New Patreon ONLY video is up.
As promised, I cover the Battle of France and talk about why the French Air Force failed. It's not because the Germans caught them by surprise as is often claimed.
I'm planning on having a lot more Patreon only videos as the onslaught of AI slop on youtube is ruining that platform.
Here is the link: https://rumble.com/v7d8xly-why-did-the-french-air-force-fail-in-1940.html
Greg
Comments (30)
I like the video as always Greg, but I fear your political bias is fairly evident in this one. As when you suggest a mature French pilot would be disinclined to risk their lives fighting to defend 'one socialist regime over another.' I don't see the point of lumping different varieties of 'socialism' together; such as for example Marxist Socialism, by which is meant an immature stage on the inevitable path to Communism, and National Socialism, which is premised on the necessity of utterly destroying Communism and Communists. I know you know, but that is part of my criticism. So did many Frenchmen, and it's fairly obvious that many French people were committed to 'Socialist' ideas of whatever stripe in this period, and mindful of the stark contrast between these different conceptions; otherwise how is it that the contemporary political culture was dominated as you state by parties that can be described as Socialist? You seem keen to imply that the awful governmental fuck-ups that the country committed in this fateful time were somehow intrinsically Socialist in nature. However the British Tories also managed, notoriously, to screw things up in a comparable manner. As a fan and a Patreon supporter of yours, I don't much enjoy criticising your work, so I'm glad to be able to say on the plus side that I heartily approve of your antagonism toward AI created videos on Youtube. There does seem to be general growing hostility to AI in its various forms, so your cause is not only a good one but likely to be victorious in time. I would observe that the damn things seem to be much less of a problem over here ~ I'm in the Republic of Ireland. It's not that they're not there, but they don't appear in my Youtube feed to an annoying extent. ( I'm very glad to say. ) Possibly Youtube is being much more tentative in releasing them to a possibly more resistant European market.....? However if they take over in the States I can easily see that changing; so more power to your elbow in your efforts to combat the scourge.
Manu, regarding French Socialism in the 1930s, I'm certainly not saying that literally everyone in French politics were Socialists but most were, especially the ones in power and extra especially the ones who ended up the in Vichy govt. This is one of those topics that's way too complex to fit into the video in the sort of detail that would be done on a political channel, but my overall point was, it was French in-fighing that caused their failures in the Battle of France and not a lack of decent airplanes. I hope that helps.
Manu, Regarding the purge, that's discussed quite a bit in the Col. Kirkland document I talked about, and he has sources there for everything. Here is what he said about the purges "Cot's all-out support of strategic bombing met some opposition in the Superior Air Council--the seven or eight senior generals in the air force. To facilitate acceptance of his program, Cot convinced the parliament to pass a law reducing the mandatory retirement age limits for each grade by five years. This move forced all of the members of the Superior Air Council into retirement and removed 40 percent of the other officers as well. Cot filled the vacancies by promoting NCOs and calling reserve officers to active duty--men he believed were more amenable to his new programs of political indoctrination.17 His purges and the sudden promotion of strategic bombing enthusiasts generated a crisis of morale in the officer corps. The crisis was exacerbated rather than alleviated when Guy La Chambre replaced Cot in 1938, because the new air minister conducted his own purge--of the men whom Cot had promoted. La Chambre denounced strategic bombing and directed the air force to prepare to provide close support to the army. Following these developments, the air force leaders perceived the government as an adversary, as well as the army. They began a practice of ignoring governmental policies and deceiving the air minister and the parliament while pursuing narrowly institutional interests. "
Hi Greg, that is interesting and it is good to see the original source; but it still sounds like your source produced a biased and garbled version of events. What Cot found in 1933 was an air force that was mostly obsolescent and 60% equipped with army two co-operation types such as the Potez 25, Breguet 19 and Breguet 27. Holdovers from WWI tactics, which predicated that aircraft might well drop some bombs, but their most effective function was to provide targeting information for the artillery. That really was an important function, but the French air force was over-invested in it, and way too many of these aircraft had been ordered as a means to keep their manufacturers in business, not because they were still effective. Half of the nominal air force strength of around 3900 aircraft was held in storage. Cot’s Plan I — it was not an entirely new idea, and not entirely his — envisaged the re-equipment of the air force with a shift to more large multi-seat aircraft, and especially deep cuts in army co-operation types. To Goering is attributed the quote that “The Fuehrer doesn’t ask me what aircraft we have, but how many”; Cot was of the opposite belief. Plan I sacrificed quantity for quality with a reduction in first-line strength from about 1400 to about 1000 aircraft, with much smaller reserves, but these would be modern types. In fact not much of a reduction of numerical strength happened, in smaller part because more ambitious goals (a first line strength of 1554) were soon formulated, and in larger part because the plan foundered on the poor capacity of the French industry. In January 1936 the French air force had received 502 new aircraft instead of the 1,372 ordered. It still had 2,496 old ones, and 387 that were regarded as “transitional”, i.e. merely obsolescent instead of obsolete. So yes Cot could be said to have made a 40% cut, but it only ever happened on paper, and it was aircraft not men. The Army of course bitterly resented that the control of the co-operation units was taken away from them. If there had been a large cull of officers, it would be over all the French historiography by now; it is not. (French aviation history publications are often very good, but rarely translated. There are unfortunately few publications in English.) There certainly was a fight. As for La Chambre, he in part replaced Cot because the latter came to believe that France could not maintain a first-line strength above 1,500 aircraft, the Plan II goal. La Chambre’s plan (“Plan V”) envisaged a first-line strength of 2,617 aircraft by March 1941. To do so he indeed traded size for numbers: Fewer heavy and medium bombers, more light bombers and dive bombers. But this was as much about industrial realism as it was about doctrine. His plan still needed 88,300 men including 4,630 officers, while the current allocation was 46,550 and 2,550 respectively. It was thus La Chambre who in 1938 initiated a large expansion of training. As Vuillemin pointed out, this implied a short-term need to shift some units from combat roles to training, as otherwise there would not be enough instructors. But it was too late. La Chambre's purge of the officer corps seems to have been limited to his decision to replace the ailing C-in-C general Fequant not with Jauneaud, who had been Cot's right-hand man, but with the respected and uncontroversial Vuillemin, who had risen through the ranks. Joseph Vuillemin turned out to be a pessimist. What did happen, both under Cot and under La Chambre, was that major changes in the command structure of the air force were made. The structure of 1934 organised the air force in four regions, the one of 1936 put more emphasis on function, and the one of 1938 went back to a regional organisation, which was found to be easier to run. Of course this added to the confusion.
That D.520 looks so sweet!
I'm afraid there are lots of problems and issues with this one. It's disappointing. It's true enough that "L'Armee de l'Air" started the war with a shortage of 30% of pilots, which was partially mitigated by calling up older reservists. This was not because some sort of political purge had culled the ranks, there is no evidence for that. The expansion of training had simply been neglected until 1938! There were some "purges" at senior officer level as the generals had personal and professional conflicts with each other and with the sequence of air ministers, and arguably Vuillemin ended up in charge because he hadn't made too many enemies, instead of being talented. Shortage of aircrew was only part of the reason for many modern aircraft remaining in storage. The French had a very fragmented industry in 1933 with a lack of mass production capacity. They drastically grew and reorganised it, and finally managed to increase the production of airframes. But French production was still very artisanal, and you don't double your workforce without diluting skills. Equally bad was that production of engines, propellers, instruments, radios etc. did not keep up. So aircraft as-delivered were rarely fit to fly, let alone fight! They usually needed remediation work and fitting of missing parts. And then they were delivered to depots, where armament would be installed. A lot of modern equipment thus remained stuck in the pipeline. That the French politicians of the 1930s were all socialists is a view that would have _amazed_ president Lebrun. Though I concede that the more successful and famous ones often were. Finally, I guess this got stuck on Rumble because Greg wanted to make a silly argument that the NSDAP were somehow socialists. On this we can be short: The NSDAP once had had a left wing; Hitler had them murdered. The difference was fundamental: Socialists saw the world as divided horizontally by lines between classes; nazis saw the world as divided vertically by lines between ethnicities.
It is really disappointing to see the tiresome conflation of socialism and the NSDAP. Even if one personally dislikes socialism, their irreconcilable differences should be readily apparent, but i digress. Also, France was obliged to declare war upon Germany were they not? I don’t really see how the fact that France fulfilled an obligation to declare war somehow means that they weren’t expecting the war to come later. I know other French projects caught in utter quagmire, the MAS 35/38/40 immediately come to mind, or the somewhat sorry state of French armor, their severe shortage of radios, I’m sure there is more. Purge feels like a really strong word to use for the sort of political, doctrinal, economic struggles they were facing, really from the sounds of it they were hardly even organized enough to have had a purge in the classic sense.
It's so true, I can't stand the inpersonal drone of those cheap filler videos
Hey guys, literally just joined today. I’m wondering where I find the pilot manuals, magazines, etc that Greg said he posts here in Patreon. Thanks
"Rex" of "Rex's Hangar" has a series of lengthy videos on French bomber development during the interwar years. He goes into exhaustive, gory detail about all of the interservice and political feuding that led to France being unready for war when it came in 1940.
Thank you. Haven’t watched it yet. I see that you also released a video on YouTube available for everyone about the Battle of France. It’s 54:10 long. Is the video on Rumble, that runs 17:04, additions that can’t be published on YouTube?
An excellent video. Further context is that the Air Force was (and still is) the republican arm by excellence, in that its officers are usually normal republican people (in this context, supporters of a republic). By contrast, to this day, the French Navy and Army are usually monarchist, catholic or even traditionalist catholic, despite several purges. When I was in, there was still complaining by senior officers that Pilots are not real officers and they have no business commanding anybody, as they are in charge of no men, only of a machine (a view I mostly share). This also means that the air force is far more integrated with "regular" politics then other branches; the 1932 riots and subsequent banning of the leagues and the 1926 excommunication of the Action Francaise reduced army and navy influence in politics to basically nil.
With regards to the "backwards" throttles in French (and Italian/Polish) aircraft, I believe this was based on steam locomotive tradition, where you pulled on the throttle to increase power. Other arguments for it (easier to operate under stress or G, mechanically simpler) don't really hold up under scrutiny.
I'm glad hear everyone seems to like this content. I might make a Dewotine 520 video. As you could probably tell in this video, I have the manuals for it.
Looking forward listening at this d520 video. Thanks Greg for your awesome job. I jointed your patreon because I ‘m so impressed about the quality of your job and analysis. Not always convinced about your theories about the battle of France but convinced about your technical astonishing knowledge and patience to explain it… Thank you so much.
Josko, what AI is doing there is simply pulling everything ever written via it's massive search engine. That doesn't make it coherent or correct, just extensive.
Alexander, I'm not sure what you mean by saying you can't stream it on Rumble. The video seems to work just fine.
It’s a shame this is in Rumble now. I can’t stream it anymore 😔
I can stream it fine with Linux and Firefox.
Hey Greg, love the French content. I’d love to see some about Cold War French aviation and doctrine. Also an episode about the Polish Air Force in 1939 would be awesome. I know they had a lot of very experienced pilots who went on to fly the entire war.
This is what AI says are the reasons when you ask it why French airforce failed in ww2 (just for fun don't mean anything by it,was just curious to see what it had to say...apparently the fear of German bombers both on tactical and strategic scale influenced French doctrine) The French Air Force failed in the Battle of France not because of a single flaw, but because its entire conception of airpower was misaligned with the war it actually had to fight. The core reasons fall into four interlocking categories: doctrine, leadership, force structure, and operational employment. Core Takeaway The Armée de l’Air in 1940 was built for a long‑range defensive bombing war that never came, led by commanders psychologically fixated on avoiding Luftwaffe bombing rather than winning the battle on the ground. As a result, France entered the campaign with misused aircraft, too few trained pilots, no strategic reserve, and no doctrine for close air support, while Germany executed a fast, mobile combined‑arms offensive. 🇫🇷 1. Doctrinal Misalignment: France Prepared for the Wrong War French air doctrine between the wars was dominated by fear of strategic bombing. Political and military leaders believed that bombers alone could decide wars and devastate cities, so they prioritized long‑range bombing and air defense over battlefield support. This meant: Underinvestment in fighters needed to protect reconnaissance and ground forces. Neglect of close air support, despite having pioneered it in WWI. No equivalent to Germany’s VIII Air Corps, which provided devastating battlefield airpower. France essentially prepared for a 1930s version of nuclear deterrence rather than mobile combined‑arms warfare. 🧠 2. Leadership Failures and Psychological Paralysis Maurice Gamelin, the French Commander‑in‑Chief, adopted a strategy designed primarily to minimize the impact of German airpower, not to defeat the German army. Key leadership failures: Sacrificed the entire strategic reserve to shield the front from Luftwaffe bombing. No operational flexibility once German armor broke through at the Meuse (12–15 May). Cognitive and physical decline in Gamelin’s final years, impairing decision‑making. This left France unable to respond when the Germans achieved their breakthrough. ✈️ 3. Structural Weaknesses: Pilots, Modern Aircraft, and Readiness Despite common myths, France actually had numerical parity in aircraft production by spring 1940. The real problem was trained pilots. Pilot Shortage Aircraft existed, but insufficient pilots meant many units were understrength or grounded. Training pipelines were slow and bureaucratic. Aircraft Issues The most common fighter, the MS.406, was maneuverable but obsolescent and slower than the Bf 109E. Modern fighters (D.520, MB.152) were arriving during the campaign, too late to matter. Modern bombers like the LeO 451 suffered from complex systems and reliability problems. Reserves France had larger fighter reserves than Germany on paper, but they were poorly organized and not rapidly deployable. ⚔️ 4. Operational Employment: Misuse of Available Forces Even the aircraft France did have were used poorly. Poor Coordination with Ground Forces No doctrine for close air support. No integrated command structure linking air and ground operations. Reconnaissance assets were vulnerable due to lack of fighter cover. Fragmented Deployment French aircraft were dispersed across many small airfields. Units were often tied to rigid defensive sectors, unable to mass force at decisive points. Luftwaffe Advantages Germany held overwhelming superiority in bombers (1,200+ twin‑engine bombers and 340 Stukas vs. ~400 Allied bombers). This allowed: Rapid destruction of French communication nodes. Continuous support to fast‑moving armored spearheads. Air superiority over breakthrough zones. 🧩 5. The Result: A Force That Could Not Influence the Decisive Point The French Air Force was not weak in absolute terms. It simply could not deliver combat power where and when it mattered. When the Germans crossed the Meuse, France had: No strategic reserve (spent trying to avoid bombing). No massed fighter force to contest the breakthrough. No doctrine for stopping armored thrusts with airpower. No leadership capable of rapid adaptation. The Luftwaffe, by contrast, was optimized for exactly this scenario. 📌 Bottom Line France’s air failure in 1940 was not about numbers—it was about ideas. The Armée de l’Air was built for a theoretical future war dominated by strategic bombing. The Luftwaffe was built to support fast, decisive ground operations. When the real war arrived, Germany fought the war it had prepared for; France fought the war it feared. Core Takeaway The Armée de l’Air in 1940 was built for a long‑range defensive bombing war that never came, led by commanders psychologically fixated on avoiding Luftwaffe bombing rather than winning the battle on the ground. As a result, France entered the campaign with misused aircraft, too few trained pilots, no strategic reserve, and no doctrine for close air support, while Germany executed a fast, mobile combined‑arms offensive. 🇫🇷 1. Doctrinal Misalignment: France Prepared for the Wrong War French air doctrine between the wars was dominated by fear of strategic bombing. Political and military leaders believed that bombers alone could decide wars and devastate cities, so they prioritized long‑range bombing and air defense over battlefield support. This meant: Underinvestment in fighters needed to protect reconnaissance and ground forces. Neglect of close air support, despite having pioneered it in WWI. No equivalent to Germany’s VIII Air Corps, which provided devastating battlefield airpower. France essentially prepared for a 1930s version of nuclear deterrence rather than mobile combined‑arms warfare. 🧠 2. Leadership Failures and Psychological Paralysis Maurice Gamelin, the French Commander‑in‑Chief, adopted a strategy designed primarily to minimize the impact of German airpower, not to defeat the German army. Key leadership failures: Sacrificed the entire strategic reserve to shield the front from Luftwaffe bombing. No operational flexibility once German armor broke through at the Meuse (12–15 May). Cognitive and physical decline in Gamelin’s final years, impairing decision‑making. This left France unable to respond when the Germans achieved their breakthrough. ✈️ 3. Structural Weaknesses: Pilots, Modern Aircraft, and Readiness Despite common myths, France actually had numerical parity in aircraft production by spring 1940. The real problem was trained pilots. Pilot Shortage Aircraft existed, but insufficient pilots meant many units were understrength or grounded. Training pipelines were slow and bureaucratic. Aircraft Issues The most common fighter, the MS.406, was maneuverable but obsolescent and slower than the Bf 109E. Modern fighters (D.520, MB.152) were arriving during the campaign, too late to matter. Modern bombers like the LeO 451 suffered from complex systems and reliability problems. Reserves France had larger fighter reserves than Germany on paper, but they were poorly organized and not rapidly deployable. ⚔️ 4. Operational Employment: Misuse of Available Forces Even the aircraft France did have were used poorly. Poor Coordination with Ground Forces No doctrine for close air support. No integrated command structure linking air and ground operations. Reconnaissance assets were vulnerable due to lack of fighter cover. Fragmented Deployment French aircraft were dispersed across many small airfields. Units were often tied to rigid defensive sectors, unable to mass force at decisive points. Luftwaffe Advantages Germany held overwhelming superiority in bombers (1,200+ twin‑engine bombers and 340 Stukas vs. ~400 Allied bombers). This allowed: Rapid destruction of French communication nodes. Continuous support to fast‑moving armored spearheads. Air superiority over breakthrough zones. 🧩 5. The Result: A Force That Could Not Influence the Decisive Point The French Air Force was not weak in absolute terms. It simply could not deliver combat power where and when it mattered. When the Germans crossed the Meuse, France had: No strategic reserve (spent trying to avoid bombing). No massed fighter force to contest the breakthrough. No doctrine for stopping armored thrusts with airpower. No leadership capable of rapid adaptation. The Luftwaffe, by contrast, was optimized for exactly this scenario. 📌 Bottom Line France’s air failure in 1940 was not about numbers—it was about ideas. The Armée de l’Air was built for a theoretical future war dominated by strategic bombing. The Luftwaffe was built to support fast, decisive ground operations. When the real war arrived, Germany fought the war it had prepared for; France fought the war it feared.
Great video Greg, Rumble is a bit different but casting to the TV worked fine. Keep up the great work, a pleasure to support you. Cheers, Clint.
GOOD video! Have been studying the battle of France lately, and it was no surprise to me to hear that the French were too busy fighting each other to take on the Germans!
Excellent as usual, Greg!! The depth, and breadth of your research on the pertinent topics covered by this video, really make it easy to understand precisely what happened here. I've not seen anyone else cover these factors with ANY amount of detail previously. Thank you!!
That's a good take. Fish rots from the head down. But I would like to learn more about french ground attack techniques. If the army and air forces were waging a cold war, how much were they ready to cooperate?
It's complicated. In May 1940 a significant part of the French air force was still organically attached to large army units. An Army Corps, Light Mechanised Division (DLM), Light Cavalry Division (DLC, tanks not horses) or Armoured Division (DCR) would each have its assigned "Aviation Group of Observation", e.g. the 1st DLM could directly call on the services of the GAO 552. Old biplanes were being replaced by the more modern but still vulnerable Potez 63.11. Much like the British Lysander, these army-cooperation types lacked the firepower to be independently effective. It was a bad idea. Besides that, the air force did aim to equip itself with heavy attack aircraft, dive bombers, and light bombers that were suitable for striking tactical targets. Much of this equipment was delayed, so there were e.g. only a handful of (not very good) Nieuport LN 411 dive bombers. The best available were the new American bombers, such as the Douglas DB-7 and Martin 167. When the crisis broke in May, the air force did whatever it could to support the army. But French communications failed under the pressure of the kind of battle that developed. The Germans used radio freely, enabled by the Enigma machine; the French relied too much on the telephone network, runners, and even pigeons. They had no situational awareness. Unlike the Germans and British, they had no effective radar system to control the defence. So instead of being able to organise coordinated attacks on the most important targets, a lot of small, piecemeal, poorly organised strikes were made. This played in the hands of the German fighter force and ubiquitous AAA.
I can use the Brave browser on Android to watch youtube videos without ads and listen with the screen off. Can't do that with rumble so I'm much less likely to get around to watching/listening to anything there. 🙁
I can watch Rumble videos using Brave, both on Android and Windows machines with no problem, no ads. Not sure why your are having trouble.
Nice job, excellent video.
Enjoyed this one Greg. Do you have numbers on available/active Armee de la Air pilots in comparison to RAF and Luftwaffe pilots at the time of the Battle of France?