Radio War Nerd EP #578 — Deconstructing "Munich 1938" Pt. 2: 1933-39, feat. Annibale

Trotsky played a political and rhetorical role in condemning the Soviet actions in Spain. Still, the reality is that while POUM was considered "Trotsky-friendly", Trotsky and Andreu Nin weren't getting along at all. The most credible reading of the May Day crisis was that POUM was naive, easily manipulable, even by the VERY limited operations done by Western intelligence, and mostly wrong about a cold, rational strategy to keep the republic alive. But they weren't a fifth column and the NKVD-led repression was almost entirely based on fabrication and paranoia. Again, this doesn't mean Orwell was right in its reading of the crisis.

Ep 205 Listen now also :)

Aside: great to be around people who love Space Balls :D

You’re going to ask Annibale’s opinion on a tooze book and not mention wages of destruction

Not exactly. Britain was mainly preoccupied with "defending imperial interests," but other factors like budget issues and post-WWI "war fatigue" were also significant. France, less global than Britain, was genuinely frightened by the idea of another war with Germany. The League of Nations was a late 19th-century concept with some 20th-century polish: it was very Britain- and France-centred, lacked enforcement powers, was unpopular with most public opinion outside those countries, and had a grotesque "all decisions must be unanimous" rule, making effective action against aggression difficult. I believe Wilson sincerely proposed it, but, like much of his work, it showed a poor grasp of European politics. Wilson thought, in a very "liberal Anglo-Saxon Protestant" way, that war was triggered by secret diplomacy and power struggles, that peace could be maintained by diplomatic institutions, that international law could restrain states, and that democracy led to peace. However, he completely misunderstood WWI’s trauma and its lasting impact, misreading US isolationism and Europe colonial legacies.

Second this. A lot of liberals meme about it and say it’s the best thing ever which can push some away to not watch it but it’s genuinely good and heartwarming. O’Hara puts on a comedic masterclass. Made me laugh so hard my stomach hurt. Just an incredibly funny person. I grew up watching her from home alone to beetlejuice to best in show to schitt’s creek. Was genuinely gutted reading she passed.

The message I hope will be clear after listening to the episode is that Chamberlain was a fool (or at least someone who made a mistaken assessment of his own diplomatic capacity), but not a fool in the sense he's been portrayed in the post-Churchill era. This means he was not a "coward" and did not "believe in Hitler". This is clear from the evidence we have - in private, Chamberlain often repeated that he did not trust Hitler. Also, his perception that England in 1938 was not in a position to deter Germany was correct. However, implying that Munich was a clever short-term sacrifice to buy England time is just silly (and most of Harris is silly, IMHO). Because Chamberlain (like most European leaders at the time) greatly downplayed the danger Hitler was posing to Europe and - crucially - misread the Soviet position. Until 1940 he was convinced that while deterring Hitler was impossible, "containing him" and preserving British interests was possible. In other words, Chamberlain asked himself this question: How do we avoid a catastrophic war we are not ready to fight? The question was right, but he gave himself the wrong answer. On the other hand, Churchill's position in 1938 was that Germany's power was growing and British interests were best served by finding a way to stop this growth. Again, right question, but unfortunately Churchill too gave himself the wrong answer.

I'm concerned this might reinforce my growing reputation as a tankie or a closet Stalinist. I am definitely neither. My goal is to be honest about understanding history. The current consensus is that, although Orwell provided a detailed, ground-level perspective on Barcelona during the May days, his interpretation of the events was (purposefully?) inaccurate. It is now clear that Stalin wasn't particularly interested in a "Soviet" Spain and would have preferred supporting a strong republican government that was, first, sympathetic to the USSR, and second, acceptable to Britain, France, and the US. Moreover, despite the obvious admiration for the International Brigades, without Soviet organisational support, they might not have lasted as long as they did.