THIS WEEK IN VIOLENCE: Supply & Demand

2026, Week 36

This week, we’re coming through with some updates on the swirl of outside actors arming the conflict in Sudan; news of a thwarted coup in Niger which possibly clarifies the nature of Russia’s role in the Sahel; and a troubling technological advancement in the Russia-Ukraine War. Enjoy.

Foreign support, drones fuel Sudan war and possible war crimes, UN probe says
Reuters – Sep 03, 2026
Reporting by Olivia Le Poidevin

GENEVA, Sept 3 (Reuters) - Foreign weapons, military technology, fighters and logistical networks are helping sustain Sudan's conflict and expanding the ‌warring parties' ability to strike distant civilian areas with drones, a U.N. fact-finding mission said on Thursday.

Sudan's war, which erupted in April 2023 following a power struggle between the military and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), has displaced more than 14 million people and created one of the world's worst humanitarian crises.

In a report, the U.N. mission said more than 1,000 people were killed in drone ​strikes in the first five months of 2026, accusing both sides of serious violations of international humanitarian and human rights law in drone operations, with ​some conduct amounting to war crimes.

The RSF and Sudan's military did not immediately respond to requests for comment from Reuters. In ⁠the past, both have denied abuses.

The mission said investigators found grounds to believe a network involving individuals and entities in the United Arab Emirates, Chad, Libya and ​Somalia supplied the RSF with weapons, equipment, logistics, training and foreign personnel.

It said up to 2,000 Colombian contractors had helped operate and maintain drone systems and other advanced ​weapons used by the RSF. Some were present during operations around the city of al-Fashir in Darfur, which was captured by the RSF in October 2025 and where the U.N. mission has previously said mass killings bore hallmarks pointing to genocide.

The UAE has routinely denied accusations that it has backed the RSF militarily. Its diplomatic mission in Geneva repeated that stance, saying it "remains committed to open ​and constructive dialogue with the Fact Finding Mission".

Somalia's government said it took the report's allegations seriously. It said it did not permit its territory, airspace or ports ​to be used by parties to the conflict for military purposes, but added that there had been "gaps" in information-sharing between the federal government and regions.

Colombia told investigators it opposed mercenarism and ‌was taking ⁠steps to address the participation of Colombian nationals in foreign conflicts.

The ambassador to Chad's mission in Geneva, Makaila Ahmad, told Reuters all allegations against the country were false, reaffirming Chad's neutrality in Sudan's conflict, and saying it was making significant efforts to secure its borders and prevent arms trafficking.

Libya's mission in Geneva, which represents the internationally recognised government in Tripoli, did not immediately respond to a Reuters request for comment.

Troubling developments continue to flow out of Sudan, which is now in its fourth year of civil war. Itself triggered by a destabilising coup in 2021, the war’s origins can be traced back to the 2003 war over Darfur, the country’s southwestern region, where the predecessor to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), the Janjaweed, first rose to prominence.

The history traces back further still, as it often does. Following the defeat of Libya and allied forces during the Chad-Libya conflict (which we covered in our Toyota Hilux episode), Muammar Gaddafi supported the formation of a pan-Arabist (and Arab nationalist) militia across the Chad-Sudan border in Darfur.

The group was tolerated by the Sudanese government throughout the 1990s, and when provocations by armed groups and Darfur separatists escalated into a full-blown insurgency, the government in Khartoum chose to arm the Janjaweed as its prime counterinsurgency forces. Over the next several years, the Janjaweed carried out a campaign of mass killing of civilians, namely African and non-Arabised groups, which was estimated to have claimed up to 400,000 lives, and which has since been classified as genocide.

The UN’s latest report regarding the role of outside entities in arming and prolonging the conflict in Sudan makes for troubling reading, but in some cases simply adds weight to longstanding suspicions. 

The report focuses primarily on the RSF whom, as we have previously covered, have long been suspected of enjoying significant backing from the United Arab Emirates. Previous reporting has also revealed the extensive use of Colombian mercenaries in both arming and assisting RSF forces in Sudan, including providing training to alleged child soldiers.

More concerning is the revelation of a much larger arming, training and logistics network related to the conflict spanning the neighbouring countries of Chad, Libya and Somalia. Each of those countries, in turn, is suffering from its own internal conflicts.

Over the past few years, Chad has seen rising cross-border conflicts in its southeastern regions, while the country’s political system has been sliding toward authoritarianism under President Mahamat Déby, who has used ongoing instability in Chad as a pretext for the consolidation of power.

While Libya nominally has an internationally-recognised government in Tripoli, the country remains racked by warring factions in the long fallout of the 2011 ouster of Muammar Gaddafi. Since then, as we have discussed, the country has functioned as a gateway for the flow of black market goods in and out of North Africa.

As for Somalia, despite being the primary (and unacknowledged) recipient of the brunt of the US’ ongoing drone strike programme—as former guest Spencer Ackerman recently covered in an extensive report for Zeteo—western intervention has failed to quell insurgent violence in the country, and may have even facilitated its fragmentation. 

Far from suppressing Islamist militants in Africa’s eastern horn, the US’ extensive drone strike programme against the al-Qaeda aligned al-Shabaab appears to have created opportunities for a Somali branch of Islamic State in the region.

Rather than prompting a review of strategy or tactics, the US now splits its drone strikes between the two groups, while AFRICOM, the US joint military command overseeing operations in the region, has allegedly been seeking to leverage disruptions in the Bab al-Mandab Strait provoked by Israel’s genocide in Gaza and the US-Israeli war in Iran, hoping to reinvigorate US commitment to an area which has been overshadowed by the Middle East, rising bellicosity toward South America and, of course, the long-anticipated pivot to China.

Regarding the arming and supply of the government-aligned Sudanese Armed Forces, the UN mission claims that its reporting remains in its preliminary stages. Most notable in the report are findings that the SAF have been using combat drones and loitering munitions—which have the ability to linger in the sky before descending on an identified and selected target—manufactured by Turkey and Pakistan.

This doesn’t necessarily mean that Turkey and Pakistan are the ones providing the weapons, of course. There’s a long trail separating a weapon’s manufacture and its arrival to the final user. But it does raise questions as to who has access to such materiel and is making it available in Sudan. 

As in the case of the RSF being found using British-made parts originally supplied to the UAE, it’s equally possible such transfers are the consequence of negligence, exploitation of strategic ambiguity, or, as they say, just business. So, too, with the reports findings that the RSF has been carrying out at least some of its strikes on civilians and civilian infrastructure using FH-95 drones manufactured by China.

All in all, a lot of developments, few of them good. While a resolution to the conflict in Sudan and farther afield seems out of sight, apparently other actors are happy to use the region as a laboratory. So it goes.

Inside the 24-hour mutiny that threatened Niger's ruling junta
Associated Press – Aug 31, 2026
Reporting by Chinedu Asadu

ABUJA, Nigeria (AP) — Niger’s capital of Niamey on Sunday appeared calm with normalcy restored after a day of unrest as aggrieved soldiers staged a mutiny that threatened the ruling military junta before being repelled by loyalist forces aided by Russian troops.

In what was seen as a major threat to the junta in power since a 2023 coup, the soldiers engaged loyalist forces in sustained gunfire overnight from Friday till late Saturday. Most of the clashes took place at Niamey’s main airport that houses the military air base and in a district where the presidential palace is located.

The unrest culminated in the arrest or killing of dozens of soldiers, some of whom were paraded in front of the cameras live on state television. The fate of the mutineers was not immediately clear and authorities did not disclose any charges against them.

On Sunday, military trucks and check points were seen across the city, particularly along major roads between the airport and the presidential district. Junta leader Abdourahamane Tchiani was yet to make any public comments or appearance.

Here’s what we know about the mutiny, according to witnesses, analysts and diplomats:

Unrest started with a hostage situation

Nigeriens were awoken around midnight on Friday into Saturday by bursts of gunfire and explosions that started at the Diori Hamani International Airport. The airport is a strategic hub that hosts a key military air base, known as Base 101, as well as the headquarters of Russia’s Africa Corps in the country. It was the third time this year the airport has experienced unrest.

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Niger’s Defense Ministry said its forces were gradually regaining control of the situation after a group of soldiers took their “comrades” hostage at the air base and fired at “sensitive” sites, without specifying the cause of the unrest.

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Soldiers appeared to be aggrieved over worsening security crisis

The unrest appeared to have been triggered by grievances over rising insecurity, including rampant jihadi attacks that have led to the mass killing of soldiers in the last year.

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Jihadi violence has worsened in the wider Sahel region, including in neighboring Burkina Faso and Mali, where the military also seized power from civilian governments. The junta in Niger promised to stabilize the country but instead security has deteriorated. Attacks on military positions have increased, including one about a week ago when at least 18 soldiers were reportedly killed in the southern Dosso region.

The mutiny was led by soldiers mostly deployed on the ground against the jihadis, according to Wassim Nasr, a senior research fellow at the Soufan Center, a New York-based think tank. “Deteriorating insecurity drove the coups that swept across the central Sahel, and the latest events show how these same pressures are now fueling unrest within the militaries that seized power,” said Héni Nsaibia.

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Russia’s Africa Corps comes to the junta’s rescue

The mutineers remained camped at the military base within the airport complex for several hours, resisting efforts from loyalist forces, until Russia’s Africa Corps intervened with ground and aerial support, several analysts said.

The Africa Corps is believed to have between 200 to 300 personnel in Niger where it is primarily protecting the junta and its interests, and also supporting the fight against jihadis.

In interviews broadcast on Russian media, Moscow’s ambassador to Niger, Viktor Voropayev, said Niger had requested support from the Russian force and the mutineers were “neutralized particularly thanks to the intervention” of Africa Corps.

The mutineers outnumbered the elite presidential guard that was deployed to retake the air base and it was unclear who was in control until the Russians intervened, according to Nasr, from the Soufan Center.

“At the end of the day, it is easier to go full-blown on repression when it’s a foreign force,” Nasr said.

You lose them how you get them. You will recall in our extended newsletter on the conflict in the Sahel that the trifecta of coups which rearranged power relations in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger were each sparked to varying degrees by ongoing Islamist insurgencies in the region and frustration among the countries’ military classes with how the violence was being handled.

Of those three coups, the third and final one in Niger has allegedly been the least stable. While the military governments of Mali and Burkina Faso have managed to buttress their governments with projects of regeneration and political transformation, Niger’s narrative has been more one of a military government failing to resolve the issue which said military used to justify its takeover of government.

It is also interesting to note the role of Russia’s Africa Corps in putting down this latest mutiny, led by a segment of Niger’s military and localised around the national airport at the Nigerien capital of Niamey. Again, as we covered previously, Russian presence in the Sahel serves two functions; supporting the three military governments who appear unable to suppress insurgent violence independently, collectively, or without international support; and advertising Russia’s services as a potential alternative and countervailing force to the US and the west.

Russia’s intervention in the uprising at Diori Hamani International Airport has certainly proved that Africa Corps can be determinative in a power struggle, averting another military coup in a region where they have occurred with troubling regularity. But this simply raises the question of what Russia’s assistance is effective at achieving: Providing internal political and military security, or simply shoring up the authority and repressive power of a government which would otherwise be incapable of sustaining itself?

Russia Turns to New-Generation Drones and All-Day Attacks to Wear Down Ukrainians
The Wall Street Journal – Aug 31, 2026
Reporting by Anastasiia Malenko and Alistair MacDonald

Russia is trying to pound Ukraine’s capital into submission by using its growing fleet of jet-powered drones for nearly continuous attacks, combining improved weaponry with new tactics. 

Jet-powered Geran drones, an evolution of the Iranian Shahed model, are stretching Ukraine’s air defenses with their speed. Since last Thursday, piecemeal Russian airstrikes around the clock have replaced periodic massive barrages at night. 

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The rise of jet-powered drones marks a new stage in Russia’s war on Ukrainian cities. By this summer, the air defenses around Kyiv and other cities were often shooting down around 90% of older, propeller-driven Geran models, often using cheap interceptor drones. 

Ukraine’s air force hasn’t yet released data showing how many jet-powered drones it is intercepting. But Yurii Ihnat, a spokesman for the Ukrainian Air Force, told The Wall Street Journal that a higher share of jet-powered drones are reaching their targets than of propeller-powered versions. In some attacks, up to two-thirds of the Gerans—the name Russia uses for Shaheds—used in Moscow’s attacks are now jet-powered, he said.

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Moscow has expanded its strategic bombing campaign against cities while its army struggles on the front line. Russian forces have advanced very little in Ukraine’s eastern Donbas region this year despite significant casualties, and have lost some ground to Ukrainian counterattacks in the country’s south. 

Adding jet engines to Geran drones turns them into less-sophisticated cruise missiles, allowing them to reach speeds of around 300 miles an hour—roughly three times the speed of older versions of the Shahed-type drone.

[...]

Russia first began to use Shahed-type drones in the fall of 2022 as a cheap way to flood Ukraine’s air defenses and allow costlier, more powerful missiles to get through. By summer 2025, Russia was using hundreds of the drones at a time in nighttime salvos. Their slow speed, though, made them relatively easy to shoot down. 

Russia has been mixing in jet-powered Gerans since late last year. But the numbers of the new variants have shot up since July, and they are becoming the backbone of Russia’s long-range drone campaign. 

When Russia launched 101 mostly jet-powered Gerans on Aug. 6, Ukraine’s air force shot down only 65% of them, the lowest interception rate this year, according to the Centre for Information Resilience, a U.K.-based open-source investigations group. 

The jet-powered Gerans are more expensive than earlier versions. Russia has reduced the total number of drones used in its attacks as it invests more resources into the newer models, Ukrainian officials have said. 

More grim news emerging from Ukraine’s ongoing attempt to defeat and expel Russian forces following their full-scale invasion of the country in 2022. 

Following the initial invasion and battles of 2022 and the rally of offensives and counteroffensives which characterised the war’s early years, Russia’s war on Ukraine has gradually become a space where the shape and character of the next ‘big war’ is being determined; a laboratory for the strategies, tactics and tools which global powers will have to make and master.

The rise of drone warfare, particularly of the low-cost, high-quantity variety, has been one of the major developments in this lab. A war which began with tanks, helicopters and fighter jets has become dominated by small, scrappy inventions emerging on the Ukrainian side (as well as more costly, boutique options from US manufacturers), as well as corresponding adaptations on the Russian side.

If there were an award ceremony for Weapon of the Year, the 2026 prize would almost certainly go to Iran’s Shahed line of combat zones. Both across the Middle East and in Ukraine, footage has abounded of Iran’s buzzing drones inflicting considerable damage on military and civilian infrastructure at a surprisingly low price.

Russia’s adoption of the Shahed model, produced domestically as the Geran variant, has empowered Russia’s military to continue its gruelling and costly campaign against Ukraine on a more frugal budget—at least concerning money, not bodies.

This latest development, replacing the drone’s cheap and slow propeller with a more expensive, but much faster jet propulsion engine, typifies a dynamic we’ve sketched out in numerous episodes of the show; the dialectical evolution of weaponry in manifold directions according to bigger-smaller, faster-slower, louder-quieter and so on, as contingencies demand. 

The Journal’s description of these new Geran variants as ‘less-sophisticated cruise missiles’ is an interesting one. As their nomenclature indicates, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) are popularly conceived not as projectiles, but as driverless aircraft. The removal of a pilot made it possible for militaries to pursue riskier missions and inflict damage on enemy forces and infrastructures in novel ways. With that utility and qualitative shift having been thoroughly proven, the focus now turns to quantity: faster, deadlier.

Ukraine’s military have certainly done well to hold up against Russia for so long, but only the most enthusiastic partisans on either side would stake the claim that anyone is ‘winning’ this war. Ukraine’s chronic deficit over the past few months has been defence; interceptors and missiles to fend off Russia’s increasingly aggressive and indiscriminate attacks on Kyiv and civilian centres.

Unfortunately, Trump’s decision to drag the US into yet another Middle Eastern quagmire, a folly for which he is too arrogant to accept failure, means that the external missile defence supplies on which Ukraine relies have been both thoroughly depleted, and are now being focused almost entirely on Trump’s sunk cost.

It has been reported that US military generals have been warning Trump and Hegseth that their commitment to sustaining war in Iran is having a deleterious effect not only on the US’ ability to sustain itself elsewhere, but possibly even its ability to defend itself.

As we enter winter, it is likely that frontline operations will pause somewhat as forces wait for more favourable conditions for offensive manoeuvres. In the meantime, both Ukraine and Russia will probably prefer to focus their energies on long- and medium-distance strikes against targets within each other’s territory.

Any war sufficiently prolonged eventually descends into an attritional one, with each side hoping the other side will be ground down before they are. This is Ukraine’s fourth winter of war, and hopefully they will continue to be able to fend off Russian aggression. But several months of jet-powered Gerans devastating Kyiv and Ukraine’s civilian population might be enough to thoroughly alter the terms of peace negotiations, if and when they eventually happen.