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THIS WEEK IN VIOLENCE: Protecting The Organism (1 of 3)
THIS WEEK IN VIOLENCE: Protecting The Organism (2 of 3)
THIS WEEK IN VIOLENCE: Protecting The Organism (3 of 3)
May 24, 2026

THIS WEEK IN VIOLENCE: Protecting The Organism

2026, Week 21

This week we’ve got a recent report from the BBC regarding activities by a para-state political organisation in Russia which appears to be assuming ever greater policing and security prerogatives within that state amidst the exceptional situation of the war on Ukraine – and becoming further radicalised and emboldened in the process.

Brutal raid on woman's birthday party highlights rise of Russian vigilante group
BBC – May 15, 2026
Reported by Christoper Giles and Julia Luft

Warning: This article contains discriminatory language

Katya was about to blow out the candles on her 30th birthday cake when masked men burst into the nightclub hired for her party, and began physically and verbally attacking her friends.

"They called us faggots and lesbians. I could hear violence from every corner," she told a BBC World Service investigation. Her mother was told to get down on all fours, she says.

The swoop was instigated by a vigilante group, called Russkaya Obshina, that wants to accelerate President Vladimir Putin's agenda to stamp out what he describes as Western liberalism, and promote traditional family-orientated values.

As is sometimes the case in these raids, members of the police joined them. Russkaya Obshina stated in a subsequent video it shared on social media that it was looking for evidence of LGBT "propaganda", which is illegal in Russia. Nothing of this nature was found, but Katya was nevertheless interrogated by law enforcement.

Nine months later she was convicted for blasphemy because there had been a red neon crucifix-shaped light hanging on the wall of the nightclub.

[...]

Over the past year, the BBC World Service has spoken to half a dozen current and former members of Russkaya Obshina, as well as those, like Katya, who have been impacted by its actions.

The picture that has emerged is of a movement of highly motivated nationalist and religious Russians dedicated to patrolling towns and cities, and raiding shops, warehouses, hostels, nightclubs and abortion clinics, looking for any activity they feel violates their traditional values and potentially breaks the law. They then lobby for the prosecution of their targets.

[...]

We spoke to someone who says he left Russkaya Obshina only a couple of months ago. He is typical of many in the group - a former soldier who returned, wounded, from the Ukraine front line, in search of a role and purpose in Russian society.

The man, who we are calling Dimitry, is glad to channel his military training into what he sees as issues at home - the effect, he says, of "foreign intrusion" on the country's culture.

"People from other cultures come in and Russkaya Obshina responds like an antibody, stopping them harming the organism. You could say Russkaya Obshina is like a kind of doctor," he says.


To speak of an authoritarian turn within the Russian Federation feels like something of a misnomer. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and Russia’s transition to capitalism – a process accompanied by numerous conflicts in and over its peripheral territories – the country has toed an increasingly reactionary path.

This history is difficult to untangle from the figure of Vladimir Putin, who has effectively governed Russia either directly or by proxy for the entirety of the 21st century. As for discerning political motives, of the man or the nation, this is more difficult.

On the one hand, reducing the politics of Russia to the whims of one man would be a foolish endeavour. On the other, in a political system in which one man wields so much authority over the state’s direction and directives, the whims of that one man surely play a substantial role. (One reason some commentators push back on characterisation of Russia as an oligarchy is because this arguably misunderstands the power dynamics between Putin and his country’s billionaires. It is him who positions and controls them, not vice-versa.)

As those early wars on the peripheries to suppress breakaway states and restive ethnic minority groups indicate, there has always been a military dimension to Putin’s project, which might be characterised as revanchist-restorationist; a vision of returning the Russian state to its former glory by avenging the betrayals and errors of bygone eras which contributed to its downfall.

The cultural dimension became more pronounced, at least to international media and other outside onlookers, from the mid-’00s onwards, as the country began to backslide on a number of civil rights issues, most notably LGBT rights. This reached something of a head in 2013 with the passage of a law which clamped down severely on the publication and dissemination of information or materials discussing LGBT issues. 

This law was so sweeping in its language that it was tantamount to a total ban on LGBT expression and even existence in public. Internationally it was referred to as the ‘anti-gay law’, but the law’s official name as passed by the Russian Duma better captures the revanchist-restorationist tenor we are alluding to: the ‘Law for the Purpose of Protecting Children from Information Advocating a Denial of Traditional Family Values’.


Russia’s conflict with Ukraine goes back at least as far as 2014 with the latter country’s Maidan Revolution. These protests led to the ouster of Ukraine’s pro-Russia President Viktor Yanukovich, which was followed by the invasion and annexation of Crimea by Russia (or pro-Russian forces), and the beginning of separatist activities by pro-Russian factions in the eastern territories of Donetsk and Luhansk.

To the extent there was ever a rationalisation given for Russia’s full-blown invasion of Ukraine in 2022, it was in an interview conducted between Vladimir Putin and the former FOX News commentator Tucker Carlson in February 2024, a few days before the war’s second anniversary. 

Among the many grievances aired by the Russian leader in that broadcast was a feeling that former Russian leaders, including venerated figures of the Soviet era, had mismanaged and frittered away Russian territory and prestige, allowing western figures or other pretenders to encroach and annex that which was rightfully Russia’s.

Naturally, therefore, Putin saw it as his duty to reverse these historical wrongs. It is probably not coincidental that he decided to embark upon this ambitious military project on the eve of his 70s. The project to restore Russia’s legacy would also be the one that would cement Putin’s own. Go figure.

All of which is to say that, at the risk of being glib by borrowing a line from Fight Club, there is a dimension of Russia’s ongoing ‘great war’ which is a spiritual war, and it is being fought both at home just as much as the front.


Certainly, Modern Russia has been no stranger to traditionalist and nationalist politics. Given the right-wing disposition typical of such movements, they have often had to deploy peculiar or evasive methods to downplay or reconstitute Russia’s recent, well-renowned communist past, or else circumvent it entirely.

Most famous among these is probably the National Bolshevik Party, the political movement founded in the 1990s by Eduard Limonov and Aleksandr Dugin which sought to synthesise aspects of far-left and far-right politics as the basis of a revitalised, robust, nationalist Russian state. Basically, ‘What if National Socialist — but serious about the socialism this time?’

In more recent years, though, Russia has seen an explosion in so-called Russian Traditionalist groups, a constellation of political organisations, para-state assemblages, paramilitaries and loosely-defined social arrangements which advance a far-right political agenda under the aegis of protecting and upholding traditional Russian values. 

Prominent examples include the Northern Man movement, which claims to have nearly 200,000 members, as well as the Sorok Sorokov Movement, and the All-Russian Social Movement or People’s Council.

Commonly identified tenets of such groups tend to include a grab bag of Russian nationalisms, traditionalism and conservatisms, as well as anti-immigration, antisemitism, Islamophobia and homophobia, as well as a deep hostility to non-ethnic Russians.

Assembled and organised over social media channels such as VK and Telegram, these groups are often local in nature, but may be chapters plugged into larger national networks.

The largest by far, however, is Russkaya Obschina or Russian Community, which in 2024 was reported to boast 150 separate chapters across all of the eleven time zones Russia spans. 

As the BBC report quoted in this newsletter states, the organisation has expanded rapidly following Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, providing opportunities for returning soldiers and veterans to participate in ‘constructive civic activities’ (scare quotes) after returning from the frontline. Russkaya’s Obshina’s activities were also likely bolstered in November 2022, when Vladimir Putin signed a decree entitled ‘On Approving the Fundamentals of State Policy for the Preservation and Strengthening of Traditional Russian Spiritual and Moral Values’.


Interestingly enough, there is a practical way in which the rise of community vigilante groups — seemingly with the tacit approval of the Russian government, if not its outright backing as well as funding from Kremlin-adjacent billionaires — ties into the war effort in Ukraine. 

Russia’s war effort, now in its fifth year, has produced a massive demand for workers with military-style training. As a consequence, many local police forces have experienced a drain as their officers leave to fight on the front, taking advantage of the military’s attractive signing incentives in the process. As a consequence, it has been estimated that Russia’s Interior Ministry may be experiencing shortages of police in the tens, perhaps even hundreds of thousands.

And so, where Putin’s revanchist-restorationist project overseas has created security deficits at home, these various decentralised para-state movements and organisations have been gradually empowered to plug the gaps. 

Reports that groups such as Russkaya Obshina have been ramping up their executions of police-style raids against groups and individuals who fall foul of their traditionalist politics indicate that this new formation of violence worker, on the boundary of state employee and private citizen, is becoming an increasingly regular component of the Russian security apparatus. Moreover, reports that their raids are carried out with the assistance or supervision of actual Russian police would suggest the assistance is welcome.

Endorsement goes beyond police forces. As well as being officially blessed by the Russian Orthodox Church — which is sympathetic to the moralistic dimensions of these traditionalist movements and is otherwise well-coordinated with Putin’s state project — reporting is also emerging suggesting these groups have received substantial backing from wealthy Russian businessmen, including one individual with direct familial ties to Russia’s Federal Security Service or FSB.

There is another way of looking at this phenomenon, which perhaps resonates with similar cases in other countries, including much closer to home. Perhaps one way of understanding these organisations, such as Russkaya Obshina, is as non-state affiliated, though tacitly or explicitly state-sanctioned organisations permitted to make use of the state’s prerogative over violence to impose social codes and boundaries beyond the purview and stipulations of juridical law. 

Or, put another way, to perform violent enforcement and suppressive activities which the state might be incentivised to do but which it may not wish to be seen to support or condone for the sake of other considerations. This is an understanding of these groups and their relations to the state and to violence which bring us back to our early episode on Walter Benjamin’s Critique of Violence. 

It is also one which might allow us to then think about, for example: The activities of groups such as the Proud Boys, Oathkeepers and Patriot Front from the first Trump term onwards and the alleged incorporation of their membership into official state organs such as CBP and ICE; the British government and security forces’ long tolerance and accommodation of Tommy Robinson and the English Defence League concurrent to the media-led legitimation of Nigel Farage and his far-right UKIP, Brexit and Reform parties; and, of course, the symbiotic relation between the Israeli Defence Forces and other security organisations in the occupied West Bank, and civilian settler groups, who are de facto empowered to commit enormous violence against Palestinians in their own territory, with IDF soldiers ordered only to intervene to protect those Israeli settlers or suppress Palestinian resistance.

On a last note, it is also worth noting that the historical organisation these Russian groups most closely resemble, both in form and function, once again, is the German Freikorps; quasi-state affiliated paramilitary organisations empowered and legitimised by the state to use extraordinary, overwhelming violence to suppress perceived enemies and opposition to the authoritarian state in manners which go beyond mere enforcement of law to the establishment of new social-legal conditions which, in so doing, extend the normal purview of law itself.

On a closing note, regarding last weekend’s Unite the Right rally held in Central London: It may seem as though the British state’s continued normalisation of Tommy Robinson and his disaggregated mass of Islamophobic, far-right thugs, and that same state’s continued pursuit of legal and social proscription of left-wing and pro-Palestinian causes, are two separate and distinct issues. And in some very literal sense they are. But hopefully this week’s subject matter demonstrates that, directed in a certain way, it is not certain that they will always be so.