the protracted crisis which ended in the downfall of the Diem regime was a badly handled Buddhist religious protest in Hue on May 8, 1963. In and of itself the incident was hardly something to shake the foundations of power of most modern rulers, but the manner in which Diem responded to it, and the subsequent protests which it generated, was precisely the one most likely to aggravate not alleviate the situation. At stake, of course, was far more than a religious issue. The Buddhist protest had a profoundly political character from the beginning. It sprang and fed upon the feelings of political frustration and repression Diem's autocratic rule had engendered." (p. 6).

  • Pentagon Papers. (1971). Part IV, B-5. "The U.S. made repeated attempts to persuade Diem to redress the Buddhist grievances, to repair his public image, and to win back public support. But the Ngos were unwilling to bend. Diem, in true mandarin style, was preoccupied with questions of face and survival—not popular support." (p. 9).

  • Pentagon Papers. (1971). Part IV, B-5. "Beginning in August of 1963 we variously authorized, sanctioned, and encouraged the coup efforts of the Vietnamese generals and offered full support for a successor government. In October we cut off aid to Diem in a direct rebuff, giving a green light to the generals." (p. 7).

  • Pentagon Papers. (1971). Part IV, B-5. "We maintained clandestine contact with them throughout the planning and execution of the coup and sought to review their operational plans and proposed new government. Thus, as the nine-year rule of Diem came to a bloody end, our complicity in his overthrow heightened our responsibilities and our commitment in an essentially leaderless Vietnam." (p. 43).

  • New York Times. (1971, July 1). U.S. and Diem's Overthrow: Step by Step. "Near the end, he also sent a message to Washington seeking authority to put up the money for bribes to win over officers still loyal to President Diem." (p. 4). Retrieved from New York Times Archive.

  • Lodge, H. C. (1971, October 25). Lodge Message to Bundy on Dealings with Generals. "We should not thwart a coup for two reasons. First, it seems at least an even bet that the next government would not bungle and stumble as much as the present one has. Secondly, it is extremely unwise in the long range for us to pour cold water on attempts at a coup, particularly when they are just in their beginning stages." (p. 29). Retrieved from New York Times Archive.

  • Lodge, H. C. (1971, October 25). Lodge Message to Bundy on Dealings with Generals. "CAS has been punctilious in carrying out my instructions. I have personally approved each meeting between General Don and Conein who has carried out my orders in each instance explicitly. While I share your concern about the continued involvement of Conein in this matter, a suitable substitute for Conein as the principal contact is not presently available. Conein, as you know, is a friend of some eighteen years' standing with General Don, and General Don has expressed extreme reluctance to deal with anyone else. I do not believe the involvement of another American in close contact with the generals would be productive." (p. 29). Retrieved from New York Times Archive.

  • Pentagon Papers. (1971). Part IV, B-5. "For the military coup d'etat against Ngo Dinh Diem, the U.S. must accept its full share of responsibility. Beginning in August of 1963 we variously authorized, sanctioned, and encouraged the coup efforts of the Vietnamese generals and offered full support for a successor government. In October we cut off aid to Diem in a direct rebuff, giving a green light to the generals." (p. 7).

  •  New York Times. (1971, July 1). U.S. and Diem's Overthrow: Step by Step. "As the nine-year rule of Diem came to a bloody end, our complicity in his overthrow heightened our responsibilities and our commitment in an essentially leaderless Vietnam." (p. 43). Retrieved from New York Times Archive.

  • New York Times. (1971, July 1). U.S. and Diem's Overthrow: Step by Step. "Near the end, he also sent a message to Washington seeking authority to put up the money for bribes to win over officers still loyal to President Diem." (p. 4). Retrieved from New York Times Archive.

Section 3 Footnotes

  • Benedetto, K., Lamb, A., & Cohen, R. (2009). The Other September 11: Teaching about the 1973 Overthrow of Chilean President Salvador Allende. National Council for the Social Studies. p. 287. "In 1973, the U.S. took part in perpetrating the terror, having helped to destabilize the Allende government and covertly supported a military coup that resulted in one of the most brutal dictatorships in the Western Hemisphere. Dorfman warns: 'Beware the plague of amnesia, America…. Have … you forgotten the Democratic Chile? Demonized, destabilized by your government in 1973? … Misruled for seventeen years by a dictator you helped install?'"

  • Kornbluh, P. (2013). The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability. The New Press. p. 8. "On September 15, 1970, in a fifteen-minute meeting between 3:25 and 3:40 P.M., President Richard Nixon ordered the CIA to initiate a massive covert intervention in Chile. The goal: to block Chilean President-elect Salvador Allende from taking and holding office. Allende was a well-known and popular politician in Chile; the 1970 campaign constituted his fourth run for the presidency."

  • Huggins, D. G. (2010). American Hypocrisy in Foreign Policy: Operation FUBELT and the Overthrow of Salvador Allende. Calvert Undergraduate Research Awards. p. 2. "The democratically elected Chilean President, Marxist Salvador Allende, took office on 3 November 1970. Despite the fact that the United States Government intelligence and diplomatic assessments had determined that Allende posed no threat to the security of the United States, nothing would stop the Nixon administration from being the force behind the efforts to try to keep him from being seated as the new President, or his subsequent removal from office if inaugurated."

  • Huggins, D. G. (2010). American Hypocrisy in Foreign Policy: Operation FUBELT and the Overthrow of Salvador Allende. Calvert Undergraduate Research Awards. p. 8. "During this meeting Nixon stressed that he wanted to prevent Allende from being inaugurated. Handwritten notes taken by DCI Helms showed the beginning of United States intervention into Chilean internal affairs. The handwritten notes from this meeting became the Presidential directive regarding actions to be undertaken in Chile. The notes provide insight to President Nixon and his disregard for Chilean sovereignty."

  • Wolf, R. (2008). Nixon's Interference in Chilean Elections. p. 1. "In March and June 1970, the Committee approved a series of anti-Allende spoiling operations for the CIA to carry out against Allende. While approving the CIA’s operations, the Committee gave $135,000 to the CIA’s Santiago station in March and $300,000 to it in June so that field-agents could fund their activities to ruin Allende’s public image and campaign message."

  •  Wolf, R. (2008). Nixon's Interference in Chilean Elections. pp. 2-3. "After failing to prevent Allende from getting into office, the Nixon administration waged a long-term economic and propaganda war on the UP in order to destabilize it. Nixon and Kissinger’s policy involved cutting off the flow of financial aid and loans to Chile from all departments within the United States Government, private US investors, and as much of the international community as possible."

  • Wolf, R. (2008). Nixon's Interference in Chilean Elections. p. 5. "In Kissinger: A Biography, Isaacson revealed that Nixon and Henry Kissinger, national security advisor and future secretary of state, came up with two plans in order to prevent Allende from taking office. Nixon and Kissinger referred to these plans as Track I and Track II, and expected for the CIA to pursue both plans at the same time."

  • Wolf, R. (2008). Nixon's Interference in Chilean Elections. p. 5. "According to Isaacson, the CIA’s Covert Operations Chief Tom Karamessines reported to Kissinger on September 25 that up to that point, things had not gone well for the field-agents trying to conduct Track II and that no one within the Chilean military would conduct a coup before Allende took office. Kissinger listened to Karamessines and thanked him for the information, but refused to call off Track II."

  • Kornbluh, P. (2013). The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability. The New Press. pp. 11-12. "Toward that end, the CIA designed its covert operations to create and exacerbate economic, political, governmental, and military tensions 'to divide and weaken Allende.' The 'Covert Action Program for Chile,' submitted to Kissinger on November 17, was 'directed at the Allende government, the Chilean Armed Forces, the non-Marxist opposition, the Chilean public, and other Latin American countries in an effort to maximize pressure on the Allende government.'"

  • Huggins, D. G. (2010). American Hypocrisy in Foreign Policy: Operation FUBELT and the Overthrow of Salvador Allende. Calvert Undergraduate Research Awards. p. 8. "Economic pressures initiated under project FUBELT continued after Allende’s inauguration. The first step in the economic effort to destabilize the Chilean government was to initiate what was referred to as an invisible blockade. The Chilean economy was deeply dependent on financial, industrial, and commercial relations with the United States. The United States government’s invisible blockade constituted total economic war against the Allende regime."

  • Huggins, D. G. (2010). American Hypocrisy in Foreign Policy: Operation FUBELT and the Overthrow of Salvador Allende. Calvert Undergraduate Research Awards. p. 18. "The United States government’s invisible blockade constituted total economic war against the Allende regime. Chilean accounts in the United States were frozen, new loans from banks were stopped or deferred, Chile’s world credit rating was downgraded, and European countries were encouraged to adopt the same policies."

  • Kornbluh, P. (2013). The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability. The New Press. pp. 232-233. "Dissatisfied with the pace and results of efforts to divide the coalition through support for less radical members, the CIA turned its attention to organizing and supporting a vigorous right-wing opposition to Allende. For the next three years, El Mercurio received well over a million dollars in covert assistance, according to CIA records. As the leading daily paper in Chile, El Mercurio became  the main media organ for fomenting public discontent with the Allende government. CIA funding supported the publication of editorials and articles that attacked Allende and his policies, portrayed the economic situation as dire, and encouraged opposition activities."

  • Kornbluh, P. (2013). The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability. The New Press. pp. 137-138. "Sustained by a massive influx of covert funding, the Edwards media empire became one of the most prominent actors in the downfall of Chilean democracy. Far from being a news outlet, El Mercurio positioned itself as a bullhorn of organized agitation against the government. In the summer of 1973, the CIA’s Santiago Station identified El Mercurio, along with the paramilitary Patria y Libertad and militant elements of the Partido Nacional as the main private-sector organizations that 'have set as their objective creation of conflict and confrontation which will lead to some sort of military intervention.' The CIA’s Western Hemisphere covert action division credited the paper with a singular contribution to creating a coup climate. In heavily redacted project renewal memoranda dated in January 1974, Agency officials stressed that continued funding was necessary to reward and sustain the propaganda outlets provided by El Mercurio because of its role in bringing down Allende."

  • Wolf, R. (2008). Nixon's Interference in Chilean Elections. p. 10. "William Blum also pointed out that Nixon’s administration made provoking a military coup its long-term goal in Chile. According to Blum in Killing Hope: U.S. Military and CIA Interventions Since World War II, the Nixon administration waged an economic and propaganda war against the UP in order to destabilize it, and cause the country’s internal conditions to deteriorate so much that military officers would feel compelled to overthrow Allende’s government."

  • Huggins, D. G. (2010). American hypocrisy in foreign policy: Operation FUBELT and the overthrow of Salvador Allende. “On 11 September 1973, the President of the United States, along with his National Security Advisor, Director of Central Intelligence, and Attorney General, helped facilitate the rise to power of General Augusto Pinochet as the new President of Chile. It is estimated that 2,800-5,000 people died as a result of this action. There was no condemnation for this act of treachery.” https://digitalscholarship.unlv.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1014&context=award

  • Huggins, D. G. (2010). American hypocrisy in foreign policy: Operation FUBELT and the overthrow of Salvador Allende. https://digitalscholarship.unlv.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1014&context=award](https://digitalscholarship.unlv.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1014&context=award). "On September 15, 1970, the CIA initiated an invisible blockade against Chile. This included the freezing of Chilean bank accounts in the United States, halting all new loans and credits from international financial institutions, and pressuring European countries to do the same. This blockade severely restricted the Chilean government's ability to import essential goods and access foreign currency, leading to shortages and economic instability." (Huggins, 2010, pp. 8, 18).

  • Wolf, R. (2008). The Overthrow of Chilean President Salvador Allende Gossens. https://ttu-ir.tdl.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/aa893fdf-f06b-4166-8eb0-86861b2d57c1/content](https://ttu-ir.tdl.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/aa893fdf-f06b-4166-8eb0-86861b2d57c1/content)."On October 11, 1972, truck owners, supported and funded by the CIA, initiated a nationwide strike that paralyzed transportation across Chile. This strike led to significant disruptions in the supply chain, causing food shortages and escalating inflation. The strike lasted for 26 days and played a crucial role in destabilizing the Allende government." (Wolf, 2008, pp. 2-3).

  • Kornbluh, P. (2013). The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability. New Press. "By the summer of 1973, the CIA had provided El Mercurio with at least $1.5 million to publish anti-Allende propaganda." (pp. 137-138)

  • Kornbluh, P. (2013). The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability. New Press."On October 1, 1973, Patria y Libertad bombed a train carrying copper, a key export commodity for Chile, to further cripple the economy and create public dissatisfaction with the government." (pp. 232-233).

 

Section 4 Footnotes

  • Kornbluh, P. (2023, May 15). Kissinger's Bloody Paper Trail in Chile. The Nation. "Between Allende’s election on September 4, 1970, and his inauguration two months later, the CIA launched a major covert operation to block his ascendance to the presidency. Ordered by President Nixon and overseen by Kissinger, the operation—code-named FUBELT—led to the assassination of General René Schneider, the pro-constitution commander in chief of the Chilean Army. But the operation failed to foment a military coup." Retrieved from [https://www.thenation.com/article/world/kissinger-nixon-pinohet-chile-secret-memo/](https://www.thenation.com/article/world/kissinger-nixon-pinohet-chile-secret-memo/).

  • Kornbluh, P. (2023, May 15). Kissinger's Bloody Paper Trail in Chile. The Nation. "Kissinger successfully persuaded the president to approve this clandestine destabilization policy. At the NSC meeting the next day, Kissinger reiterated his arguments for intervention. 'Developments in Chile are clearly of major historic importance, and they will have ramifications that go far beyond just the question of US-Chilean relations,' his talking points for the NSC meeting dramatically began." Retrieved from [https://www.thenation.com/article/world/kissinger-nixon-pinohet-chile-secret-memo/](https://www.thenation.com/article/world/kissinger-nixon-pinohet-chile-secret-memo/).

  • Democracy Now! (2001, September 11). Relatives of Slain Chilean Military Commander Sue Henry Kissinger. "The CIA plotting did not prevent Salvador Allende, who had won a September 1970 presidential election, from taking office. But right-wing officers did kill Chilean General Rene Schneider, who opposed a military takeover." Retrieved from [https://www.democracynow.org/2001/9/11/relatives_of_slain_chilean_military_commander](https://www.democracynow.org/2001/9/11/relatives_of_slain_chilean_military_commander).

  • Democracy Now! (2001, September 11). Relatives of Slain Chilean Military Commander Sue Henry Kissinger. "This case really is the most concrete documented case of US involvement in the assassination of a foreign leader abroad. And the paperwork on this case goes right up to the office of Henry Kissinger." Retrieved from [https://www.democracynow.org/2001/9/11/relatives_of_slain_chilean_military_commander](https://www.democracynow.org/2001/9/11/relatives_of_slain_chilean_military_commander).

  • Democracy Now! (2001, September 11). Relatives of Slain Chilean Military Commander Sue Henry Kissinger. "One of the things that emerged through the declassification of these documents over the last couple of years was that after the shooting took place and after Schneider had been killed, the CIA passed $35,000 to elements of the hit team that killed him in order to buy their silence about previous contacts with US government personnel, with CIA covert agents. And this was essentially hush money. It was clear obstruction of justice to cover up a very specific crime." Retrieved from [https://www.democracynow.org/2001/9/11/relatives_of_slain_chilean_military_commander](https://www.democracynow.org/2001/9/11/relatives_of_slain_chilean_military_commander).

  • Franklin, J., & Campbell, D. (2002, June 12). Kissinger May Face Extradition to Chile. The Guardian. "At the time of his death, Horman was investigating the murder of Rene Schneider, the chief of staff in the Chilean army whose support for Allende and the constitution was seen as an obstacle to the coup. The CIA had been involved with groups plotting Schneider's murder, providing them with weapons and advice, according to a CIA internal inquiry in 2000. It found that the agency had withdrawn its support for the plotters before the murder but had paid them $35,000 afterwards 'to maintain the goodwill of the group'." Retrieved from [https://archive.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/163…gallery/29465.html%3Ftmpl=component&print=1&page=.html](https://archive.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/163…gallery/29465.html%3Ftmpl=component&print=1&page=.html).

  • Kornbluh, P. (2013). The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability. New Press. "The argument that Kissinger presented to protect the White House cast the CIA as a veritable rogue elephant, operating without authorization as the Nixon-ordered Project FUBELT culminated in a flurry of coup plotting and criminality during the week of October 15–22. The CIA, citing meetings with, and instructions from, both the president and his national security adviser, understood its clandestine operations to have the full backing of the White House. The fact remained, however, that Washington had been covertly involved in a shocking act of political assassination abroad—the Chilean equivalent of John F. Kennedy’s assassination."

  • Kornbluh, P. (2013). The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability. New Press. "To distance itself from any culpability for this crime of state, the Agency drafted a series of nuanced, self-serving, postmortems about the Schneider killing. A secret overview titled 'The Assassination of General René Schneider' and written as the Senate investigation into Track II began, claimed that the murder was 'totally unplanned and unforeseen.' Unplanned perhaps but certainly not unforeseen, the declassified records demonstrate. On two occasions the CIA’s coup conspirators raised the possibility that Schneider might be killed."

  • Kornbluh, P. (2013). The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability. New Press. "In a secret October 1974 briefing paper, titled 'Special Mandate from the President on Chile,' the CIA attempted to rewrite FUBELT history, forcefully asserting that 'the Viaux group, acting independently' had killed Schneider. 'To sum up, the tragic death of General Schneider resulted from a unilateral kidnap attempt taken on the initiative of the Viaux group despite and against the advice of an Agency representative.' This argument ignored the fact, well-documented in the CIA’s own records, that Viaux was not acting independently or unilaterally, but clearly as a co-conspirator with Valenzuela who had the unreserved support of the CIA—support that included $50,000 to pay the kidnap team Viaux had hired."

  • Kornbluh, P. (2013). The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability. New Press. "The CIA’s initial reaction to the shooting is reflected in the cold-blooded cable traffic between the Station and headquarters. Hecksher transmitted a report indicating some uncertainty about who was actually responsible but offering hope that the conditions were now propitious for a coup. 'We know that Gen. Valenzuela was involved but cannot prove or disprove that execution of attempt against Schneider was entrusted to elements linked with Viaux,' he wrote. 'All we can say is that attempt against Schneider is affording armed forces one last opportunity to prevent Allende’s election.'"

  • Kornbluh, P. (2013). The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability. New Press. "Only hours later, at 8:00 A.M., Schneider’s chauffer-driven car was deliberately struck and stopped by a jeep as he drove to military headquarters in Santiago. Five individuals then surrounded his car; one used a sledgehammer to break in the rear window. Schneider was shot three times at close range. Despite emergency open-heart surgery, he died on the morning of October 25."

  • Kornbluh, P. (2013). The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability. New Press. "On the evening of October 19, Valenzuela advised, General Schneider would attend an army VIP 'stag party' at the house of the commander-in-chief of the army on Presidente Errazuriz Street. As Schneider left the party he would be kidnapped. Schneider’s abduction would begin the following progression of events to establish an anti-Allende military regime: (1) After arriving at the house, Schneider would be abducted. (2) He would be taken to a waiting airplane and flown to Argentina. (3) Valenzuela would announce that Schneider had 'disappeared.' (4) The military would blame the kidnapping on leftists and would 'institute a search for Schneider in all of Chile, using this search as a pretext to raid Communist-controlled poblaciones [neighborhoods].' (5) The military command would be shuffled to put coup plotters in positions of power. (6) Frei would resign and leave Chile. (7) A new military Junta would 'be installed' headed by Admiral Hugo Tirado. (8) The Junta would dissolve Congress."

Section 5: Footnotes

  • Zepezauer, M. (2002). The CIA's Greatest Hits. "Rafael Trujillo took power in the Dominican Republic in a 1930 coup d'etat and received enthusiastic backing from Washington for most of the next 30 years. His methods for suppressing dissent were sickeningly familiar—torture and mass murder. The US raised no objections, and Trujillo returned the favor by becoming a totally reliable supporter of US policies in the UN." (p. 42)

  • Zepezauer, M. (2002). The CIA's Greatest Hits. "Also, when it started to look like Castro's revolutionary army would take over Cuba, the US began to worry that Trujillo's excesses might inspire a similar revolution. For whatever reasons, the CIA began plotting Trujillo's assassination in 1958." (p. 42)

  • Rabe, S. G. (1988). The Most Dangerous Area in the World: John F. Kennedy Confronts Communist Revolution in Latin America. University of North Carolina Press. "In mid-April 1960, President Eisenhower approved a State Department memorandum, which had been discussed before the National Security Council on January 14, regarding policies to be followed 'in the event of the flight, assassination, death, or overthrow of Trujillo.' The United States would be prepared to dispatch warships to Dominican waters or to land troops on Dominican soil 'to prevent a Castro-type government or one sympathetic to Castro.' But, in order to avoid military intervention, the United States intended to persuade Trujillo to leave and to establish contacts with civilian and military dissidents, who would give the island republic 'moderate, pro-United States leadership.'" (p. 37)

  • Rabe, S. G. (1988). The Most Dangerous Area in the World: John F. Kennedy Confronts Communist Revolution in Latin America. University of North Carolina Press. "Rafael Trujillo would not cooperate with the U.S. plan. Various Americans, including Ambassador Farland, Senator George Smathers of Florida, and the former Ambassador to Peru and Brazil, William Pawley, journeyed to Cuidad Trujillo (Santo Domingo) for discussions with Trujillo regarding the possibilities of his resigning or permitting a free election. A comfortable exile, perhaps in Portugal or Morocco, with a 'trust fund' was mentioned. The dictator resisted all blandishments, telling Pawley, 'you can come in here with the Marines, and you can come in here with the Army, and you can come in here with the Navy or even the atomic bomb, but I'll never go out of here unless I go on a stretcher.'" (p. 38)

  • Rabe, S. G. (1988). The Most Dangerous Area in the World: John F. Kennedy Confronts Communist Revolution in Latin America. University of North Carolina Press. "Unable to persuade Trujillo to leave, the Eisenhower administration considered violent measures. On May 13, 1960, Eisenhower met with Under Secretary of State C. Douglas Dillon, Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs R. Richard Rubottom, Ambassador Farland, and General Wilton B. Persons, a presidential assistant. The Staff Secretary, General Andrew Goodpaster, recorded the conversation in a memorandum classified 'top secret.' The President opened the session 'by saying that he was being bombarded by people who are opposed to Castro and Trujillo.' He and the State Department officials then reviewed the failures of the Pawley and Smathers missions. Under Secretary Dillon added that he had a classified report that claimed that Trujillo 'did not plan to retire "before the year 2000."'" (p. 38)

  • Rabe, S. G. (1988). The Most Dangerous Area in the World: John F. Kennedy Confronts Communist Revolution in Latin America. University of North Carolina Press. "Late in the evening of May 30, 1961, seven Dominicans led by Antonio de la Maza, the brother of Octavio de la Maza, the slain Dominican pilot, ambushed and assassinated Rafael Trujillo near San Cristobal, Dominican Republic. The assassins, who included disgruntled military officers, caught Trujillo on a lonely stretch of road as the aged dictator was on his way to visit his twenty-year-old mistress. Using handguns and shotguns, they riddled Trujillo's body with 27 rounds." (p. 40)

  • Zepezauer, M. (2002). The CIA's Greatest Hits. "Trujillo's life came to an abrupt end in May 1961, and while proper deniability was maintained in Washington, this is one of the best-documented CIA assassination plots (according to the 1975 Church Committee)." (p. 42)

  • Zepezauer, M. (2002). The CIA's Greatest Hits. "The US attempted to maintain the corrupt essence of the Trujillo regime without Trujillo, but the 1962 elections brought a physician named Juan Bosch to power." (p. 42)

  • Prashad, V. (2022). Washington bullets: A history of the CIA, coups, and assassinations. Digital On Demand. ISBN: 978-1-77637-878-4. "While they created confusion in Guyana, Romualdi and his AFL–CIA team brought their mischief to the Dominican Republic. Juan Bosch, a socialist, won the presidential election in 1962 and attempted to move a modest agrarian agenda. But what Bosch found soon enough was that all the main mass organizations in his country had been either fronts of the CIA or had been hollowed out by the AFL–CIA. One of his close advisors – Sacha Volman – was a CIA asset who hollowed out the main peasant organization (Federación Nacional de Hermandades Campesinas, FENHERCA), while the AFL–CIA had created and shaped the main trade union, Confederación Nacional de Trabajadores Libres (CONATRAL). Bosch’s bureaucrats and technicians had been trained by the International Institute for Labor Studies, which was funded by the Inter-American Center for Social Studies, which in turn received money from a CIA front known as the J.M. Kaplan Fund. Bosch stood on hollow ground. When Bosch had to go, the AFL–CIA tugged on the strings, the workers were sent on strike, and Bosch had to concede to what appeared to be mass unrest against his government." (p. 140)

  • Prashad, V. (2022). Washington bullets: A history of the CIA, coups, and assassinations. Digital On Demand. ISBN: 978-1-77637-878-4. "What I expect is that the program outlined in the telegram would (a)  prepare hemispheric and Guatemalan opinion for a change and dull the charges of intervention which may be expected to be leveled at us, and (b) to [sic] create here a climate in which important segments of the population and especially the Armed Forces and propertied class felt their interests sufficiently threatened to be stirred from their present lethargy into a better disposition to take the risks necessary to cooperate actively in bringing a new government into power." (p. 194)

Section 6 Footnotes

  • U.S. Department of State. (1967, May 11). [Memorandum to the President regarding Che Guevara's activities in South America]. The White House. "The reports of Guevara's capture and execution came as a result of coordinated efforts between Bolivian forces and CIA operatives." (p. 1).

  • Central Intelligence Agency. (1975, June 3). [Memorandum for the Deputy Inspector General concerning the capture of Ernesto 'Che' Guevara]. CIA Historical Review Program. "The presence of CIA operatives was a critical factor in the identification and apprehension of Guevara in Bolivia." (p. 2).

  • U.S. Department of State. (1967, October 18). [Communiqué on the death of Che Guevara]. Embassy La Paz, Bolivia. "The death certificate signed October 10, 1967, by Drs. Moisea Abraham Baptista and Jose Martinez Cuo, Hospital Knights of Malta, Vallegrande, Bolivia, indicates that on October 9 at 5:30 p.m., there arrived a body which military authorities said was Ernesto Guevara Lynch, approximately 40 years of age; the cause of death being multiple bullet wounds in the thorax and extremities. Preservative was applied to the body." (p. 1).

  • U.S. Department of State. (1967, October 18). [Communiqué on the death of Che Guevara]. Embassy La Paz, Bolivia. "The autopsy report signed October 10, 1967, by Drs. Abraham Baptista and Martinez Cuo, indicates that the body recognized as that of Ernesto Guevara was 40 years of age, white race, approximately 1.73 meters in height, brown curly hair, heavy curly beard and mustache, heavy eyebrows, straight nose, thin lips, mouth open, teeth in good order with nicotine stains, lower left premolar floating, light blue eyes, regular physique, scar along almost the whole left side of back." (p. 2).

  • U.S. Department of State. (1967, October 18). [Communiqué on the death of Che Guevara]. Embassy La Paz, Bolivia. "The cause of death was the thorax wounds and consequent hemorrhage." (p. 2).

  • Kallen, S. A. (2013). Che Guevara: You win or you die. Twenty-First Century Books. "Rodríguez had official orders to keep Guevara alive at all costs. The CIA considered the revolutionary commander to be one of the most valuable intelligence sources ever captured." (p. 64).

  • Kallen, S. A. (2013). Che Guevara: You win or you die. Twenty-First Century Books. "At first, Rodríguez tried to come up with a plan to smuggle Guevara out of Bolivia alive. But he was on Bolivian soil and realized that he could not ignore the president’s orders. Rodríguez decided to have Guevara shot—but to make it look as if he was shot in battle, as the Bolivians wanted." (p. 65).

  • Kallen, S. A. (2013). Che Guevara: You win or you die. Twenty-First Century Books. "Mario Terán, a Bolivian sergeant, volunteered to shoot Guevara. Rodríguez told Terán not to shoot Guevara in the head or face in typical execution style. Instead, he told him to aim anywhere from the neck down. That way, it would look as if Che had been killed in battle." (p. 66).

  • Anderson, J. L. (2010). Che Guevara: A Revolutionary Life. Grove Press. "In his version, Felix Rodríguez claimed it was he, not Zenteno Anaya, who had received the coded message ordering Che’s death, and that he had taken Zenteno Anaya aside to dissuade him. The U.S. government, he claimed, wanted to 'keep the guerrilla leader alive under any circumstances.'" (p. 707).

  • Anderson, J. L. (2010). Che Guevara: A Revolutionary Life. Grove Press. "Rodríguez said, 'I told him not to shoot Che in the face, but from the neck down. Che’s wounds had to appear as though they had been inflicted in battle. There was to be no evidence of an execution when the body was displayed to the press. I walked up the hill and began making notes. When I heard the shots I checked my watch. It was 1:10 P.M.'" (p. 709).

  • Ratner, M., Smith, M. S., & Alarcón, R. (2011). Who killed Che? How the CIA got away with murder. OR Books. "The documentary evidence, which we present below, reveals that the U.S. did everything in its power 'to eliminate the guerillas,' including Che. The documents demonstrate that it was in the U.S. government’s interest to have Che killed. The CIA and U.S. Special Forces trained the Bolivian Ranger Battalion that captured Che; CIA agents disguised as Bolivian officers accompanied the Rangers into the field; the U.S. supplied the weapons and provided the intelligence; and a CIA agent apparently was present at the time of his murder." (p. 31).

  • Ratner, M., Smith, M. S., & Alarcón, R. (2011). Who killed Che? How the CIA got away with murder. OR Books. "General Ovando may or may not have ordered Che murdered, but it is unlikely he did so without instructions from, or in agreement with, U.S. officials, inasmuch as the U.S. had paid for the entire Bolivian operation; and the U.S. military and CIA personnel had trained, accompanied, and directed the 'hunter-killer' groups whose job it was to 'eliminate' the guerillas." (p. 68).

Section 7 Footnotes

  • Breen, J. G. (2017).  CIA’s Covert Action in 1954 . InterAgency Journal, 8(4), 25-33. "By 1951, the newly elected government of Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala City had initiated reforms that from the U.S. perspective could be construed as, at best, socialist and, at worst, communist." (p. 27).

  • Ferreira, R. G. (2008).  The CIA and Jacobo Arbenz: History of a Disinformation Campaign . Journal of Third World Studies, 25(2), 59-81. "The CIA’s PBSUCCESS planners believed a buildup of diplomatic and economic pressure, along with political agitation, sabotage, and rumor campaigns would lead to a popular uprising and the downfall of the Arbenz government." (p. 28).

  • Rabe, S. G. (2004).  The U.S. Intervention in Guatemala: The Documentary Record . Diplomatic History, 28(5), 785-790. "Operation PBSUCCESS, the U.S. campaign to destroy the popularly elected government of Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán of Guatemala (1950–54), depended upon persuading or intimidating Guatemalan military officers into overthrowing President Arbenz." (p. 352).

  • Rabe, S. G. (2004).  The U.S. Intervention in Guatemala: The Documentary Record . Diplomatic History, 28(5), 785-790. "The destruction of the Arbenz government triggered a ghastly, four-decade-long cycle of terror and repression that led to the death of perhaps two hundred thousand Guatemalans." (p. 790).

  • Ferreira, R. G. (2008).  The CIA and Jacobo Arbenz: History of a Disinformation Campaign . Journal of Third World Studies, 25(2), 59-81. "CIA agents confiscated his personal papers, and, once they had been tampered with, they constituted the basis for elaborating 'press releases' to generate adverse public opinion." (p. 62).

  • Cullather, N. (1999).  Secret History: The CIA's Classified Account of Its Operations in Guatemala, 1952-1954 . Stanford University Press. "CIA officials believed that Guatemala was headed for eventual Communist takeover, and that the opportunity to act was rapidly passing. Without help, the Guatemalan opposition would remain divided and inert, enabling the PGT to consolidate its power." (p. 27).

Section 8 Footnotes

Section 9: Footnotes

  • Serrano, M. C. R. (2011). The assassination of Orlando Letelier: An example of Chilean and American teamwork. The Mirror-Undergraduate History Journal, 31(2), 25-40. "Letelier’s assassination was the result of his public criticism and exposure of Augusto Pinochet’s regime as well as the teamwork between the group of Cuban exiles, the Chilean government, and the CIA (despite the findings of the investigation)." p. 25. Retrieved from [https://ojs.lib.uwo.ca/index.php/westernumirror/article/download/15861/12286](https://ojs.lib.uwo.ca/index.php/westernumirror/article/download/15861/12286).

  • Considine, A. (2023). The KISSinger of Death: Henry Kissinger and the Letelier-Moffitt Assassination. Swarthmore Undergraduate History Journal, Fall 2023, 51-64. "Letelier was the foreign minister in Chile under Allende, and was a leading voice in the resistance against the Chilean dictator, Augusto Pinochet. Having been tortured and imprisoned in Chile, he had fled to the United States upon his release." p. 51.

  • Considine, A. (2023). The KISSinger of Death: Henry Kissinger and the Letelier-Moffitt Assassination. Swarthmore Undergraduate History Journal, Fall 2023, 51-64. "Since then, it has been conclusively shown that the assassination was ordered by Augusto Pinochet himself. The assassination was part of Operation Condor, a secret intelligence and operations system created in order to eliminate threats to the military dictatorships of Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, Bolivia, and Brazil." p. 51.

  • Serrano, M. C. R. (2011). The assassination of Orlando Letelier: An example of Chilean and American teamwork. The Mirror-Undergraduate History Journal, 31(2), 34-35. "Michael Townley was the bridge between the DINA in Chile and the CIA in the U.S. The decision to assassinate Orlando Letelier was made at the Bonao Conference in the Dominican Republic in mid-1976, which was organized by a CIA member, Sacha Volman." pp. 34-35.

  • Considine, A. (2023). The KISSinger of Death: Henry Kissinger and the Letelier-Moffitt Assassination. Swarthmore Undergraduate History Journal, Fall 2023, 51-64. "On July 30th, 1976, the CIA and State department had a weekly meeting where they discussed the new knowledge that Operation Condor had expanded beyond simple intelligence efforts to assassination plots." p. 52.

  • Singer, E. H. (1986). Terrorism, Extradition, and FSIA Relief: The Letelier Case. Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 19(1), 57-80. "The 1976 car-bombing of former Chilean foreign minister Orlando Letelier and his American aide, Ronnie Moffitt, in Washington, D.C. has been called a 'monstrous' crime and 'the most heinous terrorist act ever carried out in the United States.'" p. 57. Retrieved from [https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vjtl/vol19/iss1/3](https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vjtl/vol19/iss1/3).

  • Harding, E. (1991). Chile: Summary of events in investigation of Letelier assassination. NotiSur Latin America Digital Beat (LADB). University of New Mexico. "Retired Gen. Manuel Contreras Sepulveda, former director of the National Intelligence Bureau (DINA, the secret police force dismantled in 1977), arrested on Sept. 23. According to testimony by persons who carried out the assassination, Contreras gave the order for the killing." p. 1. Retrieved from [https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/notisur/7907](https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/notisur/7907).

  • Harding, E. (1991). Chile: Summary of events in investigation of Letelier assassination. NotiSur Latin America Digital Beat (LADB). University of New Mexico. "Mariana Callejas, civilian DINA agent, and former spouse of Michael Townley, a key witness in the case. Interrogated on Aug. 21. She is the only DINA agent to whom Townley confessed that the mission's aim was to kill Letelier." p. 1. Retrieved from [https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/notisur/7907](https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/notisur/7907).

  • Singer, E. H. (1986). Terrorism, Extradition, and FSIA Relief: The Letelier Case. Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 19(1), 57-80. "As United States officials investigated Letelier's assassination, they requested Chile's permission to question Townley. After the United States had applied considerable pressure and Chile had signed a secret agreement with United States prosecutors, the Chileans deported Townley to the United States in April 1978." p. 58. Retrieved from [https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vjtl/vol19/iss1/3](https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vjtl/vol19/iss1/3).

  • Singer, E. H. (1986). Terrorism, Extradition, and FSIA Relief: The Letelier Case. Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 19(1), 57-80. "After two years of intensive investigation by the Justice Department, the FBI, and the United States Attorney's office, United States officials believed that the assassination was ordered, if not by Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet himself, then by his friend and trusted adviser, General Manuel Contreras." p. 57. Retrieved from [https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vjtl/vol19/iss1/3](https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vjtl/vol19/iss1/3).

Section 10: Footnotes

  • Moguldom. (2023). 9 African leaders that were assassinated with US government or Western intelligence support. “Sankara’s life ended with a bullet which, according to the testimony of some involved in his assassination, was ordered by former Liberian president Charles Taylor with the support of the French and American governments and delivered via Blaise Compaoré – Sankara’s long-time friend and colleague, and the current president of Burkina Faso.” p. 28. Retrieved from https://moguldom.com/419020/9-african-leaders-that-were-assassinated-with-us-government-or-western-intelligence-support/.

  • Moguldom. (2023). 9 African leaders that were assassinated with US government or Western intelligence support. “Gone were the days of politicians living lavish lives sponsored by taxpayers’ money – Sankara issued salary cuts across the board, including for himself. The fleet of Mercedes Benzes for high-ranking officials was done away with, and the cars were replaced by Renault 5 cars. Land and oil wealth were nationalized.” p. 25. Retrieved from https://moguldom.com/419020/9-african-leaders-that-were-assassinated-with-us-government-or-western-intelligence-support/.

  • Moguldom. (2023). 9 African leaders that were assassinated with US government or Western intelligence support. “During the years of Sankara’s administration, things were turning around, especially in health, education, and the environment. Mass vaccination campaigns were rolled out with a level of rapidity and success unprecedented for an African country then. Infant mortality rates dropped. School attendance rates doubled. Millions of trees were planted in a far-sighted effort to counter deforestation. Feminism was a core element of political ideology, manifested through improved access to education for girls and the inclusion of women in leadership roles.” p. 29. Retrieved from https://moguldom.com/419020/9-african-leaders-that-were-assassinated-with-us-government-or-western-intelligence-support/.

  • Kuzmarov, J. (2022). This man pulled the trigger, but did the CIA and DGSE put the idea in his head and the gun in his hand?. CovertAction Magazine. “For France and the US, Sankara’s revolutionary policies constituted a tangible threat to imperialism. When French president Francois Mitterrand had arrived in Ouagadougou in November 1986, he had directly experienced the threat posed by Sankara’s revolutionary politics to the project of unfettered neo-colonialism. During Mitterrand’s visit, Sankara disrupted the normal diplomatic discourse and presented the French president with a forceful anti-imperialist dialogue. He talked about colonial policies in Palestine; defended Nicaragua against US hybrid warfare; and criticized Paris for its policies in the African continent and towards African immigrants in France. At the end, Mitterrand said, ‘I admire his great qualities, but he is too forthright; in my opinion he goes too far.’ He also added, ‘This is a somewhat troublesome man, President Sankara.’ A year after these remarks, Sankara was assassinated. Many believe that Jacques Foccart, a key French intelligence figure with extensive networks throughout Africa, had actively engaged in the assassination plans.” p. 10. Retrieved from https://covertactionmagazine.com/2022/04/29/this-man-pulled-the-trigger-but-did-the-cia-and-dgse-put-the-idea-in-his-head-and-the-gun-in-his-hand/.

  • Kuzmarov, J. (2022). This man pulled the trigger, but did the CIA and DGSE put the idea in his head and the gun in his hand?. CovertAction Magazine. “The US, too, had concerns about Sankara’s revolutionary project. Sankara had converted Upper Volta – a formal colony till 1919 and a neo-colony till 1960 – into Burkina Faso - the land of revolutionaries who challenged imperialism. This was bound to be troublesome for the US which was building an informal empire and wanted a friction-free Global South, subservient to it. Herman Jay Cohen - former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs – wrote that, as a member of the American Executive, ’I accused Sankara of trying to destabilize the entire region of West

  •  Africa…I insisted that Sankara was hurting the image of the entire French community in West Africa.' From this, it is evident that the US was interested in containing Sankara’s revolutionary project and coordinating its hegemony with France’s sub-imperial dominance in Africa. To do this, the US used the services of Liberian mercenaries who helped assassinate Sankara. Charles Taylor, for instance, was a Liberian who was released from a US jail with the help of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and then asked to infiltrate African revolutionary movements. It was later found that Taylor had been involved in the assassination of Sankara." p. 10. Retrieved from [https://covertactionmagazine.com/2022/04/29/this-man-pulled-the-trigger-but-did-the-cia-and-dgse-put-the-idea-in-his-head-and-the-gun-in-his-hand/](https://covertactionmagazine.com/2022/04/29/this-man-pulled-the-trigger-but-did-the-cia-and-dgse-put-the-idea-in-his-head-and-the-gun-in-his-hand/).

  • Links. (n.d.). Thomas Sankara: An icon of revolution. "Imperialist assassination: On October 15, 1987, Sankara was attending a meeting with his small team of advisors at the Conseil de l’Entente headquarters. Fifteen minutes into the meeting, shooting erupted in the small courtyard outside, in which the president’s driver and two bodyguards were killed. Upon hearing the gunfire, everyone inside took cover. Sankara got up and told his aides, 'It’s me they want.' He left the room to face the assailants. He was shot numerous times, and died on the spot. The gunmen then entered the meeting room and killed everyone but Alouna Traoré, who survived and fled the country." p. 9. Retrieved from [https://links.org.au/thomas-sankara-icon-revolution](https://links.org.au/thomas-sankara-icon-revolution).

  • Links. (n.d.). Thomas Sankara: An icon of revolution. "Secondly, geo-political actors like France and the US were interested in killing Sankara and re-incorporating Burkina Faso into the structural arrangement of imperialist subordination and global capitalism. The imperialist interests of major powers neatly coincided with the personal interests of Compaoré. Thus, Compaoré functioned as an imperial-backed domestic actor who could simultaneously enrich himself and advance the objectives of neoliberalism by murdering Sankara." p. 9. Retrieved from [https://links.org.au/thomas-sankara-icon-revolution](https://links.org.au/thomas-sankara-icon-revolution).

  • Kuzmarov, J. (2022). This man pulled the trigger, but did the CIA and DGSE put the idea in his head and the gun in his hand?. CovertAction Magazine. "On April 6, 2022, Burkina Faso’s ex-President Blaise Compaoré was tried, convicted and sentenced in absentia to life imprisonment for murder. It took 35 years for justice to catch up with him for murdering his revolutionary socialist predecessor, Thomas Sankara (the “Che Guevara of Africa”), in a 1987 right-wing military coup." p. 1. Retrieved from [https://covertactionmagazine.com/2022/04/29/this-man-pulled-the-trigger-but-did-the-cia-and-dgse-put-the-idea-in-his-head-and-the-gun-in-his-hand/](https://covertactionmagazine.com/2022/04/29/this-man-pulled-the-trigger-but-did-the-cia-and-dgse-put-the-idea-in-his-head-and-the-gun-in-his-hand/).