Questions about Ukraine’s counteroffensive? Ask them for our next episode of ‘This Week in Ukraine’
Dear Kyiv Independent community members,
We need your questions for the next episode of “This Week in Ukraine.” The topic this time is Ukraine’s long-awaited counteroffensive, which has finally begun.
To send in your questions, you can leave them in the comments below, message us on Patreon, or email community manager Brooke at brooke@kyivindependent.com. We look forward to hearing from you.
Episode 11, “Russia’s destruction of Ukrainian dam, and catastrophic flood it caused” is linked above. The episode is available on YouTube and on listening platforms, with your questions starting at 21:00.
Comments (5)
I've read about the Ukrainian OTRK "Sapsan" missile launcher that is being developed in Ukraine, and is apparently 70% ready. With a strike range of 400 to 500km it will enable Ukraine to target deep into Russian territory without the border restrictions of western supplied weapons. Is this correct and do you know what volume of these can be produced?
In planning and evaluating the counteroffensive, just how much can Russian stupidity, low morale, and infighting be factored in?
During a war would encourage not thinking about the enemy as stupid. Instead, I would encourage thinking about: 1. What decisions the enemy has made in the past? 2. Who has benefited from those decisions, and who has suffered because of those decisions? 3. What has enabled those decision-makers to act in their own best interest without considering how it affects others? 3. Are there signs that the decision-making process is changing, which will allow the enemy to become more efficient or effective? With this in mind, I believe there have been three significant trends: 1. Personal Power: The primary goal of the people in power, either political or monetary power, is to consolidate more wealth or power for themselves. Part of building power is circumventing people and organizations that would limit their power or wealth. 2. Financial Corruption: This is most clear in the limitations of Russia to bring all of the combat power they have on paper to the battlefield. Over the decades, multiple layers of political and military leaders have 'skimmed their fair share off the top.' This has left an army and military industrial base much weaker on the battlefield than on paper. 3. Factionalization: A third trend is factionalization, in which a society or groups split into segments that compete for power and money. These issues are not uniquely Russian. We can see them playing out in other Western countries as well. The question for Ukraine, the UAF, and the West is how can we exploit specific weaknesses in Russia while strengthening our own civil, governmental, and miltary structures.
is an offensive even feasable in a situytion where the Ukarine doesn't have a three- or four-to-one superiority regarding their army vs Russia? and no air-superiority? , and 2) I guess the army and its advisors will have taken into account that Russia might blow up the huge Dam?
What are Ukrainian civilians expectations for the offensive, are the objectives realistic?
