💦 CREATE AND FUCK YOUR OWN AI CUMSLUT 🔥 TRY NOW ♥
Create AI Cumsluts 💦
July 14, 2024

Latest Video Sources:

FOOTNOTES & CITATIONS

Section 1 (Post-Soviet history)

1. World Economic Forum. (2022). Timeline- Ukraine's turbulent history since independence. (https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2022/08/timeline-ukraines-turbulent-history-independance/). "Ukraine faced numerous challenges, including severe economic instability, inflation, and corruption."

2. Howlett, M. (2023). Expert Comment: Three decades on, Ukraine, a sovereign country, is fighting a war for independence. (https://www.ox.ac.uk/news/2023-02-22-expert-comment-three-decades-ukraine-sovereign-country-fighting-war-independence). "The early years were marked by political turmoil, as various factions vied for power."

3. World Economic Forum. (2022). Timeline- Ukraine’s turbulent history since independence. “Ukraine also agrees to relinquish its nuclear arsenal… in return for security assurances under the Budapest Memorandum.”

4. Howlett, M. (2023). Expert Comment: Three decades on, Ukraine, a sovereign country, is fighting a war for independence. (https://www.ox.ac.uk/news/2023-02-22-expert-comment-three-decades-ukraine-sovereign-country-fighting-war-independence). "Ukraine struggled trying to balance relationships between Russia and the West."

5. World Economic Forum. (2022). Timeline- Ukraine's turbulent history since independence. (https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2022/08/timeline-ukraines-turbulent-history-independance/). "Reaching hyperinflation levels in 1993."

6. Howlett, M. (2023). Expert Comment: Three decades on, Ukraine, a sovereign country, is fighting a war for independence. (https://www.ox.ac.uk/news/2023-02-22-expert-comment-three-decades-ukraine-sovereign-country-fighting-war-independence). "Characterized by frequent changes in leadership and government structure."

7. World Economic Forum. (2022). Timeline- Ukraine's turbulent history since independence. (https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2022/08/timeline-ukraines-turbulent-history-independance/). "Corruption and political infighting remained pervasive."

 Section 2, Part 1 (Initial Western Engagement)

8. Lazarević, D. (2009). NATO Enlargement to Ukraine and Georgia: Old Wine in New Bottles? Connections, 9(1), 29-66, p. 48. "Ukraine's location is of strategic importance both for the West and Russia. Ukraine is the second-largest European country, surrounded by four NATO countries (Romania, Hungary, Slovakia, and Poland) and Russia, situated on the Black Sea. In geopolitical terms, Ukraine represents a buffer zone between Russia and NATO. Ukraine is the transit country for Russia’s natural gas supply, which covers approximately two-thirds of the total European demand for gas." https://www.jstor.org/stable/26326193

9. Pifer, S. (2023). Ukraine, NATO, and the Future of European Security. Foreign Policy Research Institute, p. 1. "After gaining independence following the Soviet Union’s 1991 collapse, Ukraine set about building relations with the West, including with institutions such as NATO. In 1994, Ukraine became one of the first states to join the alliance’s Partnership for Peace. Three years later, Ukraine and NATO established a distinctive partnership." https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/FP-20231213-ukraine-nato-pifer.pdf

10. Lazarević, D. (2009). NATO Enlargement to Ukraine and Georgia: Old Wine in New Bottles? Connections, 9(1), 29-66, p. 49. "Ukraine was the first country of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to join the Partnership for Peace in 1994. This cooperation was further enhanced by signing the NATO–Ukraine Charter on Distinctive Partnership in July 1997, which established the NATO–Ukraine Commission (NUC)." https://www.jstor.org/stable/26326193

 

11. Lazarević, D. (2009). NATO Enlargement to Ukraine and Georgia: Old Wine in New Bottles? Connections, 9(1), 29-66, p. 48. "The main constraint in the efforts of the Ukrainian government to gain membership in NATO is the low number of Ukrainians who support such a move. This has been proven by the results of all polls conducted on the subject in the last few years. One poll, conducted in June 2008 by the Fund for Public Opinion, reported that '55% of Ukrainian respondents were against NATO membership, with only 22% in favor.'" https://www.jstor.org/stable/26326193

12. UNAV. (2022, March 14). Perspectivas de la Integración Euroatlántica de Ucrania. "Since its independence in 1991, for the past three decades Ukraine has been swinging back and forth between an ever-widening West and an East circumscribed by a Russia reborn from the rubble of the USSR: 'flirting with the West, while paying homage to Moscow'.” https://en.unav.edu/web/global-affairs/perspectivas-de-la-integracion-euroatlantica-de-ucrania

13. UNAV. (2022, March 14). Perspectivas de la Integración Euroatlántica de Ucrania. "The slow rapprochement with the Alliance was slowed in 2010 when President Viktor Yanukovych adopted the non-block doctrine, which goal was aimed at improving relations with Russia. This doctrine was rejected by Ukraine's top committee in 2014 because of Russian aggression, which also prompted Ukraine to seek NATO support again." https://en.unav.edu/web/global-affairs/perspectivas-de-la-integracion-euroatlantica-de-ucrania

14. National Security Archive. (1994). January 14 Trilateral Statement. Retrieved from https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/22914-january-14-trilateral-statement-january-14-1994, (p. 3)

15. National Security Archive. (1994). January 14 Trilateral Statement. Retrieved from https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/22914-january-14-trilateral-statement-january-14-1994, (p. 4)
16. Pifer, S. (2023). Ukraine, NATO, and the Future of European Security. Foreign Policy Research Institute, p. 1. "The United States has long defined a stable and secure Europe as a vital national interest, an objective naturally shared by NATO’s European members. It is increasingly apparent that this will not be possible absent a stable and secure Ukraine." https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/FP-20231213-ukraine-nato-pifer.pdf

17. Lazarević, D. (2009). NATO Enlargement to Ukraine and Georgia: Old Wine in New Bottles? Connections, 9(1), 29-66, p. 53. "Ukrainian scholar Taras Kuzio called the “golden era of U.S.–Ukrainian relations,”65 one might see various stages in the history of bilateral relations between the two countries." https://www.jstor.org/stable/26326193

18. UNAV. (2022, March 14). Perspectivas de la Integración Euroatlántica de Ucrania. "The creation of the Vice-Presidency of the Government for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration of Ukraine in 2016 heralded a pro-Western course. In February 2019 this course was reiterated by amendments to the Constitution: the introduction of references to 'the European identity of the Ukrainian nation and the irreversibility of Ukraine's European and Euro-Atlantic course', as well as the extension of the constitutional competences of the Higher committee concerning the process of Ukraine's integration into NATO and the EU as a member in its own right." https://en.unav.edu/web/global-affairs/perspectivas-de-la-integracion-euroatlantica-de-ucrania

Section 2, Part 2 (Orange Revolution)

19. Beissinger, M. R. (2011). Mechanisms of Maidan: The structure of contingency in the making of the Orange Revolution. Mobilization: An International Quarterly, 16(1), 25-43. "On Sunday, November 21, 2004 (election day in Ukraine), as the expected reports of massive electoral fraud began to trickle in, the campaign of Viktor Yushchenko issued a call for supporters to begin a protest campaign the following day on Kyiv’s Independence Square" (p. 26).

20. Beissinger, M. R. (2011). Mechanisms of Maidan: The structure of contingency in the making of the Orange Revolution. Mobilization: An International Quarterly, 16(1), 25-43. "Participation in the Orange Revolution was more a short-term fluctuation in activism than a long-term general shift in societal values and behaviors. It was fueled primarily by identity divisions, economic frustrations, and by the illegitimacy of the Kuchma government (the 'last straw' of a long train of abuses rather than a suddenly imposed grievance from a stolen election)" (pp. 40-41).

21. Beissinger, M. R. (2011). Mechanisms of Maidan: The structure of contingency in the making of the Orange Revolution. Mobilization: An International Quarterly, 16(1), 25-43. "The demonstrations at Maidan evolved into one of the most spectacular displays of protest Europe has seen: a seventeen-day round-the-clock protest/rock concert bedecked with orange banners, balloons, and scarves that shut down government operations and eventually forced the authorities to schedule a new vote" (p. 26).

22. Beissinger, M. R. (2006). Promoting democracy: Is exporting revolution a constructive strategy? Dissent, 53(1), 18-24. "The United States government spent $65 million promoting democracy in Ukraine in the years immediately preceding the Orange Revolution—most of it channeled to Ukrainian NGOs and social movements that opposed Kuchma—through third-party NGOs such as Freedom House or the National Endowment for Democracy" (p. 20).
23. McFaul, M. (2007). Ukraine Imports Democracy: The Role of External Actors. International Security, 32(2), 45-83. "The Orange Revolution is also a critical case for measuring democracy promotion. Although the U.S. government never targeted its financial resources at fomenting revolution, it spent more than $18 million in election-related assistance efforts in Ukraine in the two years leading up to the 2004 presidential vote" (p. 48).

24. McFaul, M. (2007). Ukraine Imports Democracy: The Role of External Actors. International Security, 32(2), 45-83. "More generally, U.S. ambassadors in Ukraine actively engaged Ukraine’s democratic forces, especially after the murder of Gongadze, in a manner that Ukrainian government offcials called meddlesome." (p. 67).

25. McFaul, M. (2007). Ukraine Imports Democracy: The Role of External Actors. International Security, 32(2), 45-83. "The West—Canada (a big player in Ukraine due to the large Ukrainian émigré community there), Europe, and the United States—remained a constant pull on Ukrainian government officials" (p. 66).

26. Beissinger, M. R. (2011). Mechanisms of Maidan: The structure of contingency in the making of the Orange Revolution. Mobilization: An International Quarterly, 16(1), 25-43. "The electoral campaign of 2004 was extraordinarily well organized and penetrative, in contrast to those the came before it and after it. The civil-society organization Pora (It’s Time) estimates that its activities reached approximately 25 million citizens during the electoral campaign. Voters were targeted on public transport, and numerous public rock concerts were organized as ways of attracting younger voters into the campaign, leading up to the climax that took place during the Maidan demonstrations themselves. But Pora’s activities were only one part of the opposition electoral campaign, as both “Our Ukraine” and numerous other NGOs engaged in parallel attempts to get out the vote." (p. 38).

27. Kuzio, T. (2005). The Opposition's Road to Success. Journal of Democracy, 16(2), 117-130. "The success of the Orange Revolution should in part be attributed to Ukraine’s youth, the generation that has no memories of pre-perestroika Soviet rule and therefore harbors much less fear of the authorities than do their parents and grandparents" (p. 127).

28. Kuzio, T. (2005). The Opposition's Road to Success. Journal of Democracy, 16(2), 117-130. "Many young people have traveled, studied, and worked in Europe or North America, and most of them take the desirability of democracy as a given" (p. 127).

29. Wilson, A. (2006). Ukraine’s Orange Revolution, NGOs and the Role of the West. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 19(1), 21-32. https://doi.org/10.1080/09557570500501747. "The Orange Revolution led to a storm of protests that began a revival of third sector activity" (p. 21).

30. Beissinger, M. R. (2011). Mechanisms of Maidan: The structure of contingency in the making of the Orange Revolution. Mobilization: An International Quarterly, 16(1), 25-43. "In the months immediately following the Orange Revolution, its leaders squabbled with one another over the distribution of power and property, undermining the coalition that made the revolution. They squandered their political capital and ultimately paved the way for the corrupt leaders they had defeated to return to power" (p. 26).

31. Beissinger, M. R. (2011). Mechanisms of Maidan: The structure of contingency in the making of the Orange Revolution. Mobilization: An International Quarterly, 16(1), 25-43. "The Orange Revolution protests were part of a larger interrelated wave of protests over electoral fraud that swept through the post-communist region from 1998 through 2005, as exemplified by the thick transnational ties that connected activists across these cases and their extensive sharing of frames, strategies, and techniques" (p. 38).

 Section 2, Part 3 (Euromaidan)

1. Marcetic, B. (2022). A US-backed, far right–led revolution in Ukraine helped bring us to the brink of war. Jacobin. https://jacobin.com/2022/02/maidan-protests-neo-nazis-russia-nato-crimea - "In 2014 Ukraine, great power gamesmanship, righteous anger at a corrupt status quo, and opportunistic far-right extremists toppled the government in the Maidan Revolution."

2. Smith, A. (2015). International actors in Ukraine’s revolution to democracy from 2004 to 2014. 2nd Annual Nelson Institute for Diplomacy and International Affairs - Undergraduate Conference on Global Affairs, April 10-11, 2015. - "Since its independence in 1991, Ukraine has gone through two major upheavals in its transition to democracy, the Orange Revolution in 2004 and the Euromaidan in 2014. One important factor that has influenced both events is international intervention by Russia, the United States, the European Union, the OSCE, and surrounding post-Soviet countries that have previously experienced color revolutions." (Pg. 1)

3. Marcetic, B. (2022). A US-backed, far right–led revolution in Ukraine helped bring us to the brink of war. Jacobin. https://jacobin.com/2022/02/maidan-protests-neo-nazis-russia-nato-crimea - "Demonstrators were fed up with the nepotism and corruption that pervaded Ukrainian society."

4. Marcetic, B. (2022). A US-backed, far right–led revolution in Ukraine helped bring us to the brink of war. Jacobin. https://jacobin.com/2022/02/maidan-protests-neo-nazis-russia-nato-crimea - "Whatever one thinks of the Maidan protests, the increasing violence of those involved was key to their ultimate victory."

5. Kuzio, T. (2016). The Orange and Euromaidan Revolutions: Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives. Kyiv-Mohyla Law and Politics Journal, 2, 92-115. Retrieved from http://www.ukrainianstudies.uottawa.ca/ - "Yanukovych sent tens of thousands of vigilantes to Kyiv in the Orange Revolution and Euromaidan but Kuchma prevented their use in the former while in the Euromaidan they were unleashed against protesters." (Pg 114)

6. Marcetic, B. (2022). A US-backed, far right–led revolution in Ukraine helped bring us to the brink of war. Jacobin. https://jacobin.com/2022/02/maidan-protests-neo-nazis-russia-nato-crimea - "One enduring mystery of the Maidan Revolution is who was behind the February 20 sniper killings that set off the final, most bloody stage of protests."

7. Marcetic, B. (2022). A US-backed, far right–led revolution in Ukraine helped bring us to the brink of war. Jacobin. https://jacobin.com/2022/02/maidan-protests-neo-nazis-russia-nato-crimea - "A majority of wounded protesters testified they either saw snipers in protester-controlled buildings or were shot by bullets coming from their direction, testimony backed by forensic examinations."

8. Smith, A. (2015). International actors in Ukraine’s revolution to democracy from 2004 to 2014. 2nd Annual Nelson Institute for Diplomacy and International Affairs - Undergraduate Conference on Global Affairs, April 10-11, 2015. - "The Euromaidan is even more advantaged in relation to world timing, as it came after the Orange Revolution. Many of the protesters of the Euromaidan had already protested in 2004 and knew that things could be changed (at least at the top) with a peaceful, nonviolent revolution." (Pg 23)

9. Kuzio, T. (2016). The Orange and Euromaidan Revolutions: Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives. Kyiv-Mohyla Law and Politics Journal, 2, 92-115. Retrieved from http://www.ukrainianstudies.uottawa.ca/ - "Russia’s intervention in Ukraine in 2004 was the greatest it had undertaken in the region but this was dwarfed by its covert and overt operations during Yanukovych’s presidency and after his downfall in the Crimea and Donbas." (Pg 101)

10. Marcetic, B. (2022). A US-backed, far right–led revolution in Ukraine helped bring us to the brink of war. Jacobin. https://jacobin.com/2022/02/maidan-protests-neo-nazis-russia-nato-crimea - "The Ukrainian Maidan Revolution (or Euromaidan), which right around this time eight years ago actually succeeded in toppling the country’s elected government, sending then-president Viktor Yanukovych fleeing for his life to neighboring Russia."

11. Kuzio, T. (2016). The Orange and Euromaidan Revolutions: Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives. Kyiv-Mohyla Law and Politics Journal, 2, 92-115. Retrieved from http://www.ukrainianstudies.uottawa.ca/ - "The type of leader which was in power (former Soviet nomenklatura versus thuggish and criminalized Donetsk clan) had a direct impact on whether the authorities would seek compromise and non-violence (Kuchma, 2004) or reject compromise and resort to violence through vigilantes, Berkut riot police and the Security Service." (Pg 91)

12. Marcetic, B. (2022). A US-backed, far right–led revolution in Ukraine helped bring us to the brink of war. Jacobin. https://jacobin.com/2022/02/maidan-protests-neo-nazis-russia-nato-crimea - "The driver of this violence was largely the Ukrainian far right, which, while  a minority of the protesters, served as a kind of revolutionary vanguard."

13. Marcetic, B. (2022). A US-backed, far right–led revolution in Ukraine helped bring us to the brink of war. Jacobin. https://jacobin.com/2022/02/maidan-protests-neo-nazis-russia-nato-crimea - "Members of the far-right Svoboda party...were the most active agents in the protests."

14. Marcetic, B. (2022). A US-backed, far right–led revolution in Ukraine helped bring us to the brink of war. Jacobin. https://jacobin.com/2022/02/maidan-protests-neo-nazis-russia-nato-crimea - "Svoboda used its considerable resources, which included thousands of ideologically committed activists, party coffers, and the power and prominence afforded to it as a parliamentary party, to mobilize and keep the protests alive, while eventually leading the occupation of key government buildings in both Kyiv and the western regions. This was particularly the case in the western city of Lviv, where protesters took over a regional administration building that soon came to be partially controlled and guarded by far-right paramilitaries. There, they declared a 'people’s council' that 'proclaimed Svoboda-dominated local councils and their executive committees the only legitimate bodies in the region,' writes Volodymyr Ishchenko, fueling the crisis of legitimacy that ended in Yanukovych’s ouster."

15. Marcetic, B. (2022). A US-backed, far right–led revolution in Ukraine helped bring us to the brink of war. Jacobin. https://jacobin.com/2022/02/maidan-protests-neo-nazis-russia-nato-crimea - "Later, a leaked phone call showed Nuland and the US ambassador to Ukraine maneuvering to shape the post-Maidan government."

16. Marcetic, B. (2022). A US-backed, far right–led revolution in Ukraine helped bring us to the brink of war. Jacobin. https://jacobin.com/2022/02/maidan-protests-neo-nazis-russia-nato-crimea - "Senators John McCain and Chris Murphy met with Svoboda’s fascist leader, standing shoulder to shoulder with him as they announced their support to the protesters, while US assistant secretary of state Victoria Nuland handed out sandwiches to them."

17. Smith, A. (2015). International actors in Ukraine’s revolution to democracy from 2004 to 2014. 2nd Annual Nelson Institute for Diplomacy and International Affairs - Undergraduate Conference on Global Affairs, April 10-11, 2015. - "International actors played a key role in aggravating, as in the case with Russia, and mediating, as in the case with the United States and Europe, the volatile situation from 2004 to 2014 in Ukraine." (Pg 23)

18. Smith, A. (2015). International actors in Ukraine’s revolution to democracy from 2004 to 2014. 2nd Annual Nelson Institute for Diplomacy and International Affairs - Undergraduate Conference on Global Affairs, April 10-11, 2015. - "The European Union had also been working with Ukraine in order to strengthen relations and encourage Ukraine’s integration with European norms, which include democracy and open-market principles. In 1998, Ukraine and the EU signed the Partnership Cooperation Agreement, which spelled out Ukraine’s relationship with the EU and its obligations in the areas of trade, investment, democratic reform, and economic development." (Pg 15)

19. Petrova, T. (2014). Polish democracy promotion in Ukraine. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Retrieved from https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2014/10/polish-democracy-promotion-in-ukraine - "Poland has actively lobbied the EU and NATO to ensure Ukraine’s territorial integrity and to adopt tough stances on Russia. Warsaw’s relatively hawkish stance vis-à-vis Russia had ordinarily made it difficult for Poland to find allies among more dovish Western European powers. But in late July 2014, Poland (with the support of the UK, the Netherlands, Germany, and the Baltic states) finally succeeded in convincing the rest of the EU member states to begin putting in place a number of targeted economic sanctions against Russia."

20. Smith, A. (2015). International actors in Ukraine’s revolution to democracy from 2004 to 2014. 2nd Annual Nelson Institute for Diplomacy and International Affairs - Undergraduate Conference on Global Affairs, April 10-11, 2015. - "Russia contributed large amounts of money to Yanukovych, although the exact amount is controversial and unknown."

21. Marcetic, B. (2022). A US-backed, far right–led revolution in Ukraine helped bring us to the brink of war. Jacobin. https://jacobin.com/2022/02/maidan-protests-neo-nazis-russia-nato-crimea - "US officials, unhappy with the scuttled EU deal, saw a similar chance in the Maidan protests."

22. Marcetic, B. (2022). A US-backed, far right–led revolution in Ukraine helped bring us to the brink of war. Jacobin. https://jacobin.com/2022/02/maidan-protests-neo-nazis-russia-nato-crimea - "With Yanukovych out, the interim government and Washington’s handpicked prime minister signed the EU deal whose rejection had started it all, solidifying Ukraine’s move to the West."

23. Petrova, T. (2014). Polish democracy promotion in Ukraine. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Retrieved from https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2014/10/polish-democracy-promotion-in-ukraine - "Poland has been a strong supporter of Ukraine’s democratization since shortly after its own transition twenty-five years ago. Warsaw played a central role with its backing of democratic reformers during Ukraine’s 2004 Orange Revolution. And, in the current crisis in Ukraine, with pro-Russia forces aligned against those who favor closer ties with the EU, Poland has positioned itself as perhaps the most ardent and committed proponent of Ukrainian democracy."

24. Petrova, T. (2014). Polish democracy promotion in Ukraine. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Retrieved from https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2014/10/polish-democracy-promotion-in-ukraine - "In late 2013, many Polish politicians and civic activists visited the Euromaidan protests and organized campaigns in Poland in support of the movement, such as 'Light a Candle for Ukraine' and a solidarity letter-writing marathon. The Polish state and several Polish foundations sent financial and humanitarian aid to supply victims of Kyiv’s winter clashes with medicine, clothing, and food. Other organizations provided legal aid and publicity regarding cases of abuse of power by the Ukrainian regime against its citizens."

25. Kuzio, T. (2016). The Orange and Euromaidan Revolutions: Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives. Kyiv-Mohyla Law and Politics Journal, 2, 92-115. Retrieved from http://www.ukrainianstudies.uottawa.ca/ - "Russia’s intervention in Ukraine in 2004 was the greatest it had undertaken in the region but this was dwarfed by its covert and overt operations during Yanukovych’s presidency and after his downfall in the Crimea and Donbas." (Pg 101)

 Section 3, Part 1 (Conflict and Instability)

1. Aslund, A. (2015). Ukraine: What went wrong and how to fix it. Peterson Institute for International Economics, p. xii. "In the fall of 2013, the country’s record of fiscal and international deficits caught up with the leadership in Kyiv."

2. Aslund, A. (2015). Ukraine: What went wrong and how to fix it. Peterson Institute for International Economics, p. xii. "After first choosing to pursue a deeper relationship with the European Union, Yanukovych changed his mind under pressure from Moscow. That reversal provoked an uprising that focused not only on that decision but also on the corruption and poor economic policies that had strangled the Ukrainian economy for years."

3. Mearsheimer, J. J. (2014). Why the Ukraine crisis is the West's fault: The liberal delusions that provoked Putin. Foreign Affairs, 93(5), p. 77. "For Putin, the illegal overthrow of Ukraine's democratically elected and pro-Russian president—which he rightly labeled a 'coup'—was the final straw. He responded by taking Crimea, a peninsula he feared would host a NATO naval base, and working to destabilize Ukraine until it abandoned its efforts to join the West."

4. Schadler, S. (2014). Ukraine: Stress at the IMF. https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/cigi_pb_49.pdf, p. 1. "The dire economic situation and security crisis in Ukraine meant the IMF’s starting point for engagement — long-standing and severe economic mismanagement and an acute security/energy crisis — was exceptionally difficult, even by IMF standards."

5. Mearsheimer, J. J. (2014). Why the Ukraine crisis is the West's fault: The liberal delusions that provoked Putin. Foreign Affairs, 93(5), p. 77. "The United States and its European allies share most of the responsibility for the crisis. The taproot of the trouble is NATO enlargement, the central element of a larger strategy to move Ukraine out of Russia's orbit and integrate it into the West."

6. Schadler, S. (2014). Ukraine: Stress at the IMF. https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/cigi_pb_49.pdf, p. 1. "In April 2014, in a departure from its normal aversion to lending to countries in conflict, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) approved a US$17 billion loan to Ukraine to be disbursed over two years. At the time, Ukraine was three weeks away from a presidential election; engaged in combat with an armed separatist movement backed by Russia, its largest trading partner and supplier of energy; and experiencing a significant drain in foreign exchange reserves and bank deposits along with soaring yields on sovereign debt."

7. Schadler, S. (2014). Ukraine: Stress at the IMF. https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/cigi_pb_49.pdf, p. 1. "Not surprisingly, given the constraints that impede its effectiveness in Ukraine’s current circumstances, the IMF punted on the program — taking the government’s commitment to reform to a significant extent on faith, agreeing to a fiscal and monetary framework that is not adequately funded, yet building into its economic program full repayment of debt to private creditors."

 Section 3, Part 2 (Economic Exploitation)

1. Kuzio, T. (2015). Ukraine: Democratization, corruption, and the new Russian imperialism. ABC-CLIO, p. 385. "The 2011 Tax Code reduced corporate income tax rates from 25 to 16% and VAT from 20 to 17% but payroll tax remained very high at 50% and a reduction to the European average of 27–30% would increase Ukraine’s tax revenues."

2. Kuzio, T. (2015). Ukraine: Democratization, corruption, and the new Russian imperialism. ABC-CLIO, p. 358. "Privatization primarily benefited big business, dominated by emerging oligarchs, rather than the Ukrainian economy."

.] Visser, O., Mamonova, N., & Spoor, M. (2012). Large-scale land acquisitions in the former Soviet Union. Journal of Peasant Studies, 39(3-4), p. 6. "The privatisation of oil, gas, and mineral resources and industry sectors in the early 1990s led to a rush to acquire former state enterprises, involving fierce struggles between Russian oligarchs and other actors."

4. Visser, O., Mamonova, N., & Spoor, M. (2012). Large-scale land acquisitions in the former Soviet Union. Journal of Peasant Studies, 39(3-4), p. 7. "New changes in Russian land laws, focusing on attracting direct and indirect investments to the agricultural sector by guaranteeing private property rights on the land, gave impetus to the creation of large-scale agroholdings or megafarms at the expense of rural dwellers."

5. Dabrowski, M., Dekhtiarchuk, M., & Górski, U. (2021). Ukraine: From fragile stabilization to financial crisis. USAID, p. 23. "In the middle of 1998, Treasury bills accounted for 12% of total banking assets and for about 30-40% of liquid assets."

6. Visser, O., Mamonova, N., & Spoor, M. (2012). Large-scale land acquisitions in the former Soviet Union. Journal of Peasant Studies, 39(3-4), p. 4. "This situation changed dramatically with the post-1991 land reform. Land was given to the former kolkhozes and sovkhozes (collective and state farms) for further distribution among their members in the form of paper shares. During that time investors in agriculture were not able to buy land, but they were not completely passive. Some of them waited until the end of this moratorium (2002), in the meantime making contacts with the management of attractive farms and lobbying with local authorities."

7. Visser, O., Mamonova, N., & Spoor, M. (2012). Large-scale land acquisitions in the former Soviet Union. Journal of Peasant Studies, 39(3-4), p. 0. "Emerging rural social movements try to form countervailing powers but with limited success. Rich landowners easily escape the implementation of new laws on controlling underutilized land, while there is a danger that they enable eviction with legal measures of rural dwellers."

8. Schadler, S. (2014). Ukraine: Stress at the IMF. CIGI, p. 3. "The banking sector, poorly regulated and supervised, has been plagued with weak capitalization, growing non-performing loans and excessive exposure to exchange rate risk, despite periodic reform efforts."

9. Schadler, S. (2014). Ukraine: Stress at the IMF. CIGI, p. 3. "Pressures on the fiscal accounts from the lax public wage and pension policies and poor revenue administration were recurrent."

 Section 3, Part 3 (Debt Trap)

1. Kuzio, T. (2015). Ukraine: Democratization, corruption, and the new Russian imperialism. ABC-CLIO.  "Ukraine is the second largest debtor to the IMF after Romania and just ahead of Greece and the tenth largest debtor to the World Bank" (p. 359).

2. Dabrowski, M., Dekhtiarchuk, M., & Górski, U. (2021). Ukraine: From fragile stabilization to financial crisis. "The Ukraine's foreign debt stood at about $8.8 billion in late 1997 and at $10.7 billion on June 1, 1998" (p. 16).  [(https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pnacr239.pdf).

3.  Dabrowski, M., Dekhtiarchuk, M., & Górski, U. (2021). Ukraine: From fragile stabilization to financial crisis. "Government started to have problems not only with the new deficit financing but also with rolling over the existing stock of debt.” (p. 6) (https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pnacr239.pdf)

4. Dabrowski, M., Dekhtiarchuk, M., & Górski, U. (2021). Ukraine: From fragile stabilization to financial crisis. “In November 1997, the NBU permitted Ukrainian banks to include funds invested in the primary T-bills market into their mandatory reserves, decreasing indirectly the reserve requirements.” (p. 14) (https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pnacr239.pdf)

5. Dabrowski, M., Dekhtiarchuk, M., & Górski, U. (2021). Ukraine: From fragile stabilization to financial crisis. In the middle of 1998, Treasury bills accounted for 12% of total banking assets and for about 30-40% of liquid assets. (p. 23) (https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pnacr239.pdf)
6. Dabrowski, M., Dekhtiarchuk, M., & Górski, U. (2021). Ukraine: From fragile stabilization to financial crisis. Although its current level (close to 30% of GDP; much lower than Bulgaria or Russia) is still low by the international standards, it occurred to be excessive in respect to really existing financing opportunities. (p. 6). (https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pnacr239.pdf).

7. Schadler, S. (2014). Ukraine: Stress at the IMF. "The IMF’s assessments of its lending arrangements repeatedly raised a few basic problems: a preference for fixing the exchange rate meant that the beneficial effects of two large devaluations (1998-1999 and 2010) gave way to chronic problems with competitiveness and insufficient official reserves" (p. 3). (https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/cigi_pb_49.pdf).

8. Kuzio, T. (2015). Ukraine: Democratization, corruption, and the new Russian imperialism. ABC-CLIO. "Particularly important to the IMF $16.5 billion program agreed in July 2010 were increasing household utility prices to reduce state subsidies because Ukrainians were paying only 20% of the cost of imported gas. State assistance to Naftogaz Ukrayiny is two times more than the company’s transfers to the budget. In August 2010, household utility prices increased by 50% but the Azarov government baulked ahead of the 2012 parliamentary elections at introducing further price increases (the Tymoshenko government had also not implemented this IMF condition in its November 2008 Standby Arrangement  [SBA])" (p. 362).

9. Aslund, A. (2015). Ukraine: What went wrong and how to fix it. Peterson Institute for International Economics."At the end of 2013, Ukraine’s public debt was merely 41% of GDP, but it is skyrocketing. In its July 2014 public debt sustainability analysis, the IMF (2014d, 48–50) presented rather ominous numbers. Its baseline scenario was that 'debt will reach 67.6% of GDP at end-2014, a jump of over 26%age points from 2013, driven by large financing needs under past unsustainable policies as well as significant exchange rate depreciation'" (p. 178).

10. Aslund, A. (2015). Ukraine: What went wrong and how to fix it. Peterson Institute for International Economics. "Under a growth shock, entailing a cumulative growth decline of over 9% in 2015–16 in addition to the projected 2014 decline of 6.5%, the debt-to-GDP ratio reaches 99% in 2016. In a 'combined macro-fiscal shock' the IMF foresaw public debt going to 134% of GDP in 2016. Ukraine would default long before reaching these levels" (p. 178).

11. Aslund, A. (2015). Ukraine: What went wrong and how to fix it. Peterson Institute for International Economics. "By the summer of 2014, Ukraine had fallen victim to a serious financial crisis. According to the IMF, the 2014 budget deficit was set to reach 10.1% of GDP, which was based on the assumption that output would decline by 6.5%" (p. 158).

12. Aslund, A. (2015). Ukraine: What went wrong and how to fix it. Peterson Institute for International Economics. "At the end of 2014, reserves had shrunk to $7.5 billion. In spite of severe currency regulations, the economy appeared to have entered a devaluation-inflation cycle, as year-end inflation reached 25%. Inflation could easily rise to triple digits within a year as happened in Belarus in 2011." (p. 159).

13. Aslund, A. (2015). Ukraine: What went wrong and how to fix it. Peterson Institute for International Economics. "In December, the IMF saw a need for another $16 billion on top of its committed balance of $12.4 billion, implying a total financial need of $28 billion" (p. 54).  

14. Aslund, A. (2015). Ukraine: What went wrong and how to fix it. Peterson Institute for International Economics. "On that basis, JPMorgan assessed Ukraine’s total public international financing need at $40 billion for 2015 and 2016, assuming Ukrainian international reserves of merely $15 billion at the end of 2016" (p. 54).

 Section 3, Part 4 (Humanitarian Impact)

1. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. (2022). HUMANITARIAN NEEDS OVERVIEW UKRAINE. p. 6. "After eight years of armed conflict, the resulting humanitarian crisis in Ukraine has become protracted and has faded from global headlines. The ceasefire brokered in July 2020 has become increasingly fragile, resulting in the number of civilian casualties returning to pre-ceasefire levels and civilian infrastructure frequently coming under fire. Ukraine remains one of the world’s most landmine- and unexploded ordnance-contaminated countries, putting people’s lives at risk and impeding recovery, and limiting access to livelihoods and basic services."

2. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. (2022). HUMANITARIAN NEEDS OVERVIEW UKRAINE. p. 7. "With conflict, COVID-19 and its related movement restrictions driving humanitarian needs, some 2.9 million people are projected to be in need of humanitarian assistance in 2022, the majority of whom, some 54%, are women and girls. The majority (59%) of the people in need live in NGCA, where needs remain severe and continue to deteriorate."

3. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. (2022). HUMANITARIAN NEEDS OVERVIEW UKRAINE. p. 7. "Of the 2.9 million people projected to be in need, 1.1 million people live in GCA of Donetska and Luhanska oblasts, including over 133,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs), and 160,000 IDPs in other oblasts across Ukraine. Over 1.6 million people in need live in NGCA."

4. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. (2022). HUMANITARIAN NEEDS OVERVIEW UKRAINE. p. 6. "Thirty% of people in need of humanitarian assistance are older than 60 years of age."

5. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. (2022). HUMANITARIAN NEEDS OVERVIEW UKRAINE. p. 11. "The pandemic has exacerbated pre-existing patterns of discrimination, exclusion, and inequalities. Conflict-affected populations, particularly older persons, persons with disabilities, and those living in institutions, remain the most vulnerable to the effects of the COVID-19 crisis."

6. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. (2022). HUMANITARIAN NEEDS OVERVIEW UKRAINE. p. 11. "The violations of healthcare workers’ rights, 83% of whom are women, led to the shortage of healthcare staff in Ukraine and negatively affected the right to health of the general population."

7. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. (2022). HUMANITARIAN NEEDS OVERVIEW UKRAINE. p. 12. "In the conflict-affected areas, the pandemic has pushed an already fragile health system to a breaking point. At the beginning of November 2021, the occupancy rate of intensive care unit beds stood at 73% for Donetska oblast and 77% for Luhanska oblast (GCA), representing the 6th and 5th highest regional occupancy rates nationwide."

8. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. (2022). HUMANITARIAN NEEDS OVERVIEW UKRAINE. p. 85. "Insecurity, damage to and lack of maintenance of aging health facilities and medical equipment, shortages of medicines and medical supplies, understaffing, health-care system reforms and curtailed access to referral hospitals and pharmacies have all impacted the provision of and access to health-care services, further stretched by the COVID-19 pandemic."

10. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. (2022). HUMANITARIAN NEEDS OVERVIEW UKRAINE. p. 18. "In addition, the closure of the 'contact line' has further deepened the rift between people living in NGCA and those living in the rest of Ukraine, as opportunities to maintain social contacts and family ties are severely curtailed."

11. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. (2022). HUMANITARIAN NEEDS OVERVIEW UKRAINE. p. 18. "Basic infrastructure and public service provision are severely restricted, the affected population has lost important socio-economic rights. This concerns particularly health care, education, water, sanitation and heating, with pre-existing problems compounded by restrictions on movement as well as military presence, shelling, and explosive remnants of war (ERW)."

12. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. (2022). HUMANITARIAN NEEDS OVERVIEW UKRAINE. p. 98-99. "A significant proportion of IDPs continue to live in substandard housing conditions, with no prospects for alternate housing or return to their home areas in any foreseeable future. Approximately 6,200 IDPs still reside in collective centres or other temporary shelters in undignified living conditions have access to alternative adequate housing solutions."

13. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. (2022). HUMANITARIAN NEEDS OVERVIEW UKRAINE. p. 16. "The unemployment rates have consistently been the highest nationwide since 2015, with 15.7% in Donetska oblast (GCA) and 16.6% in Luhanska oblast (GCA), compared to a national average of 10.3% by the second quarter 2021."

14. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. (2022). HUMANITARIAN NEEDS OVERVIEW UKRAINE. p. 16. "Marked by deindustrialization and diminished economic opportunities, the conflict has pushed the already economically troubled region further into decline. Donetska and Luhanska oblasts used to be the most densely populated and industrially thriving part of the country, but the overall economic activity in the two oblasts has drastically declined since the conflict began in 2014."

15. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. (2022). HUMANITARIAN NEEDS OVERVIEW UKRAINE. p. 81. "According to the post-winter FIES assessment, the prevalence of severe food insecurity is about 3 per cent, and moderate food insecurity is 26 per cent in Donetska and Luhanska oblasts. In addition, the 2021 MSNA provides evidence that 5 per cent of the population in GCA and 9 per cent in NGCA are food insecure. Therefore, it is estimated that some 400,000 people need direct food and livelihoods assistance."

16. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. (2022). HUMANITARIAN NEEDS OVERVIEW UKRAINE. p. 109. "This year, 1.38 million people, including 29 per cent of all residents, need assistance with sanitation."

17. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. (2022). HUMANITARIAN NEEDS OVERVIEW UKRAINE. p. 48. "Death and physical injury from shelling, landmine and ERW contamination present similar risks in GCA and NGCA, with an estimated contamination of 7,000 km2 in GCA and 14,000 km2 in NGCA, equivalent to the size of Slovenia."

18. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. (2022). HUMANITARIAN NEEDS OVERVIEW UKRAINE. p. 76. "According to the Education Cluster School survey, more than a quarter of the facilities indicated military presence as the main security concern for children. From January 2017 to November 2021, education facilities were directly affected by continuous hostilities at least 125 times which resulted in infrastructure repair needs."

19. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. (2022). HUMANITARIAN NEEDS OVERVIEW UKRAINE. p. 77. "Besides individual learning materials, the need for teaching supplies and school equipment remains high in conflict-affected areas."

20. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. (2022). HUMANITARIAN NEEDS OVERVIEW UKRAINE. "Although the coverage of GBV services has gradually expanded as government and local communities have started to provide specialized services in addition to those supported by humanitarian partners, referral pathways, access to specialized services and quality of responses are still insufficient and continue to require complementary humanitarian GBV responses. Health-care service delivery points and mobile clinics offer improved opportunities to the most vulnerable groups of GBV survivors; however, access is still limited." (p. 102)

21. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. (2022). HUMANITARIAN NEEDS OVERVIEW UKRAINE. "According to the Education Cluster School survey, more than a quarter of the facilities indicated military presence as the main security concern for children. From January 2017 to November 2021, education facilities were directly affected by continuous hostilities at least 125 times which resulted in infrastructure repair needs.” (p. 76)

Section 4, Part 1 (Geopolitical Strategy)

1. Howard, M. R., & O’Hanlon, M. E. (2023). Backstopping Ukraine’s long-term security: Toward an Atlantic-Asian security community. Association of the United States Army. "NATO expansion was well­intentioned and designed to enlarge the zone of democratic peace in Europe while acknowledging the right of independent states to have a major say in their own security arrangements. But when juxtaposed with the pride and paranoias of Russians like Vladimir Putin, it inadvertently contributed to a Russian geostrategic and historical narrative that, however inaccurate, was both predictable and dangerous."

2. Fox, A. C. (2024). The Russo-Ukrainian war: A strategic assessment two years into the conflict. Association of the United States Army. p. 11. "Ukraine’s limited manpower and ammunition base already limits what Ukraine can do offensively." https://www.ausa.org/publications/russo-ukrainian-war-strategic-assessment-two-years-conflict

3. Cowan, R., Warburton, M., & Zengerle, P. (2024, April 20). U.S. House passes $95 billion Ukraine, Israel aid package, sends to Senate. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-house-vote-long-awaited-95-billion-ukraine-israel-aid-package-2024-04-20/ “The legislation now proceeds to the Democratic-majority Senate, which passed a similar measure more than two months ago. U.S. leaders from Democratic President Joe Biden to top Senate Republican Mitch McConnell had been urging embattled Republican House Speaker Mike Johnson to bring it up for a vote”.

4. Madhani, A. (2024, June 5). Ukraine uses US weapons to strike inside Russia. Military Times. https://www.militarytimes.com/news/pentagon-congress/2024/06/05/ukraine-uses-us-weapons-to-strike-inside-russia/. “In advancing in the northeast Kharkiv region, Russian forces have exploited a lengthy delay in the replenishment of U.S. military aid.”

5. "The Biden administration has pledged billions in military aid to Ukraine since Russia invaded in late February, and U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin said this week that the U.S. goal was 'to see Russia weakened.'" https://www.democracynow.org/2022/4/28/anatol_lieven_ukraine_proxy_war.

6. Baker, S. (2023, July 5). NATO countries are using Ukraine as a testing ground for their advanced weaponry, and are learning valuable lessons: Report. Yahoo News. https://news.yahoo.com/news/nato-countries-using-ukraine-testing-103435776.html

Ukraine's war with Russia is giving NATO countries the chance to test their advanced weaponry on an actual battlefield, and they're gaining valuable insight as a result, the Financial Times reported. NATO members, including the US, Canada, UK, Germany, and France, have been giving Ukraine weapons and training since Russia launched its invasion in February 2022. And the kinds of weapons they have handed over have become increasingly advanced since the war began, with Ukraine pushing for modern tanks, air defense systems, and aircraft. Ukraine's defense minister Oleksiy Reznikov told the FT that because of this, Ukraine's allies "can actually see if their weapons work, how efficiently they work and if they need to be upgraded."

7. "The reason I wrote the piece was in response to Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin’s statement that U.S. strategy is now to weaken Russia through the war in Ukraine. And, you know, basically, that is what a proxy war is, you know, the U.S. trying to use the war in Ukraine not just to defend Ukraine, but for a wider strategic objective." https://www.democracynow.org/2022/4/28/anatol_lieven_ukraine_proxy_war.

8. "The worrying thing about this is that this has been accompanied by more and more statements in the U.S. and NATO about helping Ukraine to win. Now, if that means helping Ukraine to fight Russia to a standstill and prevent Russia conquering Ukraine, then that is, of course, completely legitimate. But there have been suggestions that winning means actually helping Ukraine to reconquer all the territory it has lost to Russia since 2014, including territory that Russia now regards as part of its national territory. That, of course, would represent a really drastic escalation of U.S. aims, with very, very dangerous potential consequences." https://www.democracynow.org/2022/4/28/anatol_lieven_ukraine_proxy_war.

9. "Lloyd Austin’s comments, and those of the British government, as well, imply a war that will go on essentially forever, you know, an endless war against Russia. You know, we have to ask what that will do to Ukraine, what it will do to the world economy, and what it will do to Europe." https://www.democracynow.org/2022/4/28/anatol_lieven_ukraine_proxy_war

10. Mearsheimer, J. J. (2023). What is America’s interest in the Ukraine war?. University of Chicago. p. 2. "The Biden administration and other proponents of current U.S. policy have so far failed to offer a strategic argument on behalf of the costs and risks that current U.S. policy incurs in the Russia-Ukraine War. To be sure, many have defined specific objectives vis-à-vis Ukraine itself. Still, definition and discussion of how U.S. efforts in Ukraine contribute to overarching U.S. national objectives and interests are broadly lacking, reduced primarily to gesticulations toward broad principles that might justify the American response in Ukraine so far. Amid the continuing war and ongoing calls for the United States to “do more,” the question remains: what, if any, are the United States’ strategic interests in Ukraine—and how might the United States best service them?"

11. Howard, M. R., & O’Hanlon, M. E. (2023). Backstopping Ukraine’s long-term security: Toward an Atlantic-Asian security community. Association of the United States Army. p. 6. "CIA Director William Burns made a similar warning about Ukraine in particular in 2008, when he was serving as the U.S. ambassador to Russia, writing in a diplomatic cable that “Ukrainian entry into NATO is the brightest of all redlines for the Russian elite (not just Putin). I have yet to find anyone who views Ukraine in NATO as anything other than a direct challenge to Russian interests."

 

Section 4, Part 2 (Disregard for Welfare)

1. Antezza, A., Frank, A., Frank, P., Franz, L., Kharitonov, I., Kumar, B., Rebinskaya, E., & Trebesch, C. (2022). The Ukraine Support Tracker: Which countries help Ukraine and how? Kiel Institute for the World Economy. https://hdl.handle.net/10419/262746. “According to the available data, the US committed $9.38 billion in humanitarian aid”.p13

2. 24/7 Wall St. (n.d.). Which Countries Support Ukraine In The Conflict With Russia?. https://247wallst.com/investing/2024/06/08/which-countries-support-ukraine-in-the-conflict-with-russia/. p. 7 “The bulk of that aid – just under $70 billion – has been military. Unlike European allies, the United States has no trouble tapping into its stockpiles of military gear without compromising its force capabilities.”

3. Antezza, A., Frank, A., Frank, P., Franz, L., Kharitonov, I., Kumar, B., Rebinskaya, E., & Trebesch, C. (2022). The Ukraine Support Tracker: Which countries help Ukraine and how? Kiel Institute for the World Economy. https://hdl.handle.net/10419/262746. P.14 “Specifically, we include $4.35 billion intended for International Disaster Assistance to provide emergency food to people impacted by the Ukrainian conflict, $2 million for technical and regulatory support to the Ukrainian nuclear regulatory agency and $150 million for the Global Agriculture and Food Security Program to help countries (including Ukraine) fighting the impacts of a rise in food prices.”

4. Antezza, A., Frank, A., Frank, P., Franz, L., Kharitonov, I., Kumar, B., Rebinskaya, E., & Trebesch, C. (2022). The Ukraine Support Tracker: Which countries help Ukraine and how? Kiel Institute for the World Economy. https://hdl.handle.net/10419/262746. P. 3 “​​This brings total EU country commitments to €27.76 billion. It is remarkable that the US alone has committed considerably more than all EU countries combined, in whose immediate neighborhood the war is raging.”

5. 24/7 Wall St. (n.d.). Which Countries Support Ukraine In The Conflict With Russia?. https://247wallst.com/investing/2024/06/08/which-countries-support-ukraine-in-the-conflict-with-russia/. P.8-9. “Germany is one of Ukraine’s biggest supporters, second only to the United States, and one of the most transparent. The German government released detailed information about the military support given to Ukraine. With limited domestic manufacturing possible, Ukraine depends heavily on outside support for tanks. Germany has partnered with the Netherlands and Denmark to make up some of this shortfall. 200 refurbished Leopard 1A5 have been or are in the process of being shipped to Ukraine. Germany will also send 100 infantry Fighting vehicles, 66 armored personnel carrier. Patriot launchers, and over 50 million rounds of small arms ammunition. Though German support has been substantial, there are limits to Berlin’s willingness to furnish Ukraine with modern arms. Chancellor Olaf Scholz refused to send Taurus cruise missiles and has been wary of Ukraine attacking Russian territory. Differences of opinion with France on the direction of the conflict caused tensions between Berlin and Paris. However, recent talks suggest the previous limitations on directly striking Russian territory are being lifted.”

6. Antezza, A., Frank, A., Frank, P., Franz, L., Kharitonov, I., Kumar, B., Rebinskaya, E., & Trebesch, C. (2022). The Ukraine Support Tracker: Which countries help Ukraine and how? Kiel Institute for the World Economy. https://hdl.handle.net/10419/262746. P. 9 “This is close to the number of direct aid now revealed by Canada (more than CA$1.2 billion). On financial aid, we get to a total of CA$1.15 billion, compared to CA$1.6 billion listed by the government. ”

7. Antezza, A., Frank, A., Frank, P., Franz, L., Kharitonov, I., Kumar, B., Rebinskaya, E., & Trebesch, C. (2022). The Ukraine Support Tracker: Which countries help Ukraine and how? Kiel Institute for the World Economy. https://hdl.handle.net/10419/262746. P. 19 “On August 11, 2022, the Copenhagen donors conference took place, organized by Denmark, the Minister of Defence of Ukraine and the United Kingdom. The aim of the meeting consisted in strengthening the military cooperation between the European countries and Ukraine and to support the country in its defence against Russia (Danish Ministry of Defence 2022). Taken together, 26 countries attended the conference, which raised €1.5 billion in military aid, with a €300 million contribution of the United Kingdom (Gronholt-Pedersen 2022; UK Ministry of Defence 2022). We have no further information at hand on the composition or type of this newly pledged military assistance to Ukraine. As the current version of our database includes commitments until August 3, 2022, our data does not include these amounts at this time but will be added in future releases.“

8. Antezza, A., Frank, A., Frank, P., Franz, L., Kharitonov, I., Kumar, B., Rebinskaya, E., & Trebesch, C. (2022). The Ukraine Support Tracker: Which countries help Ukraine and how? Kiel Institute for the World Economy. https://hdl.handle.net/10419/262746. P. 29 “Table 3:  United Kingdom: committed vs. delivered weapons (main weapon types)”

9. Antezza, A., Frank, A., Frank, P., Franz, L., Kharitonov, I., Kumar, B., Rebinskaya, E., & Trebesch, C. (2022). The Ukraine Support Tracker: Which countries help Ukraine and how? Kiel Institute for the World Economy. https://hdl.handle.net/10419/262746. P. 36 “In total only 43.5% of the foreign budgetary support that has been promised to Ukraine has actually been disbursed by August 3, namely €13.98 billion out of a total committed sum of €32.12 billion. The gap between disbursement of commitments is large for all of the big donors. In absolute numbers it is largest for the EU Institutions (€3.09 billion disbursed out of €12.32 billion committed, a share of 25%), the United States (€3.92 billion disbursed out of a total of €8.48 billion committed, a share of 46%), Canada (€1.15 billion disbursed out of €1.77 billion committed, a share of 65%), the United Kingdom (€0.57 billion disbursed out of €1.01 billion committed, a share of 53%), France (€0.33 billion disbursed out of €0.6 billion committed, a share of 54%), and Italy (€0.12 billion disbursed out of €0.31 billion committed, a share of 40%).

10. 24/7 Wall St. (n.d.). Which Countries Support Ukraine In The Conflict With Russia?. https://247wallst.com/investing/2024/06/08/which-countries-support-ukraine-in-the-conflict-with-russia/. “ the Danes dispatched 19 F-16 jets, and long-range harpoon missiles for coastal defense. Iceland provided a Reld hospital, winter gear, and help with demining and disarming explosives.”

11. 24/7 Wall St. (n.d.). Which Countries Support Ukraine In The Conflict With Russia?. https://247wallst.com/investing/2024/06/08/which-countries-support-ukraine-in-the-conflict-with-russia/. P.14. “Norway is in it for the long haul. The government announced a multi-year support package totaling 75 billion kroner ($7.16 billion) running until 2027. As well as civilian and humanitarian support, Norway plans to send air defense systems, two F- 16 jets, eight tanks, and thousands of artillery rounds. Norway also plans to provide instructors for soldiers and explosives removal.”

12. 24/7 Wall St. (n.d.). Which Countries Support Ukraine In The Conflict With Russia?. https://247wallst.com/investing/2024/06/08/which-countries-support-ukraine-in-the-conflict-with-russia/. P. 25 “ Unwilling to supply arms, the Swiss have nonetheless sent Ynancial and humanitarian aid worth around $2.6 billion to Ukraine. Neighboring Austria is also espousing military neutrality but has supported humanitarian efforts”

13. 24/7 Wall St. (n.d.). Which Countries Support Ukraine In The Conflict With Russia?. https://247wallst.com/investing/2024/06/08/which-countries-support-ukraine-in-the-conflict-with-russia/. P.22-23. “Estonia is the pound-for-pound world champion of Ukraine aid. It has taken in 50,000 refugees (3% of its population) and spent over 1.3% of its GDP on aid. It provides weapons, ammunition, medical supplies, and support equipment. Estonia also donated four fully equipped mobile Reld hospitals with Iceland, Germany, Norway, and the Netherlands.”

14. 24/7 Wall St. (n.d.). Which Countries Support Ukraine In The Conflict With Russia?. https://247wallst.com/investing/2024/06/08/which-countries-support-ukraine-in-the-conflict-with-russia/.P. 22 “However, as a percentage of GDP, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are the strongest supporters of Ukraine by far. They’ve also taken in a high number of refugees relative to their populations.”